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CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

27 February 1956
(Revised 2 March 1956)

GIA COMMENTS ON

DRAFT COMPREHENSIVE INSPECTION PLAN

Effectiveness of the Plan in Guarding Against Surprise Attack

1. Of primary concern to intelligence is the effectiveness of the inspection scheme in guarding against the possibility of surprise attack. We do not believe that the plan outlined can give in advance any sure guarantee that the danger of surprise attack would be eliminated. However, we believe that the chances of such a surprise attack taking place would be greatly reduced once all five stages of the inspection procedure had been completed. Given present Soviet capabilities, it seems certain that warning of an impending attack would be greatly advanced over any degree of warning that could presently be obtained.

2. We do not believe, however, that as weapons technology advances such an inspection system would be of very much significance in guarding against surprise attack. Once long-range missiles are deployed, the time required for preparation of an attack and

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the interval between launching and arrival at target becomes so short as to make warning obtained through the inspection system ineffectual.

3. In commenting on earlier proposals dealing with the problem of future capabilities we said that "future assurance against nuclear surprise attack can be obtained only if in addition to a comprehensive and effective inspection system there is an actual denial, through arms reduction and limitation, of the capability to attack without noticeable preparations." Having now examined the detailed inspection plan, we continue to believe that, if the object of US policy is to bring about a situation in which danger of surprise nuclear attack is eliminated, arms limitation as well as inspection is essential. At a minimum, assuming this was reciprocally acceptable, provisions should be made for monitoring research and development of the most advanced weapons. This would at least give knowledge to both sides of the acquisition of capabilities for sudden attack.

Role of Intelligence

4. The problem of reliable evaluation of the mass of data the inspection system would acquire and the relationship of the present intelligence structure to that task remains obscure. The

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plan provides for a Data Analysis Center (3,000 people) which would presumably have primary responsibility, although it does state that "in the final analysis" US Departments and Agencies having statutory responsibilities would be involved. Although the intelligence back-up organization is not intrinsic to the plan itself, it is important to consider in advance how these responsibilities would be met. On the basis of our experience in the IAC community, we would particularly stress the importance of acquiring top-flight personnel and drawing upon the accumulated experience and resources of existing intelligence organizations.

Propaganda Implications

5. We believe that it can be predicted with virtual certainty that the USSR will not accept the plan outlined. Even if the USSR had not already publicly rejected the President's air inspection proposal, which is essential to the operation of the whole scheme, we do not believe that the Soviet leaders would regard the presence of 30,000 inspectors within their territory as compatible with their totalitarian principles and practice. The only serious question therefore is whether the proposal will serve US interests in the propaganda warfare over the disarmament issue. We think that it would present

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serious though not necessarily insuperable difficulties in this respect. The extraordinary complexities of the plan would in themselves be a barrier to effective propaganda exploitation. Primarily, however, it would be difficult to deal with the charge that our inspection requirements had been intentionally stated in such an elaborate and costly way as to insure their rejection by the USSR.

6. Perhaps the best way of overcoming these propaganda hazards would be to accompany presentation of the plan with a pledge to enter upon agreements for substantial arms reduction and arms limitation once the inspection system was functioning effectively. We note that suggestions along these lines made in our previous memorandum have in fact been incorporated textually in the introductory discussion of the present document (Para. 29, p. 13). We do not recall, however, that such a US commitment to undertake substantial arms reductions and arms limitation was contained in such policy papers proper as we have seen or in the drafts of documents to be issued when the plan is publicly announced.

Inspection of Economic Installations and Institutions

7. Steel Appendix H states that "the primary objective of the steel element.... is to verify the agreed percentage of steel used for

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armament purposes and to detect any important diversions for expanded production." The steel producing capacity of the Soviet Bloc is far in excess of requirements for armament purposes, as the term is understood in this context. Although confirmation of "output potentialities" is highly desirable from an intelligence standpoint, an inspection of this type would not disclose the extent to which such output is used for armament purposes. The functions of the Steel Inspection Organization should be re-oriented toward tracing output and shipments of selected products from the producing plants and, by liaison with other appropriate inspection teams, through the consuming plants. Transshipments, imports and stockpiles should also be subject to continuing inspection. With some alloying materials, the tracing procedure should be initiated at the mine and through to the final consumer.

Electric Power and Selected General Industries

8. Information on existing (and planned) electric power facilities and production will be useful as measures of general industrial capabilities. They will not, however, provide indications of "surprise attack" nor provide "early warning." This conclusion is based on the fact that production potentialities in each of the categories are

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overwhelmingly greater than requirements for "armament" or "attack"



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close inspection of the extent of and reasons for significant expansion programs, should contribute substantially to achieving the stated objectives. This comment is especially pertinent to the general industry inspection plan.

9. The comments of the Task Force on General Industry are limited to machine tools. No detailed inspection plan is proposed. However, it is clear that the inspection of machine tool production and distribution with no provision for other metalworking equipment will be of little or no value. Moreover, the commodity or industry omissions appear to be fully as serious as the lack of a specific inspection plan for machine tools and related metalworking equipment. In order to meet the stated objectives of the plan continuous flow inspection of such strategic items as precision mechanisms, electronic equipment, and specific chemicals such as liquid oxygen and fuming nitric acid ought to be provided.

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Budgetary and Financial Inspection

10. The Task Force Report correctly assesses the limited and supporting contribution which budgetary and financial inspection can make toward the specific objective of the disarmament plan. Budgetary and financial inspection would, however, constitute a desirable and useful supplement to other forms of inspection, by providing information concerning military forces and their equipment, armament production, nuclear energy and guided missile developments, as well as by furnishing an early, simple, and conspicuous test of good faith on the part of the nations subscribing to the disarmament agreement.

11. When the verification-of-accounts stage is reached, auditing of Soviet accounts should be facilitated by the concentration of data in the records of the State Bank, whose accounts and transactions mirror the structure and money flows of the entire Soviet economy. The records and reports of the Industrial Bank should also be carefully inspected because industrial and probably military construction is financed through this institution. In this connection, the Task Force Report (p. 18) gives too much weight to the significance, for financial inspection, of recent Soviet measures for administrative decentralization and reduced statistical reporting from the provinces to Moscow.

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While a definite trend in this direction is evident, most pertinent records will still be available in Moscow.

Communications System of the Plan

12. Our communications experts find the communications plan, as outlined in TAB H to Appendix A, comprehensive and sound. They believe that there are no communications requirements which the Department of Defense is not capable of meeting with available equipment and techniques.

Nuclear Inspection

13. We find Appendix E very general with little treatment of engineering instrumentation of an advanced character. Operating characteristics of instruments are assumed without a showing that their development is practical or that their use is feasible. This could lead to a reliance on a degree of detection beyond our ability to achieve.

It would also be useful to include a statement of assumptions on which the plan is based. The following assumptions seem to be implied:

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- a. Retention by both sides of nuclear weapons;
- b. Existence of a reciprocal access agreement;
- c. Permissible use of "black box" methods, and
- d. Access by foreign surveillance aircraft over all parts of both countries.

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THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

January 23, 1956

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CPC


Honorable Allen W. Dulles
Director
Central Intelligence Agency
Washington, D. C.

Dear Mr. Dulles:

I am enclosing for your reference a draft Comprehensive Inspection Plan developed by the Task Force groups that have been consulting with my office during the past few months.

I would appreciate receiving the comments of your Agency on this document at your early convenience. May I suggest March 10, 1956, as the date prior to which I would wish to refer back to the Task Force all Departmental comment for their revision of the Plan.

Sincerely yours,



Harold E. Stassen

Enclosure

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Remarks:

The Director has asked that you prepare for his signature the comments requested in para 2 of the attached letter from Gov. Stassen. Gen. Tuscott indicated he would be available at any time to discuss with you or your people any and all phases of the disarmament study. He also said there is a good deal more material on this subject which he can get for you if you so desire.

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