


DEPARTMENT OF STATE  
THE DIRECTOR OF INTELLIGENCE AND RESEARCH  
WASHINGTON



(16)


JUN 25 1962

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OFFICIAL - INFORMAL

Dear Mr. McCone:

I should like to bring to your attention the importance the Department attaches to receiving accurate and timely information on developments in the South Katanga and particularly on the measures which Mr. Tshombe may be taking to increase his military potential. I realize that the Agency has made a considerable effort along these lines, but the fact that Jadotville, Kolwezi and Kipushi are denied areas for official American and UN visitors makes it particularly important that intelligence operations into these towns be aggressively undertaken. With the continuing possibility that the Katangans would once again initiate hostilities against the UN it is particularly disturbing to see how little "hard" information is available regarding the Katangese forces and their disposition and plans. I should like to urge that a renewed effort be initiated to penetrate the South Katangan regime.

Sincerely yours,

  
Roger Hillsman

Enclosure:

List of priority requirements.

The Honorable John A. McCone  
Director,  
Central Intelligence Agency,  
Langley, Virginia

State Dept. review completed

~~SECRET~~

## I - BACKGROUND

The Department of State has been concerned for a long time about the lack of adequate knowledge of just what the Tshombe regime has in the way of military power and plans. The South Katanga outside the UN perimeter in Elisabethville is at present observed by U.S. and UN officials only from the air or by foreign visitors who are not under our control.

## II - REQUIREMENTS

### A. Military

- 1) OB of Katanga forces.
- 2) Identity, whereabouts, and positions held by mercenaries.
- 3) Availability of military equipment including aircraft.
- 4) Orders placed or status of procurement of war materiel including aircraft.
- 5) Assistance, preparations, general activities on Rhodesian side of border.
- 6) War plans of Katanga forces including indications of tactics to be pursued in any future encounter with UN forces.
- 7) Training being carried out particularly indicative of training in guerilla warfare and sabotage.
- 8) Morale of Katanga forces including attitude toward UN and toward central government.
- 9) Precautions taken by UMHK including location of major plant guard units.
- 10) Periodic evaluation of military situation in relation to past numbers and capacities and to present political situation.

### B. Katanga Europeans

- 1) Indications of preparations by hard core Europeans outside Elisabethville for participation in future hostilities.

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- 2) Attitude and morale of European civilians in Jadotville, Kolwezi and Kipushi, particularly indications of a willingness to accept the reintegration of the Katanga among senior UMHK officials.

C. Relations with Rhodesia

- 1) Attitude and contacts of GOK (advisers and cabinet) with UNIP and African politicians in Rhodesia.
- 2) GOK relations, contacts with Federal Government of Rhodesia and Government of Northern Rhodesia.

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