


THE DIRECTOR OF INTELLIGENCE AND RESEARCH
WASHINGTON




*Authr
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AUG 25 1958

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Dear Allen:

A series of requests for NIE's or SNIE's have been addressed to us from various offices in the Department within the past week relating to countries and problems in the Near and Middle East and South Asia. The volume of these requests is in some respects frightening, but we have looked them over carefully and have come to the conclusion that a valid need exists for most of them. Our schedule recommendations are listed below in the order of priority, which was developed in consultation with interested offices, and with explanatory comment where necessary.



1 - Factors Affecting Arab-Israeli Arms Control Possibilities

This will probably be required for the 13th. General Assembly, and is particularly timely in view of the President's Middle East proposals. Suggestions for terms of reference, prepared in S/P and concurred in by INR, are attached as an enclosure. If feasible, this should be scheduled for contributions by the first week of September.

2 - British Position in the Arabian Peninsula

This is another timely problem, and the fact that the subject has not been treated in an estimate for some time should enhance the utility of the proposed NIE. We suggest the third week in September as deadline for contributions.

3 - Outlook for Iran

The last NIE on Iran was published in 1957. A brief SNIE (34-58) on "The Situation in Iran" is now in process and slated for IAC consideration on August 26. However, a re-examination of the Iranian picture in broader perspective is believed to be worthwhile. If agreeable, I suggest contributions be scheduled for the latter part of September or early October.

STATE review(s) completed.

4 - Domestic and Political Stability in Ceylon

Mr. Allen Dulles,

The Director of Central Intelligence,

Washington, 25, 1958
Approved For Release 2003/05/08 : CIA-RDP80B01676R004200090042-3

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4 - Domestic and Political Stability in Ceylon

NIE 54-58, "The Outlook for Ceylon," was published on March 18. However, rapidly unfolding events in Ceylon have recently tended to create pressures and conditions which appear to differ, at least in degree, from those prevailing at that time. These events include the communal riots in May and June, the definite possibility of further disorders inspired by extreme nationalists and communists, and growing doubts regarding the ability of the present coalition government to stem the deterioration of law and order. In the circumstances, a re-assessment would appear to be desirable. I suggest that contributions be scheduled for the latter part of October, if possible.

Sincerely,



Hugh S. Cumming, Jr.
The Director of Intelligence and Research

Enclosure:

Tentative Outline of Topics

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**TOPICS SUGGESTED FOR CONSIDERATION
IN TERMS OF REFERENCE OF PROPOSED NIE**

To examine certain questions connected with the possibility of local arms control in the Arab-Israeli area:

I. In the absence of such local arms control, what is likely to be course of Arab-Israeli arms competition and its effect on

- 1 - Arab-Israeli relations
- 2 - Economic conditions in the area
- 3 - Attitudes in the area toward the US and the USSR
- 4 - The chances of war.

II. What would be reactions among the states of the area to:

- 1 - A UN study of the problem
- 2 - A UN effort to reach individual agreements with the states involved in the 1948 hostilities concerning
 - a - reciprocal limitations on their imports of major armaments
 - b - arrangements for inspection of such imports.

III. What would be reactions in the Bloc, the Near East, and the rest of the free world if the US countered future Soviet proposals for an arms embargo by stating that it was willing, conditional on all other arms exporting countries

doing the same,

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doing the same, to suspend shipments of heavy armaments to the area until such shipments could be resumed in accordance with a UN agreement along the lines indicated in II above. How would these reactions and those projected in para. II be affected if previously

- 1 - The US had reiterated its unwillingness to see violent change in present Arab-Israeli demarcation lines
- 2 - Israel had received some of the arms it is now seeking.

IV. What would be the likelihood that other shipping countries would

- 1 - Subscribe to
- 2 - Observe

such a temporary suspension? What would be our intelligence capability for detecting any evasion?

V. What would be the effect of such suspension, if it were observed by all shippers, on

- 1 - The prospects referred to in Para. I
- 2 - The likelihood of an agreement such as referred to in Para. II.

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CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY OFFICIAL ROUTING SLIP

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2	[Redacted]	<i>NA</i>	
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Remarks:

A copy has been sent to Jack Heires.

*I assume were indelible
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PW/C*

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