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1 July 1955

**The Honorable Robert B. Anderson
Deputy Secretary of Defense
Department of Defense
Washington 25, D. C.**

Dear Bob:

Following our conversation of the other day, I have carefully considered the various recommendations in the report of the Clark Task Force Committee with respect to ELINT. I have also reviewed the Killian Committee recommendations as well as NSCID 17.

In my opinion, I believe it would be wise to proceed to implement NSCID 17 which was adopted after long consideration and which provides, I feel, an appropriate mechanism for carrying out this important work. Accordingly, I would welcome it if you felt it appropriate to issue the Defense directive, which you have kindly shown us and which would constitute the first step for getting our work started in the ELINT field.

Faithfully yours,

**Allen W. Dulles
Director**

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NEXT REVIEW DATE: _____
FORM: 10470-2
DATE: 13/4/01 REVIEWER:

T.S. NUMBER 103817
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T.S. No. 115335
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MEMORANDUM FOR: Director of Central Intelligence

SUBJECT : CIA Problems re. Science and Technology

1. The organization for national security at the highest levels in Washington has been defective since the termination of the Office of Scientific Research and Development and the demobilization of its sub-structure (the National Defense Research Committee, the Committee on Medical Research, the Committee on Atomic Energy, etc.) at the end of the war. A partial attempt was made to remedy this through the establishment of the Joint Research and Development Board in 1946 and its incorporation in the Security Act of 1947 as the Research and Development Board within the Department of Defense (then the NME).

2. Subsequent experience has indicated to many that an organization within Defense can not encompass the breadth of interest necessary to adequate understanding and adequate management of major research and development problems related to the national security.

3. The establishment of what was intended to be a strong, aggressive scientific intelligence activity within CIA (where it would be in a staff capacity to the NSC) was initiated in 1946 by those leaders in science who revolutionized the art of warfare between 1940 and 1945. These men were therefore well able to visualize the further revolutions which might come in these fields and the dangers if other nations were to achieve these revolutions first.


4. Since the demise of RDB as an effective mechanism under Louis Johnson and the subsequent preoccupation with short-term objectives resulting from the tremendous expansion of applied research and development accompanying Korea, there has been no mechanism for highlighting the key problems in the long term race for technological superiority between the U.S. and Soviet Union other than the Office of Scientific Intelligence in CIA. Here are some of the major actions taken by OSI in this regard.

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6. It was OSI which recognized the serious implications to our essential communications of the jamming capability developed and exercised by the orbit against the international broadcasting systems. As a consequence, OSI promoted over a period of several years the development of techniques and the establishment of intelligence collecting and analysis systems capable of providing the detailed information on Soviet non-communications radio activities necessary to alert the community and permit it to take some steps toward the preparation of countermeasures.

7. OSI recognized the implications and the potential of the growing Soviet capabilities in the field of electronics as applied to radar, navigation, identification and other systems, pushed the collection, research and analysis of information on these systems, and promoted the preparation of the national intelligence estimate (SIE 5) which, although badly watered down in the community coordinating process, still makes it patently clear that the Soviets are developing a major capability in this field. Recognizing the lack of organization and other inadequacies in ELINT, OSI promoted first the establishment of ANEEG and then the present exercise re. ELINT management.

8. OSI recognized the basic importance of the quantity and quality of scientific and engineering manpower in the balance of power between West and East, initiated the studies and developed the means for alerting both the highest levels in the Government and the general public to the growing disadvantage of the West in this basic resource.

9. OSI in studying the trends of research in the field of communications pointed out the importance and recommended aggressive research to determine whether the Soviet Union may be embarked upon new systems of communications which are completely invulnerable to communications intelligence exploitation and much less susceptible to interruption through jamming.

10. It was an OSI paper which initiated action that has now culminated in NSC-5520, and it was OSI action which brought about agreement of the U.S. scientific committee to request the Government to sponsor and finance this project. Similarly, OSI brought to the attention of the Director's office the fact that the Department of Defense was defaulting in the whole field of special reconnaissance vehicles to the serious detriment of our intelligence effort.

11. OSI, with growing concern over the development of Soviet scientific and technical capabilities in all fields related to warfare, promoted and conducted a major intelligence briefing for the President's Scientific Advisory Committee which to a considerable extent spark-plugged that Committee into recommending the Technological Capabilities Study recently completed for the President.

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12. OSI recognized the importance of Soviet guided missiles activities, provided briefings for the Air Force "Teapot" Committee and working with the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Research and Development, promoted recognition of the importance of this subject. This effort resulted in the preparation of the first National Estimate on Soviet guided missiles capabilities and the present recognition of the importance of relative progress in missiles to this balance of power between East and West. This same intelligence effort has also undoubtedly accelerated Defense efforts to develop the intercontinental ballistic missile.

13. In spite of these accomplishments, the Office of Scientific Intelligence in CIA is at present not the voice of science within the Agency. The unity of scientific and technical matters as related to national security (proven by the wartime experience with OSRD, the Soviet accomplishments under the Academy of Sciences and the failures in German scientific efforts due to the lack of unity) has been completely lost within the Agency.

14. We have an Office of Scientific Intelligence concerned with certain aspects of science and technology; we have a separate research and development organization with a top level science advisory board, but operating in a rather limited field; we have recently developed the DD/P Material Board, which is going to have a major part in the exploitation of science and technology for operational purposes; we have the Land Group (of very capable scientists) advising and working with the Director at staff levels of the Agency, but with little contact with OSI; and finally we have one or more major efforts to exploit science and technology in the service of intelligence being conducted at a senior staff level with little coordination with several of the other activities. At the same time, we have the Office of Communications conducting research and development in electronic and advanced communications matters intimately related to many of these other areas of activity. In addition to all of these substantially independent efforts, we are proposing the establishment of an ELINT Staff Officer and an ELINT organization to attempt to exploit this major field of intelligence collection, but within a framework which cuts across and is often in conflict with many of the other scientific and technical activities cited above.

15. The lack of cohesion is readily apparent and, particularly within the last year, the stature of the Office of Scientific Intelligence in CIA and in the community has declined to the point that it will be unable to continue in the future to make the major contributions to the strengthening of science in relation to the national security such as outlined herein.

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


16. It is requested that I be permitted to amplify this paper and make specific recommendations in person.



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CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
 OFFICIAL ROUTING SLIP

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 NEXT REVIEW DATE: [Redacted]
 AUTH: 118 70-2
 DATE: 12/10 REVIEWER: [Redacted]

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Remarks: DCI: I do not agree with all points made but I do think it wise to hear [Redacted] ideas. Most of things he said that OSI has done were properly its job so no great Kudos are due for it.
 CPC