

ER 9-8542/a

DOCUMENT NO. _____
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NEXT REVIEW DATE: _____
AUTH: HR 70-2
DATE: 12/21/81 REVIEWER:

12 NOV 1957

OSD REVIEW COMPLETED

25X

MEMORANDUM FOR: HONORABLE WILLIAM H. FRANCI, JR.
ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
(MANPOWER, PERSONNEL AND RESERVE)

SUBJECT: RECOMMENDATION OF MR. DOYLE L. NORTHRUP

1. It is my understanding that Mr. Doyle L. Northrup is being recommended for the Department of Defense Distinguished Civilian Service Award. I wish enthusiastically to endorse this recommendation.

2. My responsibilities have kept me in direct contact with the project under for which Mr. Northrup is Technical Director. As Director of Intelligence of the Air Force from May 1948 to November 1951 (with direct responsibility for during about the latter half of that period), mine was the office of principal concern with the results of the project. As Director of the Joint Staff for the Joint Chiefs of Staff from November 1951 to April 1953, I was in a position to know the importance to strategic planning of the intelligence provided as a direct result of the project. As Deputy Director of Central Intelligence from April 1953 to the present, I am intimately familiar with the importance to National Intelligence Estimates, of the intelligence obtained through the project.

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3. The reports submitted by have been the brightest stars in the picture of intelligence on the Soviet Union. The integrity, the precision and the timeliness of these reports have provided bench marks in intelligence for which I am at a loss to visualize substitutes. These reports have had a major impact upon the U. S. Military and Atomic Energy programs. Thus the results of the activity have been of major significance to the U. S.

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4. Mr. Northrup, to my personal knowledge, has played a decisive role in the unchallenged success of . He, therefore, is richly deserving of the proposed award.

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DDCI:ekt 11 Nov 57

1 orig & 1 - addressee *(via)*
2 - Col. Lester L. Woodward, USAF

25X1 Dep Chief, Off for Atomic Energy, DCS/O

1 - DDCI

1 - ER

C. P. CABELL
Lieutenant General, USAF
Deputy Director

ER 9-8542

Noted by D/DCI
CPC/hm

8 NOV 1957

**MEMORANDUM FOR LIEUTENANT GENERAL C. P. CABELL,
DEPUTY DIRECTOR, CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE
AGENCY**

SUBJECT: Recommendation of Mr. Doyle L. Northrup

1. We are recommending Mr. Northrup for the Department of Defense Distinguished Civilian Service Award. You will perhaps recall our conversation relative to this at our dinner at the Bolling Officers Club on the evening of 28 October 1957. The basis for this recommendation will be Mr. Northrup's pre-eminent performance of duty as Technical Director of [redacted] since February 1948. During this time he has been awarded the Exceptional Civilian Service Award (highest Air Force civilian award) on three occasions. General Hooks now feels that the Department of Defense Award is fully justified. We believe that a supporting letter from you would greatly enhance this recommendation, and such a letter, I know, would be greatly appreciated by General Hooks.

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2. I am advised that your letter should be addressed to the Honorable William H. Francis, Jr., Assistant Secretary of Defense (Manpower, Personnel and Reserve), but it should accompany the basic recommendation when it leaves our office.

3. To refresh your memory and to help you in preparing such a paper, I have inclosed the narrative of the recommendation for your review. I shall be pleased to come over to your office, at your convenience, to pick up this material or to answer any questions you might have. Thank you very much for your considerations.

S/

1 Incl
Narrative of
Recommendation

LESTER L. WOODWARD
Colonel, USAF
Deputy Chief, [redacted]
Office for Atomic Energy, DCS/O

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(Returned to [redacted]
with Gen. Cabell's Memo
of Recommendation dtd 11/3/57)

K1

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9-77464

OCT 31 1957

General G. B. Erskine, USMC (Ret.)
Assistant to the Secretary of Defense (Special Operations)
Office of the Secretary of Defense
Washington 25, D. C.

Attention: Colonel E. G. Lansdale

Dear General Erskine:

The proposals made by Colonel Edward G. Lansdale in his memorandum transmitted to me on your behalf on 14 October 1957 have been carefully studied in this Agency. In my view these proposals for enhancing the contribution of the armed forces in the cold war show a most commendable degree of sound imagination. They outline practical proposals for activities which would advance United States general policy objectives; although they would require some coordination with other Government agencies, they seem clearly to be within the scope of the present missions and responsibilities of the Department of Defense.

The recommendations proposing wider indoctrination of military personnel prior to service abroad and bringing them into better contact with indigenous peoples are fully in harmony with views expressed by the President regarding the relations abroad of U. S. citizens generally.

EXECUTIVE REGIONAL FILE

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It seems to me that the proposals for a more extensive study of guerrilla warfare and unconventional methods of combat by our own armed forces and for providing such training for foreign forces through our MAAGS are particularly appropriate. Acceptance of these proposals would not only enhance the versatility of our own limited military forces but would secure the best results from the special potentials of many of our friends and allies. At the same time it would strengthen their own local defense by enabling them to secure maximum advantage from their natural capabilities and their particular geographic situation.

We are already cooperating with the armed services on overseas orientation through our relations with the Strategic Intelligence School. If you should find it helpful, I would be pleased to determine if we can assist you in respect to any of the other proposals which may be put into effect.

Sincerely,

Signed

Allen W. Dulles
Director

cc: DDCI

CONCUR:

See yellow cover sheet - 24 Oct 57.

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Deputy Director (Plans) _____ Date _____

X [Redacted]

10/29-57

Deputy Director (Coordination) _____ Date _____

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DDP/ACPP [Redacted]

(17 October 1957)

Distribution:

- Orig & 1 - Addressee
- 2 - ER *w/ base*
- 1 - DDP
- 1 - DDC
- 2 - ACPP *w/ base*
- 1 - PPC

CFC
DDCI

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17 OCT 1957

9-7746
HARRIS

MEMORANDUM FOR: Director of Central Intelligence

VIA: Deputy Director (Plans)

SUBJECT: Col. Lansdale's "Cold War Program for Defense"

1. This memorandum suggests action by the DCI, as recommended in paragraph 4, in the form of dispatch of the attached letter to General Erskine (Attention of Col. Edward G. Lansdale).

2. Col. Lansdale wrote a first draft of a Cold War Program for Defense with date of 20 September 1957. He passed this informally to CIA with a request for comment. We found this first draft objectionable, particularly because a loose use of terminology concerning "psychological warfare" and "unconventional warfare" seemed to be putting the Department of Defense into matters that were reserved to CIA by NSC 5412/2. At Mr. Wisner's suggestion, an informal conversation was held on 8 October with Col. Lansdale by Messrs. FitzGerald, [redacted] of the PP Staff. A consensus was reached that the Lansdale objectives were good in themselves and appropriate for the Defense establishment, and that the problem of re-examining Agency functions would not arise if the language were clarified.

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3. Col. Lansdale has apparently incorporated most of our suggestions about language in this second draft which is itself undated but carries a cover letter to the Director of Central Intelligence dated 14 October 1957. The various suggestions are so worded that they fall within the proper training and public relations functions of the Department of Defense. Terminology peculiarly appropriate to NSC 5412 matters has been avoided. It would be a considerable step forward in our relations with Defense on such matters if we took a very positive and encouraging viewpoint concerning these proposals of Col. Lansdale's. It would also redound to Col. Lansdale's credit that he has managed to shape his proposals in such a way that they add to the total United States impact on our foreign problems without raising captious criticisms of jurisdiction that have plagued us in the past.

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4. It is therefore recommended that you send the attached letter to General Erskine. It is addressed to General Erskine not only as a matter of protocol but in order that it may contain a commendation of Col. Lansdale in a way that could not be done were it addressed to him directly.



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Acting Chief
Psychological and Paramilitary Staff

1 Attachment

cc: DDCI
DD/C

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CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

WASHINGTON 25, D. C.

OFFICE OF THE DIRECTOR

DOCUMENT NO. _____
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NEXT REVIEW DATE: _____
AUTH: HFI 7J-2
DATE: _____ REVIEWER:

25X1

General G. B. Erskine, USMC (Ret.)
Assistant to the Secretary of Defense (Special Operations)
Office of the Secretary of Defense
Washington 25, D. C.

Attention: Colonel E. G. Lansdale

Dear General Erskine:

The proposals made by Colonel Edward G. Lansdale in his memorandum transmitted to me on your behalf on 14 October 1957 have been carefully studied in this Agency. In my view these proposals for enhancing the contribution of the armed forces in the cold war show a most commendable degree of sound imagination. ~~Colonel Lansdale's valuable foreign experience and his knowledge of the working arrangements between U. S. Government agencies abroad are amply demonstrated in this paper. Previous essays on this subject have usually been marked by impractical enthusiasms which carried their authors into proposals that would impinge upon State's diplomatic functions, USIA's information programs, or CIA's charter under NSC 5412/2. This memorandum, on the contrary, outlines practical proposals for activities which can be conducted within the scope of the present responsibility of the armed forces.~~

The recommendations proposing wider indoctrination of military personnel prior to service abroad and bringing them into better contact with indigenous peoples are fully in harmony with views expressed by the President regarding the relations abroad of U. S. citizens generally.

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OCT 31 1957

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The recommendations proposing wider indoctrination of military personnel prior to service abroad and bringing them into better contact with indigenous peoples are fully in harmony with views expressed by the President regarding the relations abroad of U. S. citizens generally.

5724

It seems to me that the proposals for a more extensive study of guerrilla warfare and unconventional methods of combat by our own armed forces and for providing such training for foreign forces through our MAAGS are particularly appropriate. Acceptance of these proposals would not only enhance the versatility of our own limited military forces but would secure the best results from the special potentials of many of our friends and allies. At the same time it would strengthen their own local defense by enabling them to secure maximum advantage from their natural capabilities and their particular geographic situation.

We are already cooperating with the armed services on overseas orientation through our relations with the Strategic Intelligence School. If you should find it helpful, I would be pleased to determine if we can assist you in respect to any of the other proposals which may be put into effect.

Sincerely,
Signed

Allen W. Dulles
Director

cc: DDCI

Concur: DD/P

Concur: DD/E 10/25/57

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1 - ERW/basis

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DDCI

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2 - ACPP w/ey basis

1 - PPC

1991 OCT 27 5:30

2

CONFIDENTIAL

MEMORANDUM FOR: MR. DULLES *W*

Copies of the attached have been furnished to
Generals Cabell and Truscott for study. A
copy has also been furnished DD/P for
preparation of reply for your signature.


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FMC 18 Oct 57

(DATE)

FORM NO. 101 REPLACES FORM 10-101
1 AUG 54 WHICH MAY BE USED.

(47)



Office of the Secretary of Defense
Washington 25, D. C.

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14 October 1957

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- It contains information of CIA
interest that must remain
classified at TS S C
Authority: ER 70-2
- It contains nothing of CIA interest

Date 17/10/57 Reviewer

STAT

Dear Mr. Dulles:

Several days ago I completed an abbreviated study, outlining some practical steps which could be taken within the Department of Defense to enhance the contribution of the armed forces in the "cold" war. General Erskine read the memorandum and concurred with the proposals, the conclusions and the recommendations. When he went to the hospital, he asked me to bring the study to your attention with a request for any comments which you or your staff might wish to make, prior to submission of the study to the Secretary.

I am forwarding the attached study to you in line with General Erskine's desire.

Sincerely yours,

/s/

Edward G. Lansdale
Colonel, USAF
Deputy Assistant to the
Secretary of Defense
(Special Operations)

Incl.

Honorable Allen W. Dulles
Director, Central Intelligence Agency

0255 10/10/57 10 12 48 57

ER: Falls
This was meant for DD/H
however they already had a copy
I have provided a reply
which now has. ekr 21 Oct

STAT



~~SECRET~~

OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
WASHINGTON 25, D. C.

9-9946
AWD/for

Dear Mr. Dulles:

Several days ago I completed an abbreviated study, outlining some practical steps which could be taken within the Department of Defense to enhance the contribution of the armed forces in the "cold" war. General Erskine read the memorandum and concurred with the proposals, the conclusions and the recommendations. When he went to the hospital, he asked me to bring the study to your attention with a request for any comments which you or your staff might wish to make, prior to submission of the study to the Secretary.

I am forwarding the attached study to you in line with General Erskine's desire.

Sincerely yours,

Ed

Edward G. Lansdale
Colonel, USAF
Deputy Assistant to the
Secretary of Defense
(Special Operations)

Incl.

Honorable Allen W. Dulles
Director, Central Intelligence Agency

Document No. _____
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OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

WASHINGTON 25, D. C.

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 Authority: _____
 It contains nothing of CIA interest

Date 17/2/91 _____

MEMORANDUM

FROM: Colonel E. G. Lansdale

SUBJECT: A Cold War Program for Defense

1. The Problem: To insure that the Armed Forces of the United States make maximum effective use of their capabilities in the national interest during the cold war.

2. Definition of the Problem:

a. United States national security planning is involved with the problems posed by three types of modern war - the "cold" war, the limited war, and the global war. Although our Defense establishment has played a major supporting role in the "cold" war, it has left the conduct of this war largely in the hands of other agencies of our government.

b. It seems logical (due to the political goals of our major enemy and his expert use of a combination of "cold" war and hot war instruments to attain those goals) our own concept of military activity should consider the three types of war as interrelated. Thus, our military participation and training in "cold" war activity should not only ready our military for combat in a limited or "global" war, but should also achieve important immediate cold war objectives. This is particularly true of such special operations as guerrilla warfare, counter-guerrilla warfare, and activities designed to create desired political/psychological impacts.

c. The enemy military is becoming expert in cold war actions which has contributed largely to his successes. These successes are not small. Since the cease-fire of World War II, the Communist enemy has conquered some 550 million people living on over 4 million square miles of territory. While most of our recent defensive tactics have prevented further conquest, there is no guarantee that further conquests cannot be made in the near future - while "cold" war political strategy keeps conventional armed forces largely standing aside from the conflict. The Communist enemy is using the "cold" war to perfect his unconventional warfare techniques: Our Armed Forces are not, at first hand.

d. Thus, it is the purpose of this paper, to point out that more effectively guided use of military assets can provide economical and important contributions to winning U. S. cold war objectives, and better prepare our military for waging limited or global war if required.

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3. Factors to be Considered:

a. Our Defense establishment has more people (military, employees, and dependents) stationed in foreign countries than any other entity of the U. S. Government. It has commands, MAAGS and missions in 38 countries abroad. Most military are in uniforms which identify them more plainly as Americans than does the clothing of other U. S. officials. Further the military are plainly recognized in foreign countries as being there to help defend those countries and the freedom of the people.

b. Among this great U. S. manpower pool of our Defense establishment abroad, there are many persons who could be engaged actively in the "cold" war in their present positions, with only slight redefinition of their present missions. These include personnel currently assigned to MAAGs, Special Warfare units, public information, and troop information and education. As a step in this direction, the appropriate Department of Defense authorities are currently proposing increased attention to the politico-military-economic impact of MAAG activities, and to training designed to better plan and control these impacts.

c. Policy relating to the subject discussed in this paper is not viewed as a matter of immediate concern. It is noted however, that the charter of the Office of Special Operations includes responsibility for psychological warfare affairs of concern to the Secretary of Defense. The Joint Subsidiary Activities Division, under the Joint Chiefs of Staff, formulates policy, with emphasis on planning for limited and global war. It is noted also that elements of Defense, such as ISA and MP&R, have policy responsibilities relating to important parts of the problem.

4. Discussion:

a. There is much that our Defense establishment could do with what it now has, and in complete harmony with other agencies now engaged in "cold" war operations. The decision is internal within the Defense establishment.

b. Some of the cold war actions open to implementation by our Defense establishment are:

(1) Giving our troops an equal chance with Communist enemy troops, in political knowledge. Admittedly, our Armed Forces have been apolitical in the sense of refraining from U. S. partisan politics and in being placed under civilian authority. However, they remain largely ignorant of our own political philosophy which helped bring us to world power (and which could be the most potent element of a Pax Americana in the world) and are largely unaware of the issues involved in the countries where they are stationed and which are exploited by the Communist enemy. They need to have their interest in foreign places awakened so favorably that they will want and know how to make friends among the people; they need education so that they can be articulate in furthering their own heritage.

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All personnel going abroad under Defense orders should be exposed to the most dynamic educational program possible. This could include movies (such as those made by a foreign country to attract tourists, as well as those portraying U. S. political philosophy in our history), language instruction, how to answer points made by Communists in the country where assigned, and adopting some of the more successful methods of indoctrinating MAAG personnel abroad (such as the wise practice in MAAG--Vietnam where an articulate Vietnamese Army general appears at monthly meetings of all MAAG officers and tells them what his brother Vietnamese officers think of their methods).

(2). Emphasis on a special program of bringing U. S. personnel and foreigners together under favorable circumstances abroad. While there is considerable activity along such lines today, on a happenstance basis, there is need for a planned program which will multiply such incidents as the visit of the USS Massey to Scotland last year, where its crew implemented a planned people-to-people program and inflicted a psychological defeat on a Soviet Delegation visiting in the area. The voluntary actions of the U. S. military in Korea in helping rehabilitate civilian institutions is a similar example. Many of our MAAGs would be helped in their work of building effective foreign armies if there were an off-duty program to teach these foreigners team-work through athletic games--starting with children who will be future soldiers; (this is particularly true in Asia and the Mid-East where most childrens' games require individual rather than team effort; yet, countering the Communists and defending freedom demands team-work).

While this type of activity is primarily within the purview of Armed Forces Information and Education, OSD, it is believed that each Service should develop its own programs, or request the JCS to initiate joint planning, with priority given to areas of increasing political imbalance (such as Okinawa and Iceland, for example). The Navy would benefit by placing imaginative, forceful officers (Captain William J. Lederer and Commander Daniel V. James come to mind) in charge of global programs for activities ashore in foreign areas.

(3). A number of foreign armed forces we are now aiding are engaged in counter-guerrilla and other security actions which fall within the provisions of NSC 1290-d (the Overseas Internal Security Program). It is usually only by chance that any of the military assigned to MAAGs which advise those armies are familiar with the doctrine or tactics required for such actions. The Armed Forces should train personnel for this task, and then assign them to MAAGs to help with advice and training. This would develop the integrity of a country's armed forces within the national political structure being supported by the U. S. One trained military man of ability, assigned for this purpose in a MAAG today and thus helping to secure a nation, would be worth a battalion of Americans later in conventional combat.

Personnel for this task should be drawn from the Army's Special Forces. Personnel so assigned would gain

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invaluable experience in a foreign area, working with natives, and learning the weapons of unconventional warfare at first-hand. They could have no finer preparation for future duties in a limited or global war.

(4). Our doctrine and use of unconventional warfare are in need of imaginative stimulation. We are still too dependent upon mechanical means of warfare, and this tends to make us conventional--even when we engage in unconventional warfare.

However, we have much to learn. Our doctrine should be expanded so that we understand the need and effectiveness of coordinated political-psychological military actions, as well as the intimate support role of operational intelligence. The U. S. now mostly separates these functions, to fight an enemy who uses them with coordinated precision. Our present experiences are teaching us little or nothing in preparation for coping with Partisan forces similar to those faced by the Germans in Russia in World War II.

Since imagination, forethought, and practical improvisation are invaluable to the success of unconventional warfare, it would be worthwhile to enrich U. S. doctrine as much as possible while opportunities exist to do so. Considering present budgetary limitations, one of the most economical methods of doing this would be to hold seminar sessions for U. S. personnel, conducted by some of the world's outstanding persons experienced in unconventional warfare. Such seminars would be stimulatingly resultful if properly attended, conducted, recorded, and studied.

A series of seminars could be held, to insure full benefit from them in the generating of thinking for strategy, tactics, materiel, and training. Thus, several seminar groups might be formed to convene with each person invited to speak on a subject; seminar sessions could be held over a period of time, with a speaker moving to successive groups. U. S. personnel could be grouped as follows:

(a). Combat troops, meeting at Fort Bragg. Personnel could consist of selected officers and men from U. S. Army Special Forces and Special Warfare units, as well as Navy, Air Force, Marines, and CIA.

(b). Staff personnel, meeting in the Pentagon. Personnel could consist of selected members of all the Armed Services now on staff duty (relating to special warfare) in the Washington area, as well as CIA, State, and USIA. Selected R&D personnel and intelligence officers should be included.

(c). School personnel, meeting at the National War College. Shortened seminar sessions could be held at Fort McNair, perhaps at night if necessary, attended by members of the National War College class and by instructors from Service war colleges, command and staff schools, and academies whose subjects concern unconventional warfare, intelligence, and geo-politics.

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If desired, the seminar idea could be tested by a trial run. A typical example of the type of foreign officer whose name belongs on the list of those who would conduct such seminars is currently on duty in Washington, is available upon proper request to his government, and is experienced in one of the least-known subjects; counter-guerrilla warfare. This is Colonel Napoleon Valeriano, a regular officer of the Armed Forces of the Philippines, now on special duty with the Philippine Embassy in Washington. He is under the orders of the President of the Philippines, and it is known that an official U. S. request to President Garcia personally for use of Colonel Valeriano for conducting such seminars would be granted promptly.

Following more than three years' experience in guerrilla warfare in World War II, Colonel Valeriano has had about seven years' experience as the Philippines' outstanding combat commander against the Communist guerrilla Huks. He first commanded the Nenita (Skull) Unit, then the 7th BCT, then became military aide and advisor to President Magsaysay, and finally assisted other governments in Southeast Asia in solutions of their problems of internal security. He is a highly articulate soldier with a thorough grounding in U. S. doctrine. His most valuable contributions to seminar sessions would be on the following counter-guerrilla subjects (and he should speak on each):

(a). Large unit infiltration methods (based upon his experience in disguising infantry companies as enemy guerrilla; motion pictures of his training methods are available.

(b). Deceptive artillery support fire methods.

(c). Air-ground intelligence, reconnaissance, and liaison methods (when enemy guerrillas are supported by the population).

(d). Anti-ambuscade and interdiction methods, as well as use of traps and mines.

(e). Other practical counter-guerrilla lessons, including interrogation methods in hostile territory, signalling systems, movements over rugged terrain and inaccessible areas, and flora and fauna in areas of operations.

(5). Seminar Speakers, both American and foreign with practical experience could be selected to assist in achieving the objectives of the seminars and other aspects of such a program.

(6). There is need for a Special Warfare trained officer at most of our MAAGs (after indoctrination such as envisaged above). We have the lesson of China where U. S. training and equipment were put to the test of battle, only to suffer an ideological defeat. Are we certain that the armed forces we are now equipping and training will stand up with us in case of need?

The Special Warfare trained officer should work initially on the morale of the armed forces in the country where

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assigned. This morale has many facets. It includes political indoctrination of the foreign troops (consistent with both the local national policy and U. S. policy) through a troop information and education program, the teaching and enforcement of true military courtesy (soldiers on our side need to be the brothers-protectors of the people to counter the successful Chinese Communist doctrine of "the Communist soldier is the fish and the people are the water"), enforcing honest practices in pay to the troops (to prevent exploitable discontent--and a number of MAAG chiefs have had bitter experiences with this), and even to establishing practical supply and messing for troops in the field (to prevent alienation of the civilian population through procurement of food at gun point).

When foreign armies are used to combat internal dissidence, the Special Warfare trained officer can gain invaluable experience in advising the foreign army on its suppression or conversion activities against dissidents.

All of the above psychological actions can be undertaken overtly with the agreement of the foreign government.

c. It would be useful to interest the Navy and the Air Force in special aspects of operational problems in their current training on U. S. bases. The Army and Navy could practice secret, maritime delivery of Special Forces personnel and equipment; this is a highly-skilled operation requiring intensive training. New techniques of target identification by Special Forces teams on the ground would be of interest to SAC and also require intensive training.

d. Additional emphasis could be placed on military intelligence in foreign armies being advised by our MAAGs, not only in conventional combat intelligence, but in intelligence for unconventional operations (such as counter-guerrilla and counter-subversion).

e. There is need in some countries for constructing a popular resistance organization, in presently non-denied areas, within the chain of command of the country's armed forces. Plans made by native leaders will range from the conduct of total war, including "scorched earth" strategy, to the more elite type of organizations which can be quietly organized and trained prior to an over-run of the country by an enemy and then serve as the cadre for a gradually built-up resistance force. While much of our current preparations for future resistance are correctly the domain of our clandestine services, there is also a military domain of providing requested guidance in preparing for resistance in current non-denied areas. Any necessary agreement between the U. S. military and the U. S. clandestine services on this specific subject can be worked out locally.

5. Conclusions:

a. There are a number of actions which the Defense establishment could undertake to help the national effort in the "cold" war, which are within its capabilities and prerogatives,

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- (1) proper indoctrination of U. S. personnel going abroad under Defense orders;
- (2) initiating and continuing a global program of bringing U. S. personnel and foreigners together on a favorable basis;
- (3) assignment of trained counter-guerrilla advisors to MAAGs where required;
- (4) stimulation of U. S. thinking on unconventional warfare through seminars conducted by outstanding, experienced persons; these can be split into two series of seminars, one on "cold" war actions (such as counter-guerrilla) and the second on methods for limited and global wars;
- (5) assignment of a Special Warfare trained officer to each of four or five MAAGs initially, and to additional MAAGs later as need becomes apparent or as successful projects indicate.

b. These actions should prove of value to the successful accomplishment of present Defense missions in foreign areas, be of utility in readying the Armed Forces for an enemy employing unconventional means in a limited or global war, enrich the unconventional warfare doctrine of our Armed Forces, and be economic to implement (since most of the means to take these actions exist already).

c. Any program such as this will require thorough staffing, since a number of entities within the Defense establishment are involved. Further, some aspects of some of the actions noted above are already under study; including some which have been studied for several years. It is felt that one advisory group could be assigned to consider all of these related actions, and could assist in obtaining fullest implementation in the most economic manner. This group could then study further actions, if Defense so decides.

d. The Secretary of Defense should be requested to put responsibility in one place for seeing that the "cold" war program outlined in this paper is carried out effectively. This will permit decisions to be made in time to be practical. It can be noted that many of the tasks are well within the present mission of the Secretary's Assistant for Special Operations.

6. Recommendation:

It is recommended that the contents of this memo be made known to the Secretary of Defense and that he be requested to assign responsibility for ensuring the development of the "cold" war program outlined above to his Assistant for Special Operations, who will act with the advice of a special group composed of representatives from Defense organizations having a major interest in the program.

EG Lansdale

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EDWARD G. LANSDALE

Colonel, USAF

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**CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
OFFICIAL ROUTING SLIP**

TO	NAME AND ADDRESS	INITIALS	DATE
1	GENERAL CABELL	<i>C/C</i>	<i>11/4</i>
2			
3			
4			
5			
6			

Jan

ACTION	DIRECT REPLY	PREPARE REPLY
APPROVAL	DISPATCH	RECOMMENDATION
COMMENT	FILE	RETURN
CONCURRENCE	INFORMATION	SIGNATURE

Remarks:

DCI has his own copy of the attached memorandum prepared by Col. Lansdale and asked that the attached copy be made available to you for your study. DD/P is preparing appropriate reply for the DCI's signature.

General Truscott also has a copy.

FOLD HERE TO RETURN TO SENDER

	NAME, ADDRESS AND PHONE NO.	DATE
	18 Oct 57	

UNCLASSIFIED CONFIDENTIAL SECRET

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
 OFFICIAL ROUTING SLIP

TO	NAME AND ADDRESS	INITIALS	DATE
1	DC/PP 15 OCT 1957	[Redacted]	16 Oct
2	je/UVS2		17 Oct.
3	AC/PP		
4			
5			
6			

<input type="checkbox"/> ACTION	<input type="checkbox"/> DIRECT REPLY	<input type="checkbox"/> PREPARE REPLY
<input type="checkbox"/> APPROVAL	<input type="checkbox"/> DISPATCH	<input type="checkbox"/> RECOMMENDATION
<input type="checkbox"/> COMMENT	<input type="checkbox"/> FILE	<input type="checkbox"/> RETURN
<input type="checkbox"/> CONCURRENCE	<input type="checkbox"/> INFORMATION	<input type="checkbox"/> SIGNATURE

Remarks:
 Mr. Wisner asked that the attached be sent to you with a repeat of the message [Redacted] left here when he brought in the paper last night. [Redacted] carried a copy of this paper to DCI at General Erskine's request. [Redacted] observed that he thought Col. Lansdale had made an honest effort to include or take cognizance of all the points brought out in discussion with your people. FGW would like to have your comments on the new paper.

Col. Lansdale would like to have the old version destroyed? Do you have it, and if so, would you please have it destroyed?

old version destroyed
 [Signature] bjm

FOLD HERE TO RETURN TO SENDER

FROM: NAME, ADDRESS AND PHONE NO.
 O/DDP [Redacted] 1046 L 10/15/57

SENDER WILL CHECK CLASSIFICATION TOP AND BOTTOM

UNCLASSIFIED CONFIDENTIAL SECRET

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
OFFICIAL ROUTING SLIP

TO	NAME AND ADDRESS	INITIALS	DATE
1	MR. WISNER		25X1 OCT 23 '57
2	C-PP 83 OCT 19		24 Oct
3	DDP		OCT 24 '57
4	DD/C		
5	DCI		
6			

<input type="checkbox"/>	ACTION	<input type="checkbox"/>	DIRECT REPLY	<input type="checkbox"/>	PREPARE REPLY
<input type="checkbox"/>	APPROVAL	<input type="checkbox"/>	DISPATCH	<input type="checkbox"/>	RECOMMENDATION
<input type="checkbox"/>	COMMENT	<input type="checkbox"/>	FILE	<input type="checkbox"/>	RETURN
<input type="checkbox"/>	CONCURRENCE	<input type="checkbox"/>	INFORMATION	<input type="checkbox"/>	SIGNATURE

Remarks:

Frank: The Director stated he agrees with you ^{25X1} on the attached and has asked that you rewrite the proposed letter to General Erskine along the lines of your comments.

*This has been done in the new draft
1 to 2 for redraft
Redrafted letter herewith. Original material also, for purposes of comparison*

Suspense 25 Oct

FOLD HERE TO RETURN TO SENDER

25X1 FROM: NAME, ADDRESS AND PHONE NO. DATE

22 Oct 57

ROUTING AND RECORD SHEET

SUBJECT: (Optional)			
FROM: CPP		NO. 9-77461 9-7746A	
TO: (Officer designation, room number, and building)		DATE	
		RECEIVED	FORWARDED
1. DDP	Oct 17	Oct 17	
2. DD/C - 204 Admin.	21 Ret	21 act	RST
3. DCI			
4. DOCUMENT NO. _____ NO CHANGE IN CLASS. [] CLASS. CHANGED TO: TS S G			
5. NEXT REVIEW DATE: _____ AUTH: HR 70.3 DATE: 11/2/81			
6. REVIEWER: []			
7.			
8.			
9.			
10.			
11.			
12.			
13.			
14.			
15.			

STAT

① to ② and ③
 The attached memorandum and draft of proposed letter for the Director's signature to General Erskine, are generally in accord with my own views and have my endorsement -- except for a minor aspect of the draft letter.
 As I have reported previously to you, orally, we consider Lansdale's paper which is presently before Under Secretary Quarles in its redrafted form, to be a useful and acceptable document, and although we might find some points to criticize we have decided that it would be best to go along with the paper as written in order to avoid giving the impression that we are being obstructive; and also with a view to giving Lansdale a little much-needed support.
 I have indicated the language which I question in the draft letter by light marginal side-lining. I feel that this language might be seized upon by certain people in the Pentagon as unwarranted criticism aimed at particular individuals.
 It also occurs to me that it might not be desirable to go too far in this letter in our praise of Lansdale, for fear of giving his enemies ammunition to support their charges that he is a "CIA plant" in the office of the Secretary of Defense.

25X