

SENDER WILL CHECK CLASSIFICATION TOP AND BOTTOM			
	UNCLASSIFIED	CONFIDENTIAL	SECRET
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY OFFICIAL ROUTING SLIP			
TO	NAME AND ADDRESS	DATE	INITIALS
1	Mr. Elder		<i>ME</i>
2	<i>ER</i>		
3			
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	ACTION	DIRECT REPLY	PREPARE REPLY
	APPROVAL	DISPATCH	RECOMMENDATION
	COMMENT	FILE	RETURN
	CONCURRENCE	INFORMATION	SIGNATURE
Remarks: A copy has gone to DD/I for information and follow up.			
FOLD HERE TO RETURN TO SENDER			
FROM: NAME, ADDRESS AND PHONE NO.			DATE
Executive Director			20 Dec 62
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ROUTING AND RECORD SHEET

SUBJECT: (Optional)
U.S. SECRET SERVICE REQUEST FOR EQUIPMENT

FROM: <p style="text-align: center;">CHIEF TECHNICAL SERVICES DIVISION</p>	EXTENSION <div style="border: 1px solid black; width: 30px; height: 20px; margin: 0 auto;"></div>	NO. DATE <p style="text-align: center;">24 January 1963</p>
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TO: (Officer designation, room number, and building)	DATE		OFFICER'S INITIALS	COMMENTS (Number each comment to show from whom to whom. Draw a line across column after each comment.)
	RECEIVED	FORWARDED		

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1.	TO: (Officer designation, room number, and building)	RECEIVED	FORWARDED	OFFICER'S INITIALS
	Mr. 7 D 59 Hqqs. Bldg.			LBK/m
2.	ETB - Pls include in			
3.	daily folder			
4.	and ^{then} file w/ ref.			
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1: If any further action required, pls advise me

R.

Executive Registry

62-9176

1 4 10 1 002

The Honorable Douglas Dillon *CD*
Secretary of the Treasury
Washington 25, D. C.

Dear Doug:

In response to your question concerning recent Soviet gold sales in the London market, our analysts have prepared the enclosed memorandum. We believe the amount and the timing of gold sales since 24 October are in line with Soviet foreign exchange requirements arising very largely from their trade deficit with Western Europe.

We shall continue to follow Soviet sales closely and shall advise you of any significant developments.

Sincerely,

JOHN A. MCCONE

John A. McCone
Director of Central Intelligence

Enclosure

Distribution:

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CONCUR:

OAD/RR



13 DEC 1962

(EXECUTIVE REGISTRY FILE *McCone*)

GROUP 1
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downgrading and
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MB
at
ERI

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CIA No. 1670

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
Office of Research and Reports
12 December 1962

MEMORANDUM

SUBJECT: Significance of Recent Soviet Gold Sales

1. The abrupt occurrence of large Soviet gold sales in London beginning on 24 October led to speculation that they represented a Soviet response to unanticipated financial obligations resulting from the Cuban crisis. The size and timing of these sales, however, was consistent with the seasonal pattern generally characteristic of Soviet offerings since the entry of Soviet gold on a large scale in international bullion markets beginning in 1953. The Soviet "gold selling year" usually lasts from fall (generally October) to late spring. With the major exception of 1960, when the USSR withheld gold from international bullion markets apparently in anticipation of an increase in the U.S. gold price, this pattern has been generally followed.

2. For the most part, the USSR sells gold in international markets in anticipation of foreign exchange needs; i.e., to obtain foreign exchange to settle indebtedness for Soviet purchases. The volume of Soviet gold sales is generally a function of the success which the USSR has in selling commodities in international markets; that is, that portion of Soviet imports from the West which cannot be financed by commodity exports is paid for by sales of gold. Currently the USSR's balance of payments is subject to additional pressures because of the need to repay some of the medium-term credits which the Soviet Union has obtained from Western countries since 1959.

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
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not unusual. The USSR frequently sells its gold in large individual lots. For example in March 1961, when no international crisis was in evidence, sales during a one-week period amounted to approximately \$60 million. Similarly large lot sales occurred in other years, as in April 1959 when \$50-75 million worth was sold in a two-day period.

4. As shown in the accompanying table, annual Soviet gold sales since 1953 have averaged about \$185 million--an order of magnitude with which 1962 sales of \$192 million* appear generally consistent.



5. We have no evidence that the recent large volume of Soviet gold sales has been related to the Cuban crisis. Apparent additional Soviet chartering of Western vessels occasioned by Cuban trade in October, for example, would require only a few million dollars at the most. Nor is there any evidence that Soviet gold sales have been in any way related to Cuban economic needs.



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**Soviet Gold Sales
1953-1962**

<u>Year</u>	<u>Million US\$</u>	<u>Year</u>	<u>Million US\$</u>
1953	150	1958	182
1954	93	1959	303
1955	70	1960	125
1956	154	1961	311
1957	275	1962	192*

*Through 10 December.