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27 April 1953

Dear Henry:

Thank you very much for sending over the completed "Planning Study on the Employment of U.S. Political Advisers to U.S. Military Commanders in U.S. Commands Abroad and in International Commands". I know from talking to General Smith that he had some carefully worked-out comments to make on the original draft and I am glad to see that you have taken them into account in the present study.

Sincerely yours,

Allen W. Dulles
Director

Mr. Henry Carter
Office of the Counselor
Department of State
Washington 25, D. C.

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State Department review completed

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WASHINGTON


April 22, 1953

Dear Allen:

I enclose for your information and files a copy of "Planning Study on the Employment of U.S. Political Advisers to U.S. Military Commanders in U.S. Commands Abroad and in International Commands", as approved for information purposes by Mr. Bohlen under date of December 15, 1952. This paper has been given limited distribution to Departmental and Foreign Service Officers particularly concerned with political adviser matters, for background information.

You may recall that General Smith in a letter to Mr. Bohlen dated February 22, 1952 commented extensively on the original draft of this study. I believe that you will find that the paper in its present form gives substantial effect to the comments made in General Smith's letter under reference.

Sincerely,


Henry Garter

P.S. Copies have also been sent to and to Mr. Reber in your Organization.

The Honorable
Allen Dulles,
Director,
Central Intelligence Agency.

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DEPARTMENT OF STATE
Office of the Counselor

April 15, 1953

MEMORANDUM

The attached "Planning Study on the Employment of U.S. Political Advisers to U.S. Military Commands in U.S. Commands Abroad and in International Commands" has been prepared for the background information of Departmental and Foreign Service Officers particularly concerned in political adviser problems and activities. Its conclusions have been informally communicated to the Department of Defense and have been noted by that Department. However, it should be noted that this paper is a Departmental planning study only and is not to be regarded as representing an agreed State-Defense position or "doctrine".

The exact status of this paper as between the two Departments is indicated in the attached exchange of letters between Mr. Dohlen and Mr. Frank Nash of the Department of Defense and is further discussed on pages 21-22 of the paper itself. In essence, the exchange of letters between Mr. Dohlen and Mr. Nash note the agreement between State and Defense that no written "doctrine" of general application is practicable or necessary at this time to define the functions and status of a political adviser to a U.S. military commander in international commands or other U.S. commands abroad, and that the interests of both Departments will best be served by a continuation of present practices.

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PLANNING STUDY ON THE
EMPLOYMENT OF U.S. POLITICAL ADVISERS
TO U.S. MILITARY COMMANDERS IN U.S. COMMANDS ABROAD
AND IN INTERNATIONAL COMMANDS

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An examination of U.S. practice with respect to the employment of U.S. Political Advisers and Liaison Officers to U.S. Military Commanders in U.S. commands abroad, particularly those in international command structures, and a summary of the current policy considerations and working assumptions of the Department of State with respect thereto, for the background information and general guidance of Departmental and Foreign Service Officers.

Submitted by

Henry Carter
Consultant
Officer of the Counselor
Department of State

Approved for information purposes:

~~CHARLES E. BORN~~
Counselor of the Department
of State
December 15, 1952

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DISCUSSION**I****HISTORICAL BACKGROUND**

The employment of civilian political advisers in U.S. Military Theaters of Operations has been, relatively speaking, a recent innovation in U.S. military practice, and may be said to date from the designation of Mr. Murphy of the American Foreign Service to advise and assist General Eisenhower in dealing with the difficult and delicate political problems involved in the invasion of North Africa in 1942. The origins of the practice have been described by Mr. Murphy:

"I believe General Eisenhower's headquarters blazed the trail. It was an Allied Force Headquarters, and when General Eisenhower went to London to prepare for the North African landings he felt the need of political guidance. An official of the British Foreign Office, Harold Mack, now British Ambassador to the Argentine, and an officer of the American Embassy in London, H. Freeman Matthews, now Deputy Under Secretary of State, were placed at General Eisenhower's disposition. It was their duty to keep him and his military staffs informed of political developments and trends. At that time the British Foreign Office was more alert to the necessity of this function than we were, and I believe that the British representative was provided with more material and better coaching for his assignment. The top staff members of Allied Forces Headquarters on the British side generally were better informed regarding European and Mediterranean political considerations than were the Americans. This is no criticism of our own people. Many

British side

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Britishers had lived and worked in the area, had business ties and political connections and knowledge of the language and of personalities. Our officers had been exposed to the usual academic courses of European history and possessed a theoretical knowledge of European affairs, but that knowledge is quite different. For example, after our forces landed in French North Africa within a matter of hours British representatives entered the offices of the British communications, banks, insurance companies, mining and shipping enterprises and the like, in which there were British interests. They were able to exploit these facilities for intelligence and political purposes. This was of immense practical value. British officers, who enjoyed this intimate knowledge of the area easily outpaced our own people, few of whom spoke French well and practically none of whom spoke Arabic.

"When General Eisenhower was established at Algiers he was provided with a State Department political adviser, and this officer was given the added title of Chief Civil Affairs Officer. General Eisenhower at first wanted the officer in this assignment inducted into the Army and put into uniform with some appropriate rank. I remember he asked me whether that would be agreeable. I took the position that such an arrangement would defeat its purpose. This was not a task for a military subordinate. Yet the idea of a civilian representative from another Department of the Government sitting in at regular staff meetings at Headquarters and receiving complete distribution of telegrams and other papers was such a novel concept that for a long time General Eisenhower hesitated. When he had thought it through, however, he saw the value of such an arrangement and gave it enthusiastic support.

"I believe that throughout the three-year period which followed and which saw the Axis defeat in North Africa and the various Mediterranean operations leading up to the Italian armistice and landings, as well as the European campaign which ensued, the experimental system of political advisers attached to headquarters became accepted as an essential part of operations." (American Foreign Service Journal, May 1952, page 19).

Like most innovations the development and extension of the political adviser system in the Mediterranean Theater, and in Western Europe and Germany, was largely the result

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of a process of trial and error, as in the beginning there was no very clear concept of the appropriate status and function of a political advisor, or of the politico-military areas of interest and activity where his services could most effectively contribute to the success of the military commander's mission. However, as the war progressed toward its conclusion and into the post-hostilities period, the political adviser became more and more an integral part of the total operation, and certain well-defined patterns and characteristics of relationship and activity emerged, which will be presently discussed.

Political advisers to U.S. military commanders were also employed in Asia to a very considerable extent, in the C-B-I Theater, the Southeast Asia command, in China and Korea. However, owing to the scattered and variegated types of operations in Asia, the pattern of their activities was less well-defined and systematic than that developed in Europe, and in the main they functioned as language officers and regional experts rather than as policy advisers. No political advisers were employed in the Pacific Theater of

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general principles to be summarized and discussed as follows:

1. The Military Commander - Political Adviser relationship in each case developed as a highly personal and flexible one, dependent for its successful functioning on the personal acceptability of the Political Adviser to the Military Commander, and on the attainment of mutual confidence and understanding. These in turn were conditioned in each case by the personal caliber of the Political Adviser and his objective usefulness to the Military Commander.

2. The Political Adviser was regarded an important member of the Military Commander's official family. His role was that of a personal adviser and assistant to the Military Commander on matters of political and politico-military importance in the latter's area of responsibility. The range of such matters proved potentially very broad and included at various times such things as the political aspects of certain military operations (air targets afford a

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4. The Political Adviser was utilized in many instances as a representative of the Military Commander in dealings with national governments and their representatives in the [] and with the political elements of other national or international commands.

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5. The Political Adviser was accorded as a matter of standard procedure direct access to the Military Commander, the Chief of Staff, and other staff and command echelons, as appropriate; he regularly attended staff conferences; he had access to pertinent information within his areas of interest; and he received appropriate recognition and administrative support on the part of the military authorities in the area as regards his activities and those of his assistants. This administrative support frequently took the form of "assimilated rank".

6. He was also accorded uncensored use of a direct technical channel of communication with the Department for purposes of information and informal consultation, and use of Departmental codes to insure

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privacy for such communications. The use of this technical channel of communication was coupled with a personal obligation to keep the Military Commander fully advised of all communications of a substantive or policy character. Conversely, the Military Commander kept the Political Adviser appropriately informed of his substantive communications with Defense of a political or politico-military character. How this operated in practice is described in General Clay's "Decision in Germany", page 58:

"So that Murphy and I could be fully informed, he came to my office at least twice a day with the major cables he had received, and my daily cable book, which contained the important messages I had received and dispatched, was sent to him each day. Neither of us ever kept a cable to his department secret from the other. Thus, daily, major messages were discussed and analyzed so that their principles could be applied in our negotiations and decisions. The majority of cables relating to negotiations which were sent to us from Washington made it clear that their content was informational, leaving me considerable discretion. Such was the relationship between Murphy and me that I know of no decision taken during the four years in which we were in Germany from which he dissented. Nor were we ever advised that any decision was at variance with our instructions or with the general policy under which we operated."

7. Communications from the Department to the

Political Adviser were regarded as having advisory

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effect only as [redacted] Military Commander.

All directives, including political directives, were handled through command channels. General Clay discusses this point as follows (ibid.):

"As a result (i.e., of uncertainty on this point) it was arranged that instructions should always be sent through the War Department and that State Department messages to the political adviser were to be considered as suggestions. Throughout the occupation we received many of these suggestions which were accepted in large part. When they were not, Murphy was free, if he thought it important enough, to advise the State Department so that those rejected could be repeated as instructions. To me this arrangement seemed simple and satisfactory. In any event I am sure that government has never been better informed than it was on our operations in Germany. There was a constant exchange of cables between the State Department and the political adviser. In fact between July 1945 and April 1949 the State Department sent 18,970 cable dispatches to Germany and received 17,298 from the political adviser. Military Government received 50,000 cables and dispatched 23,000 cables to the War Department. In addition to these cable exchanges there were frequent teleconferences, the monthly report of the military governor, and many special reports by mail."

As noted above, these were general patterns or principles of action developed in World War II (and occupation) experience and practice in U.S. or U.S.-British Theaters of Operations, especially in the Mediterranean and in Europe. However, they would appear applicable, in principle, to the relationship between any U.S. Political Adviser and any

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U.S. Military command in any type of command, whether national or international or both.

III

CURRENT PRACTICE IN INTERNATIONAL COLLIAND STRUCTURES

Since the conclusion of the War there have been radical changes in the general political and politico-military framework within which potential future military operations will presumably take place. Instead of having vast areas of enemy-held territory to liberate, in which no effective national government existed, we would be operating from advanced bases in friendly territory effectively governed by friendly governments with which we have closely integrated and organized political and military relations. Instead of having relatively simple command structures of a predominantly U.S. or U.S.-British character we have elaborate international

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international command structures under the United Nationsegis, as exemplified by NATO and by the United Nations Command for Korea. In Washington there have been notable advances in politico-military thinking and organization, including the establishment of NSC and the development of closer State-Defense cooperation and techniques of consultation at the JCS and other levels. There has also been the establishment of ISA and other international programs of mutual international assistance in the interest of UN and US defense. These developments involve now, and in respect of potential future operations, political problems and responsibilities as great or greater than during the last War; these problems and responsibilities seem likely to assume increased prominence as a result of U.S. participation in NATO and other international commands and defense programs. Indeed it may be safely premised that on the spot U.S. political advice to U.S. military commanders

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
abroad is likely [redacted] even higher utility factor and importance than before, particularly in the case of U.S. officers holding high command in international command structures. Such command positions are political as well as military in character, and in filling them the U.S. assumes a direct responsibility for giving the U.S. commanders effective political support and assistance from Washington, in addition to appropriate Defense support and assistance.

In point of fact, senior U.S. commanders abroad in international command structures now obtain their day-to-day political advice from American diplomatic officers informally attached to them, regardless whether they exercise national command, international, or both. Korea affords an example. There we find General Clark, a U.S. Theater Commander (CINCPAC), also acting as United Nations Commander of an international force (in which U.S. forces predominate), operating under the Unified Command (i.e., the U.S. Government) created in response to a U.N. request, in an area governed by a friendly government with which the

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... carries on direct diplomatic relations through an established U.S. Embassy, which Embassy also furnishes the local U.S. field command (EUSAC) and the U.S. Theater Commander (and United Nations Commander), General Clark, with appropriate on the spot political advice and assistance. In short, General Clark, as a U.S. officer, although holding an international command, gets his on the spot political advice as regards Korea from a distinctively U.S. source, namely the American Embassy in Pusan, DOS
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The NATO command structure affords other varied examples:

- (a) General Ridgway as SACEUR exercises international command only. As U.S. CINCEUR he commands all U.S. forces in Europe with certain minor exceptions as laid down by the JCS. He has no official U.S. Political Adviser on the basis that if he had one he would have to have political advisers from all the other NATO nations. However, as a U.S. officer he has access to the U.S.

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Embassy in Paris which acts as the channel for conveying U.S. policy information through the person of G. Frederick Reinhardt, nominally a member of the Paris Embassy, who has been detailed to act as special assistant to General Ridgeway and as such is a member of General Ridgeway's office (OSACEUR).

(b) General Eddy as Commander-in-Chief, U.S. Army Europe (CINCUSAREUR) commands all U.S. forces (7th Army, 12th Air Force and Navy for Germany) in Germany, and Army forces in France concerned with the Line of Communications. Tactically, in an emergency, he and his Army forces will operate under international command (CINCLANDCENT) but until very recently he did not himself exercise international command. However, as a U.S. commander of U.S. forces he has attached to him Mr. Herbert Fales, a diplomatic officer officially assigned to the U.S. High Commissioner at Bonn.

(c) The NATO Commander in Chief for Southern Europe (CINCOSOUTH), stationed at Naples, is U.S. Admiral Carney. Leonard Unger of the U.S. Embassy in Rome has been assigned as Special Liaison Officer to him to act as his unofficial political adviser.

(d) U.S. Admiral McCormick has been recently assigned as NATO Commander for the Atlantic (SACLANT)

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with headquarters at Norfolk. Mr. Daniel Anderson of the Foreign Service has recently been assigned a personal political adviser to Admiral McCormick. He is also Director of Politico - Military Affairs on the SACLANC staff.

(e) Other NATO commands held by U.S. Officers include CINCAIRCENT under General Norstad at Fontainebleau; COMAIR-SOUTH under Air Force General Schlatter at Naples; and COMAIRNORTH under Air Force General Taylor at Oslo. None of these three has had a political liaison officer specifically assigned to him, but this might well be considered by U.S. Defense authorities as a possibility in the event of actual operations.

Besides the UNC and NATO commands there are a number of U.S. military commands abroad of international significance to which political advisers or liaison officers have been, or are in process of being, assigned. These include General Hays' command in Salzburg (USFA), to which Mr. Espy of the American Embassy in Vienna acts as unofficial adviser and liaison officer, and the U.S. command in Trieste to which Mr. Higgs has been assigned as U. S. Political Adviser. In

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addition, a special political liaison officer has recently been assigned to the U.S. Logistical Command in Leghorn, and consideration is being given to the question of political liaison for the newly established U.S. European Theater under General Handy, who acts as a U.S. deputy to General Ridgway for this purpose. There has also been a request from Admiral Radford, Commander-in-Chief of the Pacific Theater, an exclusively U.S. Command, for periodic political consultation in the Theater with the Assistant Secretary for Far Eastern Affairs.

The foregoing indicates both the need and the desire on the part of U.S. commanders in international command structures (and in U.S. commands having international significance) for U.S. political advice, and affords a reasonably consistent pattern of the basis upon which such advice can be appropriately and conveniently made available. However, when we look past the technical aspects of the problem of supplying U.S. political advice to U.S. commanders operating within international command structures we come back to the basic concept of a U.S. political officer acting

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as a personal adviser to a senior U.S. military commander on matters of political and politico-military importance within the latter's area of responsibility, regardless whether the command be national or international in character. He will be performing the same basic functions and will have substantially the same basic requirements as those developed in U.S. and U.S.-British Theaters during the War and during the post-War occupations. Some of his areas of interest may shift or require new emphasis, but his relationship with the U.S. military commander to whom he is attached will remain personal and by that token unchanged, regardless of the external character of the command and regardless of the tactical channel of command.

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IV

CURRENT POLICY CONSIDERATIONS
AND WORKING ASSUMPTIONS

The Department feels that political adviser practice as developed during World War II and the various occupations, especially in the Mediterranean and European Theaters (see Section II above), affords useful precedents and criteria, generally speaking, for working out political adviser status and functions in current and future assignments, subject to such variations and modifications as appear called for in each individual case. It also feels that these matters are, in fact, being worked out in actual practice, on a case by case basis (see Section III), in a manner which appears satisfactory to both the Department of State and the Department of Defense. It is further impressed that the development of international command structures presents, and will continue to present, many novel and unique problems as regards the status and employment of political advisers, which will call in each case for individual consideration. For these reasons it agrees with

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The Department of Defense has no "doctrine" or State-Defense agreement, or "treaty" of general application is practicable or necessary at this time to define the functions and status of a political adviser to a U.S. military commander in international commands or other U.S. commands abroad, and it also believes that mutual purposes of both Departments in these matters will be best served by a continuation of present practices and of the present case by case approach.

In considering present practice and the present case by case approach to problems in this field, the Department has been able to formulate and relate a number of the general considerations and working assumptions by which it is being currently guided in fact, in matters relating to the assignment of political advisers or liaison officers to U.S. military commanders abroad, particularly those having international command responsibilities. These general considerations and working assumptions may be summarized as follows:

- 1) U.S. military operations abroad,
particularly those within UN, NATO or other
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international commands, present unusually complex and far-reaching political problems, which will have to be met in the first instance as command responsibilities by the individual military commanders concerned.

2) The assignment by the U.S. of U.S.

military commanders to major command positions in international command structures (or to U.S. commands of international significance such as USFA) places on such commanders personal responsibilities which are political as well as military in character, regardless whether the command be U.S. or international in character.

3) Such assignment also places on the U.S.

responsibility for providing the U.S. military commanders concerned with the best possible U.S. political advice and assistance, both from Washington and on the spot.

4) Such political advice and assistance to

a U.S. military commander is provided by directives .

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and messages transmitted through command channels, and these in turn may be effectively supplemented by attaching directly to him a civilian political officer, of his own nationality, to act as his personal adviser and assistant on matters of political and politico-military importance in the area of his command responsibility. Generally speaking, it will be advisable for policy reasons for such advisers to avoid use of the title, "Political Adviser", especially those in international commands.

5) In inactive Theaters, or so long as conditions remain reasonably stable politically in the countries in which a particular command is based and operates, it may be convenient to have the U.S. Ambassador to the country concerned, or a designated member of his staff, act as an informal Political Adviser to the U.S. Commander concerned.

6) In active

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6) In actual theaters, particularly where governmental authority and normal diplomatic relations have broken down, it may prove advisable to have a U.S. Political Adviser independent of any Embassy assigned to the U.S. Commander.

7) Matters in which a Political Adviser's services may be of particular usefulness to the Military Commander may include at various times such things as Civil Affairs and Military Government, Psychological Warfare, public relations, intelligence evaluation, covert operations, as well as general problems of inter-Allied and international relations in the political and economic field. However, his relation to such matters should be advisory and consultative in character, and he should not undertake direct operational responsibilities in these fields.

8) The details of political adviser status, functions and facilities are technically matters within the discretion of the Military Commander.

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but they may in some aspects involve policy considerations requiring determination in each case at the State-Defense level: as, for example, the relationship in an international command of the political adviser to the international staff; also the question of the Political Adviser's technical channel of communications with the Department of State. As to this last it should be noted that the Department attaches particular importance to the maintenance of a direct and uncensored technical channel of communications between the Political Adviser and the Department (and other diplomatic officers as appropriate) as essential to the effective usefulness of the Political Adviser, and basic to the purposes sought in his assignment; also to his use of Departmental codes for this purpose in the interest of diplomatic security, a factor of special importance in or near international commands.

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commands. The Department feels that the Political Adviser should not be restricted in these respects except for reasons of overriding military importance, and that in the absence of these, the maintenance of this technical channel should be regarded as the norm. Use of the technical channel by a Political Adviser is coupled with personal responsibility for keeping the Military Commander fully informed of messages sent and received.

9) U.S. military commanders exercising major national or international command abroad should consider the extent to which they are likely to require U.S. political advice and assistance, both for current needs and for potential future operations, and should make timely requests to have U.S. political advice and assistance made available to them.

10) Determination of the need for the assignment of political advisers or political

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liaison officers should be made jointly by State and Defense in each individual case, and officers selected for such assignments should be personally acceptable in this capacity to both Departments and to the Military Commander.

11) The Department of State should be prepared to furnish qualified personnel for such Political Adviser assignments as a matter of top priority, and should further consider the extent of the current demands which may be made on it in this respect, and also those which might be made in the event of major military operations.

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