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30 November 1955

**MEMORANDUM FOR:** Honorable Harold E. Stassen  
Special Assistant to the President for Disarmament

**SUBJECT :** Progress Report on Proposed Policy of the United States  
on the Question of Disarmament

**REFERENCES :** NIE 11-11-55  
NIE 100-5-55

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1. The Progress Report does not present the details of the proposed Armament Inspection Plan in sufficient detail to permit me to pass <sup>from</sup> judgment upon it as an effective instrument for the implementation of NSC Action 1419. <sup>Moreover, my primary concern is</sup> [However, I do not consider it appropriate for me to pass judgment on the proposed plan or upon the outline presented in this paper except insofar as] the collection, evaluation and dissemination of national intelligence may be involved. In that regard, I do have a heavy responsibility under existing laws and various NSC Directives and Executive Orders. As you are aware, I am extremely cognizant of the short-comings in intelligence pertaining to the USSR and the Soviet Orbit and particularly the intelligence affecting Orbit capabilities for adversely affecting the security and national policies of the United States. I have therefore a very vital interest in any inspection and verification system, since any such system will be of enormous value in the field of intelligence as applied to national security and national policies. While the information contained in the Progress Report is not sufficiently complete to warrant detailed critical analysis, I believe that the broad outline presented does afford a basis for <sup>from an intelligence standpoint,</sup> some comments which may be worthy of consideration.

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SECRET

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- 2 -

2. For convenience of reference, I will address my remarks under four principal <sup>General</sup> headings and follow with some specific comments and recommendations. The four principal <sup>General</sup> headings are:

- a. The intelligence implications of the proposed arms inspection system;
- b. The effectiveness of the system in achieving its objectives, particularly in providing "against the possibility of great surprise attack";
- c. The probable acceptability of the proposed plan to the USSR;
- d. The probable value of the plan, if rejected by the USSR, in aiding to retain the initiative in the propaganda campaign around the problem of disarmament.

3. Intelligence Implications

I assume that information to be disclosed in the "blue prints" would be complete information concerning national military establishments and as much of the industrial and economic assets as would be necessary to determine war-making potential and particularly any future build-up for possible attack. I would also assume that these disclosures would be made in successive stages as may be agreed upon, and each stage fully verified before proceeding with the next; and that the inspection and verification posts and teams located within the country would be situated so that verification and inspection would be possible and that inspection personnel would have necessary freedom of movement and from interference to permit access to installations, units, and objects to be inspected and verified. In such case, an inspection organization

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SECRET

- 3 -

of the scope outlined, together with the aerial reconnaissance and inspection which was inherent in the President's proposals and indicated in the Proposed Report, would certainly have the capability for producing a vast amount of intelligence. This information when properly processed would doubtless answer most of the questions concerning the Orbit which now torment the intelligence community, and it would <sup>go far to</sup> ~~doubtless~~ fully meet [all] requirements from the intelligence point of view as regards national security and national policy with regard to the Orbit.

[The Key  
concepts!]

It seems hardly necessary to point out that the objects of inspection, the rights of access, the means of verification, and the extent and reliability of communications provided for the inspectors will need to be spelled out in great detail before effectiveness of any plan can be judged and before it can provide any basis for serious negotiation.

[Again  
better than  
the same  
point,  
pp 3-4)

Such a system would result in the accumulation of a vast amount of data which would be meaningless in raw form. It is to be presumed that the organization contemplated will provide for an evaluating function in the successive echelons. While the Proposed Report indicates that the Department of Defense would be the executive agent for carrying out any inspection plan, it should be clearly recognized that the resulting intelligence should not rest in the field of departmental intelligence, but should also involve national intelligence for which the Central Intelligence <sup>Agency</sup> has a primary responsibility. This necessary support for the inspection system would have to be carefully planned in advance.

[Better than  
the same  
p 5)

SECRET

While no specific provision refers to Communist China, it is my opinion that Communist China will have to be considered as being within the Orbit and would have to be included in the area of inspection eventually.

[Lcd brief this up + make it cover the "eventually" ONE p. 6 last para detail]

In summary, because the USSR now has vastly greater information concerning the U.S. than we possess concerning the USSR, the net gain from verified disclosure would be overwhelmingly on the side of the U.S., unless the system required the U.S. to make disclosures of advanced weapon types and weapon production processes which the USSR does not now possess. In short, the U.S. would for the first time come into possession of a really adequate foundation for its intelligence on the USSR, and the USSR would achieve at best a marginal improvement in its intelligence on the U.S.

[ONE pp. 7-8]


4. Effectiveness, Especially Against Surprise

[ONE pp. 9-14, condensed, perhaps too much.]

With regard to protection against surprise attack, I am of the opinion that an inspection system on the scale outlined, if it provided for continuous observation of delivery vehicles <sup>and their current production, and of</sup> [and] essential Soviet military installations and also for continuous reliable communications, would effectively prevent surprise attack given present Soviet capabilities. However, the Proposed Report does not appear to limit the development of future capabilities. I am of the opinion that future assurance against nuclear surprise attack can be obtained only if there is an actual denial, through arms limitation and reduction, of the capability to attack without noticeable preparations. Such assurance against surprise nuclear attack can be obtained only if provisions for progressive arms reduction and limitation, along with a sound and comprehensive inspection system, were made an integral part of a disarmament program.

[ONE p. 9, + NIC II-11]

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[v. close paraphrase  
of ONE of 19-21,  
reworked.]

5. Probable Acceptability to the USSR

I am of the opinion that it can be predicted almost with complete certainty that the system outlined in the Proposed Report is not one which could win agreement from the USSR. Faced with a prospect of 20,000 to 30,000 Western personnel within their country, the Soviet leaders would hesitate to expose their closed society to such extensive external influences for fear that such alien influences could compromise their traditional effort to hold Soviet society in isolation from the Western world. Soviet leaders <sup>rightly or wrongly / tend to</sup> would also regard any inspection system which did not provide for the immediate dismantling of the presently superior <sup>as</sup> nuclear power as one which would freeze the present situation into one of permanent inferiority for them. Further, the Communists regard themselves as being involved in permanent conflict with the West. In this contest they are never likely to deny themselves <sup>to the extent that this plan would seem to do</sup> the option of employing whatever means, including force or the threat of force, which may seem desirable to them at any time. I am of the opinion that the Soviet leaders desire to avoid a nuclear war with the U.S., but there is little doubt that they consider themselves able to <sup>avoid such a loss</sup> accomplish this objective without making what they would almost certainly consider to be unnecessary sacrifices.

I fully  
this point.  
likely, it  
means they will  
never agree to  
anything.

6. Probable Value of Plan in Aiding Retention of Initiative in Propaganda

On the whole, I believe that the plan if carefully and effectively presented to world opinion would be acknowledged as a sincere effort to advance the chances of a durable peace. It is an elaboration of the President's Summit Proposals, the reception of which in world opinion was generally favorable.

- 6 -

There are some omissions which will make the plan vulnerable to Soviet counter-propaganda. For example, the minimal emphasis upon arms reduction would constitute one. Impact would be much stronger on world opinion if, while insisting upon an effective inspection system, the U.S. was able to commit itself in principle to substantial arms reduction on a reciprocal basis once an effective inspection system were in force and the successive "blue prints" verified satisfactorily. ONE 22

This point is of particular importance because the scale of the proposed inspection system is likely to come as something of a surprise to world opinion. There is some danger that the U.S. may be charged with setting impossible requirements in order to torpedo ~~disarmament negotiations~~ <sup>any measures for the reduction of armaments</sup> once and for all. This factor would indicate the desirability for careful analysis to insure that the scale of the system is actually the minimum required to accomplish the objectives. ONE 22

A final point of vulnerability to Soviet counter-propaganda is the failure to mention control over nuclear weapons other than in connection with a proposal to place future production of fissionable material under international control. The fear of nuclear weapons is basic in the preoccupation of the world opinion with the disarmament issue. Soviet propaganda is likely to make much of the absence of specific control of the weapons themselves. To counter this attack, it would be necessary to make a major information effort to establish the fact that no reliable inspection and control can be applied to nuclear weapons themselves since there are no reliable techniques to account for past production. ONE 22  
will show failure to mention

*Specific*  
7. General Comments


a. With reference to Section III of the Proposed Report, the principle that the degree of dispersal of U.S. facilities would determine the scale necessary for a successful initial attack and therefore that greater dispersal would increase the likelihood of advance detection by inspections seems sound. Whether present dispersal of U.S. retaliatory capability is sufficient in the light of the proposed inspection system is a technical question upon which I am unable to comment.

[ONE 14-15]

b. With reference to Section IV of the Proposed Report, the statement that the USSR is likely to have a ICBM within ten years is in accord with current estimates. This subject is currently under review but any change in the estimated date of this weapons availability will make it earlier rather than later. I agree with the statement that the ICBM could not be ready in quantity without detection by the proposed inspection system.

[ONE 15]

c. ~~With reference to Section V, I am of the opinion that~~ <sup>have noted</sup> ~~the flat statement in Paragraph A that "the outlook for future decades includes increasingly great dangers of a nuclear war" is an oversimplification which should not appear in this paper.~~ <sup>expressed in Section V, Paragraph 1</sup> Our estimates have emphasized that despite prospective increases in Soviet nuclear capabilities, U.S. retaliatory capability <sup>if maintained</sup> will continue to have a deterrent effect and that the USSR <sup>with their air</sup> will continue to try to avoid substantial risks of general war. Such an unqualified statement as indicated might appear to place the U.S. under some compulsion to accept an inspection scheme as the only alternative to nuclear destruction.



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d. With reference to Section VI, there is one important objective for U.S. policy on disarmament which should be included. This is that U.S. policy ought to be calculated to maintain solidarity of U.S. alliances. Thus far the Soviet line on disarmament has aimed to sow dissention between the U.S. and its partners. For the present, therefore, disarmament is more important as a field of political warfare maneuvering than as a subject of serious negotiation and U.S. policy should take this into account. I suggest the objective might be stated about as follows:

ONE 16-17

To handle the disarmament issue in such fashion as to insure substantial unity with the principle Allies of the U.S. and to obtain maximum support of free world opinion.

e. With reference to Paragraphs B 3 and 5 of Section VI, by all odds the most important feature which the UK, French and Soviet proposals have in common is the provision for reduction to agreed force levels. Under the proposed policy, the U.S. will accept only modest initial reductions and will only contemplate important reductions at a later stage. The area of possible "synthesis" is likely to cover relatively unimportant matters which underlines the importance of early determination of a complete U.S. policy with respect to <sup>armament</sup> ~~armed~~ reduction and limitation.

ONE 17

f. With reference to Paragraph C of Section VI. I question the desirability or necessity for the statement that the objectives listed in connection with this policy should be pursued "without subordination" to other objectives. On the grounds of both history and logic, I do not think that the disarmament problem can be separated from the political and security problems which are, after all

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[ONE 17-18-

the main cause of the arms race. U.S. policy ought not therefore to give the disarmament issue the degree of priority applied in the statement referred to, but should continue to relate this issue to a just settlement of other international problems and indeed use disarmament negotiations where possible to further such settlements.

8. Conclusions

In conclusion, I would like to emphasize the importance of national intelligence with regard to national security and national policy and to underscore the important relationship which any inspection system will necessarily have in connection with the collection, evaluation and dissemination of information upon which national intelligence is based. I want to assure you that the Central Intelligence Agency is ready at all times to render the maximum assistance in developing what will necessarily be in effect an overt intelligence system in which nations operate on a reciprocal and legalized basis. Finally, I would urge that any inspection plan contemplated should insure maintaining alert and dispersed retaliatory and defensive forces at least until the actual execution of an inspection system has established a basis for mutual confidence among nations, possibly in some distant and remote future.

*Pete's point - allows slightly greater freedom - but not perhaps fit as an "I assume" under the 1st P of p. 6*