

61-2674

~~SECRET~~

OGC 61-0540

5 April 1961

MEMORANDUM FOR: Director of Central Intelligence

**SUBJECT: Defense Posture Hearings Before Senate
Armed Services Committee**

1. This memorandum is for information only.
2. The Defense posture hearings started yesterday and the entire day was devoted to Secretary McNamara testifying on the Department of Defense posture. A copy of his statement which was released is attached. Considering the Easter recess, there was full attendance with eleven of the seventeen members present.
3. In the morning session today there were a number of items which are of general interest to the Agency. I shall attempt to cover most of these. Later it is hoped that we can have access to the one copy of the transcript which the Pentagon will receive. No copies can be procured from the Committee.
4. Senator Cannon asked the question, "Do we have a specific intelligence estimate on what level of damage is considered to be unacceptable to the USSR or Communist China?" The answer was that we did not.
5. Senator Russell raised the question of duplication in our monitoring operations. He mentioned a letter he had sent to the Department of Defense to which the response was that the subject is so sensitive that it was hoped Senator Russell would handle it in a Subcommittee. Senator Russell commented that this was a tremendously expensive activity and felt it should be looked into carefully. It was pointed out that the Department of Defense was doing a complete

OSD REVIEW COMPLETED

~~SECRET~~

Leg Counsel

review of intelligence activities generally. In fact, Secretary McNamara indicated that this study was now being considered by the Joint Chiefs of Staff. However, their tentative conclusion was that there should be even more consolidation into one Department of Defense intelligence agency and that it should be assigned to the Joint Chiefs of Staff. General Lemnitzer discussed off the record the COMINT problem, indicating there is a vital need for more intelligence in this field. He pointed out the entire program was under NSA. Senator Russell stated that while he was opposed to unification generally he believed there should be unification in the fields of (a) communications (meaning COMINT and ELINT), (b) intelligence generally, and (c) language training.

6. Senator Saltonstall referred to Admiral Hillenkoetter's testimony before Appropriations indicating that the information on possible attack from North Korea did not get to the top. He apparently remembered specifically that Hillenkoetter exhibited receipt of various reports from lower level. Saltonstall was raising this point to query whether currently intelligence does get to the top. McNamara indicated that he and other elements of the government get it through the normal process but the Director of Central Intelligence calls him personally on many items. Further, the Secretary of Defense and the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff have frequent access to the President and the White House. Lemnitzer reported this general position. However, he referred back to the Korean situation stating that for a six-months' period no intelligence agency had indicated that an attack was imminent. Senator Russell also got into this discussion mentioning that at the McArthur hearings it was clear that there were many reports forwarded by combat units to General Willoughby concerning the presence of Chinese divisions above the Yalu. Russell also commented on the North Korea picture stating that his recollection was that the reports from CIA showed significant build-up of North Korea forces along the parallel and indicated that at the time CIA was worried, conceding that there had been no report an attack was scheduled for next Tuesday. He believed there was considerable carelessness in handling that information. Lemnitzer again indicated that these facts were not consistent with his memory and Russell suggested that Lemnitzer should check into this.

7. There was a great deal of discussion on the matter of Defense secrets appearing in the press. Russell, Bush, Saltonstall, Thurmond, and others were most strong in their views that too much information was released and suggested that McNamara should err on the side of too little information. They all assured McNamara he would receive full

SECRET

SECRET

support from Senate Armed Services on this. McNamara was most grateful for this indicating that he felt this was a real problem and said he had put General Carrell in charge of a new program in this regard. In fact, McNamara said he was very much surprised when he saw what his Assistants had cleared for release in his statement to the Committee of yesterday. Senator Russell stated that he was also surprised at how much was included.

8. Senator Symington mentioned his visit to Adana last year where in a briefing by Air Force they referred to a NASA project at the base about which nothing could be said. Symington did learn the name of the commander, that is, Colonel Sheldon and when he talked with Colonel Sheldon he was advised that no information could be furnished. Symington used this as an example of improper briefing by the people at Adana. His point in raising this was to support his conclusion that one of the basic troubles in retaining security information within the military was the question of interservice rivalry.

Attachment

JOHN S. WARNER
Legislative Counsel

Dictated but not read - JSW:mks

Distribution:

- Orig - DCI w/att
- 1 - DDCI w/o att
- 1 - IG w/o att
- 1 - ER w/o att
- 2 - Legislative Counsel

OGC/LC:JSW:mks

SECRET

