Approved For Release 2003/03/28 : CIA-RDP80R01731R000900010004-2

2

STENOGRAPHIC NOTES OF CONVERSATION BETWEEN DCI, GOVERNOR HAROLD E. STASSEN, AND ROBERT AMORY ON 21 NOVEMBER 1957 AT 1500 HOURS

D- "This is very interesting--."

S- "You sense--."

D- "We've been thinking a little bit along these lines. We thought of trying to do something based on this challenge that he has sent out, but I think this is--I might ask one or two questions."

S- "Yes."

D- "Of course, you point out--I don't know enough about our own position, honestly know, about our position in the rocket field well enough to judge whether we can stand this from that angle or not. I assume, in any event, this would be rejected by the Soviet Union because of the second part of it."

S- "Well, I think the rejection--."

D- "So, I don't think you're running very much risk on that."

S- "I think we have to be--you have to be ready, (as you say), for the other. This is my thinking on--of course, we have to see what the rocket people themselves say, but I think you would then approach, if they accepted and wanted to work in the details, you'd say, 'All right, we'll test

DOCUMENT NO.
NO CHANGE IN CLASS. ☐
☐ DECLASSIFIED
CLASS. CHANGED TO: TS S C 2011
NEXT REVIEW DATE:
AUTH: HR 70-2
DATE: 1991 REVIEW

Approved For Release 2003/03/28 : CIA-RDP80R01731R000900010004-2

25X1

Approved For Release 2003/03/28 : CIA-RDP80R01731R000900010004-2

five hundred, one thousand, two thousand, three thousand, four thousand, five thousand.' Now, they might say, 'There's no use testing these short ranges, we're only going to test the five thousand.' Well, there's a certain admission of weakness on their part right then--."

A- "Yes."

S- "And I think we would be in a perfectly strong position to say, 'All ranges are going to be important.' If we have--in fact--are very accurate on the shorter things then, if they are further ahead of the other and as I see it, in the negotiating process if they accept it, you could easily drag two or three years if you want to and many other things can happen. Furthermore, on the long-range, we're all right on the Snark which isn't as fast but, yet, can be carried over there and can be very accurate; so that your terms of reference are also--one factor to judge would be speed but not the sole factor. So, I think we've got certain safeguards in there that--."

D- "What have they got the Snark up to? Mach two?"

A- "Oh, no sir."

D- "I thought they had--not the Snark--but they've got one, haven't they that goes--?"

Approved For Release 2003/03/28 : CIA-RDP80R01731R000900010004-2

Approved For Release 2003/03/28 : CIA-RDP80R01731R000900010004-2

S- "No, still below--."

A- "Still below."

S- "Subsonic, I think."

A- "Yes."

D- "Yes, I know, but I thought they had one--."

A- "Well, I thought they cancelled Navaho. I think that was one of the--that big decision was made in August by the Pentagon--."

D- "The Navaho was the one that was more than mach."

A- "Yes sir, the Navaho II was to be Mach 3.5--."

S- "Yes, I think they decided--."

D- "Yes.

A- "And I would wash that one out, Governor, because Khrushev already calls that a bomber whether it's got men aboard it or not, and it doesn't go high enough or fast so that an ordinary Soviet MIG-19 can knock it down."

S- "Well, what I meant is, if, in the ultimate--."

A- "Oh, yes."

S- "They had accepted and we were up against something three years from now--."

A- "It's like weight lifting--we want to do track, they want to do weight lifting--we'll throw this particular poll vault in."

Approved For Release 2003/03/28 : CIA-RDP80R01731R000900010004-2

Approved For Release 2003/03/28 : CIA-RDP80R01731R000900010004-2

D- "And you send them over there, the target, at night and things of that kind, it's not too easy--."

A- "Oh, yes, and in a storm, that's right. I wouldn't want to be living under--."

D- "It's not too easy to shoot down."

A- "Living in the place where one of them is aimed, I agree."

S- "You can argue that the fact that you got there in so many hours, you were right on the button, doesn't counter in the longer-range thing."

A- "Sure."

S- "That is, of course, you would need to be able to show a darned good--say, two-thousand mile capability, by the time you started making such a test if they accepted."

A- "Why not say that we'd both use each other's ball park. We'd offer them a firing pad at Patrick in return for a firing pad at--."

D- "That is in here."

S- "That's in there. Both use both, you see."

D- "Yes."

A- "Both use both? I'm sorry, I didn't read it carefully to get that."

D- "Yes, that's in there."

A- "Yes, I think that's very important."

Approved For Release 2003/03/28 : CIA-RDP80R01731R000900010004-2

Approved For Release 2003/03/28 : CIA-RDP80R01731R000900010004-2

S- "Then, you see, they'd have to let us learn a lot by that ...--."

A- "That would be terrific, yes."

S- "On the test."

D- "Now, tell me how would you work out the second part of this? I mean, how is a practical matter?"

S- "You'd--."

D- "A study addressed to or the standard of living."

S- "You'd have to have a United Nations group of economic experts whose countries were not in the contest; who would set the criteria of how you judged it; and would go in to see, give a sort of a measurement of present standing, and observe what developed--."

D- "You wouldn't exclude the Soviet Union and the United States, would you?"

S- "You mean not as participating, yes, but--."

D- "Not on the Commission."

S- "Well, they would be on the Commission, but in the particular area of who judges the results, you would have to have some economic experts, well, from places like--."

A- "ECE."

S- "Sweden, and ... and so on."

D- "Oh, yes."

Approved For Release 2003/03/28 : CIA-RDP80R01731R000900010004-2

Approved For Release 2003/03/28 : CIA-RDP80R01731R000900010004-2

A- "And there are a hell-of-a lot of them in ECE and (ECAFE) and .... almost international student--(Gunner Möetle) would be an ideal chairman."

S- "They'd have to be the sort of in-between people like Hammerskjold, you see."

D- "Yes."

S- "That type who would set up the criteria and it would--you see, if they're entered into that, there'd probably never be agreement as to what the correct percentages were, but the mere fact of getting into and observe developments of standards of living. But I think that--in the first place, it would be very difficult for them to open up for it."

D- "I don't know whether you would want a six-year contest because in six years, they could increase their standard of living more than we could because we are at a very high level and they are way down. We'd have to state it somewhat a little differently on that."

S- "For consumer? I'm not sure that they can. You've got to count in, you know, the Poles and the Bulgarians and the Romanians ....."

D- "Well, for example, we couldn't increase our automobile--the number of automobiles--ten times. We haven't got the

Approved For Release 2003/03/28 : CIA-RDP80R01731R000900010004-2

Approved For Release 2003/03/28 : CIA-RDP80R01731R000900010004-2

roads on which to put them--in six years--and they could very easily increase their automobiles ten times in less than six years. I mean, things of that kind, in all these commodities that we have in a abundance."

S- "The fact that they increased the automobiles ten times, wouldn't change the standard of living of most of their people. It would just mean a few more people could have some automobiles. We'd have to work out the way that you gave some weight to that."

A- "Consumer disposable income, but I still think the Director has a point that if you did it on a percentage basis--take North Vietnam, take a place that's right down at the bottom--now, if (Ho King Ming) was pushed forward from Moscow on his own initiative and said, 'Now, make the maximum business,' well, hell, he could take the Army and cut it down for two years of those five and have probably a sixty percent increase in the standard of living as it would be fairly statisticized by a UN-type individual."

S- "You see, they'd have to do that in all the satellite areas though. It would be a tremendous shift to their resources."

SECRET
Approved For Release 2003/03/28 : CIA-RDP80R01731R000900010004-2

Approved For Release 2003/03/28 : CIA-RDP80R01731R000900010004-2

SECRET

A- "Yes."

D- "You're making your missiles test as kind of a spot test as where one is at a given moment. Now, if you could have a contest where one is at a given moment in the standard of living with recommendations as to improvement, I wonder if that wouldn't beat it. Something along that line."

S- "Well, of course, you couldn't expect them to compare present living standards in the United States to the Soviet Union because they've made no acclaim ... and there've been no real--it has to be relative movement over a period of time for consumers."

A- "Now, I wouldn't mind that if you did it in absolute terms. In other words, if--."

D- "If we do it in comparative terms, they could--."

A- "Yes. ..."

D- "..."

S- "..... It should be, not in percentages--."

A- "Right, but in something that's a ruble, dollar, pound, rupee combination which was agreed to be a fair measure of value in a consumer's pocketbook whether he has a pigskin purse in Lahore or a wallet in Moscow."

SECRET

Approved For Release 2003/03/28 : CIA-RDP80R01731R000900010004-2

Approved For Release 2003/03/28 : CIA-RDP80R01731R000900010004-2

D- "You could combine maybe the two, you could combine maybe--."

S- "In other words, the absolute improvement in the available consumer goods and services for the people per capita over the period of six years?"

A- "Yes."

S- "That would be the basis of--."

A- "And, conceivably, as the Director says, you might combine them. They might see the flaw in that but we started a big base there; therefore, a ten percent improvement would be equivalent to a hundred percent and maybe there's some way our mathematical friends could say, you could reach a reasonably objective combination of the two."

D- "Right."

S- "Well, if we ever got into the .... they'd get the end of it. You'd have the great argument where--."

A- "Sure."

S- "Where it was more absolute but less in percentages. You'd have an argument of who won but that would be--."

D- "Yes."

A- "But it would still be to the greater glory of humanity."

SECRET

Approved For Release 2003/03/28 : CIA-RDP80R01731R000900010004-2

Approved For Release 2003/03/28 : CIA-RDP80R01731R000900010004-2

S- "But in the process, Allen, if you've got your people running all over these countries and looking at them and you've got the sort of the monitoring of their own supervision of their satellite populations, you'd have a big gain there. The great likelihood--I considered, see, nine out of ten, they have to turn it down."

D- "Yes."

S- "But you have to also analyze the one out of ten that they would accept it."

D- "Yes, they're challenging us to a contest where they think they're well ahead so we have a little right to challenge them to a contest in a broader field where we're recognized--."

S- "You see, what we've been trying to do here lately is to remind them that we're ahead in long-range bombers."

D- "Yes."

S- "That was all right, it was a good thing to do but I don't think it's adequate."

D- "We aren't very far ahead there, you know."

S- "No."

D- "I think our bomber probably--isn't it the general belief now the B-52 is better than the Bison probably?"

SECRET

Approved For Release 2003/03/28 : CIA-RDP80R01731R000900010004-2

Approved For Release 2003/03/28 : CIA-RDP80R01731R000900010004-2

A- "Bison, yes."

D- "The last--in numbers, we're not very far ahead of them."

S- "Well, you don't think it's completely off base now?"

D- "No, I don't, I don't."

S- "I'm going down and talk a little bit to Chris about it and just see whether he considers it any kind of a consideration angle and what the negative angles are. I've got to get back down and see him now."

D- "I'm terribly sorry about this--."

S- "That's all right."

D- "But I had no idea--if it hadn't been for the Vice-President making--. You know, he made a very good speech on mutual aid."

A- "Good. Oh, he's a dedicated guy on that."

S- "And he's taken hold of that problem."

D- "Oh, he went to town on that and that's why I didn't want to get up. I appreciate it very much, I'd like to give this some study and those are just the ... thoughts of this."

S- "Yes, I want you to and don't hesitate--you see, this is not submitted to you or anything--."

D- "Oh, I understand, I understand."

Approved For Release 2003/03/28 : CIA-RDP80R01731R000900010004-2

Approved For Release 2003/03/28 : CIA-RDP80R01731R000900010004-2

S- "It's put on top--it's just like as if you and I talked a little bit, it's a preliminary draft."

D- "I've felt very much that we ought to do things--."

S- "Because if I get some very negative things, you see, I may never even push it any further and I wanted to get some of your reaction first of all. But I do have this feeling, Allen, somewhere we've got to find something more than what we've got so far, you see."

D- "I agree."

S- "We don't want to be in this present psychology for a couple of years because the kind of things--."

A- "No sir."

D- "The Vice-President threw out one suggestion, it's not on our list there that we're working on, and he said it came from a talk he had with Teller. It's a thing we've been thinking about a bit. It's the proposition of controlling the weather. I don't know whether that's out of--."

S- "Johnny von (Neuman) used to speak of that years ago."

D- "Yes."

S- "Well, glad to see you and I'll talk to Herter."

D- "Wait a second and I'll come out with you."

SECRET

Approved For Release 2003/03/28 : CIA-RDP80R01731R000900010004-2

Approved For Release 2003/03/28 : CIA-RDP80R01731R000900010004-2

A- "Have you got transport?"

S- "My hat is down below."

A- "Have you got a car?"

S- "I asked them to keep one."

D- "Well, take mine then."

A- "I have one waiting right here for me anyway."

D- "Bob, are you getting off tomorrow?"

A- "Yes sir."

D- "Well, I'll see you before, won't I?"

Approved For Release 2003/03/28 : CIA-RDP80R01731R000900010004-2

Approved For Release 2003/03/28 : CIA-RDP80R01731R000900010004-2

NYLS ONLY

SECRET

Approved For Release 2003/03/28 : CIA-RDP80R01731R000900010004-2