

SECURITY INFORMATION

CIA POSITION ON PROPOSED JCS GUIDANCE
TO THE US REPRESENTATIVE TO THE STANDING GROUP
ON CLANDESTINE OPERATIONS

I. PROBLEM:

a. To determine if the concept of clandestine organization in wartime and definitions as they appear in the Proposed Joint Chiefs of Staff Guidance on Clandestine Operations are in conflict with those accepted by the Central Intelligence Agency.

II. FACTS:

a. The proposed JCS Paper:

1. Indicates that "US policy (NSC 10/2 and NSCID No. 5) directs that the conduct of such clandestine operations will be commanded by the American Theater Commander in Active Theaters of War where American Forces are engaged."

2. Defines clandestine operations to "embrace^{as} BOTH 'Unconventional Warfare' and 'Espionage and Counter-espionage' as used in the US."

3. Defines espionage and counterespionage as "operations embracing positive intelligence and counter-intelligence in enemy countries by clandestine means."

4. Indicates that "Supreme Allied Commanders (NATO) should be responsible for determining the organization to discharge their assigned responsibilities for clandestine operations, subject to policy approval by the SG."

III. DISCUSSION:

a. The proposed JCS paper overlooks the need for political participation in the control of clandestine operations as illustrated by NSCID No. 5 which makes the Director of Central Intelligence responsible for the conduct of espionage and counterespionage operations outside the United States. This authority and responsibility also pertains to active theaters of war and, in effect, places the US national clandestine assets under control of the US National Intelligence Authority. The JCS paper would substitute the Standing Group, an international body, as the responsible authority for US national clandestine assets. While the Supreme Allied Commander is most capable of determining his organizational arrangements, this should not extend to the vitiation of commitments made by member countries at a national level, with the full knowledge of their military establishments, before the outbreak of war.

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b. The proposed definition of "clandestine operations" to include both "unconventional warfare and espionage and counter-espionage" is contrary to the normal usage of such terms in this agency: The word "clandestine" is a restrictive adjective which confines such operations to those designed for secret implementation. The word "unconventional" is, on the other hand, unrestricted and in fact includes all kinds of warfare not restricted by the definition "conventional." Since the word "unconventional" is broader than the word "clandestine," it would appear appropriate to reverse the position of these two words in the JCS draft.

c. For the sake of clarity it is believed that the definition of "espionage and counterespionage" as operations embracing positive intelligence and counter-intelligence in enemy countries by clandestine means should be amended to read "against enemy countries" instead of "in enemy countries."

d. Among the fields of action listed under the definition of unconventional warfare is "subversion against hostile states". The actions described under this category are those of resistance groups so that the term "resistance" would properly be substituted as the most appropriate title for the sub-paragraph.

IV. CONCLUSIONS:

a. That the JCS paper contains provisions that are not in consonance with the authority vested by the National Security Council in the Director of Central Intelligence.

b. That the definition of clandestine operations is in conflict with accepted understanding of its meaning.

c. That the definitions of espionage and counterespionage requires amendment.

V. RECOMMENDATIONS:

a. That the conclusions be approved.

b. That the proposed memorandum to General Balmer (Tab A) be signed and dispatched.

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