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President Edel, and members of the faculty and the student body -- I guess four years have passed since your President and I appeared on the same platform together at Cornell. The pleasures of being with him again and sharing his hospitality are very real to me. It is all too infrequently that I get a chance to sit down with my old companion and shipmate, and reminisce about our days aboard that gallant battleship, the U.S.S. Maryland. And -- thinking of the Maryland -- I find it difficult to think of your President as Mr. President or President Edel. I shall never disassociate him from the title of Padre, the name by which all of us knew him with affection and respect.

What I would like to do with all of you here would be to sit down and reminisce about the good old days;

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but in the correspondence which led me here, there occasionally cropped up the phrase that I should talk to you on the subject of the duties of a "Super G-Man." I tried to rack my brain to find out what a "Super G-Man" might be, and came to the conclusion that he was probably a cross between Superman and J. Edgar Hoover. The non-existence of such a colossus led me to the ultimate conclusion that something other than the "Super G-Man" -- something less in the realm of fantasy -- would be *more appropriate to discuss.*

I realize that one of the characteristics of such a super-sleuth has been described in a wonderful burlesque novel by the British author, Compton Mackenzie, called "Water On The Brain." In talking of one of the chief characters of this novel -- the Director of Extraordinary Intelligence -- Mackenzie's hero observed that the Director always wore large, dark, horn-rimmed

spectacles, which could be removed only on sudden impulses of expansive good fellowship. Any last thought that I might have had of being a "Super G-Man" went out the window when I failed to find a pair of dark, horn-rimmed spectacles for ~~this~~ occasion!

There has been an enormous growth over the past few years in the appreciation of intelligence matters. This increased appreciation is due in part to a full realization of our pre-war failures in the field of intelligence. In Washington, some of it is due to the reduction of our armed forces as they approach their peace-time complement. It is axiomatic that the more the actual combat forces are reduced the greater is the role that must be played by intelligence. Commanders in all grades have expressed a high regard for operational intelligence.

As General Spaatz said recently, in testifying before the President's Air Policy Commission:

"I think Intelligence must be exploited to the maximum. We must spend all that is necessary to get the best Intelligence."

Testifying before the same Commission, Admiral Nimitz suggested that the Commission

". . . give thought to the importance of intelligence to our national security.

The greater the capabilities of our enemies for sudden attack, the more important it becomes that our intelligence agencies and activities be the best that we can devise."

From this knowledge, gained through the experiences of the past decade, an appreciation of intelligence has spread through the highest ranks and agencies of our Government.

Public awareness of the role played by intelligence was heightened immeasurably by the work of the Joint

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Congressional Committee which investigated the attack on Pearl Harbor in 1946. As an historical document that report makes vivid reading equalled by few histories that I have seen. It should be in every college library. However, I merely wish to point out to you the validity of many of the findings and conclusions of that Committee concerning some failure which went to the very foundation of our intelligence structure; namely, the failure to exploit obvious sources, the failure to coordinate the collection and dissemination of intelligence and the failure to centralize intelligence. One point that the Committee made, I think deserves particular underlining, and that is the statement that "efficient intelligence services are just as essential in time of peace as in war".

The end of the war found the United States in a position of international importance and power in a

very unstable world -- and that position maintains today. We must never again find ourselves confronted with the necessity for developing plans and policies on the basis of intelligence collected, compiled, and interpreted by a foreign government. It is common knowledge that we found ourselves in just that position, in the European Theatre, at the beginning of the war. For months we had to rely blindly and trustingly on the superior intelligence system of the British. Our successes prove that this trust was well placed.

However, in matters so vital to a nation having responsibilities of a world power, the United States must never again be forced to go, hat in hand, begging a foreign government for the eyes -- the foreign intelligence -- with which to see.

Our war experience in the intelligence field, the conclusions of the Joint Congressional Committee which

investigated the Hawaiian attack, and the studies of many other groups and committees, focused attention on the need for a centralized intelligence system.

As a result, a National Intelligence Authority was established by President Truman on 22 January 1946, by Executive Directive. The Central Intelligence Group was designated as the operating agency of the National Intelligence Authority. Since the Central Intelligence Group has now been legalized by the National Security Act of 1947 -- under the new name of the Central Intelligence Agency -- I shall not discuss the old organization further -- but will proceed to the new.

~~With this background, I would like to discuss with you the pertinent provisions of the National Security Act of 1947, insofar as they affect the intelligence picture. This Act establishes -- for the first time~~

on a legal basis -- a National Security Council, the function of which is to advise the President on the integration of foreign, domestic and military policies relating to the national security. The Council is to be presided over by the President himself, or by any member he may designate. Its membership is composed of the President, the Secretaries of State, Defense, the Army, the Navy, the Air Force, and the Chairman of the National Security Resources Board, together with certain others who may be appointed at the option of the President.

The Central Intelligence Agency is established under this Council which directs the planning, development and coordination of all Federal foreign intelligence activities.

There is one more point which I wish to make concerning Central Intelligence. During the period in

which we operated under Executive Order, and in the debates, both in the press and in the Congress, which preceded our establishment under the National Security Act of 1947, we were the subject of some unthinking attacks. Nothing could be more unfair to us or do more to muddy the public reaction as to our real duties than the attempts which were made by some to label us as an incipient Gestapo. Therefore, let me lay this ghost once and for all by pointing out, in the first place, that the law specifically provides -- and I quote -- that the Central Intelligence Agency "shall have no police, subpoena, law enforcement powers or internal security functions." Internal security is the function of the FBI. The functions of the Central Intelligence Agency are the foreign intelligence activities of the United States. Central Intelligence does not have, and

does not want any internal domestic functions, and under the law we cannot assert them. The history of Ogpu, of NKVDs and of Gestapos will show that they can only arise when the intelligence functions and the police powers are blended together in one organization. That cannot happen and will not happen here.

I would like to spend a few minutes telling you of one or two of the things which we do. The first of these is the continuation of the exploitation of foreign documents captured during the war in all theatres. As this exploitation nears completion, we will continue to translate and exploit current magazines, technical works and the like from all foreign countries. This type of function can be most economically and efficiently performed by a central agency such as ours, for it pools the skilled linguistic personnel and the dissemination functions.

In line with the thesis that intelligence is really the product of extremely hard work over materials which are available in the press, radio, periodicals, encyclopedias and libraries, a most interesting statement was made by Reichmarshal Herman Goering after his capture. He said that there wasn't a single airplane used by the Americans during the war that he didn't know about before its appearance. We asked him how he knew this, and he said that it was very simple. It was just the fact that Americans were proud of what they produced, wrote about it in books and in magazines, spoke about it on the radio, and made the information public in the usual ways. All the Germans had to do was to read and to listen. What was true for the Germans is true for us.

A member of my staff told me the other day that he had been on an intelligence mission in Berlin, looking for documents after V-E Day. In the course of that

mission, he was in the headquarters of the great German air line, Deutsche Lufthansa. There upon the shelves stood loose-leaf volume after volume of data on foreign air lines -- magazine articles, newspaper clippings, and other material. He took from a shelf one of the volumes on Pan American Airways, and started looking through it. Every conceivable article on Pan American was there -- articles on their routes and route development; articles on the aircraft they were flying, with detailed data on the DC-3; copies of stockholders' reports; and press clippings galore. Thus, just from simple documents, a great mine of information can be built up. The Germans and the Japanese did it; and today, on a global basis, we find it very important. There is no secret about it: It is just a matter of sitting down and reading the material which is readily available for analysis.

An amusing incident involving German thoroughness

in the field of documents occurred in Germany in the Summer of 1945, when a member of my present staff helped to dig out of the ground a box of intelligence documents of one of the components of the German armed services. Among those present was an American officer, the former chief of intelligence of one of our Armed Services.

(For the sake of unification, I shan't say whether it was Army, Navy or Air Force!) As the box was opened, this officer was startled to find that the first item in the German material was an article on intelligence which he had once written for the Saturday Evening Post!

Incidents of the value of documents during the war can be multiplied indefinitely. In the Pacific, one great haul of documents followed the destruction of a big Japanese convoy which set out for New Guinea in 1943 with reinforcements. Following the destruction of this convoy by our forces, the survivors came ashore on

Goodenough Island hugging brief cases containing the complete plans and alternate plans of the whole operation -- including the ships involved, the Army units, and the air cover. The information thus gained on the Japanese military situation in New Guinea was invaluable.

Studies of simple things like railway gazetteers, time tables, and the like, have always been helpful. Today those engaged in intelligence have learned that it isn't Mata Hari and the man with the false whiskers who produce the results. The results come from just hard, painstaking work, pouring over newspapers and magazines which come from abroad, reference works and similar material, and endlessly putting together fact upon fact, until the whole outline appears and the details begin to fill in.

Another example of work which we do is the monitoring of foreign radio voice broadcasts of news and propaganda and public statements of leading figures abroad. This is an increasingly important source of information. As the Japanese found before Pearl Harbor, a continual study of a country's broadcasts over a protracted period of time brings much intelligence which can be secured by no other means. It might be of interest to cite you one or two examples of this type of work.

Recently the Arab League held a conference in Cairo. In a broadcast intercept in French from Beirut, which apparently was an oversight in the security measures of the Arab League Conference, the text of the decisions was released. There were no subsequent broadcasts or releases on the Arab League Conference. Consequently, without the monitoring service of the FBIB this information would not have been available to us for weeks, if ever.

In October of 1947, TASS, the Soviet news agency, broadcast a communique which reported the formation of the Cominform. The FBIB, having monitored the TASS communique, immediately set to work to determine the reaction of radios throughout the world. On the following day the FBIB was able to present a cross section of world reaction and within the next two days the Soviet reaction was broadcast as an excerpt from KOMSOMOLSKAYA PRAVDA. CIA had the information 2 or 3 days earlier than would have been the case without FBIB monitoring.

At about the same time that the Cominform was front-page news with Commercial press services the FBIB picked up the first notice of the Communist worldwide attack on Socialists when it heard Radio Bratislava announce the arrest of Czechoslovakian right-wing democrats.

Since the war the movies have sought to glamorize certain phases of war-time ^{intelligence} activity -- particularly that of the OSS. Films such as "13 Rue Madelaine" with Jimmy Cagney and "OSS" with Gary Cooper are wonderful entertainment to be sure. A sidelight which might amuse those who saw "13 Rue Madelaine" might be of interest. You recollect that in that picture, which dealt with the dropping of agents behind the lines in France, the agents all carried little white pills to be swallowed upon capture and producing instant death. You recollect in the movie that Jimmy Cagney had one of these pills in his hand when clubbed from behind and the first thing the Germans did was to take the pill away from him. Not so long ago I asked a member of our staff who had dropped into war-time France with these so-called "Jedburgh" teams what he had done with his little white death pill. He said,

"As soon as I had parachuted to safety, the first thing I did was to throw my little pill away, because I was scared I might get excited and swallow it by mistake." As I said, these movies tend to glamorize intelligence without taking into account the painstaking and serious work involved with materials which are so readily available by the simple process of mental digging and assimilation. The same can be said of many of the post-war books of revelation, particularly those on OSS, such as "Sub Rosa" by the famous newspaper columnist Stewart Alsop and Tom Braden who parachuted into France with the "Jedburgh" teams, and the satire on intelligence activities in the Balkans called "Operation Bughouse" by Beverley Bowie. Then there is the serious and magnificent story of the establishment of an intelligence net in France by the deGaullists entitled "Adventures of a Secret Agent of Free France" by a Frenchman ^{known by} called

Remy. One of the more amusing books -- certainly one of the best written -- which in some measure tends to show more of the painstaking work involved, ~~had~~ had wide circulation on the best seller lists -- this is "Undercover Girl" by Elizabeth MacDonald, and deals with morale operations and psychological warfare in the Far East.

While all the above make wonderful reading, I want to stress over and over again that to me intelligence takes on more of the proportions which are best expressed in a stanza of Rudyard Kipling's poem "The Elephant's Child":

"I keep six honest serving men.

(They taught me all I knew.)

Their names are What and Why

and When

And How and Where and Who."

What I really would like to point out to you in this talk is that there is nothing mysterious, no great mumbo-jumbo about intelligence. Instead, it is a business in which results are best achieved by the time-honored formula of applying the seat of the pants to the seat of the chair.

All intelligence is not sinister, nor is it an invidious type of work. Before the Second World War, our intelligence services had left largely untapped the great open sources of information upon which roughly 80 per cent of intelligence should normally be based. I mean such things as books, magazines, technical and scientific surveys, photographs, commercial analyses, newspapers and radio broadcasts, and general information from people with a knowledge of affairs abroad.

I feel it is safe to say that in peace time approximately 80 per cent of the foreign intelligence information necessary to successful operation can and

should be collected by overt means. By overt means I mean those obvious, open methods which require, basically, a thorough sifting and analysis of the masses of readily available material of all types and descriptions. Into the United States there is funnelled so vast an amount of information from so many varied sources that it is virtually staggering. It encompasses every field of endeavor -- military, political, economic, commercial, financial, agricultural, mineral, labor, scientific, technical, among others -- an endless and inexhaustible supply.

There exists a misconception in the minds of some people regarding the task intelligence is to perform in time of peace, as contrasted with its task in time of war. This misconception is that in wartime intelligence is more important and more difficult than in time of peace. This is a fallacy. In the midst of a war, our armed forces, with their intelligence services, gather

vast amounts of strategic and tactical information.

This may be secured through the underground, or resistance movements, reconnaissance, prisoner-of-war interrogation, and aerial photographs taken in spite of enemy resistance -- to mention a few. But these sources are drastically reduced as our forces return home. Such information, which can be collected during actual combat, is largely denied us in peace-time. In times of peace, we must rely on the painstaking study of that available overt material I mentioned a minute ago, in order to replace the material readily available during combat.

If we fail to take advantage of these vast masses of material, we are deliberately exposing the American people to the consequences of a policy dictated by a lack of information. We must realize that we are competing with other nations who have been building up

their intelligence systems for centuries to keep their leaders informed of international intentions -- to inform them long before intentions have materialized into action.

In the world today, America's leaders must be the best informed on the face of the earth. To make them so, is the role of intelligence. That is the goal which we at Central Intelligence have set for ourselves.