



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2 JUN 1960



Many thanks for the transcript of the recent conversation which you were so thoughtful to send me.

I read this with a great deal of interest and I have also made it available to some of my associates here for their information and further study.

With every best wish.

Sincerely,

SIGNED

Allen W. Dulles
Director



O/DCI, bak(2 June 60)

Distribution:

- Orig. - Addressee
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Meeting with Yuri Zhukov -- April 23, 1960
Washington, D. C.

Zhukov had lunch with me on Saturday, April 23rd. He said he wanted to talk to me alone. Just Zhukov and the interpreter, Georgi Bolshakov, were present. Zhukov started in by saying that Khrushchev wanted to know the attitude of the American people toward Russia and the Summit Meeting. He was particularly interested as to whether we felt the Summit Meeting could be successful.

Regarding the Summit Meeting, I told him that many Americans felt that the Summit Meeting could not be successful if the Soviet Union insisted on her program in Berlin. The Berlin question, I felt, was symptomatic of a larger question, the unification of Germany. Did Russia herself really want such unification. This led to a discussion of free elections in Germany, and Zhukov maintained that Germany did not have free elections because the Communist Party and its sympathizers were not given fair treatment. Russia, he said, was the only country that had free elections. Some time was spent on this ridiculous discussion. Eventually Zhukov insisted that there were other subjects for discussion such as disarmament; banning the use of nuclear weapons; East-West trade; and general improvement of East-West relations. We had a rather lengthy discussion on all four of these subjects without much general agreement.

He then got into what appeared to be the meat of his subject -- the violation by Americans of the spirit of Camp David. Why had Douglas Dillon made an unwarrantedly provocative talk ^{against} ~~again~~ the Soviet Union. It was this speech, plus the denunciatory remarks made by other administrative officials, that had caused him to come to America. Why were we doing this. Was it desire to wreck the Summit Meeting. The Voice of America had gone out of its way to criticize the Soviet Union, this in spite of the spirit of Camp David. Either the Voice of America must revise its attitude or Russia would have to begin again to jam the Voice programs to the Soviet Union. He said, "How can Khrushchev stand idly by while you repeatedly spit in his face, particularly after the promises and friendship evidenced at Camp David." I told him I was sure there was no desire on the part of anybody to spit in Mr. Khrushchev's face. Was he reflecting, by this remark, Mr. Khrushchev's personal opinion. He said, no, he was speaking only for himself as a private citizen. I asked him how he could separate himself as a private citizen from his governmental responsibilities and had Mr. Khrushchev stated this. He again claimed this was his idea.

I then tried to answer him specifically on many of the complaints that he had voiced. I told him that national policy was always subject to debate and review in a time of national election.

He went on to say that he thought the Summit Meeting was being held at a very poor time, because of our election year. But he again pressed the point that the Soviet Union could not understand the destructive attitude on the part of governing officials and the press. Why couldn't we speak "in a calmer, less irritating voice." If the Soviet Union continued to take these offensive remarks without replying, it would weaken the Soviet's position in world opinion. Again he referred to the attitude of Camp David and the friendship that the President had professed.

To all these questions I tried to assure him that I saw no evidence that the President or any American officials had revoked the spirit of Camp David; that Mr. Khrushchev had started the irritation by speeches he had made; that Mr. Mikoyan's visit to Cuba was certainly not well timed; that Mr. Mikoyan's remarks in Norway on his return to Russia were not placating; etc. He made no effort to reply specifically to these points, but did make notes of them in a notebook.

He again referred to the Summit Meeting and felt that although not much progress could be made at this one, could this lead to subsequent Summit Meetings after our elections. This depended, I said, upon conditions and circumstances, but I certainly thought our government would give it consideration.

He then wanted to discuss American politics and who would be elected. I told him it was too early to give a definitive answer. I asked him what else he was going to do in Washington and he told me he had come to see five people: Walter Lippmann; James Reston; George Allen of USIA; Bill Lacy of the State Department; and me; that he was leaving Washington on Monday and returning immediately to the Soviet Union.

Three things impressed me:

1. About six weeks previously almost identical questions and complaints were made by the Soviet Ambassador at a lunch I had with him at the Soviet Embassy, this after repeated invitations from Mr. Menshikov. I understand that Mr. Menshikov had luncheon with one or more of the people Zhukov came to see. Was Zhukov's trip to confirm Menshikov's viewpoint or did this show lack of confidence in The Russian Ambassador.


2. He stressed heavily the inflammatory remarks of administrative officials and the abrupt change that had taken place since the professed friendship at Camp David. Also our election year. These made it difficult to hold a Summit Conference but would this one be followed by others.

3. He constantly stressed the Russians' desire for peace.
Would it be possible to return to the spirit of Camp David
after our elections were over.

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MEMORANDUM FOR: Mr. Dulles:

Copies of this memorandum of conversation
have already been sent to DD/I and DD/P.



1 June 1960

(DATE)

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FORM NO. 101 REPLACES FORM 10-101
1 AUG 54 WHICH MAY BE USED.

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