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OPINION TRENDS
IN THE AFTERMATH OF GENEVA

September 23, 1955

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STATE review(s) completed.

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FOREWORD

The major portion of this report -- Part I -- deals with opinion in Western Europe in connection with the Big Four Conference and the upcoming Foreign Ministers Meeting.

The data on Western Europe are taken from a variety of materials prepared both by the State Department and by USIA. Opinion poll data were drawn from USIA's Barometer Surveys in Britain, France, Germany, and Italy -- particularly from a comprehensive survey just concluded.

Part II contains brief descriptions of the opinion situation in other parts of the world. The material reported therein was derived primarily from State Department data supplemented by reports prepared by USIA.

The excellent cooperation of both agencies is gratefully acknowledged.

Nelson A. Rockefeller

September 21, 1955

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INTRODUCTION

Certain highlight conclusions emerge from this analysis of world opinion in the aftermath of the Big Four Conference.

At Geneva President Eisenhower was brilliantly successful in sustaining American leadership and convincing the world of America's desire for peace. The result was a substantial enhancement in American popularity and prestige throughout most of the world, and particularly in Western Europe.

At the same time, the Russian leaders accomplished a "public relations" success of no mean proportions by reducing substantially the unpopularity of the Soviet Union in Western European eyes, and the fear of Soviet aggression.

There is little doubt that the net result has been a further undermining of the Western Alliance, as represented by NATO, in terms of public opinion support, including the opinion of the more influential upper socio-economic groups.

American foreign policy in general, and U. S. military security in particular, are based on a system of alliances, of which NATO is the most important.

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The opinion situation developing in Western Europe appears to challenge the basis of American policies with respect to Europe -- and, in particular, raises the question of whether continuing reliance can be placed on NATO as the core of U. S. -European policy.

The ways in which the "Spirit of Geneva" has affected opinion outside Western Europe present related problems for U. S. policy. In those countries with a real stake in the anti-Communist effort -- as well as in areas tied more tenuously to Free World security arrangements -- there is considerable uncertainty and apprehension.

Opinion in the neutral and uncommitted countries seems to have accepted "relaxation" as an accomplished fact and appears relieved that a choice between East and West may no longer be necessary.

Evidence of fractures in the Western security system or even of a tendency to compromise the Western security "posture" will crystallize these feelings.

One danger in this kind of a situation arises from the possibility that some countries which are highly vulnerable to Communist pressure --

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and which are inherently defenseless without Western aid, and perhaps more importantly, Western will to defend them -- might well be psychological casualties of the "spirit" of Geneva despite the absence of any concrete results of East-West negotiations.

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PART I. WESTERN EUROPE

Overview

Available data indicate that the Four Power Conference was generally viewed with elation by public opinion in most of the Western European countries.

While this opinion recognizes that no solutions were found for the concrete problems dividing East and West, it nevertheless appears convinced that the "spirit of Geneva" marks at least an "armistice" in the cold war and considerably reduces the dangers of a "hot" war.

Except in West Germany, opinion in most of the countries of Western Europe is relatively optimistic that the Foreign Ministers Conference will constitute a further step toward normalization of East-West relations and the reduction in tensions.

The intensity of popular optimism over Geneva has caused some concern in official circles in the United Kingdom, the Benelux countries, and especially France lest popular disillusionment follow realization of the widening gap between the sentiments and expectations of public opinion and the practical results of further discussion with the Russians.

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With the exception of France, where the government spokesmen apparently hesitate to oppose openly the strong wave of optimism, official circles and the responsible press have attempted to temper public sentiments by pointing out that long and arduous negotiations lie ahead.

In some cases, too, the press has expressed skepticism of the Kremlin's "peace strategy" and has emphasized its potential dangers to the West.

The following report points up the reality of this danger.

ATTITUDES TOWARD PRESIDENT EISENHOWER

USIA's Barometer Surveys confirm the "flash survey" of August 3 and the State Department* conclusion that President Eisenhower's popularity and prestige were greatly enhanced by the Four-Power Conference --- with only two minor qualifications.

As of August '55, shortly after the Meeting at the Summit, a composite average of 56% of the people in the four major countries of Western Europe (weighting Britain, France, Germany and Italy equally) expressed

* OIR 7033, World Reaction to the Summit Conference (Confidential)

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a "Good" or "Very Good" opinion of the President.

This undoubtedly made him the most popular political leader of any world power in Western European eyes.

- Eden's rating, for example, was 3 percentage points less (53%), even allowing his total to be swelled by the understandably high vote he received in his own country.
- Bulganin's percentage of "Good" and "Very Good" opinions was, by contrast a mere 18%.

A rough index of the immediate effects of the Conference on the President's prestige can be gained by comparing his ratings on two different, but basically similar Barometer questions, one asked in June, just before the Conference, the other in August, shortly after the Conference.

On a country-by-country basis, the President's rating among the general public --

- Jumped a remarkable 24 percentage points in France (from 20% to 44%);
- And 14 percentage points in Italy (from 48% to 62%).

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But, at the same time --

- Remained the same in Britain (72%);
- And substantially the same in Germany (58% before the Conference, 55% afterward - a difference too slight to have statistical validity for trend purposes.)

Very clearly, the somewhat dampened post-conference reactions in Britain and Germany were not typical of those in the rest of Western Europe. According to all available data, Eisenhower's prestige and popularity were soundly enhanced by the Four-Power Conference on the Continent as a whole to a point which can only be characterized as a great personal triumph for the President.

ATTITUDES TOWARD THE U. S.

Among the general public, favorable opinions about the U. S. as a nation, did not rise as the result of the Conference as they did in regard to President Eisenhower personally -- except in France. They did, however, remain at or near the very high plateau attained in June '55.

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The totals of "Good" and "Very good" opinions of America before and after the Conference run like this:

FAVORABLE OPINIONS ABOUT THE U. S.
(General Public)

	<u>June '55</u>	<u>Aug. '55</u>
In France	20%	35%
In Italy	66	67
In Britain	58	62
In West Germany	63	59

The modest shifts up and down, except for France, are too slight to be considered statistically significant.

Although the French figure of 35% seems low in comparison to the other countries, it will be noted that it actually represents a rise of 15 percentage points from the 20% registered just before the Conference.

Along with other data, this appears to confirm the State Department's impression that: "viewed as the champion of the 'spirit of Geneva', the U. S. won greater confidence and prestige in France than it has enjoyed in several years."*

* "World Reactions to the Summit Conference".

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In contrast to the relative inertia exhibited by the opinions of the general public, the total of "Good" and "Very good" opinions of the U. S. among the better informed upper socio-economic groups increased sharply in most countries as a result of the Conference:

FAVORABLE OPINIONS ABOUT THE U. S.
(Upper Groups)

	<u>June '55</u>	<u>Aug. '55</u>	<u>Gain or Loss</u>
In France	28%	41%	+ 13 percentage points
In Italy	77	90	+ 13
In Britain	70	73	+ 3
In West Germany*	62	71	+ 9

Putting Western European opinion about the U. S. in proper prospective, the trend figures for the ten month period from October '54 to August '55 show that favorable opinion about America among the Western European public:

- Registered a 15 percentage point increase in France (from 20% to 35%);

* The shift in the German figures is not quite large enough to be considered statistically reliable, considering the small size of the upper group sample.

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- Jumped 13 percentage points in Britain (from 49% to 62%);
- Rose 8 percentage points in Italy (from 59% to 67%);
- Remained almost completely stable in West Germany (61% vs. 59%), a situation assumedly influenced, in part, by uneasiness over the reunification issue.

These, and supplementary data, support the generalization that the U. S. gained very considerably in prestige during the Four-Power Conference period and finds itself in the immediate post-Geneva situation considerably better thought of by the people of Western Europe.

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the Four Power Conference, opinions about the USSR among Western Europeans had become very considerably less unfavorable than they had been before.

The percentages holding a "Good" or "Very good" opinion of Russia increased -- but, as seen above, remained low. However, the percentages of "Bad" and "Very bad" opinions declined --

- From a total of 50% in October '54
- To a total of 37% in August '55

Correspondingly, the percentages in the "Fair" opinion category almost doubled:

- From 16% in October '54
- To 28% in August '55.

The degree of improvement from the Soviet point of view can be measured roughly by adding the "Fair" opinion percentages to the "Good" and "Very good" percentages, and comparing the totals at the beginning and end of the ten months' period:

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"FAIR", "GOOD" AND "VERY GOOD"
OPINIONS ABOUT THE USSR
(General Public)

	<u>Oct. '54</u>	<u>Aug. '55</u>	<u>Gain</u>
In France	23%	45%	+ 22 percentage points
In Italy	30	38	+ 8
In Britain	30	58	+ 28
In West Germany	18	26	+ 8

Within this longer range trend, the extent to which the Four Power Conference itself contributed to the improvement in Soviet "public relations" can be gauged by comparing the short term shifts which occurred between June '55 (immediately before the Conference) and August '55 (shortly after the Conference closed).

During this period the totals of "Fair", "Good" and "Very good" opinions of the USSR:

- Jumped 16 percentage points in Britain;
- Rose 10 percentage points in France;
- Increased 5 percentage points in Italy;
- Dropped 5 percentage points in West Germany (assumedly because of the reunification issue).

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The Meeting at the Summit brought a parallel improvement in Premier Bulganin's "public relations" in Western Europe.

This was so marked that, by the end of the Conference (August '55) --

- Four out of ten of the general public in the four major countries held at least a "Fair" opinion of Bulganin.

In short, while the U.S. has substantially increased its popularity and prestige in an affirmative way among Western Europeans over the last ten months -- the Russians, in a somewhat more negative way, have also achieved a potentially formidable "public relations" success --

- Not in making themselves "popular",
- But in reducing very markedly their unpopularity.

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THE GOAL OF "PEACE"

It can, perhaps, be assumed that the main reason for this double-barreled phenomenon is that, during the period concerned, both the U. S. and the USSR appeared to be moving in conformity with the aspirations of Western Europeans -- i. e. , toward the goals of "peace" and relaxation of international tensions.

This assumption is born out by the trends on two questions asked periodically in the Barometer Surveys about the U. S. and Russia:

"Is America (Soviet Russia) doing all it should do to prevent a new world war? "

	<u>Feb. '55</u>	<u>June '55</u>	<u>Aug. '55</u>
YES, AMERICA IS	32%	37%	50%
YES, RUSSIA IS	14	21	28

The impact of the Four Power Conference itself is evident in the difference between the June and August figures:

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- While the American percentage rose a husky 13 percentage points,
- The Russian figure also went up 7 percentage points -- and became double what it had been in February.

Thus, while faith in America's peaceful intentions increased spectacularly, so also did belief in Russia's.

The increased feeling of "safety" among Western Europeans is further evidenced by the trend on a Barometer question having to do with the likelihood of war.

"Do you believe that there will or will not be a world war in the next three or four years?"

WILL NOT BE A WAR
(Composite Average: Four Countries)

Feb. '55	52%
June '55	62
Aug. '55	65

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The upper socio-economic groups are equally optimistic regarding the prospects of war (the composite figure for August is 67%).

Obviously, these large majorities who do not believe there will be a world war in the next few years implicitly assume the USSR does not intend to resort to war in the near future -- at least, a world war affecting Europe.

Fear of Soviet aggression would thus seem to be at an all-time low since the end of World War II.

DECLINING POPULAR SUPPORT FOR NATO

The increase in America's popularity in Western Europe and in belief in her peaceful intentions is satisfying, of course, and will undoubtedly prove to be a valuable asset in the coming months.

However, the future policies of the Western European governments will not be determined on the basis of any popularity contest between the United States and the Soviet Union.

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In this connection, some of the other trends mentioned above, if continued, may have even more fateful consequences --

- The decrease in the unpopularity of the USSR;
- The increased faith in Soviet peaceful intention;
- The growing belief that there will be no world war;
- The decreasing fear of Soviet aggression.

Since the Western Alliance, as represented by NATO, was, at least originally, built on a sense of mutual danger, it would appear that the Russians have already gone a long way toward accomplishing an essential first step in splitting or weakening the Western coalition.

There would seem to be little doubt that NATO at this stage has been brought to a dangerously low ebb of solid public support. This is shown, among other data, by a battery of questions asked in the August Barometer Survey.

Question: "Have you heard or read of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization - NATO, that is?"

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YES, HAVE HEARD OR READ

Italy	72%
Britain	69
West Germany	64
France	45*

As an additional test of their knowledge about NATO, the respondents were than asked whether their own country is a member of NATO.

The percentages which had even the rudimentary knowledge that their country is a member -- and consequently any concept at all of their own relationship to the NATO alliance -- ranges as follows:

KNOW THEIR COUNTRY
IS A MEMBER OF NATO

In Italy	63%
In Britain	60
In France	49
In West Germany	43

* An additional 15% in France, who had not heard or read of NATO, said they had at least heard of a "military alliance of Western powers formed since World War II."

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It is fairly obvious that the question of allegiance to NATO can hardly arise in the case of an individual who: (1) does not know that NATO exists; or (2) does not know that his own country is a NATO member.

Consequently the foregoing figures would appear to represent the maximum percentages of the public who might conceivably feel any tie, at all, to NATO.

Composite-wise, they work out to a little more than half of the citizenry in the countries constituting the four major members of NATO in Western Europe.

Poll questions on a subject as complex as NATO are notoriously difficult to draft, and criticism may be levelled against the wording of the succeeding question on the August Barometer Survey, particularly with respect to the significance of the answers derived on the basis of this particular wording:

Question: "All things considered, do you think NATO has done well, not so well, or badly up to now?"

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To establish a certain significance to the responses given below, it can probably be postulated that, at the least, anyone who accepts the official argument that it is the NATO build up in strength which has reduced the threat of Soviet aggression and caused the Russians to become more conciliatory would be inclined to feel that NATO "has done well".


Yet the percentages who believe NATO "has done well" work out to a composite average of only one individual in five.

NATO HAS DONE WELL
(General Public)

Britain	30%
Italy	25
West Germany	20
France	10

The total picture, expressed in terms of composite averages for the four countries, looks like this:

NATO HAS DONE ...



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The remaining two questions involving NATO in the August Barometer Survey raise disquieting doubts about the future of the NATO alliance.

Question: "Suppose it were proposed that NATO be replaced by a security system including both the U. S. and the USSR and other European nations. Would you favor this proposal, or do you prefer present arrangements for West European Defense?"


Although the highest percentages of the replies are in the "Don't know" category, a sizeable plurality in each of the four countries would favor such a new system, involving the scrapping of NATO.

The figures for Britain, Germany and Italy are sufficiently similar that they can be expressed in a composite average for the three countries:

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
The picture in France is even more unfavorable to NATO:



Question: "Suppose the Russians suggested the following:

- 1) That both the U.S. and Britain withdraw all their forces from the Continent and give up their bases;
- 2) That Soviet Russia withdraw its forces to within the borders of the USSR.


Would you want this proposal accepted or rejected?"



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In all four countries, the trend as between June '55 (before the Four Power Conference) and August (after the Conference) shows a strong increase in sentiment favoring such a proposal regarding troop withdrawal.

Taking composite averages, the percentages in favor rose 12 percentage points in these two months --

- From 38% in June
- To 50% in August.

It may well be contended that the foregoing results represent the

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uninformed answers of a public deplorably ignorant about NATO; and that, anyway, even in Western Europe public opinion is by no means a conclusive determinant of governmental policies.

However, equally disturbing are the replies of the upper socio-economic groups who are obviously better informed, and generally include within their ranks the elements in the various countries which do have more than average power or influence upon governmental policies and press opinions. At the least, their opinions are frequently indicative in some degree of the attitudes that eventually emerge in both governmental and press circles.

As might be expected, higher proportions of the upper groups believe that NATO has done well, but in no country does the percentage constitute a majority.

NATO HAS DONE WELL
(Upper Groups)

Britain	42%
Italy	39
West Germany	37
France	17

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On the question about replacing NATO with a security system including the USSR, pluralities in each country among the upper groups favor such a move -- in fact, heavy pluralities except in Italy.

UPPER GROUPS

	<u>Favor</u> <u>New</u> <u>System</u>	<u>Prefer</u> <u>Retaining</u> <u>NATO</u>	<u>Don't</u> <u>Know</u>
West Germany	47%	29%	24%
France	46	18	36
Britain	40	27	33
Italy	35	33	32

Comparably high percentages among the upper groups are in favor of the proposal regarding mutual withdrawal of troops and bases --

- In fact, a majority in all four countries except Britain -- even in Britain the figure is 46%.

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FAVOR ACCEPTING TROOP WITHDRAWAL
(Upper Groups)

France	55%
West Germany	51
Italy	50
Britain	46

Furthermore, as between June '55 and August, the trend among the upper groups was in the direction of substantially increased support for troop withdrawal.

The composite average for the four countries approving this proposal rose --

- From 41% in June
- To 51% in August.

Putting it conservatively, the foregoing data tend to show that attitudes favorable to NATO's future are by no means firmly structured

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in the minds of either the general public nor the upper groups of Western Europe. NATO, in fact, appears highly vulnerable from the opinion point of view. At the least, it appears that the people of Western Europe are now willing to consider security arrangements alternative to NATO and defense measures alternative to present NATO dispositions.

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PART II. Asia, the Near East, and Latin America

Opinion generally in the aftermath of Geneva in areas outside the U. S. and Western Europe is heavily influenced by local issues and interests. While recent events have aroused an over-all feeling that the danger of war has receded, forward-looking opinion in these various regions and countries - with sharply divergent views and interests - ranges from unqualified optimism to deep depression and anxiety.

Area Highlights

A. Asia: An entire spectrum of views - both in kind and intensity - characterizes opinion in this region. Most Asian countries are waiting for the Geneva "spirit" to seep into the Far East with varying degrees of hope and apprehension. In all countries, attention is focused on the U. S. - which emerged from Geneva in a clear-cut position of leadership with greatly enhanced prestige. Hopes and aspirations - whether for the maintenance of Free World strength against unregenerate Communism - or for leadership into a golden era of peaceful co-existence - are firmly fixed on U. S. actions.

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1. Japan: The new relaxation has aroused intense interest and a wide-spread sense of anticipation among the Japanese. Generally, they hope that opportunities will emerge for strengthening Japan's position and influence in the Far East.

The press almost unanimously approves the "new spirit" and lauds the "turning-point" as "effective for peace."

Political leaders are more restrained, cautioning that "concrete" results must come gradually. Nevertheless, Japanese officials have drawn public attention to the new spirit and among other things to the fact that it could lead to an agreement between Japan and the Soviets on a peace treaty.

- The Prime Minister has voiced support for an Asian conference - in which Japan would of course participate.

Many commentators see brighter prospects for Japan to increase trade with Communist China.

- In this connection, opinion leaders seem well aware that Japan's prospects for "normalizing" relations with Communist China -- and for otherwise playing a more active role in the Far East - depend on U. S. policies.

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- At the moment, the Japanese show more support for the U. S. than at any time in recent months, partly because the U. S. seems to be moving in the direction the Japanese wish to take.

2. Nationalist China and The Republic of Korea

Anxiety and apprehension dominate opinion in these countries.

Official and press opinion in both countries adhere firmly to the view that

- Soviet peaceful "gestures" are at best only a temporary change of tactics.
- the Soviets want "relaxation" in Europe only to whip-up aggression in the Far East.
- in any case, no good can come out of negotiating with the Communists.

In both countries, the U. S. - Chinese Communist ambassadorial talks have aroused a sense of alarm.

- In Taiwan, the talks reportedly caused the strongest anti-American outburst ever voiced.

- Some Taiwan newspapers attribute the talks to "private" arrangements concluded at the Summit Conference. However false, these charges reflect fear that the U. S. may sell Free China down the river.

Both Korea and Taiwan look forward to further East-West negotiations with deep foreboding.

- They feel that the least damage that would result from a so-called "easing of tensions" would be a "freezing" of the status quo.
- The worst would be Free World acceptance of Communist conquests.
- From their point of view, therefore, relaxation is the path to self-annihilation.

3. Philippines:

Opinion in the strongly anti-Communist Philippines reflects none of the sense of "immediacy" and "involvement" that characterizes the ROK and Taiwan.

In fact, attitudes toward the East-West struggle have been relatively unchanged by Geneva developments.

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- U. S. leadership and initiative receives -
as usual - consistent and strong support.
- If anything, basic distrust of the Soviets seems
to have been reinforced by recent developments.

Vice-President Garcia has focused Philippine
attention on disarmament.

- He said the Geneva Conference missed its
main objective in failing to agree on President
Eisenhower's plan.
- He also pointed out that regional security
arrangements must be maintained indefinitely.

4. Thailand: Official and press opinion show signs of uncertainty
and apprehension as the U. S. - Chinese
Communist talks proceed.

Underlying all comments is a strong distrust of
Peiping's motives and fear of the potential impact
of the talks on the security of Thailand and Southeast
Asia.

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Thai leaders, accustomed to following the US/UN lead regarding Communist China, appear to find the U.S. policy line obscure and the government seems uncertain what position to adopt.

5. India and Burma:

Opinion in both countries reflects great satisfaction with current trends - which are viewed as a vindication, as well as the result- of their "mediation" policies.

U. S. prestige is at the highest levels.

- President Eisenhower's disarmament proposals are widely praised as a "very good step," a "good fresh approach."
- The President generally has been given major credit for the "success" of Geneva - his "sincerity" has been particularly stressed.

Opinion leaders have welcomed the U. S. - Chinese Communist talks.

- U Nu considers them a "forerunner of hopeful things to come."

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- The Indian press refers to them as a practical extension of the Geneva spirit -- the first fruits of the Indian - Burmese campaign for peaceful coexistence in the Far East.

Looking forward hopefully to new progress toward "coexistence," opinion in both countries shows strong support for an Asian Conference to "settle" tensions in the Far East.

B. Near East and Africa:

Except in Greece and Turkey - where recent developments have aroused intense interest and strong feelings -- opinion in this region is fixed almost exclusively on local problems.

1. Greece: Official and press comment in Greece reflects two sentiments:

- relief that the danger of war has lessened.
- skepticism of Soviet intentions.

The prevailing mood in Greece was reflected recently in a statement by a major newspaper, "International and domestic Communism will have to show in practice its respect of the principle of coexistence,

and cease to undermine through subversive activity the regimes and governments of sovereign states."

2. Turkey: Underlying Turkish views toward the Geneva "spirit" and generally toward "negotiations" with Communists, is an ingrained distrust of the Soviets and fear that a relaxation of tensions may curtail U. S. aid to Turkey and weaken Turkish efforts to broaden the Turk - Iraqi Pact.

A typical view was expressed by a leading newspaper, "We wonder how long those who believe in the sincerity of the Russian smile will continue to do so without concrete evidence of good will."

3. The Arab World: The most significant effect of East-West developments on Arab opinion - which has just barely responded to the recent series of meetings - may well be to arouse a feeling that relaxation of tensions makes a choice between East and West no longer necessary.

- Therefore, increased Soviet bloc activities in Arab countries are more likely to be well

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- For the same reason, in any negotiations about defense pacts and arms aid, the Arab States may hold to a "hard" line on Israel.

C. Latin America: Opinions differ in Latin America on the new atmosphere in East-West relations.

- Virtually all comment reflects awareness of "the beginnings of a change in the world situation" but there is a considerable undercurrent of skepticism about the Soviets.
- Disappointment was widespread that none of the issues were solved at Geneva. On the other hand, the President and the U. S. delegation were warmly praised for their sincere and honest efforts.

Latin America is watching developments with great interest. As one Mexican newspaper said "No country of America can be indifferent to the decisions -- since our destinies are inevitably linked to those of the United States and consequently we must be interested in the salvation of the ideals which we pursue."

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D. Sino-Soviet Bloc: There are few dependable indicators of "opinion" behind the Iron Curtain. Official propaganda does however reveal some interesting cross-currents.

1. USSR Propaganda continues to merchandise the Geneva "spirit" - with laudatory and optimistic variations on the major theme of a "new and improved atmosphere." There are nevertheless the usual counter-themes, characteristic of Soviet treatment of major developments in a "fluid" stage. These proceed from a general proposition that appeared in Pravda shortly after the Summit Conference, "-aggressive forces have not yet been smashed, but have only retreated temporarily and have taken refuge here and there and are continuing to hatch their wily intrigues."

2. Satellites: Propaganda reflects triumph. The shelving of the Satellite issue at Geneva is interpreted as a vindication of Satellite "independence" and Free World acceptance of the status quo.

The people of the Satellites - from information received - feel hopeless and apathetic. The failure of the West to espouse their cause is regarded as abandonment.

3. Communist China Propaganda has given fairly heavy treatment to mutual understanding and the conciliatory spirit in the aftermath of Geneva.

At the same time, there is no evidence that Peiping has in any way altered its views. It consistently holds that the U.S. is fomenting trouble and disorder throughout the world but that problems could be settled if East and West were to meet, if China were to take its "rightful" place in the U.N. and if the U.S. were to get out of Taiwan.