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29 August 1957

The Honorable Percival Brundage
The Director of the Bureau of the Budget
Bureau of the Budget
Washington 25, D.C.


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NEXT REVIEW DATE: 2011
AUTH: HR 79-2
DATE 16/3/81 REVIEWER:

Dear Mr. Brundage:

Reference is made to the Bureau of the Budget "Report on United
 of recent date.

In general the report presents a balanced and responsible view
of intelligence activities As an inevitable result of
the short time allotted to the survey the validity of some of its
conclusions are debatable and in some instances at least appear to
be based upon factual inaccuracy or misunderstanding.

As might be expected, the paper is ^{most questionable} weakest when it considers
the extremely complicated subject of political and psychological war-
fare (PP) activities



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most questionable

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*negative
as
indicated
concern*

This does not mean that we are not in full agreement with the conclusion of the report to the effect that PP operations should be critically reviewed. Critical review and evaluation as well as revision, expansion, or contraction as appropriate is a necessary part of any PP program, and this review process will continue to be an integral part

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In considering clandestine collection activities, the desirability of prior coordination in the sense of target allocation appears as a recurrent theme throughout the paper. This is, of course, contrary to present Agency policy. Although undoubtedly attractive from the budgetary point of view, such allocation might be contrary to long-term national interests in that it would contribute to the fractionization of the U.S. intelligence effort and require expansion of the coordinating and essentially non-productive superstructure. In this same context, NSCID 2 and the Economic Intelligence Committee are not appropriate mechanisms for the coordination of espionage activities.

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idea of the

We are in complete agreement with the proposals to establish advisors with the military commands, to increase the flow of CIA and State Department political information and studies on the Communist parties, and to handle low level comint like any other secret intelligence information. It is doubtful, however, whether adoption of the first two would in fact materially reduce the political collection and analysis activities of the commands; *the first*

would require the addition of personnel.
Sincerely,

~~G. P. Cabell~~
~~Lieutenant General, USAF~~
~~Acting Director~~

Dulles

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NEXT REVIEW DATE: 2017

AUTH: HR 102

DATE 12/31/81

REVIEWER:

CIA COMMENTS ON BUREAU OF THE BUDGET

REPORT ON UNITED STATES INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES

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p. 1 : We are gratified that the representatives of the Bureau of the Budget noted significant improvements in the intelligence effort For several years now the CIA has devoted considerable attention to the problem of bringing the intelligence community closer together and we have felt for some time that notable improvements have been made.

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pp. 2,9 : It is possibly misleading to call COMINT and traditional espionage parallel activities. Neither of these activities would be completely reliable, alone. Both Communications Intelligence and espionage are susceptible to use as deception vehicles and consequently can act to check each other. Further, COMINT is on a magnitude far exceeding that of espionage and grouping them together gives a very disproportionate picture

inadequate,
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pp. 2,9 : The question of "integrity of command" is one exclusively for the Department of Defense. However we would raise serious questions as to whether this concept, which is basic to our military command structure, is one that could or should be changed.

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pp. 3,9 : We are in agreement that there should be more and more coordination of clandestine intelligence activities in the planning stage. We also agree that there should be a clearer delineation of collection responsibilities and are attempting to achieve this in our revision of the NSCIDs. The Inter-Agency Priorities Subcommittee of the IAC is charged with reviewing requirements for clandestine collection.

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pp. 3,11: We endorse the recommendation that the Department of State provide political advisors to the various military commands, and that these advisors should be charged with the responsibility of keeping the commands informed of political developments affecting them. The CIA will be happy to support these political advisors with necessary intelligence information.

pp. 3,12:

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pp. 3,12: The CIA will be happy to *increase flow to the* supply the *of* military commands with information on both national and international Communism.

✓


pp. 3,13: In another context we are working on the integration of low-level COMINT (plain text) with other intelligence information. We are in agreement that this might prove economical.

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pp. 3,14:



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pp. 4,15: We are currently reviewing the plans for "hot war" and believe that our arrangements for continuing our activities after the outbreak of hostilities will be much better than they were several months ago. However, it should be recognized that war plans are bound to be nebulous as long as the type of war to be fought remains uncertain.

p. 4 : The tables of personnel strength are not truly reflective of intelligence activities per se. It should be recognized that




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peripheral intelligence activity.

p. 12 : The CIA will supply USAFE with intelligence on the Near East. This arrangement is already being put into effect.

p. 16 : The questions raised concerning PP activities are similar to those which can be asked concerning political and psychological warfare activities in any area of the world. It should be particularly noted that these activities were coordinated in advance with the Department of State and that there was general agreement that they should be undertaken. Naturally, it is difficult to assess the results of any PP activities, but we are reasonably convinced that these have

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
favorably inclined toward the United States and its objectives.

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p. 17 : are of a different nature and are more specifically governed by NSC directives. There are more convincing evidences that these projects are effective and contribute to keeping alive a spirit of resistance which is a basic U. S. policy.

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p. 18 :



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recognized that all of our activities are subjected to annual review by our internal Projects Review Committee.

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Remarks:

DCI would like to have you review Mr. Kirkpatrick's attached rewrite of proposed comments for the Agency to forward to the Bureau of the Budget on the Perry-Wilhelm report and let him have your views.

Comment Channels

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Remarks:

Frank -

gone over this draft and the suggested changes are indicated. The last sentence of the 2nd item is unclear i.e. what is meant by "magnitude"? Based on CS experience the last sentence of the first item on page 2 is not true.

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Remarks:

In addition to proposed reply to D/Budget and the basic paper, I am forwarding also the various agency comments on the Budget paper in the event the DCI wishes to see them. Believe agency comments have been seen previously by General Cabell, then A/DCI.

LBKirkpatrick

Comint Material is attached

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OFFICE OF THE DEPUTY DIRECTOR

DCI :

I like Kirk's
rewrites of agency
comments .

ck

19 oct

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