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LECTURE AT THE NATIONAL WAR COLLEGE

WASHINGTON, D. C.

8 APRIL 1947

PRESENTED BY

LIEUTENANT GENERAL HOYT S. VANDENBERG

DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE

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IN DISCUSSING THE SUBJECT OF NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE WITH YOU GENTLEMEN THIS MORNING, I WISH TO COMMENCE BY STATING TWO UNDISPUTED FACTS. IN THE FIRST PLACE, PRIOR TO WORLD WAR II, WE DID NOT HAVE A NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE SERVICE IN THIS COUNTRY COMPARABLE TO THAT OF GREAT BRITAIN OR FRANCE, RUSSIA, OR GERMANY OR JAPAN. IN THE SECOND PLACE, WE HAVE NOT YET REACHED THEIR PROFICIENCY.

PRIOR TO PEARL HARBOR, WE DID NOT HAVE A FIRST-CLASS INTELLIGENCE SERVICE BECAUSE THE PEOPLE OF THE UNITED STATES WOULD NOT ACCEPT IT. IT WAS FELT THAT THERE WAS SOMETHING UN-AMERICAN ABOUT ESPIONAGE -- AND EVEN ABOUT INTELLIGENCE GENERALLY. TODAY WE HAVE OUTLINED CERTAIN NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE OBJECTIVES. THESE CANNOT BE REACHED OVER-NIGHT. THEY CANNOT BE ATTAINED BY WISHFUL THINKING. OUR GOALS CAN BE REACHED ONLY BY YEARS AND DECADES OF HARD, PAINSTAKING LABORS -- TOIL AND SWEAT, IF YOU WILL -- IN THE FIELD OF STRATEGIC AND NATIONAL POLICY INTELLIGENCE. TO REACH THESE OBJECTIVES, THE

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OF PRELIMINARY WORK, WE THINK WE HAVE OUTLINED THE INITIAL
PATHS WHICH MUST BE FOLLOWED. WE FEEL THAT PERHAPS WE HAVE
TAKEN A FEW STEPS ALONG THOSE PATHS. WE DO REALIZE, HOWEVER,
THAT THESE STEPS ARE JUST A BEGINNING.

AS GENERAL MARSHALL STATED IN TESTIFYING ON THE UNIFICATION
BILL BEFORE THE SENATE MILITARY AFFAIRS COMMITTEE LAST YEAR,
"...PRIOR TO ENTERING THE WAR, WE HAD LITTLE MORE THAN WHAT
A MILITARY ATTACHE COULD LEARN AT A DINNER, MORE OR LESS OVER
THE COFFEE CUPS." FROM THIS START, WE SUDDENLY HAD INTELLIGENCE
SPRINGING UP EVERYWHERE. BUT NOWHERE WAS ITS COLLECTION,
PRODUCTION OR DISSEMINATION FULLY COORDINATED -- NOT EVEN IN
THE ARMED FORCES. GENERAL MARSHALL POINTED THIS OUT IN HIS
TESTIMONY WHEN HE MENTIONED THE "DIFFICULTY WE HAD IN EVEN
DEVELOPING A JOINT INTELLIGENCE COMMITTEE. THAT WOULD SEEM
TO BE A VERY SIMPLE THING TO DO, BUT IT WAS NOT AT ALL."

TO A GREAT EXTENT, OUR INTELLIGENCE SERVICES, BEFORE
WORLD WAR TWO, HAD LEFT COMPLETELY UNTAPPED THE GREAT OPEN
SOURCES OF INFORMATION UPON WHICH ROUGHLY SIXTY PER CENT OF

INTELLIGENCE SHOULD NORMALLY BE BASED UPON SUCH THINGS AS

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BOOKS, ENCYCLOPEDIAS, MAGAZINES, TECHNICAL AND SCIENTIFIC PUBLICATIONS, ATLASES, PHOTOGRAPHS, NEWSPAPERS AND RADIO BROADCASTS -- AND THOSE AMERICAN CITIZENS WHO HAD GATHERED VALUABLE INFORMATION THROUGH BUSINESS CONNECTIONS IN FOREIGN LANDS, OR JUST PLAIN STUDY OR TRAVEL ABROAD. THOSE OF OUR INTELLIGENCE SERVICES WHICH DID DABBLE IN ANY OF THESE SOURCES FAILED TO COORDINATE THEIR RESULTS WITH EACH OTHER.

Various Depts of The govts with their files & Experts

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THE JOINT CONGRESSIONAL COMMITTEE TO INVESTIGATE THE PEARL HARBOR ATTACK REACHED MANY PERTINENT CONCLUSIONS REGARDING THE SHORT-COMINGS OF OUR PRE-WAR INTELLIGENCE SYSTEM AND MADE SOME VERY SOUND RECOMMENDATIONS FOR ITS IMPROVEMENT. MANY OF THESE WE ARE TRYING TO INCORPORATE INTO OUR PRESENT THINKING. THE COMMITTEE SHOWED THAT SOME VERY SIGNIFICANT INFORMATION HAD NOT BEEN CORRECTLY EVALUATED. THAT, TO BE SURE, WAS A HUMAN ERROR, BUT STRIKES RIGHT TO THE CORE OF OUR OWN PERSONNEL PROBLEM, WHICH I WILL DISCUSS LATER. IT FOUND THAT SOME OF THE INFORMATION DID NOT GET TO THE FIELD COMMANDERS, AND THAT THE FIELD COMMANDERS DID NOT

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PROPERLY APPLY THE INFORMATION THAT WAS GIVEN. THESE WERE ERRORS WHICH COULD OCCUR TO ANY NATION OR PEOPLE WHO ARE NOT KEENLY AWARE OF THE FUNCTION OF INTELLIGENCE. THEY COULD HAPPEN AMONG ANY GROUP OF MEN -- WHETHER THEIR INTERESTS BE MILITARY OR DIPLOMATIC OR ECONOMIC -- WHO HAVE NOT BEEN RIGOROUSLY SCHOOLED IN THE USE OF INTELLIGENCE. BUT, OVER AND ABOVE THESE FAILURES WERE OTHERS WHICH WERE PERHAPS MORE SERIOUS AND WHICH WENT TO THE VERY STRUCTURE OF OUR INTELLIGENCE ORGANIZATIONS. I AM TALKING NOW OF THE FAILURE TO EXPLOIT OBVIOUS SOURCES; THE FAILURE TO COORDINATE THE COLLECTION AND DISSEMINATION OF INTELLIGENCE; THE FAILURE TO CENTRALIZE INTELLIGENCE FUNCTIONS OF COMMON CONCERN TO MORE THAN ONE DEPARTMENT OF THE GOVERNMENT WHICH COULD MORE EFFICIENTLY BE PERFORMED CENTRALLY.

AS THE UNITED STATES FOUND ITSELF SUDDENLY PLUNGED INTO A GLOBAL WAR, THE IMMENSE GAPS IN OUR KNOWLEDGE BECAME READILY APPARENT. THE WORD "INTELLIGENCE" QUICKLY TOOK ON A FASHIONABLE CONNOTATION. EACH NEW WAR-TIME AGENCY -- AS WELL AS MANY OF

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THE OLDER DEPARTMENTS -- SOON BLOSSOMED OUT WITH AN INTELLIGENCE STAFF OF ITS OWN, EACH PRODUCING A MASS OF LARGELY UNCOORDINATED INFORMATION. THE RESULTANT COMPETITION FOR FUNDS AND SPECIALIZED PERSONNEL WAS A MONUMENTAL EXAMPLE OF WASTE -- ALTHOUGH, UNDER THE CIRCUMSTANCES, IT WAS INESCAPABLE. THE WAR AND NAVY DEPARTMENTS DEVELOPED FULL POLITICAL AND ECONOMIC INTELLIGENCE STAFFS, AS DID THE RESEARCH AND ANALYSIS DIVISION OF THE O.S.S., THE BOARD OF ECONOMIC WARFARE, AND ITS SUCCESSOR, THE FOREIGN ECONOMIC ADMINISTRATION, ALSO DELVED DEEPLY INTO THE FIELDS OF ECONOMIC INTELLIGENCE. NOT CONTENT WITH STAFFS IN WASHINGTON, THEY ESTABLISHED SUBSIDIARY STAFFS IN LONDON AND THEN FOLLOWED THESE UP WITH OTHER UNITS ON THE CONTINENT.

WHEN, DURING THE WAR, FOR EXAMPLE, OFFICIALS REQUESTED A REPORT ON THE STEEL INDUSTRY IN JAPAN OR THE ECONOMIC CONDITIONS IN THE NETHERLANDS EAST INDIES, THEY HAD THE REPORTS OF THE BOARD OF ECONOMIC WARFARE, G-2, O.N.I., AND THE O.S.S. FROM WHICH TO CHOOSE. BECAUSE THESE AGENCIES HAD COMPETED TO SECURE THE FINEST PERSONNEL, IT WAS NECESSARY

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FOR EACH OF THEM TO BACK UP ITS EXPERTS BY ASSERTING THAT ITS PARTICULAR REPORTS WERE THE BEST AVAILABLE AND THAT THE OTHERS MIGHT WELL BE DISREGARDED.

THE OFFICE OF STRATEGIC SERVICES -- THE OSS -- WAS HASTILY CREATED UNDER GENERAL DONOVAN. IT WAS DIVIDED BASICALLY INTO TWO MAIN PARTS -- RESEARCH AND ANALYSIS, AND OPERATIONS. IT WAS ABLE, ON ONE HAND, TO TURN OUT SUCH VAST RESEARCH AS ITS PRE-INVASION STUDY OF THE RAILROADS OF NORTH AFRICA, AND, ON THE OTHER HAND, TO CONDUCT SUCH OPERATIONS AS THE ASSISTANCE WHICH IT GAVE TO THE MAQUIS IN FRANCE AND TO RESISTANCE ELEMENTS ELSEWHERE.

IN WEIGHING THE MERITS OF THE OSS, HOWEVER, ONE SHOULD REMEMBER THAT IT CAME LATE INTO THE FIELD. IT WAS A STOP-GAP. IT WAS GIVEN A FUNCTION TO PERFORM WHICH THE BRITISH, FOR INSTANCE, HAD BEEN DEVELOPING SINCE THE DAYS OF QUEEN ELIZABETH AND THE SPANISH ARMADA.

THE FACT REMAINS THAT, AT LEAST INSOFAR AS THE EUROPEAN THEATER WAS CONCERNED, WE WERE DEPENDENT INITIALLY ALMOST

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TO OUR ASSISTANCE AT EVERY TURN, AND HELPED US TO DEVELOP AMERICAN COMBAT INTELLIGENCE TO THE HIGH POINT OF EFFICIENCY WHICH IT WAS REACHING WHEN THE WAR ENDED. TO ME, AND I HOPE TO ALL OF YOU, IT IS INCREDIBLE THAT OUR INTELLIGENCE SHOULD EVER SINK TO ITS PRE-WAR LEVEL AGAIN. IT IS FOR THAT REASON THAT I WANT TO TALK TO YOU VERY SERIOUSLY.

IN PEACE-TIME, THE SAME MASSES OF INFORMATION ARE AVAILABLE AS THERE ARE DURING A WAR. WITH OUR WAR-TIME EXPERIENCE BEHIND US, WE KNOW WHERE TO LOOK FOR MATERIAL. THE TRANSITION FROM WAR TO PEACE DOES NOT CHANGE THE NECESSITY FOR COORDINATION OF THE COLLECTION, PRODUCTION AND DISSEMINATION OF THE INCREASINGLY VAST QUANTITIES OF FOREIGN INTELLIGENCE INFORMATION THAT ARE BECOMING AVAILABLE. THIS COORDINATION THE CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY WILL SUPPLY.

IN CONTRAST TO THE APATHY IN INTELLIGENCE BEFORE THE WAR, ONE HEARS TODAY FROM MANY QUARTERS THAT "INTELLIGENCE IS OUR FIRST LINE OF DEFENSE," BUT WITH THE REPETITION OF THAT PHRASE ONE IS APT TO BE LULLED INTO FALSE SECURITY,

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FOR TO MAKE INTELLIGENCE OUR FIRST LINE OF DEFENSE REQUIRES MORE THAN THE MERE MOUTHING OF THE PHRASE. ~~IT REQUIRES THE TYPE OF ACTION WHICH WE ARE TRYING TO DEVELOP IN THE CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE GROUP.~~ I SHOULD BE THE FIRST ONE TO DENY THAT INTELLIGENCE SHOULD BE OUR SOLE AND ONLY FIRST LINE OF DEFENSE. WE MUST LEAD THE FIELD IN THE STRENGTH AND CAPACITY OF OUR PRODUCTION. WE MUST STRIVE TO STAY AHEAD OF THE SCIENTIFIC ADVANCES OF ANY OTHER COUNTRY IN THE WORLD. THESE ELEMENTS SHOULD ALSO BE A PART OF OUR FIRST LINE OF DEFENSE. HOWEVER, AS WE BUILD THAT FIRST LINE TODAY, I WILL SAY THAT INTELLIGENCE MUST BE ONE OF ITS KEYSTONES, ~~AND I PLEDGE YOU THAT, WITH THE HELP OF THE INTELLIGENCE SERVICES OF THE ARMY, NAVY, AND AIR FORCES, AND THE STATE DEPARTMENT, THE CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE GROUP WILL AGGRESSIVELY ENDEAVOR TO BUILD THE FINEST INTELLIGENCE SERVICE IN THE WORLD.~~

I THINK WE CAN BUILD SUCH AN INTELLIGENCE SERVICE BECAUSE I FEEL WE HAVE THE BACKING OF THE PEOPLE. THEY ARE INTELLIGENCE CONSCIOUS. IN THE PAST MONTHS ~~I HAVE TALKED TO MANY OF THE~~

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I HAVE TALKED TO MANY OF THE MEMBERS OF CONGRESS, AND MANY OFFICIALS OF THE GOVERNMENT. AT EVERY HAND THEY HAVE PLEDGED THEIR INTEREST AND THEIR SUPPORT.

PERHAPS THE MOST IMPORTANT FACTOR IN MAKING PEOPLE INTELLIGENCE CONSCIOUS WAS THE DISASTER AT PEARL HARBOR. THE SUBSEQUENT INVESTIGATION BY THE CONGRESSIONAL COMMITTEE BROUGHT FORTH SEVERAL RECOMMENDATIONS FROM THE COMMITTEE WHICH FORM THE BASIS FOR SOME OF OUR PLANNING. THE COMMITTEE SAID THAT INTELLIGENCE WORK REQUIRES CENTRALIZATION OF AUTHORITY AND CLEAR-CUT ALLOCATIONS OF RESPONSIBILITY. WITH THAT I AGREE. THE COMMITTEE STATED THAT THE ARMED FORCES SHOULD SELECT OFFICERS FOR INTELLIGENCE WORK WHO POSSESS THE BACKGROUND AND CAPACITY FOR SUCH WORK; THAT THEY SHOULD RETAIN THESE OFFICERS ON INTELLIGENCE DUTY FOR AN EXTENDED PERIOD OF TIME; THAT THEY SHOULD INSURE THAT OFFICERS WITH AN APTITUDE FOR INTELLIGENCE RECEIVE SUCH ASSIGNMENTS AND DO NOT HAVE THEIR PROGRESS IMPEDED OR THEIR PROMOTIONS AFFECTED. WITH ALL THAT I AM IN HEARTY AGREEMENT. THE DAY SHOULD BE LONG SINCE PAST WHEN

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WHEN INTELLIGENCE WORK SHOULD BE SOMETHING AN OFFICER DREADED FOR FEAR OF IMPEDING HIS PROGRESS. IT SHOULD NEVER AGAIN BE CONSIDERED AS MERELY A T/O VACANCY. IT SHOULD NEVER BE A PLACE TO SHELVES AN OFFICER.

HAVING DISCUSSED THESE FEW GENERAL POINTS, I WOULD LIKE TO DEVOTE THE REST OF MY TIME TO A DISCUSSION OF THE CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE GROUP, ITS ORGANIZATION, SOME OF THE OPERATIONS WE ARE TRYING TO CONDUCT, AND TO DISCUSS QUITE FRANKLY WITH YOU SOME OF THE PROBLEMS WHICH WE ARE FACING.

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THE NEED FOR A COORDINATED INTELLIGENCE PROGRAM WAS RECOGNIZED BY THE LATE PRESIDENT ROOSEVELT. ~~THAT NEED WAS DRAMATIZED, OF COURSE, BY THE PEARL HARBOR DISASTER.~~ AS THE WAR DREW TO A CLOSE, THE PRESIDENT DIRECTED THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF TO STUDY THE PROBLEM AND DRAFT RECOMMENDATIONS. THE SOLUTION OFFERED BY THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF WAS REFERRED TO THE SECRETARIES OF STATE, WAR AND THE NAVY. THE PROGRAM WHICH THEY EVOLVED RESULTED IN AN EXECUTIVE DIRECTIVE FROM PRESIDENT TRUMAN, DATED 22 JANUARY 1946.

THIS EXECUTIVE DIRECTIVE ESTABLISHED THE NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE AUTHORITY. IT CONSISTS OF FOUR VOTING MEMBERS -- THE SECRETARIES OF STATE, WAR AND THE NAVY, AND THE PRESIDENT'S PERSONAL REPRESENTATIVE, AT THIS TIME HIS CHIEF OF STAFF, FLEET ADMIRAL LEAHY. A FIFTH MEMBER -- WITHOUT A VOTE -- IS THE DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE. THE NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE AUTHORITY WAS DIRECTED TO PLAN, DEVELOP AND COORDINATE ALL FEDERAL FOREIGN INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES, SO AS " TO ASSURE THE MOST EFFECTIVE ACCOMPLISHMENT OF THE INTELLIGENCE MISSION RELATED TO THE NATIONAL SECURITY."

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THE PRESIDENT'S DIRECTIVE ALSO PROVIDED FOR A CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE GROUP AS THE OPERATING AGENCY OF THE NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE AUTHORITY. THE FIRST DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE -- THAT IS, HEAD OF THE CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE GROUP -- WAS REAR ADMIRAL SIDNEY W. SOUERS, A FORMER DEPUTY DIRECTOR OF NAVAL INTELLIGENCE, WHO HAS NOW RETIRED.

THE DIRECTOR OF THE CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE GROUP IS PRESENTLY CHARGED WITH THE FOLLOWING BASIC FUNCTIONS:

1. THE COLLECTION OF FOREIGN INTELLIGENCE INFORMATION OF CERTAIN TYPES -- WITHOUT INTERFERING WITH THE NORMAL COLLECTION ACTIVITIES OF THE MILITARY AND NAVAL INTELLIGENCE SERVICES, OR THE FOREIGN SERVICE OF THE STATE DEPARTMENT.
2. THE EVALUATION, CORRELATION AND INTERPRETATION OF THE FOREIGN INFORMATION COLLECTED, IN ORDER TO PRODUCE THE STRATEGIC AND NATIONAL POLICY INTELLIGENCE REQUIRED BY THE PRESIDENT AND OTHER APPROPRIATE OFFICIALS OF THE GOVERNMENT.
3. THE DISSEMINATION OF THE STRATEGIC AND NATIONAL POLICY INTELLIGENCE PRODUCED.

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4. THE PERFORMANCE OF SUCH SERVICES OF COMMON CONCERN TO THE VARIOUS INTELLIGENCE AGENCIES OF THE GOVERNMENT AS CAN BE MORE EFFICIENTLY ACCOMPLISHED CENTRALLY.

5. PLANNING FOR THE COORDINATION OF THE INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES OF THE GOVERNMENT SO AS TO SECURE THE MOST EFFECTIVE ACCOMPLISHMENT OF THE NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE OBJECTIVES.

THESE FUNCTIONS AND RESPONSIBILITIES ARE IN A CONTINUAL PROCESS OF REDEFINITION AND CLARIFICATION. ~~AS WE PROGRESS AND DETERMINE THE PRIMARY RESPONSIBILITIES OF THE VARIOUS INTELLIGENCE AGENCIES WITHIN THE GOVERNMENT, THE FUNCTIONS OF THE C. I. G. WILL BE AGGRESSIVELY, ECONOMICALLY AND EFFICIENTLY EXECUTED TO THE BEST INTERESTS OF ALL AGENCIES.~~

IN ORDER TO PERFORM HIS PRESCRIBED FUNCTIONS, THE DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE MUST KEEP IN CLOSE AND INTIMATE CONTACT WITH THE DEPARTMENTAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCIES OF THE GOVERNMENT. TO PROVIDE FORMAL MACHINERY FOR THIS PURPOSE, THE PRESIDENT'S DIRECTIVE ESTABLISHED AN INTELLIGENCE ADVISORY BOARD TO ADVISE THE DIRECTOR. THE PERMANENT MEMBERS OF THIS

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BOARD ARE THE DIRECTORS OF INTELLIGENCE OF THE STATE, WAR AND NAVY DEPARTMENTS AND THE AIR FORCE. PROVISION IS MADE, MORE-OVER, TO INVITE THE HEADS OF OTHER INTELLIGENCE AGENCIES TO SIT AS MEMBERS OF THE ADVISORY BOARD ON ALL MATTERS WHICH WOULD AFFECT THEIR AGENCIES. IN THIS MANNER, THE BOARD SERVES TO FURNISH THE DIRECTOR WITH THE BENEFITS OF THE KNOWLEDGE, ADVICE, EXPERIENCE, VIEWPOINTS AND OVER-ALL REQUIREMENTS OF THE DEPARTMENTAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCIES.

ONE FINAL THOUGHT IN CONNECTION WITH THE PRESIDENT'S DIRECTIVE. IT INCLUDES AN EXPRESS PROVISION THAT NO POLICE, LAW ENFORCEMENT OR INTERNAL SECURITY FUNCTIONS SHALL BE EXERCISED. THESE PROVISIONS ARE IMPORTANT, FOR THEY DRAW THE LINES VERY SHARPLY BETWEEN THE C. I. G. AND THE F. B. I.. IN ADDITION, THE PROHIBITION AGAINST POLICE POWERS OR INTERNAL SECURITY FUNCTIONS IS AN ANSWER TO THOSE CITIZENS WHO LOOK UPON EVERY INTELLIGENCE ORGANIZATION AS AN INCIPIENT GESTAPO OR SECURITY POLICE.

HAVING DISCUSSED IN A GENERAL WAY, IN THE PRECEDING REMARKS, THE BASIC CHARTER

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OF OUR ORGANIZATION, I WOULD LIKE TO TELL YOU NOW, IN SOMEWHAT GREATER DETAIL, OF THE MANNER IN WHICH WE OPERATE, AND TO TALK TO YOU QUITE FRANKLY OF SOME OF THE PROBLEMS WHICH WE FACE.

IN HIS FINAL REPORT TO THE N. I. A. EARLY IN JUNE 1946, ADMIRAL SOUERS STATED THAT THE INITIAL ORGANIZATION AND PLANNING PHASE OF CIG ACTIVITIES HAD BEEN COMPLETED. HE URGED THAT THE ACTUAL OPERATIONS OF CENTRALIZED INTELLIGENCE SERVICES SHOULD BE UNDERTAKEN BY THE GROUP AT THE EARLIEST PRACTICABLE DATE.

IN MOVING INTO THE SECOND PHASE OF ITS EXISTENCE, IT WAS NECESSARY TO REORGANIZE C. I. G., AND THIS HAS BEEN ACCOMPLISHED.

TO ASSIST IN CARRYING OUT THE BASIC PREMISE OF AGENCY INTERDEPENDENCE AND RESPONSIBILITY, AN INTERDEPARTMENTAL COORDINATING AND PLANNING STAFF HAS BEEN ESTABLISHED. IT IS COMPOSED OF REPRESENTATIVES OF THE STATE, WAR AND NAVY DEPARTMENTS, AND THE AIR FORCES, DESIGNATED BY THEM BUT UNDER THE ADMINISTRATIVE CONTROL OF THE DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE. THIS GROUP MAINTAINS CONSTANT LIAISON WITH OTHER DEPARTMENTS AND AGENCIES OF THE GOVERNMENT. IT RECEIVES PROPOSALS FOR

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INTERDEPARTMENTAL PROGRAMS AND PLANS, AND WORKS CLOSELY WITH AGENCY REPRESENTATIVES IN DEVELOPING DETAILED PROGRAMS FOR ADOPTION BY THE NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE AUTHORITY. I EMPHASIZE "ADOPTION BY THE NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE AUTHORITY" IN ORDER TO POINT OUT TO YOU THAT FULL CONSIDERATION IS GIVEN TO COMMAND CHANNELS. NO ONE CAN DISPUTE THE AUTHORITY OF THE SECRETARIES OF STATE, WAR AND THE NAVY OVER THE ACTIVITIES OF THEIR DEPARTMENTS. THEREFORE, WHEN THE NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE AUTHORITY ISSUES A DIRECTIVE, OR WHEN THE INTELLIGENCE ADVISORY BOARD, BY UNANIMOUS VOTE, ISSUES IT IN THE NAME OF THE NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE AUTHORITY -- AS IT MAY DO IN CERTAIN SPECIFIED CASES -- THAT PLAN OR THOSE PROCEDURES CAN BE CONSIDERED AS ORIGINATING AT THE TOP -- THE FOUNTAINHEAD OF COMMAND -- AND NOT AS INJECTED SOMEWHERE ALONG THE LINE FROM OUTSIDE.

I MIGHT POINT OUT HERE THAT THESE ADOPTED PLANS OR PROCEDURES, BINDING AS THEY ARE UPON THE STATE, WAR AND NAVY DEPARTMENTS, MUST BE ISSUED FROM AN ORGANIZATION ON THE LEVEL OF THE NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE AUTHORITY RATHER THAN FROM THE LEVEL OF THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF, AS HAS

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BEEN SUGGESTED TO YOU BY PREVIOUS SPEAKERS. THE THOUGHT EXPRESSED BY ONE OF THEM THAT NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE SHOULD EMANATE FROM THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF LEVEL, LOSES SIGHT OF THE FACT THAT NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE MUST INCLUDE POLITICAL AND ECONOMIC INTELLIGENCE DEVELOPED BY THE STATE DEPARTMENT AND INTELLIGENCE DEVELOPED BY OTHER AGENCIES OF THE GOVERNMENT, NOT MILITARY INTELLIGENCE ALONE.

THE SERVICING OF THE INTELLIGENCE REQUIREMENTS OF THE VARIOUS DEPARTMENTS AND AGENCIES OF THE GOVERNMENT IS THE PRIME RESPONSIBILITY, WITHIN THE CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE GROUP, OF THE OFFICE OF COLLECTION AND DISSEMINATION. THIS OFFICE DOES NOT SUPPLANT THE DEPARTMENTAL COLLECTION ACTIVITIES. NORMALLY, THE COLLECTION OF FOREIGN INTELLIGENCE INFORMATION CAN BEST BE DONE BY THE EXPERTS OF THE DEPARTMENTS IN THE VARIOUS FIELDS. THE ROLE OF THE CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE GROUP IS TO COORDINATE THIS COLLECTION. WE HAVE ATTEMPTED TO DETERMINE, APPORTION, AND ALLOCATE THE PRIMARY FIELDS OF RESPONSIBILITY FOR THE COLLECTION OF FOREIGN INTELLIGENCE INFORMATION AMONG VARIOUS AGENCIES OF THE GOVERNMENT. THUS TO THE WAR DEPARTMENT HAS BEEN ASSIGNED

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THE PRIMARY DUTY FOR COLLECTING MILITARY AND AIR INTELLIGENCE; TO THE NAVY DEPARTMENT, NAVAL AND NAVAL AIR INTELLIGENCE; AND TO THE STATE DEPARTMENT, POLITICAL, CULTURAL AND SOCIOLOGICAL INTELLIGENCE.

AFTER THIS MASS OF MATERIAL HAS BEEN STUDIED AND EVALUATED, CERTAIN GAPS IN THE OVER-ALL PICTURE BECOME READILY APPARENT. A CENTRALIZED INTELLIGENCE AGENCY, INTENT UPON COMPLETING THE NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE ~~AGENCY~~ ~~INTENT UPON COMPLETING~~ ~~THE NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE~~ PICTURE, MUST HAVE THE POWER TO SEND OUT COLLECTION DIRECTIVES AND REQUEST FURTHER MATERIAL TO FILL THESE GAPS. ONCE THE INITIAL FIELD OF COLLECTION IS DELINEATED, THE RESPONSIBILITY FOR SECURING THE ADDITIONAL INFORMATION CAN BE PROPERLY CHANNLED AND AP-PORTIONED. CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE, HOWEVER, NEEDS THE AUTHORITY GRANTED ORIGINALLY BY THE PRESIDENT'S DIRECTIVE, AND NOW BY THE PROPOSED NATIONAL SECURITY ACT OF 1947, TO COORDINATE ALL THIS FOREIGN INTELLIGENCE COLLECTION. THEN WHEN THESE GAPS APPEAR, THE DIRECTOR CAN SAY TO ANY DEPARTMENT OF THE GOVERNMENT: " YOU WILL INSTRUCT YOUR MAN IN SUCH AND SUCH A COUNTRY TO SECURE, IF POSSIBLE, INFORMATION ON THIS GIVEN POINT."

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WE ARE ENGAGED IN MAKING CONTINUAL SURVEYS OF ALL GOVERNMENT AGENCIES TO ASCERTAIN THEIR REQUIREMENTS IN FOREIGN INTELLIGENCE. WHEN TWO OR MORE AGENCIES HAVE SIMILAR OR IDENTICAL REQUIREMENTS, THE COLLECTION EFFORT FOR ONE CAN BE MADE TO SATISFY ALL OTHERS. WHEN A REQUEST IS RECEIVED WHICH DUPLICATES ONE ALREADY PENDING, THIS FACT IS REVEALED BY OUR RECORDS, AND A DUPLICATE COLLECTION EFFORT IS AVOIDED. THE ONLY ADDITIONAL ACTION NECESSARY IS THE ADDITIONAL DISSEMINATION. BY THE EFFICIENCY AND VIGOROUS APPLICATION OF THESE OPERATIONS IN COORDINATING INTELLIGENCE COLLECTION, WE HOPE TO ACHIEVE SUBSTANTIAL SAVINGS IN TIME, PERSONNEL AND MONEY.

WITHIN OUR OFFICE OF COLLECTION AND DISSEMINATION WE HAVE A READING PANEL WHICH DAILY REVIEWS THE INTAKE OF INTELLIGENCE MATERIAL FROM ALL AGENCIES OF THE GOVERNMENT AND INSURES THAT IT IS MADE AVAILABLE TO ALL DEPARTMENTS HAVING A POSSIBLE NEED FOR IT. THUS, IN ADDITION TO DISSEMINATING NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE TO THE PRESIDENT AND THOSE RESPONSIBLE OFFICIALS OF THE GOVERNMENT WHO HAVE NEED OF

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FOR DISSEMINATION OF MATERIAL TO ALL
APPROPRIATE USERS THROUGHOUT THE GOVERN-
MENT. I HASTEN TO ADD THAT WE DO NOT
MEASURE OUR SUCCESS IN THE FIELD OF DIS-
SEMINATION BY THE GROSS TONNAGE OF INTEL-
LIGENCE SENT TO EACH USER.

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THE OFFICE OF REPORTS AND ESTIMATES WITHIN CIG IS CHARGED WITH THE EVALUATION, CORRELATION AND INTERPRETATION OF THE FOREIGN INTELLIGENCE INFORMATION GATHERED FOR THE PRODUCTION OF NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE. THIS INCLUDES THE PROCESS OF SYSTEMATIC AND CRITICAL EXAMINATION OF INTELLIGENCE INFORMATION FOR THE PURPOSE OF DETERMINING ITS USEFULNESS AND ACCURACY. IT INVOLVES THE PROCESS OF SYNTHESIS OF THE PARTICULAR INTELLIGENCE INFORMATION WITH ALL AVAILABLE RELATED MATERIAL. IT INVOLVES THE PROCESS OF DETERMINING THE PROBABLE SIGNIFICANCE OF EVALUATED INTELLIGENCE INFORMATION.

INTELLIGENCE INFORMATION GATHERED IN THE FIELD IS SENT TO THE DEPARTMENT WHICH COLLECTS IT. THIS MATERIAL IS NECESSARY TO EACH DEPARTMENT, IN THE COURSE OF ITS DAY-TO-DAY OPERATIONS. EACH ONE OF THESE DEPARTMENTS MUST HAVE PERSONNEL AVAILABLE TO DIGEST THIS INFORMATION AND PUT IT TO SUCH USE AS IS NECESSARY WITHIN THE DEPARTMENT. THE HEADS OF GOVERNMENT DEPARTMENTS AND AGENCIES MUST BE CONSTANTLY INFORMED OF THE SITUATION WITHIN THEIR OWN FIELDS TO DISCHARGE

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THEIR OBLIGATIONS TO THIS COUNTRY. WITH THIS DEPARTMENTAL
FUNCTION OF COMMAND, CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE WILL NOT INTERFERE.
EACH DEPARTMENT MUST EVALUATE AND CORRELATE AND INTERPRET
THAT INTELLIGENCE INFORMATION WHICH IS WITHIN ITS OWN
EXCLUSIVE COMPETENCE AND WHICH IS NEEDED FOR ITS OWN
DEPARTMENTAL USE.

THE IMPORTANCE OF RESEARCH TO THE CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE
AGENCY BECOMES EVIDENT WHEN WE START TO DEAL WITH INTELLIGENCE
ON A NATIONAL AS DISTINGUISHED FROM A DEPARTMENTAL LEVEL. THE
RESEARCH PROVIDED BY THE CENTRAL AGENCY MUST BE TURNED TO THE
PRODUCTION OF ESTIMATES IN THE FIELD OF NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE.
NOW, NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE IS THAT COMPOSITE INTELLIGENCE,
INTERDEPARTMENTAL IN CHARACTER, WHICH IS **REQUIRED** BY THE
PRESIDENT AND OTHER HIGH OFFICIALS AND STAFFS TO ASSIST THEM
IN DETERMINING POLICIES WITH RESPECT TO NATIONAL PLANNING AND
SECURITY IN PEACE AND IN WAR, AND FOR THE ADVANCEMENT OF
BROAD NATIONAL POLICY. IT IS IN THAT BROAD POLITICAL -
ECONOMIC-MILITARY AREA, OF CONCERN TO MORE THAN ONE AGENCY,

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MUST BE OBJECTIVE, AND MUST TRANSCEND THE EXCLUSIVE
COMPETENCE OF ANY ONE DEPARTMENT.

ONE OF THE GREATEST CONTRIBUTIONS WHICH THE CENTRAL
INTELLIGENCE AGENCY CAN MAKE LIES IN THE FIELD OF THE
PREPARATION OF NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE ESTIMATES. WITHOUT A
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE GROUP, IF THE PRESIDENT DESIRED AN OVER-
ALL ESTIMATE OF A GIVEN SITUATION, HE WOULD HAVE TO CALL, FOR
EXAMPLE, UPON THE WAR DEPARTMENT, WHICH WOULD FURNISH HIM
WITH THE MILITARY AND AIR PICTURE: THE NAVY DEPARTMENT, WHICH
WOULD PRESENT AN ESTIMATE OF THE NAVAL POTENTIALITIES AND
CAPABILITIES: AND ON THE STATE DEPARTMENT, WHICH WOULD COVER
THE POLITICAL, ECONOMIC AND SOCIOLOGICAL PICTURE. BUT NOWHERE
WOULD THERE BE AN OVER-ALL ESTIMATE. NOWHERE WAS THERE SUCH
AN ESTIMATE BEFORE PEARL HARBOR. EACH DEPARTMENT WOULD, OF
NECESSITY, PRESENT AN ESTIMATE SLANTED TO ITS OWN PARTICULAR
FIELD. NOW, IT FALLS TO THE CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE GROUP TO
PRESENT THIS OVER-ALL PICTURE IN A BALANCED, NATIONAL
INTELLIGENCE ESTIMATE, INCLUDING ALL PERTINENT DATA.

FROM THIS THE PRESIDENT AND APPROPRIATE OFFICIALS CAN DRAW A
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WELL-ROUNDED PICTURE ON WHICH TO BASE THEIR POLICIES.

THE ESTIMATES FURNISHED IN THE FORM OF NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE BY THE CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE GROUP FILL A MOST SERIOUS GAP IN OUR PREVIOUS INTELLIGENCE STRUCTURE. THESE ESTIMATES REPRESENT THE MOST COMPREHENSIVE, COMPLETE AND PRECISE NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE AVAILABLE TO THE GOVERNMENT. WITHOUT A CENTRAL RESEARCH STAFF PRODUCING THIS MATERIAL, AN INTELLIGENCE SYSTEM WOULD MERELY RESEMBLE A COSTLY GROUP OF FACTORIES, EACH MANUFACTURING COMPONENT PARTS, WITHOUT A CENTRAL ASSEMBLY LINE FOR THE FINISHED PRODUCT.

A THIRD OFFICE WITHIN CIG IS THE OFFICE OF OPERATIONS. TO IT FALLS THE RESPONSIBILITY FOR THOSE ACTIVITIES HAVING SUCH GENERAL INTEREST TO TWO OR MORE DEPARTMENTS OR AGENCIES OF THE GOVERNMENT THAT IT HAS BEEN DETERMINED THAT THEIR


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ACTIVITIES CAN BEST BE OPERATED CENTRALLY.

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A SECOND MAJOR PROJECT IS OUR FOREIGN BROADCAST INFORMATION BRANCH, WHICH MONITORS THE BROADCASTS OF FOREIGN NATIONS. THIS IS A SOURCE OF INTELLIGENCE INFORMATION WHICH HAS NEVER BEEN FULLY EXPLOITED, AND WHICH WE HOPE TO DEVELOP TO THE MAXIMUM. GENERAL MARSHALL, NOW NEGOTIATING IN MOSCOW, REQUESTED US BEFORE HE LEFT TO FURNISH HIM WITH A 500-WORD DAILY DIGEST OF RUSSIAN AND SATELLITE BROADCASTS REGARDING THE CONFERENCE. THIS IS INDEED STELLAR RECOGNITION OF THE POSSIBILITIES IN MONITORING FOREIGN BROADCASTS. OUR PRESENT MONITORING COVERAGE IS APPROXIMATELY WORDS EACH DAY OF THE ESTIMATED TEN MILLION WORDS BROADCAST DAILY BY FOREIGN TRANSMITTERS. THE WAR AND STATE DEPARTMENTS HAVE TOLD US THAT THEIR INTELLIGENCE STAFFS ARE UNIQUELY SERVED

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
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BY OUR MONITORING REPORTS WITH REFERENCE TO SUCH COUNTRIES
AS ALBANIA AND OTHERS BEHIND THE IRON CURTAIN, WHERE UNITED
STATES REPRESENTATION IS LACKING OR FACILITIES FOR COLLECTION
AND COMMUNICATION ARE INADEQUATE. AMONG THE PRIORITY ITEMS
FIRST REPORTED EXCLUSIVE [REDACTED] WERE SUCH MATERIAL AS

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PLANS HAVE ALSO BEEN INITIATED FOR THE COVERAGE OF THE
FOREIGN LANGUAGE PRESS PUBLISHED IN THE UNITED STATES AS A
POTENTIAL SOURCE OF FOREIGN INTELLIGENCE INFORMATION. ALONG
SIMILAR LINES ARE THE PLANS BEING MADE FOR THE ACQUISITION
ABROAD OF FOREIGN LANGUAGE PUBLICATIONS -- INTELLIGENCE TOOLS
WHICH ARE GREATLY NEEDED.

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THE WASHINGTON DOCUMENT CENTER WAS A JOINT SERVICE VENTURE FOR THE TRANSLATION OF CAPTURED DOCUMENTS. THIS HAS BEEN TRANSFERRED TO CIG FOR CONTINUED EXPLOITATION, AND IT IS BELIEVED THAT THE WAR DEPARTMENT WILL CENTRALIZE IN OUR DOCUMENTS BRANCH ITS PRESENT SCATTERED COMMITMENTS AS TO CAPTURED GERMAN DOCUMENTS.

IN ADDITION TO OUR OFFICE OF OPERATIONS, CIG ALSO INCLUDES AN OFFICE OF SPECIAL OPERATIONS. THROUGH THIS OFFICE, FOR THE FIRST TIME, THE UNITED STATES ENTERS INTO THE FIELD OF ESPIONAGE THROUGH A CENTRALIZED, COORDINATED ORGANIZATION.

I STATED EARLIER THAT I WOULD DISCUSS SOME OF OUR MOST PRESSING PROBLEMS. THE FIRST OF THESE IS THE NECESSITY FOR THE CIG TO BE ESTABLISHED ON A LEGISLATIVE BASIS RATHER THAN BY EXECUTIVE ORDER. THIS IS NEEDED BECAUSE OF TECHNICALITIES OF THE LAW REGARDING APPROPRIATIONS, CIVIL SERVICE, THE RIGHT TO HIRE AND FIRE, AND OTHER SPECIAL PRIVILEGES WHICH AN AGENCY SUCH AS OURS FINDS NECESSARY. THIS NEED FOR LEGISLATION IS

RECOGNIZED IN SECTION 202 OF THE PROPOSED NATIONAL SECURITY
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ACT OF 1947 -- THE UNIFICATION BILL NOW UNDER CONSIDERATION. THIS ACT WILL TRANSFER THE PRESENT FUNCTIONS OF THE NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE AUTHORITY TO A PROPOSED NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL. UNDER THIS COUNCIL WILL BE A CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY, TO WHICH THE FUNCTIONS, PERSONNEL AND FUNDS OF THE PRESENT GROUP WILL BE TRANSFERRED. ONCE THIS BASIC LAW HAS BEEN PASSED, IT WILL BE NECESSARY FOR US TO FOLLOW WITH A DETAILED ENABLING ACT OF OUR OWN, IN ORDER TO SECURE THOSE NEEDED PREROGATIVES WHICH I MENTIONED ABOVE.

IN ADDITION, IT IS NECESSARY FOR US TO APPEAR BEFORE THE APPROPRIATIONS COMMITTEES OF THE HOUSE AND SENATE TO SECURE THE FUNDS FOR NEXT YEAR'S OPERATIONS. THE NECESSITY OF "SELLING" THESE COMMITTEES ON THE NEED FOR CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE HAS IN SOME INSTANCES BEEN DIFFICULT. I HAVE BEEN FRANK TO URGE UPON THESE COMMITTEES THAT OUR BUDGET SHOULD NOT BE MADE PUBLIC. KNOWLEDGE OF ITS TOTAL FIGURE, AS WELL AS OF OUR PERSONNEL STRENGTH, SHOULD BE HELD AT AN ABSOLUTE MINIMUM.

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IT WOULD BE COMPARATIVELY SIMPLE FOR ANY GOOD INTELLIGENCE AGENCY OF ANY FOREIGN POWER TO MAKE A FAIRLY ACCURATE ESTIMATE OF THE SIZE AND SCOPE OF OUR OPERATIONS IF THEY WERE TO KNOW OUR BUDGET FIGURES OR OUR PERSONNEL CEILINGS. I BELIEVE THAT THE CONGRESS WILL GO ALONG WITH US IN TAKING EVERY STEP TO KEEP THESE FIGURES AN ABSOLUTE SECRET.

WHILE ON THE SUBJECT OF SECRECY, I WOULD LIKE TO MENTION ONE OF OUR GREATEST DIFFICULTIES, WHICH IS SECURITY. THE ESPIONAGE LAWS OF THE UNITED STATES ARE ~~PER~~^{ER}HAPS ADEQUATE TO COVER THE FLAGRANT CASE OF SOMEONE WHO, FOR EXAMPLE, BREAKS INTO A WAR DEPARTMENT SAFE, TAKES OUT A TOP SECRET DOCUMENT, AND IS CAUGHT RED-HANDED SELLING THE DOCUMENT TO A FOREIGN AGENT. BUT THE ESPIONAGE LAW IN ITS MOST IMPORTANT PENAL SECTION REQUIRES THE TEST OF KNOWLEDGE, THE TEST THAT THE VIOLATOR PERFORMED HIS ACT WITH INTENT TO INJURE THE UNITED STATES, OR WITH REASON TO BELIEVE THAT IT WOULD AID A FOREIGN NATION. IT HAS PROVEN VERY DIFFICULT IN MANY CASES TO PROVE THE NECESSARY INTENT REQUIRED BY THE LAW. IT IS EQUALLY DIFFICULT IN SOME CASES TO PROVE

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THAT THE ACT WAS PERFORMED WITH REASON TO BELIEVE THAT IT WOULD AID A FOREIGN NATION. TO PROVE A MAN'S INTENT HAS ALWAYS BEEN DIFFICULT.

CERTAIN OTHER PROVISIONS OF THE ACT PROVIDE PENALTIES FOR WILLFUL VIOLATIONS OF ITS PROVISIONS. THERE AGAIN THE MERE NECESSITY OF PROVING A WILLFUL VIOLATION INVOLVES SOME ELEMENT OF PROOF OF INTENT, FOR THE WORD "WILLFUL" ITSELF MEANS THAT THE VIOLATOR HAD AN INTENT. WHAT IS NEEDED IS A LAW WHICH DEFINES THE CRIME OF VIOLATION OF SECURITY IN TERMS OF ITSELF WITHOUT REFERENCE TO INTENT. FOR EXAMPLE, IN MANY STATES THE POSSESSION OF FIREARMS IS ILLEGAL. THERE IS NO NEED TO SHOW INTENT IN THESE CASES; POSSESSION OF THE FIREARMS IS SUFFICIENT. ONE REMEMBERS THE PROHIBITION ACT. POSSESSION OF LIQUOR WAS ILLEGAL. THERE WAS NO NEED TO SHOW INTENT TO DRINK IT; POSSESSION WAS THE CRIME. AND SO A SIMPLE LAW WHICH WOULD MAKE IT A SEVERELY PUNISHABLE CRIME FOR AN UNAUTHORIZED PERSON TO POSSESS CLASSIFIED DATA, OR TO PUBLISH IT, OR TO TALK ABOUT IT, IS WHAT IS URGENTLY REQUIRED IN ORDER TO SAFEGUARD OUR SECURITY.

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WE MUST HAVE AN "OFFICIAL SECRETS" ACT SUFFICIENTLY BROAD TO COVER SUCH A SITUATION. FREEDOM OF THE PRESS IS PARAMOUNT IN THIS COUNTRY, AND I WOULD BE THE LAST ONE TO INFRINGE UPON IT IN ANY MANNER. HOWEVER, I DO BELIEVE MOST SINCERELY THAT FREEDOM OF THE PRESS IS NOT SERVED WHEN A NEWSPAPER COLUMNIST PUBLISHES THE FULL TEXT OF A TOP SECRET CABLE, COMPLETE WITH ITS CABLE NUMBER AND CLASSIFICATION, WHICH CAME FROM THE SECRET FILES OF A GOVERNMENT DEPARTMENT. I BELIEVE THAT THE SUCCESSFUL OPERATION OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE MUST BE CARRIED ON WITHOUT PUBLICITY. I DO NOT BELIEVE THE INTERESTS OF THE COUNTRY ARE WELL SERVED IF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE MUST OPERATE IN A GOLDFISH BOWL.

ANOTHER PROBLEM WHICH MUST SOON BE SOLVED IS THE RELATIONSHIP TO BE MAINTAINED BETWEEN CIG AND THE NEWLY CREATED ATOMIC ENERGY COMMISSION. ~~IT IS OBVIOUS THAT THIS COMMISSION, CREATED WITH IMMENSE POWERS, WILL NEED HIGHLY SPECIALIZED FOREIGN INTELLIGENCE INFORMATION. IT WILL NEED TO KNOW THE DEGREE OF PROGRESS OF FOREIGN SCIENTISTS IN THE FIELD OF ATOMIC ENERGY AND NUCLEAR PHYSICS. BECAUSE OF THE IMMENSE SECRECY SURROUNDING THIS TYPE OF WORK,~~

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THIS WILL BE MOST DIFFICULT. THE COMMISSION WILL WANT TO KNOW THE LOCATION OF RAW FISSIONABLE MATERIALS ABROAD, AND THE LOCATION OF PLANTS AND MINES.

FINALLY, I WOULD TOUCH ON THE PROBLEM OF PROCUREMENT OF PERSONNEL. I STATED AT THE START OF MY SPEECH THAT I HOPED THAT THE DAY HAD PASSED WHEN AN INTELLIGENCE ASSIGNMENT WAS CONSIDERED TO BE AT THE BOTTOM OF THE HEAP. IT IS MY HOPE THAT WE HAVE REACHED A PERIOD WHEN THE OPPORTUNITIES FOR ADVANCEMENT FOR A YOUNG OFFICER IN INTELLIGENCE WILL BE JUST AS GOOD AND JUST AS RAPID AS IN COMMAND OR TACTICAL POSITIONS. IN ADDITION, THE PERSONNEL PROBLEM HAS BEEN COMPLICATED BY THE EMBARRASSMENT OF RICHES WHICH WE HAD DURING THE WAR. MANY OF THE COUNTRY'S FINEST CIVILIAN MINDS WERE IN INTELLIGENCE. THE MAJORITY OF THEM HAVE NOW GONE BACK TO THEIR CIVILIAN PURSUITS. IN THE FIELD OF RESEARCH MANY OF THEM HAVE RETURNED TO THE QUIET LIFE OF ACADEMIC CIRCLES AND TO PURSUE THE STUDIES FROM WHICH THE WAR TOOK THEM. WE ARE TAKING MANY STEPS TO SECURE SOME OF THESE SCHOLARS AGAIN, AND OUR TASK WILL BE MADE THE EASIER WHEN THEY ARE AFFORDED THE SECURITY OF AN

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AGENCY WHICH IS ESTABLISHED BY LEGISLATION. I HOPE THAT MANY OF YOU WHO ARE HERE PRESENT WILL COME TO REALIZE THAT INTELLIGENCE DUTY IS ONE OF THE GREATEST SERVICES A MILITARY MAN CAN PERFORM IN THE SERVICE OF HIS COUNTRY.

IN CONCLUSION, I WISH TO EMPHASIZE THAT WE MUST HAVE A CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE GROUP, ORGANIZED TO FOLLOW CONSTANTLY THE INTELLIGENCE REPORTS OF THE SEVERAL DEPARTMENTS OF THE GOVERNMENT, DETERMINE THEIR CORRECTNESS WHEN VIEWED IN THE LIGHT OF THE OTHER DEPARTMENTAL REPORTS, AND THUS BUILD UP A BACKGROUND AGAINST WHICH RAPID OPERATION IS POSSIBLE WHEN THE CALL COMES THROUGH FOR A SPECIAL EVALUATION.

DURING THE PROCESS, SOME OF THIS WORK MAY APPEAR TO BE DUPLICATION. SOME OF IT IS DUPLICATION, BUT IN MY OPINION IT IS NECESSARY DUPLICATION AND IS PRODUCTIVE, SINCE THROUGH THE DUPLICATION IT CONFIRMS OR DENIES THOSE MINOR CONDITIONS OR SITUATIONS WHICH WILL BECOME THE BASIS FOR NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE WHEN IT IS PRODUCED; AND UNLESS THAT BACKGROUND IS CLEAR AND THAT FOUNDATION SURE, THE FINAL NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE CANNOT BE CLEAR OR SURE.

HOWEVER, IT IS AN INTELLIGENCE GROUP

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WERE TO UNDERTAKE TO PREPARE PURELY POLITICAL INTELLIGENCE FOR THE GUIDANCE OF THE SECRETARY OF STATE, OR MILITARY INTELLIGENCE FOR MILITARY COMMANDERS, WHICH IS A COMMAND FUNCTION, THAT WOULD BE INEXCUSABLE DUPLICATION.

WHERE CIG COMES INTO THE DEPARTMENTAL PICTURE IS THROUGH ITS COORDINATING RESPONSIBILITY. ITS BASIC PROGRAMS LAY SPECIAL EMPHASIS ON THE CONTINUING RESPONSIBILITY OF DEPARTMENTAL INTELLIGENCE TO DEPARTMENTAL CHIEFS, BUT IT TRIES TO SEE THAT NO DEPARTMENT IS REQUIRED TO EXPEND ITS EFFORTS, MANPOWER, AND PERHAPS MOST IMPORTANT AT THE PRESENT TIME ITS BUDGET DOLLARS, IN THOSE COLLATERAL FIELDS WHICH ARE NOT WITHIN ITS DOMINANT INTEREST AND CAPABILITIES, BUT WHICH AT THE SAME TIME ARE SO VITAL TO THE WELL ROUNDING OF ITS OWN DEPARTMENTAL INTELLIGENCE PICTURE.

DURING THE WAR, WHEN THERE WERE MORE OR LESS UNLIMITED BUDGETS AND THAT PATRIOTIC WILLINGNESS ON THE PARTS OF ALL DEPARTMENTS TO PITCH IN FOR THE GENERAL GOOD OF THE WAR EFFORT, ALL SORTS OF ARRANGEMENTS OF A TEMPORARY NATURE WERE MADE BETWEEN DEPARTMENTS. IT IS THE CURRENT RESPONSIBILITY OF THE CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE GROUP TO FORMALIZE

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THESE AGREEMENTS WHERE THEY HAVE PROVED PRACTICABLE, TO CREATE NEW ONES WHERE THAT APPEARS NECESSARY, AND TO GUARANTEE A CONSTANT INTERDEPARTMENTAL FLOW OF THAT INTELLIGENCE ORIGINATING IN ONE PLACE FOR ONE PURPOSE AND REQUIRED IN ANOTHER FOR ANOTHER PURPOSE.

IT IS MY BELIEF THAT, EVEN AFTER THE REDUCTIONS IN PERSONNEL WHICH CURRENTLY APPEAR INEVITABLE FOR THE COMING FISCAL YEAR, THERE WILL CONTINUE TO BE WITHIN THE GOVERNMENT SUFFICIENT PRODUCERS OF INTELLIGENCE TO SUPPLY ALL INTELLIGENCE WHICH MAY BE REQUIRED BY THE SEVERAL DEPARTMENTS OF THE GOVERNMENT. BUT TO SERVE THE NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE MISSION THEIR OUTPUT MUST BE CAREFULLY COORDINATED, BOTH AS TO SUBJECT AND TO TIMING. THIS COULD BE DONE THROUGH A MULTIPLICITY OF INTER-AGENCY BILATERAL AGREEMENTS. IT WAS SO DONE DURING THE WAR. BUT ANY OF YOU WHO HAVE SPENT MUCH TIME IN WASHINGTON DURING THE PAST EIGHT YEARS WILL KNOW HOW TIME-CONSUMING SUCH A PROCESS CAN BE. THE ESTABLISHMENT OF A CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY WILL VEST SOME CENTRAL AUTHORITY TO INSURE THE CLOSEST INTERRELATION OF THE

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SEVERAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCIES AND THE FULLEST POSSIBLE IMPLEMENTATION OF THE NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE MISSION.

I WANT TO REITERATE THAT I, AND THOSE WORKING WITH ME IN THE CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE GROUP, ARE FULLY AWARE OF THE CONTINUING NEED FOR UNHAMPERED DEPARTMENTAL INTELLIGENCE, AND WE ARE FULLY AWARE OF THE DANGERS OF DUPLICATION. WE BELIEVE THAT WHAT WE ARE DOING DOES NOT HARM THE FIRST NOR PRODUCE THE SECOND. I MAKE NO CLAIM THAT THE CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE GROUP IS PERFECTION. PERFECTION CANNOT BE EXPECTED SO EARLY IN THE DEVELOPMENT OF A NEW CONCEPT. BUT I CAN ASSURE YOU THAT MUCH PROGRESS HAS BEEN MADE -- AND MUCH MORE IS IN THE OFFING -- TO GIVE THE UNITED STATES AN INTELLIGENCE SERVICE SECOND TO NONE.

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