

ER 60-1280/a

STAT

*Handwritten signature/initials*



Mr. John Shacter



*Handwritten notes and stamps*  
Date: 2/24/60  
By: [initials]  
[initials]  
[initials]

Dear Mr. Shacter:

I appreciate your sending me your letter of February 18 and the enclosed letter to the President. I have read them with care and am having them studied by our senior estimating officials.

I would like to make only one comment at this time and that is with respect to your expressed view that intelligence estimates come up with specific, precise figures rather than with ranges spanning likely possibilities. You may be sure that we most certainly use ranges whenever the evidence at hand does not permit us to be more specific.

Inasmuch as your other points largely concern military policy and programs, I do not feel it appropriate for me to discuss them.

Sincerely,

**SIGNED**

Allen W. Dulles  
Director

O/DD/I:RAMory, Jr:mhs/24 Feb 60

Rewritten: [redacted] rad 29 Feb 60

Distribution: [redacted] 1 5 15 20

Orig - Addressee


- ✓ 1 - DCI
- 1 - DDCI
- 1 - O/DD/I
- 1 - FMC
- 1 - ER - *w/hasu*

STAT

STAT

60-1280/a

Mr. John Shacter



Dear Mr. Shacter:

I appreciate your sending me your letter of February 16 and the enclosed letter to the President. I have read them with care and am having them studied by our senior estimators.

I would like to make only one comment at this time and that is with respect to your expressed view that intelligence estimates come up with specific, precise figures rather than with ranges spanning likely possibilities. I assure you that we are most careful to use ranges whenever the evidence requires us to do so.

Inasmuch as your other points largely concern military policy and programs, I do not feel it appropriate for me to discuss them.

Sincerely yours,

Allen W. Dulles,  
Director

Distribution:

Orig.--Addressee

1--O/DCI ✓


1--DDCI

1--ER

1--O/DD/I

*raf*  
4 FEB 1960

O/DD/I:RAmory, Jr:mhs/24 February 1960




*Reverett*

STAT

MR. DULLES:

1. This is for your information only.
2. John Shacter has written a 13 page letter to the President (copies to you, Messrs. Nixon, Herter, Gates, Gray, Kistiakowsky, McCone, Glennan, York, and Eaton), seeking an audience for his views on the dilemma of the nuclear-missile age, and his proposed solution to our major national security problem.
3. Shacter's argument is as follows: He believes that we are in an inferior military position and subject to surprise attack. He believes that we are far too complacent about the chances of radical technological discovery. He does not think that the present piecemeal approach is adequate.
4. Shacter proposes drastic action. He would have our government announce that our civilization in its present state of technology is headed for certain catastrophe rather than a "stable stalemate". Our government should announce that the only solution is a comprehensive "world inspection and peace force". In the meantime, Shacter proposes we create and announce extension of our retaliatory capabilities, including IRBM and "dirty" warheads, in order to create a stalemate which he says does not exist at this time.
5. Shacter elaborates his arguments in a 17 page paper entitled, "Hard Facts and Bold Strategies". In brief, he argues as follows: we must assume that we are facing a period of blackmail of surprise attack. Our immediate response should be to produce and announce a military stalemate. Over the long run, we are on the sure track to early world destruction unless we change course. The only salvation is a world inspection and military force. This summary does not do justice to the sincerity and obvious technical knowledge which Shacter has brought to bear. At the same time, I believe my statement of his main arguments are somewhat more clear than Shacter's own exposition. For example, Shacter's point of departure is his dissatisfaction with the present national estimative process which he describes as too rigid and overprecise. This opinion is based on his own beliefs and limited knowledge of the estimative process.
6. Shacter has enclosed a letter from Mr. Gordon Gray, who had talked with Shacter and had distributed his paper to members of the Planning Board.



STAT

60-1580

THIRTY EAST FORTY-SECOND STREET  
NEW YORK 17, N. Y.

February 18, 1960


Director Allen W. Dulles  
Central Intelligence Agency  
Washington, D. C.

Dear Sir:

In the hope that they will be of interest to you, I am attaching copies of correspondence and a memorandum in the field of national planning and security. You may be aware of the fact that I forwarded an early copy of my attached memorandum, "Hard Facts and Bold Strategies," to Dr. Herbert Scoville.

It is always difficult to foresee whether a written discussion of this type meets the requirements of a specific reader with his experiences and points of view. Rather than trying to elaborate in the many dimensions apparent here, I shall simply offer to do this in a more specific discussion, if you desire; this discussion would then not be restricted to the unclassified area.

Very respectfully yours,

  
John Shacter

JS:AP  
Att.

THIRTY EAST FORTY-SECOND STREET  
NEW YORK 17, N. Y.

February 17, 1960

President Dwight D. Eisenhower  
The White House  
Washington, D. C.

Dear Mr. President:

Although the length of this letter will not enhance my already low chances of reaching you, I fear at the same time that it is too brief to put my points across to you. From time to time, you have publicly described the increasing complexity of our world and its problems, as they reflect in our national policies, and you have invited informed persons to present their ideas to our government. My experiences as a contributor and government consultant in the atomic and defense fields have caused me to be deeply concerned for some time about the combined basic premises given you and President Truman in the field of national planning and security.

I feel an unusually heavy burden in this area since I have served in a rather unique combination of roles in our own technical and production programs (since 1943) as well as in the middle of our national estimation process (in the 1950's), the results of which are reaching you, of course, in a highly digested, distilled and finalized form.

My whole career has been spent in complex technical and managerial areas starting with the early Manhattan Project upon graduation as a chemical engineer. I have had line responsibility in the key area of several major well-known crash programs in the nuclear and thermonuclear fields, being up to recently in charge of process design and operations planning at Oak Ridge. I believe that you will

find that the AEC and Union Carbide Corporation will credit me in connection with these multi-billion dollar programs with a number of technological and managerial contributions, and with some of the basic patents and ideas. Though I have been transferred to New York where I am assisting in the formulation of Union Carbide's programs of technology and management planning, I am still consulting in the above areas, and my clearances are active.

In connection with my experiences, I was first exposed to certain phases of our national estimation process by being asked to evaluate specific evidence and to comment on previously expressed semiprofessional opinions as a special consultant. As time went on, my services were soon extended to cover a broader field. Eventually, I was asked to become directly involved in phases of initial data gathering and processing, here and abroad, and in key phases of evaluation and consolidated presentation. A number of documents which relate to these efforts are on file. Thus I believe that I am one of a handful of people in this country who have had firsthand experience in contributing to activities which represent virtually all aspects of the estimates process, the gathering of raw information, providing the background of our own programs, consulting and providing critiques in the subsequent evaluation, and finally influencing our combined qualitative and quantitative thinking as expressed in our final national reports of this period. In the course of these activities, I was able to observe closely the process and people at many levels. I was also fortunate in being able to form close associations and earn the friendship of many individuals in various agencies. I was often asked to contribute or serve as a sounding board for analytical conclusions and suggested hypotheses. I know firsthand that these people are highly conscientious and undoubtedly sincere. Many of them perform outstanding operational and analytical jobs. On the other hand, I must not leave you with the impression that my direct observations and many discussions on the evolution and use of the combined estimates left me with a feeling of confidence.

In connection with these experiences, I would refer you to the AEC (divisions of production, operations analysis, research, intelligence), the CIA, and several offices in the services and the DOD. As I will elaborate later, I have also had a few contacts with the offices of your assistants in the affairs of science and national security. My attached memorandum (Hard Facts and Bold Strategies) was written in 1957 and was distributed to the Planning Board of the National Security Council by Mr. Gordon Gray about a year ago.

Although it is virtually impossible to update and condense the bases for my apprehensions or the type of specific approaches suggested into a few unclassified lines, this will have to be the objective of the remaining portion of the letter. Fundamentally we appear to examine one pressing problem area after another and force ourselves by this procedure to make the quickly needed and then necessarily over-simplified assumptions in related areas, in order that we can deal with the problem on hand. In addition, we have assigned small subdivisions of our major problems to scores of specialists and analysts operating within a very limited framework and horizon. Too often, we then try to use the process of averaging to find a way out.

I am particularly concerned with our overall interpretations and use of key data and estimates. I believe we have been led to some serious oversimplifications of facts, concepts, and their probabilities or uncertainties. This has prevented us from adopting the combination of longer-range, imaginative strategies in the fields of deterrence, disarmaments and peaceful coexistence which are essential today. Without mentioning out of context specific solutions of the type discussed in the attachments - and while emphasizing my belief that bold, yet necessary and feasible solutions are even now in sight - I want to state my complete conviction that we are on the road to national or world disaster unless we change our signals. I believe on the other hand that, if given the opportunity and time, a multi-phase approach can be outlined which would stimulate your

imagination and could lead to a comprehensive line of attack on several of these areas at the same time. All evidence suggests that, because of our complex and departmentalized system of responsibilities, this type of comprehensive approach has never been proposed to you as a single package, the only way in which it would make sense and have a chance of being accepted.

I shall try to list some of the biggest technical problems and implications in these areas and then refer to possible approaches to them. More elaborate statements will be found in the attachments, which were written in 1957 and since then.

(A) Technical Problems and Implications:

Since I have never been exposed to any classified data on estimates of missile programs, and all of my information comes from the newspapers, I can speak freely. In fact, my bases for judgment would not be too different from the information readily available to a well-read foreign technical analyst. As I see it, we are in danger of losing sight of three basic factors:

- (1) Quantitative intelligence estimates can not ever be regarded as single-point numbers. Although our analysts will admit this point, probable ranges of uncertainties in areas known to be critical are often underplayed if not ignored in practice. For instance, when we appear to base our planning on the assumption, as newspapers indicate, that Russia still has only one or two factories turning out ICBM's at a rather leisurely rate which would enable them to mount 10 missiles on launching pads at present and 35 by June 1960, we can be relatively sure of only one thing, namely, that the specific figures are bound to be wrong; the question is how wrong are they likely to be in either direction, and with what degree of certainty are we going to be satisfied? For instance, we must not fail to analyze the likelihood and effect of alternative assumptions that - contrary to our best guess -

Russian ICBM production started just months earlier,  
or on a more ambitious scale,

or that their tests shifted in type or location so that they were  
misinterpreted or unobserved by us,

or that their launching bases and systems are much simpler and  
lighter, and therefore more difficult to "prove" than we appear to  
give them credit for.

Even according to our own current estimates, apparently, an error of  
just a few months in the start-up date of production would for instance as  
much as triple the number of the June estimate. Can we reasonably afford  
to declare any or all of these uncertainties to be non-existent? Is there  
really no evidence of capability or intent on the other side of the scale?  
We must remember that a proud nation's intelligence system will find it  
nearly impossible to credit the opponent with a more ambitious or effec-  
tive program than its own, until the evidence is virtually irrefutable.  
Only our relatively overwhelming position of the past has softened the  
effects of our reported underestimates of the opponent. (In a sense,  
even our overpredictions of their cruiser and Bison-bomber programs missed  
the underlying cause as a more rapid shift into new concepts and weapons  
than we had anticipated.) If there are any managerial complexities built  
into some of our defense programs, they could be harming us twice. Once  
directly and the second time by causing a tendency toward underestimation  
of the opposite program and its management. Regardless of the numbers,  
quality, and sincerity of analysts, variety of backgrounds and interests,  
and representations of specialists, it would be fallacious to believe that  
an uncertain situation can ever be summarized and expressed by a single  
estimate, rather than a range of eventualities. These are all vital points  
in connection with the use of estimates. I am confident that many insiders  
would make the same points to you if they had the opportunity, and that  
they could be proven beyond doubt in the classified area.

(2) When we talk of adequate deterrence, this must of course be adequate in the mind of the opposing planner, or else it will be at best a punishment - and not deterrence - even assuming we are right and he is wrong. Granting for the moment that the Russians might not quite have "the 150" ICBM's today, the possibility definitely exists even in this case that the opposing planner has already advised his leadership as follows:

- (a) "By an overwhelming mass attack in the short and medium range category, we can now count on obliterating within the first half hour a major portion of the SAC NATO bases, British IRBM sites, and other deterrence bases, including refueling bases, the few large carriers, and the one or two Polaris submarines - when operational. We would do this with our many hundreds of well-proven IRBM's and submarines, followed by our hundreds of jet bombers for "clean-up" (on one-way missions, as desirable). This should virtually eliminate all means of retaliation except by remaining US-based, long-range B-52 bombers.
- (b) "We can be equally sure of a simultaneous, devastating submarine-missile attack upon deterrence bases or other key targets in a fairly wide strip along all coast lines of the U. S. (including the only ICBM base).
- (c) "We can assume that the coordinated salvo of multi-megaton, rather heavy and "dirty" warheads of our ICBM's (or our new submarine-based IRBM's), with their wide radius of destruction and proven accuracy will obliterate many or most of the remaining SAC bases in the interior of the U. S. before or as the first planes attempt to take off. (These ICBM launchings from our northern bases will not cause alarm prematurely.)

- (d) "We do not have to assume that we can destroy every retaliatory missile and plane on the ground since our potent anti-aircraft defenses will be poised for the few hours of expected counter-attack from points missed. We have effective outer defenses of radar, pursuit planes with our own "Sidewinder" homing rockets, and adequate numbers of anti-aircraft rockets with atomic warheads. Since well over 90% of their retaliatory punch depends today upon relatively slow means of delivery, including the long-range but subsonic B-52, they are now susceptible to our defenses. Finally, we can well afford the risk of having one or several bombs getting through, contrary to our best hopes.
- (e) "This superiority of ours is greatest now and will be equalized only with the advent of operational and practically instantaneous mass retaliation from mobile Minuteman missiles, and Polaris submarines, perhaps not before the middle sixties.
- (One group of analysts may also advise as follows:)
- (f) "We believe that U. S. leaders will not expect this attack. Furthermore, our regime faces a greater risk through disarmament on their present terms and intentions. There is ample evidence that softer words and concessions on disarmament by us are only being regarded as signs of weakness, and that inspection like the position of Berlin will be exploited for all sorts of infiltration. Many of the Western advisors and experts plan to controvert our concessions into added "peaceful" means of encouraging the overthrow of our system. It is apparent that this and not peace is their intent; their people have not yet been brought face-to-face with the real risks and consequences of all-out war, and with the increasingly critical need for new attitudes and approaches on all sides."

- (3) The Western World appears to take its once undisputed defense capability for granted now and in the next few years; they do not question its degree of susceptibility to sudden obsolescence due to possible technological break-throughs and resulting shifts in requirements. The risk of our reliance on SAC bombers as a deterrent is not only due to the factors mentioned above. With the advent of the Russian IRBM's and ICBM's our defense challenge has shifted largely into the anti-missile area. The Russians have not yet been under as much pressure to follow suit. Their absolute trump card would still be for the next year or two a technical breakthrough in the anti-aircraft or anti-air-breathing missiles field. A "fantastic weapon" has been claimed by Khrushchev. If the claim were true, it could be in this area. A number of our own scientists and inventors have for some time speculated about new concepts in this connection. History is full of examples in which a nation's experts relied upon the invincibility of a previously proven weapon or defense, which in the real test of the next battle turned out to be obsolete. In the extreme of this argument, even a numerical match of our Atlases with their ICBM's would not avoid all chances of inadequacies. A new fantastic weapon could affect the control of an instrumented plane or missile, so that it may be necessary to forego accuracy and rely solely upon the aim of the launching device in combination with a warhead devised for maximum area of total destructiveness.
- (4) The technical problems of achieving stability, complex as they appear now, will continue to become more difficult to approach as our civilization seems to be willing to face up to situations and approaches only as they are being superceded by new ones. This statement applies to the prevention of uncontrolled incidents or accidents, as well as to the conception of steps toward disarmament and other approaches to coexistence.

(B) Approaches:

The fact is that the atomic war has not been triggered. Apparently, the dominant Russian conclusion has been so far and for the present that we should not be attacked. We can only hope that the cons will continue to outweigh the pros. It is interesting that the most pessimistic view on the effectiveness of our present deterrence capability will necessarily credit the Russians with the greatest present desire for peaceful coexistence. Whatever the combination of reasons is for this period of positive relations, we have an obligation to use whatever time we still have left. Solutions of the following type should be considered. We could at once announce publicly our conviction that current technological developments are confronting our civilization with these undeniable facts:

- (1) The technology of warfare will become more destructive, cheaper, easier to acquire on the part of everyone, harder to inspect by outsiders, and more difficult to keep in check and control by the leaders themselves. Consequently, the world situation as it has been permitted to develop will not result in a stable stalemate, but will rather continue to produce increasingly widespread, complex problems and, sooner or later, unavoidable catastrophe through blunder or accident. (This point is discussed in greater detail in the attached memorandum.)
- (2) We are convinced, furthermore, that the only possible long-range solutions lie in approaches toward an agreed-upon and enforced political world moratorium (at least for a period of several years or until a world code for an acceptable change in national systems is universally adhered to). This should be accompanied by inspected progressive steps in national disarmaments, and the simultaneous joint formation and gradual build-up of a comprehensive world inspection and peace force. The force would be armed jointly by the major powers and devised to be more powerful than

any foreseeable alliance of aggressors; it would be subject to the necessary minimum system of world law and order, possibly involving a strengthened and world-wide United Nations.

In fact, we must not tolerate the exclusion of any nation - particularly those we trust least - from this organization and its obligations; we should anticipate this and tackle several potentially acceptable alternatives with China now. The irrefutable logic of this position will penetrate everywhere, once we have placed the whole problem and our approaches before the public in frank terms.

The Russian leaders are first and foremost realists. There are many indications that they have been similarly advised by their own technical analysts; they would be tempted to use force only if we made the price for inspected peace too high and allowed the hypothesis of a deterrence gap at the same time. Therefore, we must offer the leaders of Communism a peace plan which will not endanger their personal position, while letting their own longer-range self-interest encourage them to modify their system gradually to popularize it. Only this approach can liberate the enslaved peoples of the East. As soon as any nation attempts to use its infiltration opportunities to sponsor dissatisfaction and unrest, not only will the disarmament system fail, but a second Hungarian slaughter or worse will be on that nation's conscience. It is no longer adequate for one system to pronounce its intent to seek an overthrow of the other "by peaceful means". Nations shall either have to disavow interference of any kind or a workable and effective system of inspection and enforcement will not be acceptable as an alternative to the risk of war. This may well be the real lock and

key to an effective disarmament problem, as well as part of the framework for a solution to the Berlin problem.

(3) (Our announcement continues:) While we propose to work individually and collectively with all nations in this direction, we also do not want to tempt anyone into a short-range strategy of world domination by a sudden attack on us. The same technological developments which will extrapolate the past trends into an eventual, unavoidable world catastrophe, will also give any attacker an ever-greater advantage over the attacked, prior to the established system of world stabilization outlined in the previous point. As we have not been tempted in the past, when the overwhelming capacity was on our side, we shall not let ourselves be tempted to launch a preventive attack upon our potential adversaries. To this proven basic policy is now also added the certainty that aggression on either side will leave no victors, only vanquished. However, in order not to tempt anyone else either, we would like everyone to know just exactly how we would react today or tomorrow - if attacked:

(a) We are extending ("have extended") our dispersal of retaliatory capabilities, mobility and variety of take-off bases (highway sections, etc.) by having assigned certain fighter and tactical planes, as well as our shorter-range SAC bombers with the overriding responsibility to deliver utter destruction to any nation which attacks us. Their means of accomplishing this includes the predefined assignment to local forces of one-way missions with maximum destructive nuclear devices (per unit weight), this authority certainly applying "automatically" in case of known attack upon the continental United States.

(b) We have given similar and detailed orders to our naval forces.

(c) We have redesigned and are modifying our warheads for certain types of missiles and planes to give them maximum radii of destructiveness, to assure beyond any doubt the utter destruction of an enemy from the yield of a very low number of successfully exploded, though completely inaccurately delivered bombs. (It is much easier to devise the spiked bomb than the clean bomb, and no fancy designs or tests will be needed to convince the opponent of their obvious effectiveness. Such a device can be adopted practically "overnight".)

In addition, we should immediately place our effectively managed Polaris-type IRBM production on a crash basis for at least crude installation on mobile or temporary land bases (and surface sea vessels?) during this year of 1960 - if at all possible. We could temporarily rob some of the planned 16 missiles per submarine for this program. The most effective warheads should be provided. This would require some tough, overriding management, and should not be announced prior to operational effectiveness.

You might well ask what I have done to bring my views to the attention of responsible persons. Up to 1957, I had tried to influence only a few individuals of limited influence to whom I had ready access. Some of my efforts paid dividends in areas I cannot discuss in an unclassified letter. Concerning the long-range problem, I did go so far as to try to arrange an interview with you when you were President of Columbia University and an experienced and respected public, non-political figure. You replied that you would be unfortunately out of town at the time I expected to be in New York, and I never repeated my approach. I am mentioning this only to establish my motivation to be neither politically nor publicity inspired.


In 1957 I was introduced by several persons to Dr. Killian. The results of the half-hour interview with him were disappointing to me, although he listened to my argument very politely. I wrote the attached memorandum, "Hard Facts and Bold Strategies" right after that visit and mailed a copy to him. Subsequently I mailed additional copies to persons of potential influence with the Administration.\* With one or two exceptions, most of the recipients replied in a polite, non-committal, often apologetic manner, disavowing any responsibilities or knowledge in this combination of areas. Some did not reply at all. In early 1959, I sent a copy to Mr. Gordon Gray, who had been newly appointed as your assistant. I was given the opportunity to meet Mr. Gray and Mr. James T. Lay, Jr. Most of the discussion was spent on the long-range dangers and solutions emphasized in the memorandum. I had the feeling that my short-range apprehensions on estimates were not being taken as seriously. (More recent events have certainly confirmed that feeling.) Following this discussion, Mr. Gray wrote to me indicating that copies of my memorandum had been distributed to the Planning Board of the NSC. A copy of his letter is attached. Subsequently, I addressed Mr. Gray again. Mr. Birny Mason, Executive Vice President of Union Carbide Corporation also wrote Mr. Gray at that time, offering to make my services available to him if requested. I was not taken up on my offer to document my points in Washington. That was my last and only partially successful attempt to obtain a hearing for my views in the Administration.

\* Only two of the gentlemen listed as receiving copies of this letter have been previously sent personal copies of the attached memorandum, though persons closely associated with them have received copies.

Needless to explain, the current discussions and revelations have revived my concerns on our short and long-range approaches. I shall close this letter with a respectful request to be given the opportunity to prove and elaborate my points for you as quickly as possible. My clearances are active. I am certain that I shall be able to leave for Washington on short notice.

Very respectfully yours,

  
John Shacter

CC: Vice President Richard M. Nixon  
Secretary of State Christian A. Herter  
Secretary of Defense Thomas S. Gates  
Special Assistant Gordon Gray  
Special Assistant George B. Kistiakowsky  
Director Allen W. Dulles, CIA   
Chairman John A. McCone, AEC  
Administrator T. Keith Glennan  
Dr. Herbert York, Director of Research and Engineering  
Honorable Frederick W. Eaton

HARD FACTS AND BOLD STRATEGIES

SUMMARY

At the present status of technology, the best mankind can hope for now is a stalemate, and we can only plan sensibly if we face that fact squarely. Some means will be discussed of producing the stalemate at once. Not to do this could confront us with an immediate period of blackmail or worse.

Any solution to the immediate danger, however, will only extend a limited period of grace. The danger of accidental, if not intentional, partial or world destruction is rising at an ever faster rate. If we are successful in extending this limited period of grace, we must see to it that no moment of it goes to waste. With this situation in mind, constructive approaches must be found to reduce the present danger, to channel the competition between systems into peaceful directions, and to give hope to mankind for a better future. Examples of such approaches are given in this memorandum. This is the challenge that confronts our leadership today.

-- LIMITED DISTRIBUTION --

HARD FACTS AND BOLD STRATEGIES

INTRODUCTION

One of the difficulties in analyzing the present world situation, and seeking ways to improve it, is of course that human nature always rebels at facing unpleasant facts without apparent solutions, or at facing up to bold solutions without a clearly established need. It is therefore the purpose of this memorandum to discuss both aspects at once, so that facts and solutions which are otherwise individually unacceptable can be approached with realism, but fortunately also with some measure of hope.

This memorandum will discuss the present dangers and the instability of the coming stalemate, and will point to possible bold steps to produce that stalemate now, render it more stable, and give it the evolutionary ingredients for an ultimate constructive solution.

Not only is adoption of an overall strategy with consistent tactical moves indicated, but the initial steps must be taken soon, not in a year or two, if they are to be effective. For, contrary to some current reports, there is a probability that the Russians are now producing ICBM's as well as submarines with atomic missiles, and will be able to demonstrate their capability to launch a space and under-water attack on us in a few months. This probability may be less than 1 out of 2, but it is not negligible and must be combined with a consequence so serious that, in the interest of this nation's safety, the combination must be taken into account. We simply cannot afford another surprise, and the facts and past experiences do not rule it out. Past events carry the lesson that we must not confuse "insufficient evidence for" or "unlikely" with "proof against" or "impossible".

Our opponents have long-range objectives and plans, and are on the offensive. Except for the universal objective of avoiding world-wide destruction, their aims have been at variance with those of the Western World. Perhaps the non-controversial objectives of the free nations are to: promote freedom, justice and living standards by peaceful means and without tension, if possible; if this is unobtainable, we try to maintain at least a status quo; if even that is unobtainable, we execute delaying actions and counter-moves; and when the peaceful opportunities have been exhausted, we resolve to make the best possible showing in armed conflict.

This pattern of objectives has kept us busy putting out all sorts of fires and planning defensive tactics. Perhaps we tend to consider the current international impasse as a necessary substitute for an overall strategy.

-2-

but it is becoming clearer all the time that political science does not have much time left to get in step with developments in technology. It is easily claimed by anyone that "others" will not accept the necessarily bold approaches. But if this is true, it is the consequence of a public which has not yet been allowed the full grasp of the situation. There is much evidence, however, that people are ready and perhaps anxious for new and bold plans, born out of a clearly defined situation. We have had very little time to apply our vision and reason to an objective technico-political analysis and to the casting of bold and long-range strategies as a framework into which our short-range tactical moves can be fitted. It could be that this is the point the people envision when they clamor today for wise and bold leadership.

Because the major dilemmas and the demand for comprehensive solutions are so imposing, there has been some tendency to place emphasis on a number of lesser but admittedly important corollary problems, such as education, basic research, cessation of bomb tests, under-developed nations, the Vanguard failure, etc., and to believe that our number-one-task is to find solutions to these problems simply because solutions to these problems are visible.

This memorandum will attempt to outline the greatest current and future dilemmas facing us, mostly as the result of a world-wide mushrooming technology; it will attempt to point, by way of examples, to the type of bold strategy which is essential to prevent the surrender of Western freedom or the destruction of mankind as a whole, so that we are given a breathing spell to solve or at least tackle the other important problems.

The next section deals with the four topics which have no chance of being sold individually, but which do form the type of required and acceptable combination:

- A. The present technological dilemma,
- B. Some bold tactical approaches to the immediate problem,
- C. The broader technological dilemma, and
- D. A possible bold long-term strategy.

Each of these parts is headed by a one-sentence statement which represents the main conclusion of that section. These summary-statements are presented in the hope that they may guide the individual reader in letting his interest determine the degree of scrutiny.

Most of the individual points made or steps suggested in this memorandum are not original and have been made many times before. However, looked upon one at a time, each one has an aura of lack of realism and has, therefore, not been adopted. It is only within the framework of an overall situation, and an overall plan to cope with a situation, that they can be combined into something that can make sense, can be effective, and can be acceptable.

-3-

DILEMMAS AND APPROACHES

A. The Present Technological Dilemma --- The only safe assumption is that we are now or will be within the next few months facing a possible period of blackmail or surprise attack, unless we do something about it quickly. ---

When President Truman retired, he made a public statement to the effect that the information presented to him as President had left him highly doubtful that the Russians had indeed exploded or were capable of exploding an atomic bomb. (This statement was later challenged by the present Administration; but it did indicate that in spite of the body of information and advice available to him, the President of our country is not always in the best position to have the clearest perspective on a situation, as is so often taken for granted.) In that same period one could read conjectures in the newspapers that some of our experts were wondering whether the Russian explosion might have been an accident or could have possibly represented a pilot model of an atomic bomb which it would take years to reproduce in the form of production models. The statements were made in a manner to suggest (fallaciously) that the mechanism which produces a so-called pilot model is "used up" and must be replaced or scaled up before any other models can be produced. Since that time the public has been informed of dozens of atomic explosions so that there is no longer any doubt possible that the Russians have atomic capabilities to match the destructiveness of our stockpiles. However, it is possible that our tendency to underestimate our opponents has given way only where facts to the contrary have been clearly apparent.

The initial reaction of some of us after the first firing of a Russian ICBM has been quite analogous to our reaction after their first atomic bomb. Thus, the Director of the Pentagon Weapons System Evaluation Group, a well-informed official, was able to believe that the ICBM test claimed by the Russians might well have been a satellite gone astray. ("I'll bet they have tried to launch a satellite and failed.")

A recent public disclosure of our radar station in Turkey was made in Aviation Week. The report stated that we have been keeping track of Russian missile progress for more than 2 years. It is claimed that the Russians first tested their medium-range missiles in the summer of 1955, and that the frequency of testing achieved during 1956 (five a month) indicated that the missiles were then in regular production.\* The article claimed that test flights of multi-stage vehicles in the Russian ICBM program were picked up late in 1956.\*\* Long-range test flights supposedly began in June of last year. By the end of August at least eight test missiles had been fired. Late in August Moscow announced a successful ICBM firing which has not been disputed by the United States. Aviation Week also reported that their operation of a perfected ICBM

---

\* An impressive time schedule, if these dates are correct.

\*\* We are now firing our ICBM models over relatively short distances, although our program has been under way for some time.

-4-

missile is nevertheless assumed by us even now to be two to three years off! The December 2nd issue of Newsweek reports on the recent Senate hearings that the United States not only hopes to, but must overtake the Russians by 1960, "for by 1960 United States intelligence reports agree the Russians will have their 5,000 mile ICBM in operation. Every American city, every base of the SAC will be within its deadly range."\*

The estimate has been leaked from the current Senate hearings that the Russians are now enlarging a submarine fleet capable of launching atomic missiles several hundred miles inland from both coasts. Even more recently, it has been speculated that 1,500-mile IRBM's could be launched soon from this fleet.

As they were confronted with the complete picture available to government, the reactions of our leaders varied. Almost all of them expressed surprise, but a few appear to feel that our position has not been affected. Many informed public figures who are politically neutral or even favor the Administration have expressed their deep concern. The Rockefeller panel concluded that our "overall strategic concept lags behind developments in technology and in the world political situation", that "the U. S. is rapidly losing its lead in the race of military technology", that "there are major shortcomings in our posture for both all-out and limited war", that "our retaliatory force is inadequately dispersed and protected", and that "unless present trends are reversed (immediately) world balance of power will shift (after 2-3 years) in favor of the Soviet block".

Reaction in Congress was somber. Representative George H. Mahon, chairman of the Military Appropriations subcommittee stated recently that we are in major peril, and that he had not been aware of the danger until last year because American intelligence had not predicted the rate of Russian progress in the missile field.\* Senator Kefauver noted that the recent hearings have brought out that some intelligence branches of our governmental departments are less optimistic than others. Senator Johnson, whose committee has just reviewed intelligence information, reached the conclusion that we must assume Russian operational capability of IRBM's, ICBM's, and submarine-launched missiles to exist at present. He also claimed (January 3) that "tranquilizers have been handed the American people in a time of crisis". General Gavin noted that the Russians have paraded anti-aircraft missiles with nuclear warheads. Yet Air Force General Bernard Schreiver, in charge of the ballistic missile program, is quoted on January 6, 1958 as stating: "But my own opinion is that their ICBM program is a development program, and it is a nip-and-tuck race. I see no reason why we can't catch up".

Astute observers who have compared our military and industrial program with that of our opponents have concluded that the Russians are well capable of matching or even excelling us in specific selected areas. They can apparently accomplish this not only in the scale of effort, but -- more important -- in the race for time. It is quite apparent that by selecting a few specific areas for crash programs, the Russians have been able to cut lead times from the first idea or research achievement to production by large factors in comparison to corresponding ones in our own defense effort. Most phases of their program are undertaken in

\* January's Fortune confirms this and reports a range of '59-'61 as our new "deadline".

parallel. Thus, when they test a new weapon before we do, we must add to our delay also the difference between their crash production program and our broad and step-after-step approach. That the short-cut approach is often feasible, and in the long run sometimes less expensive, is also indicated by the criticism that has been leveled at our own defense planning. We tolerate the "orderly" approach when we feel secure and consider ourselves unbeatable. On the other hand, we are starting to realize that the frustration of starting from behind can be a powerful incentive for decisive planning and a real crash program to overtake the leader. That incentive has been working for the Russians and for us in the past. There might never have been a crash "Manhattan Project" in World War II if we had not feared that Hitler would learn to make A-bombs before we did.

It would not be safe to base our estimate of the total Russian capability only on the things we have been able to observe. Our bits of intelligence information are obtained through the dedication and often heroism of our men in the service; we owe it to them and to ourselves to use it wisely. The analyst who interprets this information must remember that it is only fragmentary and supplementary to many "open" facts, and he must be keenly aware of the consequences of erroneous judgment. This is a critical job to be performed by well-counselled and objective men who do not hesitate to face and express the range of possible conclusions. Those whose judgment has been consistently found on the dangerously wrong but more palatable side must not be allowed to influence conclusions and decisions over and over again if we want the total system to be a net asset. Steps must be taken in this area also to minimize the conscious or inadvertent influence of departmental interests on the different groups. Otherwise, much of this work can be wasted or even harmful, and our current and future predictions will have to be arbitrarily adjusted in line with the experience on our major past estimates! The sincere and capable men in these areas cannot operate efficiently under an overcompetitive set-up with factional interests and compromises.

Regardless of the accuracy of Aviation Week or Newsweek, the only safe estimate of the production date of Russia's ICBM would be to assume that their ICBM production facilities have been under construction for some time, probably before the first long-distance test was performed, and that the ICBM itself in some form, perhaps to be refined later, is now in full production. Certain components for the ICBM could have been stockpiled along with the production of medium-range missiles. There can be no doubt now that Russia has had its aim on a ICBM crash program for a long time. Since they are also ahead of us on launching ballistic missiles from submarines, they will be able to assure full "coverage" of the United States from at least two independent sources.

Today, we have no alternative to preparing ourselves for an early, unmistakable Russian demonstration, proving beyond doubt the effectiveness and operational availability of Russian long-range missile systems. Krushchev and others have hinted that some type of demonstration is under their serious consideration. Now is the time to anticipate this possibility.

It is in fact quite likely that a Russian planner would postulate to his boss that the period of the next two or three years, before the United States can catch up and achieve an absolute stalemate, is for the first

-6-

time presenting Russia with a degree of military superiority over us which they have never been able to achieve before. He might argue that our multi-billion-dollar system of giant present and future bases, including our overseas SAC bases, refueling bases, and large carriers, can be put out of action at the first strike; he might postulate that Russia's defense right after an attack on us would involve a relatively simple and short engagement, pitting the remains of our relatively slow, sonic bombing force against their fast anti-aircraft missiles with nuclear warheads, over a very short number of hours, starting from a zero hour established by them in advance. Their attack and defense could, therefore, be executed much more effectively than our own program of constant preparedness for retaliation. Right or wrong, if the Russian leaders believe this, they may at this moment be facing a decision on the best manner of demonstrating and, if necessary, using their temporary advantage to achieve maximum gains.

This is of course not to say that -- based on the same set of facts available, today -- entirely different attitudes on the part of the Russian leaders are impossible or unlikely. Let us consider at least two other attitudes for which there is some recent evidence:

- (1) They may hesitate to risk retaliation, even at its assumed reduced level of effectiveness, particularly since they are on the offensive and can anticipate gains without warfare,
- (2) Regardless of their past performance, they may be reaching the conclusion now that some form of coexistence is becoming in fact the only alternative to universal destruction.

Based on the same set of facts also, there are of course other possible interpretations concerning the military situation. Unfortunately, other interpretations are less disturbing at the moment and thus more easily adopted. A number of public statements have indicated that we do not credit Russia with full-scale long-range missile capabilities either now or in the next two years. It is this vital assumption which causes our leaders to emphasize the difference between our present security and our future danger.

There is a small group of those who claim that our SAC and present retaliatory strength will prevail and remain effective for many years to come. There is a second group, including most Administration leaders and those who have accepted the same assumptions from official sources, which concludes that our present means will suffice until our giant bases become subject to land or sea-based missile attack within about two or three years.\* The assumption on the timing of Russian operations capabilities

---

\* On January 17, 1958, General Twining, chairman of the Joint Chiefs, states as follows: "In order that the confidence of the free world may remain adequate to the cold war tasks which lie ahead, it is important that we realize, at home and abroad, that we are not -- today -- in my judgment, in a position of inferior military strength vis-a-vis the Soviet Union...."

(over)

is basic to this second group. They see no danger now or soon. But the same information on which they base that conclusion had led a third group of some equally informed men, in government as well as outside, to infer that we must base our planning on the assumption that these Russian operational capabilities exist now or will exist very soon. A fourth group simply adjusts the longer term conclusions of the second group for the assumption on timing adopted by the third group. If that is done, it yields a grim possibility which is sometimes classified as "alarmist" so that it can be ignored.

It is important to consider what the consequences could be if it should turn out that we did not have all the facts. We must take care not to consider the more easily acceptable estimate the "conservative" one. It has been postulated earlier that a small probability with a major consequence can result in a combination which must not be ignored.

**B. Bold Tactical Approaches --- Our immediate goal should be to produce and announce a military stalemate in spite of the Russian missile capabilities. ---**

It does not make sense to suggest somber conclusions unless there is some hope for specific positive approaches consistent with this interpretation. It is believed that there are such possible approaches, and they will be outlined by means of illustration in this section.

In order to prevent potential blackmail or destruction, and in order to avoid negotiating from weakness, it is absolutely necessary to convince our opponents and the world at once that a total attack on us would mean destruction of our enemy, or possibly universal destruction. Possession of many, quickly launchable IRBM's with well dispersed forward bases, or possession of an equivalent, effective ICBM force would drive this point across. However, we do not possess either. With the best lead times foreseeable on our side today, our planners apparently estimate a minimum of two years to achieve this objective in this manner.\* In fact, some of the prerequisites (numbers, dispersal, quickness in response, etc.) to make such a system effective may not be met even then, under published plans! There may be no time now for this approach as the single, short-range approach.

---

(footnote cont'd from previous page:)

"It is true that we contemplate a very dangerous future and that we must exert major efforts if we are to maintain a favorable balance of military strength. We must never allow ourselves to arrive at ... a disaster point ... where the Soviets could devastate our country without risk of effective retaliation ...."

- \* Just now, in the middle of January 1958, the manufacturer of our earliest ICBM calls the Air Force's date "by the end of 1959" too optimistic. He says: "We will have to rely on conventional forces for the next five years. We will be walking a very tight wire with our lives for the next five years ... all of us (need to be) frankly told of the size and form and timing of the danger in which we live." The president and chairman of another major corporation in the defense effort adds: "The imminence and magnitude of threat have not yet been stated effectively enough by the government itself to engender a national attitude appropriate to the threat."

Similarly, the development of somewhat faster bombers, fifteen-minute long-range warnings systems, anti-missile missiles, submarine killers and radiation shelters could not be achieved in time, and a very good case could be made for postulating that even their present realization in the form as conceivable today would be of only limited effect as far as this problem is concerned.

If this situation is honestly faced, then it becomes apparent that there is required an immediate increase in the number and mobility of retaliatory air bases and airplanes, or an entirely different concept. Since it also becomes apparent that these bases will be the primary objects for the first attack, it must be realized that any type of landing strip or highway which can be made available for takeoff may not be available for the return landing. Under these circumstances it may make a good deal of sense to double the distance range of our whole Air Force, including intermediate-range and short-range bombers and pursuit planes, by considering their missions to be one way and not round-trip retaliatory assignments. A combination of dispersal and mobility of bases, and of attack from all directions and at all levels would have catastrophic consequences to an enemy, even with the missile capabilities, offensive and defensive, which Russia has or will soon possess.

The other possible short-term solution which comes to mind and should perhaps be explored would be to announce immediately (as soon as possible) that the present world armament situation leaves us no choice but to abandon our present means of retaliation and that we have substituted for it, at least for the time being, "automatic retaliation by recoil," or the "ultimate force of retaliation."

Under this approach, we might simply announce that we have stopped flying regular "full dress" SAC missions and have instead taken steps to assure that any full-scale attack on us will "automatically"\* release our own powerful and well-spaced "spiked counterweapons."\*\* These would have sufficient combined capability to almost assure general destruction in the Northern hemisphere. Estimates that we and other atomic powers have the capacity to convert and adapt such nuclear weapons very quickly have been widely discussed in the technical and public literature for a number of years. Obviously, no test will be performed or expected to prove adequate performance. (The technical aspects of this approach could be discussed with nuclear weapons and fall-out experts who are now studying "clean" bombs.) We could further announce that our long-standing determination not to be the attacker and not to wage preventive war has made it quite logical for us, under our concepts of retaliation, to abandon routine retaliatory patrol or training missions under the new circumstances, that we do not care whether our opponents would do likewise but suggest that they follow suit because of the obvious nature of the consequences to everyone if any accidents should occur.

---

\* with safeguards --actually

\*\* Some of these might soon be placed in the form of crude IRBM bases around the North Pole and on ships. Accuracy would be irrelevant. They could be supplied by submarine and air.

-9-

(If we should announce our intentions to do so before having placed the system into effect, we might invite a sudden reaction from our opponents, particularly if we have underestimated their immediate capacity.)

It cannot be overemphasized at this point that either quick tactical solution presented by itself would make absolutely no sense at all and would leave us open for world-wide criticism from a number of quarters. It makes sense only if it is announced and used as a means to give the world a breathing spell for the approach to an overall solution. To be effective, the overall problem and our approach to its broad solution (discussed later) must also be included in the same announcement. The one-problem-at-a-time approach will not make sense!

These immediate stop-gap measures should give us time to adopt subsequent "holding action" to maintain or restore full retaliatory capability in time, until the strategy to safeguard peace can achieve tangible results. We can in subsequent months explore medium-range approaches, such as:

- (1) (Solid fuel?) Jato-type discardable rocket boosters to get all of our conventional planes off the ground faster and rockets to extend their range for the critical mission.
- (2) Conversion of part of our (one-way) medium and short-range planes into one-way drones - at a sacrifice of some effectiveness.
- (3) Furnishing many marine vessels with platforms or strips for the launching of a boosted, one-way plane, drone (Snark, Navaho?), or Polaris, depending on their availability and other factors.
- (4) Construction of small and preferably mobile (also Arctic) bases for the same purpose, etc.

As long as their launching procedures remain cumbersome and critical, liquid-propelled rockets appear to be limited for modern retaliatory purposes, although they may play a more lasting role in satellite launchings. Consequently, we may not profit greatly in real retaliatory capability through chemical ballistic missiles until the solid-fuel propulsion program yields a large number of operational IRBM's (Polaris) and possibly ICBM's. Similarly, a few, somewhat faster than sonic, chemical or nuclear planes will not play a decisive role, and it is highly doubtful that anti-missile missiles will ever have a chance to repulse an overall surprise attack.

Given emphasis, a nuclear ballistic missile (land and sea-based) and space program may be successful in a few years. This type of approach is now our only real hope to catch up with Russian missile and space technology.

Of course, it is wrong to claim that we have no unified plans for military action, but our plans tend to be born out of compromises among well-established, prior concepts of the roles and missions of the services, as well as out of continuing underestimation of the opponent's present and future capabilities. It is not fair to expect operational departments to sponsor and develop early enthusiasm for entirely new thinking which would often ~~Approved For Release 2003/05/26 : CIA-RDP80B01676R003700070017-9~~ organizations, at least as they conceive them. Furthermore, each group naturally assumes its basic essence and role consciously or unconsciously, as it

applies its judgment to a new situation and then suboptimizes. This is not only true in government but in any enterprise, and is as much true within a service as among the services. (Nuclear and missile-launching submarines versus a vulnerable carrier, containing a 1/2 billion dollars' worth of investment,...etc.) Planning, research and development for entirely new concepts and for their implementation is probably done best by people whose purpose is that, and that alone. They should certainly include former members of operational departments, as well as a top-notch technical staff, and should frequently consult with operations groups to be effective. As an independent department, the new unit would compete with the operational services for its share of funds. Its direct responsibility would be to plan for our security 2, 5 and 10 years ahead, while the other departments would take care of current and near future requirements.

We must earn the confidence of people here and abroad in our military and political planning. General Twining states that our national policy, the will of our allies, and the confidence of our people in their civilian and military leaders, must not be weakened because of a mistaken impression that the Soviets have achieved military ascendancy over the free world. "Such a misapprehension could lead to fatal compromises in connection with disarmament negotiations and could lead to other retreats which could eventually destroy our security". He states that it could increase the probability of total war by encouraging bolder Soviet action and miscalculation. But it can be added that perhaps nothing can strengthen public confidence quite so much now as evidence of a sound strategy and imagination in the military and political areas. Conversely, we could lose that confidence and endanger our security if we publicly boast about our own superiority, and in so doing, reveal our possible incomplete knowledge of the opponent's strength and rate of progress in relation to our own!

C. The Broader-Term Technological Dilemma --- We are on the sure track to early world destruction unless we change course. ---

Informed people will agree, when they let themselves think, that there is no permanent status quo in the technological world situation. A sole policy of keeping our powder dry and our nerve up is no longer a survival policy in this day and age. The present situation is completely unstable; it is very fortunate for all of us that no major incidents or accidents have occurred so far, and it would be nothing short of a miracle if that luck could continue much longer.

General Omar N. Bradley, among others, has warned that the situation will become increasingly unstable as it develops in the future at an accelerated rate along the present track. Most of the approaches discussed in the preceding section will contribute to this rapid deterioration of world stability. The reasons are, of course, as follows:

- (1) The problem of the fourth, fifth --- and fifteenth atomic nation,\*

---

\* A nation has much to gain by its possession of A and H bombs. France will soon test its own weapons. The generation of neutrons in thermonuclear devices will be achieved in the next year or two; an advanced

(over)

- (2) The problem of the "Nassers",
- (3) The problem of stockpiles in the hands of a faction about to lose a civil war,\*
- (4) The problem of human errors, drunkenness, or temporary insanity (pilot in an airplane, radioman in a submarine, operator in a control center, etc.)
- (5) The problem of the sincere and patriotically motivated commander who believes in preventive war,
- (6) The problem of the anonymous attack by the "third" nation, and finally,
- (7) The problem of electronic or instrument failures, such as the ones which occurred recently when our Snark escaped to Brazil, or when the New York Central Railroad experienced a head-on collision on their single track system right after it had been fully instrumented electronically to avoid exactly that contingency.

It may be argued (unrealistically) that our system is and will remain foolproof; but will those who risk this claim extend their guarantee to the Russian system, and later to the Chinese and Egyptian systems? Can they maintain their guarantee as all systems, in order to remain effective, must become more push-button controlled, and as communications and decisions must be increasingly subdivided and delegated to far-flung stations, outposts, and patrols?

Apart from the danger of accidents, the present climate and developments, if the trend is not reversed soon, will make it more likely that new technology of warfare will get out of control. The new means of destruction of the next decade or two have not been conceived yet, but it is obvious that they will be more effective, easier to produce, and harder

---

(footnote cont'd from previous page:)

form of such a device may perhaps in very few years enable any capable (even small) nation to manufacture plutonium or U-233 from uranium or thorium. The first indications of a "catalyst" for fusion at low temperatures have been reported. It has also been speculated for years that thermonuclear weapons may be devised some day without fission materials. Either of these or other approaches, if "successful", will enable dozens of nations to acquire stockpiles of H-bombs at a reasonable cost and effort. But in any case, several nations will acquire atomic bombs in the next few years, including China, and there will be other lethal means of mass destruction at ever lower investment. Even Russia and the United States will then be insecure. There are signs that the Russian leaders, who are not stupid, are beginning to realize this, and they may actually be seeking a way out.

\* We appear to hope for uprisings in Russia or the satellites. But the weak uprisings will not be more successful than the Hungarian slaughter, and the more evenly matched civil war could easily end in universal destruction.

to control. There are "subtle" means of damage within range of feasibility; these include or will include the planting of new strains of germs and the control of weather. Since it will be difficult to recognize this type of attack, it cannot be prevented by the threat of massive retaliation.

It might be noted that all the short-term approaches to our existing danger-- as discussed in the previous section-- will unavoidably increase the chances of mishap!

There are probably other equally good reasons which could be listed to substantiate the fact that the present situation is completely unstable, even if it is agreed that no sound mind would intentionally initiate such destruction on a partial or world scale. Although there have been newspaper commentaries and articles alluding to this fact, no one in leadership position has dared to spell this out to our nation and the world. Perhaps it is felt that there is no reason to issue brutal statements -- even if true -- unless that is necessary as a condition to make bold solutions acceptable. Without ideas there is no appreciation for candor. (Although many would call this statement undemocratic and indicative of a lack of faith.) On the other hand, once a possible solution becomes apparent, it becomes imperative that the situation and the solution are presented together!

For reasons of their own, the Russian leaders have recently made a number of statements which would indicate a growing apprehension on their part.\* If our leaders do not take the initiative soon on this point, in a constructive way, the world will listen to anyone else including the Russians for answers, believing that we are refusing to face up to the problem.

It is quite understandable that we have become skeptical of negotiations with the Communistic nations, that we would like to negotiate from overwhelming strength (as we once did), and that we do not want to rely upon words without safeguards. Nevertheless, the situation may justify a fresh approach:

- (1) The Russians and we should take advantage of our new common prime-objective: survival; it is becoming much clearer every day, and it is a task which will grow more and not less difficult with time!
- (2) We shall never again be able to count on overwhelming strength; our best hope is a quick stalemate. Words and courage alone will not carry the day.

---

\* It has been speculated recently that the past pattern of behavior of the Russian leaders can be traced to a deep-rooted feeling of inferiority and, consequently, of insecurity. According to this hypothesis, their present successes have at least temporarily removed these blocks to a more enlightened attitude on world problems, and the new attitude will then prevail unless it is interpreted as a sign of weakness or threatens to cause a hazardous loss of face.

- (3) When fully informed, the American and other free people have repeatedly demonstrated more collective guts, perseverance, common sense, and willingness to sacrifice, than their leaders have given them credit for. They are not often found behind their leaders in their intuitive grasp of a situation, including the present one. There is little cause to fear their reaction after a series of negotiations, regardless of the outcome -- provided that they do get a straight report without a calculated, and usually apparent, ulterior appeal or twist. People all over the world are in a position to demand action, if they are made aware of the total problem, and they are giving signs of getting tired of being talked down to, like children. This could become a decisive factor in future elections. Many foreign leaders have become responsive to this pressure. German Foreign Minister von Brentano feels (January 19) that the risks of not negotiating outweigh those of negotiating.
- (4) With the present and future state of technology, everyone needs a new formula to replace present disarmament proposals. (Regardless of past performance, Russia cannot afford to trust our word either.) This type of new formula will be discussed below.

D. Bold Strategies --- An acceptable, practical way must be found quickly to relax tensions and create confidence in a better future. ---

Quite apart from any question of acceptability within the Western world, any solution to be realistic must be more attractive to Mr. Krushchev and associates than the alternative of taking their chances with the present situation, dangerous as it may be even to them. Some of our past approaches may not have fully taken that balance into account. It must be realized that a step-at-a-time approach would be too slow, and each item may be completely unacceptable; whereas a complete and well formulated package proposal combining these same items would reflect and evoke a sufficient degree of honesty and realism to become acceptable.

For instance, we have proposed far-reaching disarmament policing within Russia while at the same time championing uprisings and hoping for a "collapse" behind the Iron Curtain. Krushchev is just now starting to achieve some degree of popular support, possibly in preparation for a continuing raising of the Iron Curtain. He may never become sure enough of his support to delegate rights within Russia to ostensibly hostile nations whose motives might be obvious. Justifiable as our ambitions may be, we are going to have to forget about revolutions in the Communist nations. Our best and professed hope can only be for gradual and orderly evolution and progress in all systems. We are going to have to decide between patience and holocaust.

On the other hand, we cannot be expected to enter into a competition between two systems, when the exercise of choice is unidirectional and irreversible. Consequently, we shall have to agree on freezing the current boundaries of the camps, unless we can find some formula to give the Satellite nations, as well as the democratic nations a free choice.

Thorough inspection will also make Russia lose her current advantage due to secret locations of places and installations. They will hardly surrender this advantage except as part of an overall agreement.

We shall face that acceptability problem also with any new proposals. For instance, if we should propose an immediate world government based on democratic national systems and elections today, Mr. Krushchev will reject it because it could subject Russian leaders to the will of a people and the justice of a court which they cannot control or predict. On the other hand, increased reliance on arbitration, and increasing emphasis on the enforcement of an international justice might be an essential ingredient of progress.

Another reality must be faced. Disarmament with inspection, even with enforcement, will probably remain short of perfect and is therefore not fully trustworthy in the present situation. This shortcoming has arisen since the advent of atomic mass production and will continue to increase in degree of imperfection as newer weapons are invented. It is extremely difficult to visualize any form of inspection by observation alone, aerial or otherwise, which could not be evaded by tomorrow's hidden, sunk, or buried nuclear weapon and missile aimed at the heart of the inspecting nation. The best hope for effective disarmament lies in the creation of a situation in which a now unacceptable and inadequate degree of inspection and enforcement can become acceptable and adequate. We shall discuss such a situation below. Suspensions of nuclear tests, although of some value, would of course only be a step toward controlled disarmament.

In all probability, we shall never again be able to negotiate from a position of dominating strength. If we quickly achieve a position of technological-military stalemate and simultaneously formulate and frankly propose our ideas and plans, including our pledge to wait for orderly evolution to improve all systems, we have then made it possible to reply upon the basic condition for a new approach -- the obvious common interest in survival.

Reference to past rejections of proposals paralleling a portion of this approach cannot be used to predict their unacceptability, because the claim is made here that otherwise unacceptable, piecemeal solutions can become acceptable parts of an overall approach. The first step has to be candor between governments and their people, and among different governments. The overriding interests become then common interests.

If the free world emphatically and repeatedly pledged itself also to the principle of working toward disarmament only conditional to adequate world safeguards, and invited the Russians to do likewise, it would thus define to reasonable people everywhere what constitutes an acceptable agreement, and why. This frank resolution is so easy to drive across and would make so much sense that it is inconceivable to suppose that the free people would wish to lower their guard without such a guarantee! We must no longer fear negotiations with the Soviets because of a lack of confidence in our own system and people! Of course, the negotiations would have to be well prepared for, and at a high enough level to avoid delays, the wrong calling of signals, and lack of accurate communications, vision, or authority on the part of the negotiating parties. After all, assuming that we can quickly prove the establishment of a military stalemate to the Russians, they would have to be forced to conclude that an

early, guaranteed world agreement would be as vital to them as to us. In view of the rapid military developments, no further time must be lost! Whatever we propose should avoid critical dependence on trust, but should rather emphasize prescribed positive action, agreement to which would prove de-facto the resolution of each nation to abrogate all intentions of surprise attack and aggression. The subsequent paragraphs will describe one possible approach.

As a start in improving the present world situation, the United States could propose a system of world arbitration (Hague Court?) and suggest the creation of a really potent international force immediately. This force would be in the nature of a United Nations police force, as is presently patrolling the borders between Israel and her Arabian neighbors, but of course entirely different in magnitude, scope and armaments. This force would be armed jointly by us, the Russians, and any other powers who could participate in some proportionate way. Presumably, it would be stationed all over the globe and manned by nationals of powers other than the host nation.

As this force is built up and stationed around the world, a universal inspection and control system would be initiated, productions of key armaments would be stopped, national forces and armaments could be reduced, etc. The inspection system, under which these steps would be taken, would be as thorough as it can be and still be acceptable, but it would no longer have to approach perfection. In subsequent years, it may become necessary or desirable -- and feasible -- to extend the areas of inspection to industrial installations, laboratories, and even scientists, engineers and technicians\*. As tensions would relax and confidence would be gained, additional reliance could be placed on the people of each nation to be induced to volunteer information of an unlawful character to the international inspecting personnel. Whether clandestine information could be brought in the open by the skillful use of such devices as lie-detectors may be open to question .... It is quite obvious that the ultimate framework of such an inspection system could not be created at once, but should be referred to as the goal.

All potential "fourth" nations would participate in the police force. Under this general approach they would not feel as helpless and subjected to the whims of the big powers and of irresponsible other "fourth" powers. Their security will have increased immeasurably, since peace would be enforced and since nuclear weapons and missiles would be limited and controlled. Conversely, continued unrestricted construction of new production facilities for these or new types of weapons could only hurt them. Pressure may have to be exerted on one or two to make the agreement enforced on a world-wide scale (including Red China which -- in our own interest -- would have to be made a full participant along with all other nations).

The mere fact that the United States, Russia and others would be arming such a world force with atomic missiles, etc., would be obvious evidence

---

\* Under these circumstances, the scientists and co-workers as a group would be probably the first to agree with this necessity wholeheartedly and would probably become the system's strongest link.

that these nations have resolved to settle their differences by other means than atomic attack. In this sense, many of the risks due to the instability of the present situation would be minimized. Tensions would be relaxed, and the need for ever more instantaneous retaliation and trigger-happiness would be reduced.

In this atmosphere, settlement of any world problem could become possible if solutions can be found which are more attractive to both parties than a status quo.

If this strategy pays off, it will not matter whether we have time or not to test anti-missile missiles with nuclear warheads. We are probably doing ourselves a disservice by overemphasizing its importance to our timing on agreements. It is very likely that developments in missile attack will again obsolete missile defense before it is ready for use!

Many problems and questions will, of course, be raised when these world security forces in the form of police and inspection teams are planned. Some conditions will appear essential and others negotiable. How should the teams be composed, organized and headed for maximum effectiveness? What would be their scope, tasks and responsibilities? Would the consequence of a single team's falling victim to local attack be serious enough to prevent it "at all costs"? How much and what kind of protection would the single team need? Should the United Nations be broadened or a new body be created? Under which rules should the body be governed and operated? How easily should the rules be amendable? What form of action would be taken against specific degrees of aggression or infractions of rules? By whom would punitive action be taken on minor infractions? Would punitive action be taken against nations, individuals, or both? Would there be recourse to a World Court on minor infractions?

There are many facets to be explored on these and other questions. To try to discuss them even sketchily would take more space than this memorandum covers already. The adoption of this security system would not rid us of our obligations and expenditures and will not solve all our problems. It is simply a needed alternative to a current course toward catastrophe. If there are better alternatives, we should seek them out and adopt them instead, while there is time. We owe this to the next generation. It seems certain that no effective alternative will be able to take its example from past history and past solutions. No effective course of action will come free of charge, but its price in money and other sacrifices should be materially less than that which will be demanded by our present course. It should be possible to propose general concepts along these lines without having all the fine points decided.

Bold as this proposal may appear, it would probably not suffice in the long run. The people of the world must be given an incentive which amounts to more than a world policeman. Nevertheless, this additional incentive cannot conflict with the immediate interests of present national leadership anywhere. Thus, we might propose that all nations pledge themselves to hold internationally controlled, wide open elections in the year 2000, at which time the people of each nation could decide the system under which they preferred to live. It might make sense to have that decision stand for a period of 100 years at a time.

The combination of the proposals as part of this long-term strategy would satisfy the prerequisites that the solutions not conflict with the personal interests of current national leadership, that they bring about improvement by evolution rather than revolution, and that they yet achieve the purpose of supplying a real target to man's dream of a better world.

In the period between now and the year 2000, when none of the present national leaders in any country would still be alive, present and new systems of government and society would be given the opportunity of competing with one another for the happiness and "hearts and minds" of men. New knowledge and technology, such as plentiful new sources of energy and materials can then lead to an unprecedented rate of progress. In the course of preparing for the popular vote, some systems would have to undergo real, evolutionary changes, as one can well imagine, and it is thus quite conceivable that the systems will approach each other as they approach the year 2000. During this period, each system will have the chance to convince its own and other people, including the less developed nations, by its achievements along all lines except war that it constitutes the most desirable system for them. This is a challenge that we must not fear, and which the Communist system must accept and adapt itself to, if it is not to admit defeat.

John Shacter

December 18, 1957

(Minor notes added  
Jan. '58 and '59)

Union Carbide Building  
30 East 42nd Street  
New York 17, N. Y.

THE WHITE HOUSE  
WASHINGTON

February 5, 1959

Dear Mr. Shacter:

I myself, and several members of the NSC Staff, have read with both interest and profit the memorandum entitled, "Hard Facts and Bold Strategies" which you were good enough to leave with me when you came in to see me last Saturday. Some of the ideas are familiar others are novel; particularly your point about their acceptable combination.

As I tried to make clear when we met, I am grateful to you and other informed and experienced citizens for the feeling of patriotic obligation and privilege which led you to give me and others in the Administration the benefit of views which have obviously been most carefully thought out.

It falls to my lot, at present, to hear and discuss with the responsible officials of this Administration a great variety of proposals designed, in one way or another, to answer the grave problems of national security which increasingly beset our country. Obviously, I can give you no assurance as to the likelihood that some or all of your ideas will recommend themselves to our policy-makers. I can only say that along with others, they will be given a hearing and will have to make their way in competition with other sets of ideas, in accordance with the traditional practices of our government. To this end I am reproducing your memorandum and having it distributed to the members of the Planning Board of the National Security Council. As you know, the Planning Board constitutes the normal and principal body for developing policy recommendations which the Council considers and the members will be asked seriously to consider your paper as we move ahead in our current review of basic national policy.

I feel that it would be inappropriate for me to make any suggestions to you about further distribution of your memorandum or further efforts to assure for it the consideration that I gather you feel has thus far not been accorded your proposals. Specifically, I think that I shall not seek to advise you as to whether you should send your communication to the President. But, after all, it is the right, if not the duty, of a

citizen to take whatever lawful steps he deems appropriate to obtain a hearing for views which he advances out of a patriotic regard for the security of his country.

With thanks for the time and trouble you have taken to give me and my staff the benefit of your thinking, I am

Sincerely yours,

[Redacted Signature]

Gordon Gray  
Special Assistant to the President

STAT

Mr. John Shacter

[Redacted Name]

STAT