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Major General Robert A. Breitweiser, USAF  
 Director, Intelligence (J-2)  
 The Joint Staff, JCS  
 Room 2E-966, Pentagon Building  
 Washington, D. C.

Dear General Breitweiser:

This letter is in response to the Commander-in-Chief Atlantic Fleet's telegram DTG 112130Z to the Director, Central Intelligence, in which he requested Central Intelligence Agency's answers to the Essential Elements of Information of Annex H of the Country Plan for Cuba.

The following information is furnished based on the assumption that US intervention is defined as the evacuation of US citizens for their protection with the likelihood of extending the operation to the protection of US property. It is further assumed that the sending of naval units would be required and, if necessary, marines would be used to protect the operation. There are approximately 11,000 US citizens in Cuba. The discussion is written to correspond to the paragraphs in the request to this Agency.

A. Strength, disposition, and attitude of counter-revolutionary forces: Counter-revolutionary forces are scattered, poorly organized, and uncoordinated. They are so divergent as to make it unlikely that they will soon, if ever, unite. There are believed to be several small guerrilla groups operating in the hills of Las Villas Province, and possibly others in Oriente, and the other provinces. Counter-revolutionary terrorists frequently operate in Havana, using hit and run tactics.

There are potential counter-revolutionary elements of unknown extent in middle class groups, in organized labor, in the armed forces, and in the old-line political parties.

JCS review(s) completed.

Fear of provoking repression by the authorities would probably keep the reactions to US intervention among most anti-Castro forces passive.

B. Reaction of government forces: The government of Fidel Castro can be expected to continue to harass US private interests--amounting to some \$800,000,000--by means of taxation and expropriation to the point of confiscation. US intervention would probably accelerate the process already under way. This would affect such US privately owned interests as sugar mills in Oriente and Camaguey Provinces, the Texaco refinery near Santiago, the Moa Bay mining and refinery operations as well as such US government-owned installations as the Guantanamo Naval Base and the nickel refining operation at Nicaro. The demagogic inflammation of public opinion against the US during an intervention would probably lead to sporadic mob attacks on US privately and publicly owned installations as well as on US nationals. Under certain circumstances, Castro would probably provoke incidents creating Cuban "martyrs" in order to justify his case before world opinion and might well force the breaking of diplomatic relations with the US.

Action against US interests would probably begin immediately with the US intervention. It would probably not include a frontal assault by military forces against any US landing force, but probably would include guerrilla action and violence by inflamed mobs.

Communists, who are becoming increasingly influential through sympathizers in high government posts, appear intent on provoking the United States into intervention. They would attempt then to create violent incidents that could be used in Moscow's propaganda.

C. Reaction of counter-revolutionary elements: Some anti-Castro forces might well attempt, by acts of violence against US interests, to provoke the extension of any US intervention and to change its very nature and direction. They would attempt to use the intervention to bring about the downfall of the Castro regime. The longer any evacuation operation was prolonged, the more likely that attempts would be made by the opposition to get the US more deeply involved. Such provocative acts would include sabotage of US privately- or publicly-owned installations and attacks on US nationals.

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**D. Cooperation by Cuban groups with US intervention:** A US intervention, though justified, nevertheless for historical reasons would alienate some Cubans otherwise well disposed to the United States and the US forces involved could probably not count on any organized Cuban group for active support. US citizens in Cuba might receive the protection of some Cubans, on the basis of personal friendship.

**E. Support for counter-revolutionary movement from other Caribbean states:** Certain counter-revolutionary groups already have received the moral and material backing of the Trujillo dictatorship in the Dominican Republic. Trujillo would probably support, within his limited capabilities, a full scale counter-revolutionary effort that appeared likely to succeed. He might be deterred, however, by strong adverse opinion in the rest of the hemisphere. A counter-revolutionary uprising that came as the direct result of US intervention would be condemned in the rest of the hemisphere, and even more so if such a counter-revolutionary outbreak had the backing of the widely hated Dominican dictator. It is unlikely that any other Caribbean government would actively support a counter-revolutionary movement in Cuba.

**F. Reaction of the remainder of Latin America:** A quickly executed evacuation of US nationals only would receive some passing criticism, but if it were extended over a period of time, or if it appeared primarily to protect US property, it would cause a more lasting adverse reaction. In the latter case, the US would probably be attacked before the Organization of American States (OAS) and probably the United Nations.

The United States forces in Cuba would not be opposed militarily by any Latin American nation.

**G. The US Naval Base at Guantanamo:** The US Naval Base is vulnerable to interruption of its water supply, which originates at a pumping station five miles outside Base limits. The Base water supply could be cut as soon as the Cuban government was aware of an impending US intervention. It could be done with a minimum of forces. Though unlikely, it is possible that the base might be subjected to more drastic action by the Dominican government or Cuban counter-revolutionaries seeking to provoke the US into extending and expanding the nature of its intervention.

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H. We are not in a position to assess Cuban ability to mine the country's harbors. Cuba does have the capability of placing navigational hazards in the harbors and directing some artillery fire on ships entering them.

Sincerely,

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Allen W. Dulles  
Director

Originator:  
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*D.S.C.I.*

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