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U S S R I N T E R N A T I O N A L A F F A I R S

Nov. 12, 1958

USSR NOTE ON SURPRISE ATTACK CONFERENCE

Moscow, TASS, Radioteletype in Russian to Europe, Nov. 12, 1958,
1010 GMT--L

(Text) Moscow--On Nov. 7, 1958, the U.S. embassy in Moscow sent a note to the USSR Foreign Ministry regarding the convocation of a conference of experts on the problem of prevention of a sudden attack which is a reply to the note of the USSR Foreign Ministry of Nov. 1.

On Nov. 10 the USSR Foreign Ministry sent a reply note on this problem to the U.S. embassy.

We now transmit the full text of the note of the USSR Foreign Ministry of Nov. 10:

The USSR Foreign Ministry presents its respects to the U.S. embassy, and referring to the note of the embassy No. 447 of Nov. 7, 1958, has the honor to state the following:

The ministry takes into consideration the statement contained in the note on the composition of the delegation of the United States, Great Britain, France, Canada, and Italy to the Geneva conference of experts on the problem concerning the prevention of a sudden attack opening on Nov. 10.

In accordance with the principles of equal representation of member countries of the Atlantic pact and member countries of the Warsaw treaty, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs reports that the countries of the Warsaw treaty will be represented at the conference on behalf of the Soviet Union by V. Kuznetsov, Col. Gen. A. Gryzlov, I.G. Usachev, Maj. Gen. A.V. Pisarev, and Maj. Gen. S.D. Romanov;

On behalf of Poland, by M. Naszkowski, M. Blusztajn, Brig. Gen. J. Dziewecki, and Brig. Gen. T. Piuro;

On behalf of Czechoslovakia, by J. Gajek, Maj. Gen. V. Glavaty and Col. M. Broz;

On behalf of Rumania, G. Nicolae, Maj. Gen. S. Constantin and Maj. K. Nicolae;

On behalf of Albania, Nesti Nase, Gen. Arif Hasko, col. Dilaver Poci and Lambi Becini.

Regarding the main problem of the conference, the Soviet Government, as has already been pointed out in the message of the Chairman of the Council of Ministers, N.S. Khrushchev, to U.S. President Dwight Eisenhower of July 2, and in the notes of the ministry of Sept. 15 and Nov. 1, 1958, proceeds from the fact that this problem should consist in that practical recommendations should be worked out on the measures concerning the prevention of a sudden attack combined with certain steps in the sphere of disarmament without the implementation of which the consideration of the problem on the prevention of a sudden attack is useless.

Nov. 10 Meeting

Moscow, Soviet European Service in English, Nov. 10, 1958, 2145 GMT--L

(Text) Speaking at the Geneva conference for the prevention of surprise attack, attended by the experts of 10 Warsaw pact and NATO countries, V. Kuznetsov, the chief Soviet delegate, declared the task of the conference to be the joint drafting of practical measures to be taken at once to prevent a surprise attack by one state against another and thereby (avert?) the danger of a new war. Kuznetsov said that reliable steps for preventing surprise attacks could be worked out only if a complete ban was placed on atomic and hydrogen weapons, if they were withdrawn from the armaments of states and their stocks destroyed, if war bases on foreign territories were abolished and conventional armaments and armed forces were reduced. He assured the conference that the Soviet delegation would do all it could to assure its success.

The chief U.S. delegate, Mr. Foster, made no mention in his speech of disarmament or important political issues relating to the possibility of a surprise attack and endeavored to fix the attention of the conference on the technical aspect. In fact the U.S. delegate called it a conference of technical experts and in speaking of the aims of the meeting, he insisted on using the word "reducing" instead of "preventing" the danger of a surprise attack.

SUDDEN ATTACK PREVENTION URGENT TASK

Moscow, Soviet Home Service, Nov. 10, 1958, 1620 GMT--L

(Morozov Talk)

(Text) The conference of experts convened for the purpose of examining practical questions pertaining to the problem of averting surprise attacks opened today in Geneva. Representatives of the USSR, Poland, Czechoslovakia, Rumania, Albania, the United States, Britain, France, and Italy (Canada not mentioned--Ed.) are participating.

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They are confronted with the task of elaborating recommendations on measures for preventing the possibility of surprise attacks. The experts must devote considerable attention to such technical questions as the means and objectives of control, and also to the results which these measures might insure. Of course, the experts have only to accomplish preparatory work. As to the decisions on the setting up on a mutual basis of a system of preventing the possibility of a surprise attack, these will have to be adopted by the relevant governments. The United Nations will be informed of progress in the Geneva negotiations through its Secretary General.

The importance of the issues to be considered in Geneva is extremely great. Tension in contemporary international relations caused by the cold war policy and armament race conducted by the U.S. Government, particularly of the nuclear armament race, demands the adoption of most decisive measures for removing the threat of war. This is demanded by the vital interests of all mankind, for war under present conditions is pregnant with unprecedented miseries for all nations.

The problem of preventing a surprise attack has, as is known, acquired particular urgency lately in connection with the fact that the United States had introduced the dangerous practice of flights by U.S. warplanes carrying atomic and hydrogen bombs over territories of a number of West European states and in Arctic areas in the direction of USSR frontiers. It is not difficult to imagine what consequences might arise from the irresponsible action of some American airman piloting such a plane, or simply from some technical fault in the equipment. After all, facts are already known of an atom bomb which fell from an American military aircraft on the territory of the United States itself, but by mere chance did not blow up.

The Soviet Government's position on the question of preventing a surprise attack by one state against another is clear. It is reflected in a number of official documents, among others in the Soviet Government's proposal of May 5, 1958, in the message by the Chairman of the USSR Council of Ministers, N.S. Khrushchev, to U.S. President Eisenhower of July 2, 1958, and also in a number of Soviet Government notes to the Government of the United States. The Soviet Government has declared that it considers it essential--alongside preliminary measures for limiting the armament race, such things, for instance, as general discontinuance of nuclear weapon tests--to come to terms on preventing the possibility of one state attacking another.

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In the way of concrete measures, the Soviet Union proposed that agreement be reached on the establishment of control posts at railway junctions, in large ports, and on important highways in conjunction with definite steps toward disarmament, and also on carrying out aerial photography in areas of outstanding significance from the point of view of averting the danger of surprise attack. The Soviet Government, by the way, expressed its agreement on coming to terms on the carrying out of joint aerial photography in the zone where the main armed forces of the two alignments of European states-- NATO and the Warsaw treaty--are concentrated, to a depth of 800 kilometers to the East and the West of the line delimiting these forces. In addition to this, the Soviet Government has proposed that, alongside this zone in Europe, a zone of aerial inspection including a part of Soviet territory in the Far East and of a corresponding part of territory of the United States, be established.

The significance of these Soviet proposals lies primarily in the fact that they are based on an equal estimation of the security of both sides and take into account the earlier proposals of the Western powers, in particular of the U.S. Government. The Soviet proposals are based on a realistic foundation. This can be seen, in particular, in the matter of aerial photography.

At the present time the possibility of aerial photography of vast areas, or even the whole of the USSR or U.S. territories, as proposed in the West, cannot be considered separately from measures for easing international tension and strengthening confidence among states and, in the first place, among the great powers. Under the present international situation, when the cold war conducted by the U.S. ruling circles has created an atmosphere of mistrust and suspicion, the proposal on a joint flight over all the territories of both is unrealistic. In the opinion of the Soviet Government this measure can be carried out at the final stage of the disarmament problem, that is when the questions of the complete banning of atomic and hydrogen weapons and their elimination from the armament of states, of a considerable reduction in armed forces and equipment, of removing military bases on foreign territories, will be solved. In other words, when relations of real trust between the states are created.

The Soviet proposals have been a suitable basis for reaching agreement. However, Washington's replies to the relevant USSR Government notes and U.S. press reactions have, unfortunately, shown the unwillingness of the Western powers to agree to the Soviet Union's wise proposals. During the past few days the American press has devoted much attention to the position of the U.S. delegates at the Geneva conference on preventing surprise attacks. The largest New York papers frankly wrote that at this conference the United States will pursue two aims:

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Firstly--they pointed out--the American delegation will strive to obtain the maximum information possible on the USSR's war potential and, mainly, on new types of arms. Of particular interest--and this the American press does not conceal--are Soviet achievements in the field of rocket technology which are considerably in advance of those of the Americans.

Secondly--the American papers stated--in Geneva the U.S. delegation will try to thwart any possibility of reaching a practical agreement in the discussion of the most complex system of control and inspection for effectively preventing a surprise attack. The U.S. delegation--the press noted--will try at these negotiations as well to insist on the establishment of such a system of control and inspection which, in practice, is practically impossible and represents, as described by the Baltimore SUN, something in the nature of a "global puzzle" which can include anything you wish, from interplanetary spheres and sputniks to groups of land observers!

These pessimistic American press statements cannot, however, shake the firm determination of all those who are sincerely interested in consolidating peace and who want to achieve progress in the matter of preventing a surprise attack. And the possibilities to do so are obvious. They will be implemented, as N.S. Khrushchev indicated, only if all sides proceed from the need to take into account the interests of security of every participant in the agreement, and refrain from actions leading to a deterioration in the atmosphere and to increasing the danger of a war.

Today one can but wish success to the Geneva conference on the prevention of surprise attacks, which can make an important contribution to the cause of easing international tension and consolidating peace in the world.

Conference Agreement Possible

Moscow, Soviet Near Eastern Service in Turkish, Nov. 11, 1958,
1530 GMT--L

(Druzhinin talk: "Geneva Conference on Surprise Attack Must End in Success")

(Text) The conference of experts dealing with the problem of measures for preventing surprise attack began in Geneva yesterday. The Warsaw pact countries are represented in this conference by the delegates of the Soviet Union, Poland, Czechoslovakia, Rumania, and Albania. From the countries of the North Atlantic organization, delegates of United States, Britain, France, Canada, and Italy are present.

The Soviet Government attaches great importance to the problem of preventing sudden attack. This is shown quite clearly by the fact that it is basically the Soviet Union which is the initiator in calling the present Geneva conference of experts. The Soviet Government has stated many times that in the present international situation, this problem must be solved by definite steps side by side with the disarmament problem. The Soviet Union expects the conference of experts to show practical steps in this field.

In the opinion of the Soviet Government, if the sides concerned take into consideration the reciprocal interests and refrain from actions leading to the exacerbation of the international situation and to increasing the threat of a new war, then agreement can very well be possible on measures for preventing sudden attack. Thus, as everyone will easily understand, it is because of this that the Soviet Union approaches the Geneva conference of experts in the opinion that it is both possible and necessary that those taking part in this conference reach agreement.

However, if comments in the U.S. and British press are taken as an indication, the views in certain Western circles are totally different. Long before the delegates to the conference held their first meeting in Geneva, the U.S. press was predicting that the conference would certainly fail. The papers kept referring to the deep contrasts dividing the Soviet Union and the Western powers, to the precipice between the two sides. For example the ASSOCIATED PRESS correspondent Hightower said: The conference is beginning (two words indistinct) conditions. The New York HERALD TRIBUNE added the following to the above story: Right from the beginning the conference cannot attain any sort of agreement. The UPI reported: In Washington, they are very doubtful whether the conference of experts can give definite results.

As the U.S. papers write openly, the United States intends to make use of the conference of experts to obtain as much information as possible, particularly on the Soviet Union's military potential. The measures which the United States basically wants to discuss are not at all measures for the prevention of attack. As to the problem of what sort of weapons are to be controlled, the Washington STAR asserts that in the opinion of the United States the talks should cover not only existing weapons of attack but also weapons that are in the preparatory stage. As it will be easily understood, under present day conditions when the United States is lagging noticeably behind the Soviet Union in the sphere of rocket technology, such tactics have only the following aim: to examine the Soviet Union's position in the sphere of most modern weapons.