

CONFIDENTIAL

must not know more than he needs to know of the details of a project of which he is a part. In many situations it would be most inappropriate to discuss the details of a project outline with an agent, particularly where the agent who is not a regular Agency staff employee is only a small part of a large project.

b. It was charged that there was scant or no briefing for agents and agents were required to read Handbook for Spies by Alexander Fote with an instruction to destroy after reading although it is published in a 25¢ paperback edition.

Careful briefing of agents is an essential element in the conduct of operations. A great deal of effort has been devoted to this phase of operations. The Handbook for Spies has been on the list of suggested reading for students in training courses for many years. However, it is only one of many books on the subject which are suggested reading. As to the instruction to destroy, it should be pointed out that if the individual were to operate in a foreign country as a legitimate businessman or under other cover but were in fact an agent, it might well be inappropriate to have a collection of books on espionage in his possession.

25X1

c. There was a charge of grossly inadequate training at [redacted] It was charged that the thirty-day course resulted in a high percentage of the trainees quitting. It was further charged that only one out of seven instructors had ever been in the field.

25X1

Our over-all training program and particularly the operations training at [redacted] is, I believe, a well conceived and executed program. This station opened in February 1953 and has been progressively improving since that time. It is basic policy that the instructors in operations courses are rotated from the operating elements to make available the latest experiences in the field. At the present time, without exception, all instructors in the operations courses have had field experience with the Agency and [redacted]

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[redacted] At the first running of the operations course at [redacted] it is true that only one of the total of seven instructors for that course had field experience with the Agency although some of them had had intelligence experience in the field with other agencies of the Government. This situation was rapidly changed in line with the policy mentioned above. The other charges are completely false.

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d. There was a charge of general lack of language qualifications and a specific charge relating to the Chief and Deputy Chief of Station in

I believe that the Central Intelligence Agency has the finest language program of any agency in Government. Over the years we have developed and improved this program, recognizing the need for our people to know the language of the area in which they are to be stationed. Our language training is conducted not only internally but we also utilize the facilities of Georgetown University and the Foreign Service Institute. Approximately two years ago the Agency introduced a program of incentives to develop language qualifications on an over-all basis. This language development program is at this time unique in Government. A brief summary of this program is enclosed for information. Of course, the requirements of various assignments throughout the world will on occasion be such that the language facility of the available personnel will not be the best possible so that there may well be spot situations where improvement can be made. In the specific case mentioned, the Chief and Deputy Chief had a working knowledge of the language when they were assigned to the Station and during their stay developed a considerable degree of fluency.

e. The charges of laxity of inspection and the fact that the Inspector General had no jurisdiction over the matter of accounting for funds is completely false.

The Inspector General has complete authority to look into any matter within the Agency and make appropriate recommendations to me. The Inspector General on a regular basis dispatches members of his staff to field stations for inspections and frequently he personally travels in the field. In addition to the Inspector General, I should like to point out that in the field of accounting for funds a large percentage of our funds are accountable on the same basis as funds in any other Government agency and thus are subject to audit by the General Accounting Office. As to our other funds, called Confidential Funds, they are initially audited in a manner similar to that of the General Accounting Office by the audit section of our Finance Division. Subsequently, these funds are audited by the staff of the CIA auditor on an independent basis with reports made directly to me. In addition to these facilities there is an Inspection and Review Staff in the largest operating component which investigates and examines operational activities on an independent basis within that component. As a matter of information,

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
SECRET

the method and extent of critical self-examination within the Agency has been favorably commented upon by the President's Board of Consultants on Foreign Intelligence Activities.

f. The charge of arbitrary use of termination authority by the Director of Central Intelligence and the perfunctory performance of Review Boards is not true. This authority is exercised with a great deal of care and in the overwhelming number of cases an Employment Review Board is constituted with senior officials of the Agency to conduct hearings and make recommendations to the Director of Central Intelligence. These Boards hold extensive hearings with the individual concerned appearing before the Board to present his case. Since the establishment of the Central Intelligence Agency, this authority has been exercised in 48 cases, an average of less than five per year.

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g. The charge of threats to employees if malfeasance were to be revealed is simply false. We could not and would not permit such a situation to exist and I know of no case where this has occurred.



SECRET

In the course of reviewing these charges we could not help but identify the individual who made them as this person has made identical charges to CIA personnel and has also brought them to the attention of the White House and the office of the Vice President. In addition, he has brought these matters to the attention of The Task Force on Intelligence Activities, headed by General Clark, which was a part of the Hoover Commission and the Presidential Committee to review certain activities of CIA, headed by General DeLoittle. He has also tried, without success so far, to find a publisher for his complaints. If we are correct in our identification, we should like to point out that most of these charges were placed before the Agency in 1953 at which time they were thoroughly investigated and found to be substantially false. The individual concerned was the cause of considerable difficulties within his area of assignment and, consequently, he was transferred to a completely different field of work in another location. However, it developed that his work performance fell far below an acceptable standard and on occasion he failed to follow specific instructions. His case was brought before an Employment Review Board to make recommendations to me concerning his future with the Agency. After extensive hearings, this Board recommended termination. I accepted their recommendation and terminated this individual in November of 1956 under the authority granted me by section 102(e) of the National Security Act of 1947. In May 1953 this individual was transferred out of Headquarters [redacted] 25X1 [redacted] and, hence, since then he has had little access to our operations. For almost two years, since his termination in November 1956, he has had no official contact whatever with our organization.

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It is hoped that the above will be of assistance to the Subcommittee and if further details are desired on any point, I shall be pleased to supply them. I do not intend to convey the impression that the Central Intelligence Agency and its personnel are perfect. We have made some errors in the past and no doubt will make other errors in the future but as we gain experience we are constantly improving and will continue to improve.

Sincerely,

Signed

Allen W. Dulles
Director

Enclosure

CONCURRENCES:

25X1

Acting
[Redacted]
Inspector General

22 Aug 58
Date

25X1

A/
[Redacted]
Deputy Director (Plans)

22 Aug 58
Date

25X1

D/
[Redacted]
Director of Security

22 Aug 58
Date

25X1

D/
[Redacted]
Director of Training

22 AUG 1958
Date

*concur
etc
DDCI*

CONCURRENCES:

25X1 /s/ [redacted] 22 AUG 1958
Acting Inspector General Date

25X1 /s/ [redacted] 22 AUG 1958
A/ Deputy Director (Plans) Date

25X1 /s/ [redacted] 22 AUG 1958
D/ Director of Security Date

25X1 /s/ [redacted] 22 AUG 1958
D/ Director of Training Date

Distribution:

- O & 1 - Addressee (To be handcarried by Legislative Counsel)
- ✓ 1 - ER w/att. *w/ Reading*
- 1 - DCI w/att.
- 1 - DDCI w/att.
- 1 - IG w/att.
- 1 - DD/P w/o att.
- 1 - Director/Security w/o att.
- 1 - ADD/S w/o att.
- 1 - Director/Training w/o att.
- 1 - Legislative Counsel w/o att.

OGC/LC:JSW:mks (22 August 1958)
Rewritten: O/DCI:AWD:mks (25 August 1958)

THE CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

LANGUAGE DEVELOPMENT PROGRAM

In 1955 an intensive study was initiated to determine the best method to increase the competence of CIA personnel in foreign languages.

The general objectives of the language program were to be:

First, that personnel should have a working knowledge of at least one or more of the widely spoken languages--such as French, German, Spanish and Russian. Not only would this language ability prove valuable in day to day work, but it would increase understanding of foreign peoples and ideas.

Second, that a pool of individuals who together would have competence in all of the languages of the world should be developed. This took account of the unexpected needs that can arise for linguists, as well as daily demands. It also recognized the value in making friends by being able to speak to people in their own tongue. Further, it noted the increasing importance of Africa and Southeast Asia, and of the limited competence in the languages spoken in these areas.

Third, the program was to be directed not only at developing a language competence, but, equally important, at encouraging all personnel to maintain their language ability.

In developing a program it was recognized that with limited manpower it would be necessary to build up language competence simultaneously with performance of daily tasks. Therefore incentives would be needed to encourage personnel to work on their languages in off-duty hours.

The Language Development Program was put into effect on 4 February 1957. It provides a system of cash awards for those employees who learn a language, and annual payments for those who maintain or increase their language competence. These awards range from \$50 to a maximum of \$1200, depending on the degree of difficulty of the language and the degree of proficiency acquired. Employees who learn a language during off-duty hours receive twice the amount that is received by those who acquire languages during duty hours.

Awards for learning a language are made only after an employee has passed oral and written exams which indicate the degree of proficiency.

Awards for proficiency are divided into two categories: specialized and comprehensive, each with three scales--elementary, intermediate and high. Specialized proficiency is either primarily in speaking only, or primarily in reading and translating only. Comprehensive, on the other hand, requires proficiency in speaking, reading and writing.

The languages are divided into three groups in order of increasing difficulty:

The first group of ten languages is composed principally of the Nordic and Romance languages, and awards range from \$50 for

an elementary skill in a specialized use of the language, to \$400 for high-comprehensive proficiency. Annual awards for maintaining a proficiency in one of these languages range from \$200 a year for high-comprehensive ability to nothing for only an elementary ability in either comprehensive or specialized uses.

The second group of languages consists of 26 different tongues including Russian, Hindi, Urdu and Swahili. Awards for achieving ability in any of these languages range from \$100 for an elementary skill in specialized use, to \$800 for acquiring a high-comprehensive ability. Annual maintenance awards commence with intermediate-specialized knowledge at \$100 and range up to \$400 for maintaining high-comprehensive skill.

The third group of languages consists of three: Chinese, Japanese and Korean. Awards for learning any of these start at \$200 for elementary-specialized ability, and up to \$1200 for high-comprehensive. Annual maintenance awards start with intermediate-specialized at \$200 a year and go up to \$600 a year for high-comprehensive ability.

In administering the program a Qualifications Register is maintained, with a Language Data Record on each individual with linguistic ability. No achievement awards will be made for proficiency possessed at the initiation of the program, or possessed when entering on duty with the Agency. No maintenance awards will be paid for comprehensive proficiency acquired

prior to employment by residence abroad, or where linguistic ability was the primary reason for hiring. The program is open to all personnel except those who have not applied for Career Service status, or those who have been turned down by the Career Service. In some cases the program is open to the wives of staff employees, where linguistic ability on their part is important to the work of their husbands.

In order to provide the facilities necessary for the program, the Language and Area School maintains two fully equipped language laboratories. In these laboratories work with recorded material predominates. Students can listen to tapes made by experts and then record their own pronunciation on erasable tapes to check their progress. The school has 10,000 tapes in forty languages and the laboratories are open from 7:30 a.m. to 8:30 p.m. daily, and from 10:00 a.m. to 2:00 p.m. on Saturdays. The program also provides for sending students to other regularly established language schools.

Class sections are organized with a minimum of five and a maximum of nine students. Each class has five hours of instruction per week, plus seven hours of outside study and language laboratory work. The average course lasts for 16 weeks. To accommodate personnel who wish to study languages during non-duty hours, morning classes are held from 7:15 to 8:15 a.m. and evening classes from 5:30 to 7:30 p.m.

In order to provide sufficient instructors to accommodate the number of personnel seeking to learn or improve their languages under this incentive

program, volunteers were sought among linguistically qualified employees. Some 100 CIA officers volunteered to be teachers in the before and after duty classes, and are paid for this work at the standard government overtime rates. Wives were also permitted to volunteer to instruct if they possessed native fluency in a language. The wives are generally hired at an hourly rate for a workday ranging from two to eight hours.

As of January 1958, there were 350 students taking the voluntary, non-duty-hour language training program in addition to 208 individuals studying languages during duty hours. The 350 taking voluntary language training were enrolled in 47 courses in 12 different languages: Arabic, Czech, Greek, Chinese, Finnish, Persian, Polish, Russian, Italian, French, Spanish, and German.

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10-6-57



CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

WASHINGTON 25, D. C.

OFFICE OF THE DIRECTOR

The Honorable Richard B. Russell
United States Senate
Washington 25, D. C.

1 to M

Dear Senator Russell:

It was a pleasure to appear before the CIA Subcommittee of the Senate Armed Services Committee on 8 August. ~~I had hoped that the full membership of the Subcommittee would have been able to be present. However, I am glad of the invitation which was extended to Senator Carl Hayden and Senator Stuart Symington and that they were able to be present.~~ I believe it important that this Subcommittee be briefed periodically on activities of the Agency and ~~on such occasions it serves a useful purpose to brief the Subcommittee generally on world affairs and the Soviet military posture in particular.~~

Based on
~~At that occasion~~ *AT The Aug 8 meeting*

you raised a number of questions concerning the Agency. These questions were ~~stated to be~~ complaints taken from a memorandum furnished to the Subcommittee by a former employee of the Agency. I agreed with your view ~~and Senator Saltonstall's view~~ that it was the duty of the Subcommittee to raise questions of this type. At that time I stated that the substance of these complaints and charges was not true. In some instances I responded more specifically to the points as they were raised. At this time I would like to take the opportunity of answering those points, which we ~~are able to recall~~ *noted*.

- a. It was charged that project outlines, if any were drawn, were extremely vague and rarely, if ever discussed with the agent.

Project outlines are a basic part of Agency doctrine concerning project management. This doctrine has been developed and improved over the years and is still the subject of continuing study. In training courses the proper use of project outlines is stressed, based on experience gained through actual operations. Project outlines are carefully prepared and reviewed at several echelons of command

of outlines

of outlines

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not a regular Agency employee

for completeness, consistency, security, feasibility, cost and responsiveness to requirements. These outlines over the years have been an essential element of project management. Whether a project outline is to be discussed with the agent would be a matter depending on the circumstances of the case. An agent, for security reasons, must not know more than he needs to know of the details of a project of which he is a part. In many situations it would be most inappropriate to discuss the details of a project outline with an agent, particularly where the agent is only a small part of a large project. ~~Therefore, the handling of project outlines as charged is simply not true.~~

b. It was charged that there was scant or no briefing for agents and agents were required to read Handbook for Spies by Alexander Foote with an instruction to destroy after reading although it is published in a 25¢ paperback edition.

Careful briefing of agents is an essential element in the conduct of operations. A great deal of effort has been devoted to this phase of operations. The Handbook for Spies has been on the list of suggested reading for students in training courses for many years. However, it is only one of many books on the subject which are suggested reading. As to the instruction to destroy, it should be pointed out that if the individual were to operate in a foreign country as a legitimate businessman but were in fact an agent, it might well be appropriate ~~not~~ to have a collection of books on spies in his possession.

*Let him go
or under the cover,*

25X1

c. There was a charge of grossly inadequate training at [redacted] It was charged that the thirty-day course resulted in a high percentage of the trainees quitting. It was further charged that only one out of seven instructors had ever been in the field.

~~I am extremely proud of our over-all training program and particularly the operations training at [redacted]~~ This station opened in February 1953 and has been progressively improving since that time. It is basic policy that the instructors in operations courses are rotated from the operating elements to make available the latest experiences in the field. At the present time, without exception, all instructors in the operations courses have had field experience with the Agency [redacted]

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*in [redacted] is, I believe
local [redacted] and [redacted]*

25X1

*has
made identical charges to
C.I.A. and has*

In the course of reviewing these charges we could not help but identify the individual who made them. If we are correct in our identification, we should like to point out that most of these charges were placed before the Agency in 1953 at which time they were thoroughly investigated and found to be substantially false. The individual concerned was the cause of considerable difficulties within his area of assignment and, consequently, he was transferred to a completely different field of work in another location. However, it developed that his work performance fell far below an acceptable standard and on occasion he failed to follow specific instructions. His case was brought before an Employment Review Board to make recommendations to me concerning his future with the Agency. After extensive hearings, this Board recommended termination. I accepted their recommendation and terminated this individual in November of 1956 under the authority granted me by section 102(c) of the National Security Act of 1947.

It is hoped that the above will be of assistance to the Subcommittee and if further details are desired on any point, I shall be pleased to supply them. I do not intend to convey the impression that the Central Intelligence Agency and its personnel are perfect. We have made some errors in the past and no doubt will make other errors in the future but as we gain experience we are constantly improving and will continue to improve.

Sincerely,

Allen W. Dulles
Director

*Mr. Smith has
Enclosure
Termination
in Nov 1956
He has done
no account of
work with
no organization.*

*also brought them to the
attention of the White House.
The Vice President, etc etc. He
has also tried to find a
publisher for his pamphlet*

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
~~SECRET~~

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g. The charge of threats to employees if malfeasance were to be revealed is simply false. We could not and would not permit such a situation to exist and I know of no case where this has occurred.

25X1



MEMORANDUM FOR: THE DIRECTOR

The attached letter to Senator Russell
has been redone incorporating the changes you
indicated.

Legislative Council

25 August 1958
(DATE)


STAT

FORM NO. 101 REPLACES FORM 10-101
1 AUG 54 WHICH MAY BE USED.

(47)

MEMORANDUM FOR: The Director

Attached is a proposed letter for your signature to Senator Russell discussing the complaints of a former employee. You will note concurrences from the IG, DDP, SO, and OTR. Recommend signature.



Legislative Counsel

22 August 1958
(DATE)

STAT

FORM NO. 101 REPLACES FORM 10-101
1 AUG 54 WHICH MAY BE USED.

(47)

SENDER WILL CHECK CLASSIFICATION TOP AND BOTTOM			
UNCLASSIFIED	CONFIDENTIAL	SECRET	
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY OFFICIAL ROUTING SLIP			
TO	NAME AND ADDRESS	INITIALS	DATE
1	ER - 237 Admin		
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ACTION	DIRECT REPLY	PREPARE REPLY	
APPROVAL	DISPATCH	RECOMMENDATION	
COMMENT	FILE	RETURN	
CONCURRENCE	INFORMATION	SIGNATURE	
<p>Remarks:</p> <p style="text-align: center;">Original of concurrence sheet attached hereto.</p> <p>If Legislative Counsel can be called when DCI has signed letter, it will be handcarried to Senator Russell by </p> <p style="text-align: center;"><i>orig + 1 Handcarried to Legislative Counsel 8/29/58</i></p>			
FOLD HERE TO RETURN TO SENDER			
FROM: NAME, ADDRESS AND PHONE NO.			DATE
Legislative Counsel		221 East	8/22/58
UNCLASSIFIED	CONFIDENTIAL	SECRET	