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THE SOVIET CHALLENGE

By Allen W. Dulles  
Director of Central Intelligence

It is certainly timely that a group of experts such as is gathered here should consider America's human resources to meet the scientific challenge. My share of the task is to discuss the challenge presented by Soviet scientific and technological advances.

It is not easy to divide this problem into tidy compartments. Science pervades the Soviet military threat, its industrial and economic progress. Much of the aid proffered to the newly developing countries in the free world includes technological assistance. Even on the subversive side of their operations they have shown great sophistication in the technical and scientific training of their agent personnel.

It is a challenge which calls for united and coordinated action. Hence right at the outset I wish to emphasize the value of measures to help pool the scientific assets of the United States with those of the free world wherever it will advance the common good and mutual defense. Steps in this direction have already been taken. More can and should be done.

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I appreciate the security reasons often advanced for moving slowly and here is a field in which I can speak with some authority. The security factor deserves consideration but when properly balanced against the gain from freer scientific exchange, there will be plenty of leeway to go further than we have.

If legislative bars against certain phases of our cooperation with other countries in the nuclear field are removed, it will be a major step forward. Exchanging ideas on weapons development will certainly be of value in the field of intelligence since it would improve our ability to analyze and understand the nature of the Soviet nuclear threat.

Other informational exchanges between countries where each has the capacity to help the other will advance the common cause. For us and our allies to keep scores of top scientists working separately and mutually uninformed on the same problems may be a waste of scarce resources that we can ill afford.

In your earlier meetings today I understand you have been considering the building up and marshaling of America's human assets, particularly in the scientific field, to meet the Soviet threat. In the somewhat circumscribed area of my own work, much of my time during the last seven years has been directed to a somewhat

similar end, namely how scientific assets and techniques can be most effectively used to increase our overall ability to interpret developments in the Soviet Union.

One result of this study has been to emphasize the need for current appraisals of our relative position to the Soviet in technical fields of critical importance to national security. The missile field is a good example.

Relative positions of course change from time to time as one side or the other places greater emphasis in a particular field of endeavor. This calls for constant study and re-study, but with a proper perspective of where we stand relative to the Soviet Union we can develop our foreign and defense policies with a better basis for sound decision.

During the past few months the world has had a spectacular demonstration of the great technical competence of the Soviet, notably in the field of earth satellites and ballistic missiles.

To those who have been closely following developments in the Soviet Union these came as no great surprise.

Contrary to what may be the generally accepted view, these happenings have not caused us to make any basic changes in our earlier estimates of the Soviet challenge. It was serious before. It appears to be slightly more so today.

Here and there time tables of when various Soviet new weapons might come into use have been moderately advanced, particularly in the ballistic missile field. Soviet Sputniks and recent ballistic missile tests have not altered the overall appraisals of Soviet capabilities and intentions reached a year or more ago.

We must really thank the Soviet for having dramatized their competence and mightily reduced, in this country at least, the ranks of those who could not bring themselves to believe in the high technological capability of the Russians.

Long complacently accustomed to being first, it has been a shock to the American public to find that that is not the case in a particular field and an important one. We were first in the development of long range aviation, in the dramatic break-through in the atomic field and in thermonuclear fusion, and then, as evidenced by the atomic submarine, in the application of atomic power in an important military area. On analysis one would find that the margin of our lead, here and there, had been tending to narrow.

Then in a dramatic way the Soviets had their "first" and there is a tendency to feel that there was some failure to keep the American people advised as to Soviet scientific progress which led to this result.

Also, many have instinctively assumed that in the fields of scientific achievement a free enterprise system would inevitably lead a state like the Soviet whose economy was controlled by a communist-type state dictatorship.

Achievements do not depend so much on the type of government, so long as the latter is technically competent and has a willing or subservient people at its beck and call. It depends on the goals and priorities set, the promptness and the correctness of the decisions reached, and the energy applied in terms of man hours with the proper tools and equipment.

Under normal conditions a liberal free enterprise society concentrates on the development of what the people want to improve their living standards. In a society controlled by dictatorial leaders, with the centralization and socialization of production, the leaders are able, for a time at least, to fix the goals and priorities. What the mass of the people want comes second. I have said "for a time." It may be difficult to carry on such a policy indefinitely. Some day the people may rebel against such programming.

The USSR has a national product of some 40% of our own. If one includes on our side the segment of the free world allied with us and adds to the Soviet the questionable assets of the unhappy European satellites, the margin in favor of the West is much greater.

Yet the Soviet today are producing in the military field, hardware and assets very nearly equivalent to our own. The fact that they are able to do this with less than half of our industria.

potential is due largely to three factors: (1) the different cost bases for military manpower as contrasted with that for us; (2) the larger percentage of gross national product devoted to military ends; (3) the concentration of scientific competence in military fields.

Under these circumstances is it surprising that from time to time we will have the shock of finding that the Soviet have outstripped us in some particular military field where for longer periods of time they have put in more concentrated effort than we, as for example, in the missile field.

Granting something like equality of brain power applied on each side, the answer comes close to being a mathematical one and there is no reason to seek any mysterious or sinister cause.

The fact is that since shortly after the close of the war in 1945, when they took over the German missile hardware and a large group of German scientists with their blueprints and plans in Peenemunde and elsewhere, they have spent in this field more man hours than we. They have done it under highly competent Soviet scientific and technological leadership with the necessary tools, equipment and priorities. While they profited greatly by German technological achievement up to 1948, during the last decade it has been largely a native Soviet achievement.

History is full of examples where the high standard of living countries -- placing emphasis upon those things which make the rounded, developed and cultured human being with leisure for a broadened life -- have failed to comprehend the extent and nature of external threats from the Spartas which have concentrated on military might. All you need do is read your history from the Greek and Roman days right down to England and France before World War II, or even our own history.

A free people such as ours seem to require at periodic intervals dramatic developments to alert us to our perils.

Some people seem to think that this shock treatment should be replaced by a continuous process of indoctrination which could and should be furnished by government officials. I am somewhat doubtful as to the efficacy of this.

Most Americans seem to be from Missouri. Seeing is believing. By and large, the press does a good job in this field. Its sources of information are wide and varied. Jeremiads from government leaders are generally regarded as tinged with political or budgetary motives. It was only by orbiting our own Explorer that an effective answer was made to the American people as to our own technical competence in the missile field. No amount of speech making would have done it.

Recently it has been hinted that if only the Central Intelligence Agency had been believed, everything would have been well. This is flattering but a great over-simplification. There never has been a time in history to my knowledge when intelligence has had as clear an opportunity to get its views over as it has had in this country in recent years. The National Security Act of 1947, creating the Central Intelligence Agency, has given Intelligence a more influential position in our government than Intelligence enjoys in any other government of the world. If in our government, intelligence estimates have not always had the impact that in the light of hindsight they may have deserved, responsibility must be shared by the intelligence producer. We have the chance to sell our wares.

No intelligence appraisal could have had the impact of a Sputnik.

Maybe it was necessary that over the last decade in our relations with the USSR, we had to have a series of political, economic and military Sputniks -- costly as some have been -- to keep us periodically alerted to our dangers, though once a particular crisis is over, we quickly forget the past.

First came the Soviet threat against Western Europe, Greece and Turkey after World War II. This led to the Marshall Plan and

the Truman Doctrine. Then there was the Berlin Blockade in 1948 and the Korean War in 1950. Each of these, plus the tragic loss of China and Czechoslovakia, has helped to alert us to the elements of political subversion and war by proxy in the communist menace. Hungary should have convinced us that the Soviet will not hesitate to use brute force in what they choose to call their area of influence. Now with the Sputnik and ballistic missiles, the free world knows better the nature of the competition we face in the field of science and military technology.

Knowledge of the nature of this particular Soviet scientific challenge has been brought home to the American people through the length and breadth of the land. It is the greatest advertising job ever done. The Soviet really wrote it in the sky.

For a time at least, it will not be hard to convince anybody that we really are up against a competitor with a highly developed scientific and technical competence. We can thank the Soviet that this particular selling job was done effectively in 1957 and not delayed until 1958 or later.

Under these circumstances we shall be better able than before to mobilize our assets, human and material.

What are the immediate issues, the challenges we face?

There is no evidence, as I see it, that the Soviet Union presently intends to follow a policy which in their view would involve the serious risk of nuclear war with the United States. They most certainly have a healthy respect for our present military capabilities and our great industrial potential. They recognize the present limitation on their own. They recognize that nuclear war at this time would result in devastating damage to them. They probably question their present capability to deal a knockout blow and consequently would expect that their own devastation under retaliatory attack would be very great.

Comparative estimates of military strengths do not lie in my field of particular competence. This much I can say. I do not know of any American experts in the field whose views I respect, who take the position that today the Soviet Union has an overall military capability superior to our own.

What rightfully concerns us, however, is the dynamic growth in Soviet military and industrial power. Their further successes in the ballistic missile field and in the development of an arsenal of weapons with nuclear warheads would tend to change the nature of the threat to our security.

I am by no means suggesting that our concern is solely in the missile field or that we take seriously Khrushchev's remark about treating aircraft as museum pieces. This quip was probably motivated, in part, by the desire to downgrade our own Strategic Air Command during a period when the Soviet were in a position to flaunt their success with the guided missile. After all, we do not credit the Soviet with the industrial potential of developing and producing at the same time and with equal priority and on a massive scale all possible weapons in the modern military armory. They must make choices just as we.

We do have some evidence, however, that as much as a decade ago the Soviet turned to the guided missile as a challenging competitor to the bomber. What we badly needed back in 1945 was a Billy Mitchell for ballistic missiles.

Today we need wisely to use the time, which intelligence appraisals indicate we have, to build up our own capabilities and to see to it that any gap in time, during which they may have any superiority in the missile field, is reduced to negligible proportions and counter-balanced by the use of our substantial geographic advantages and general retaliatory power.

In most of our scientific breakthroughs we have had the disadvantage of being the front runner; the pioneer. In guided missiles

we can profit by the experience of others and we have just received a fine dividend of confidence in our own achievements.

We are alerted to the problem, to the technical competence of the opposition. We are still moving from a position of strength and forewarned should be forearmed.

The mobilization of human and other resources to meet the Soviet challenge in the military field will be an easier task than to mobilize to meet international communism's programs of subversion and economic penetration. Yet the latter today are their first lines of attack, with the military buildup remaining in reserve.

They have given us nothing quite as dramatic as the Sputnik to advertise what they are doing in the Middle East, Asia and Africa. Possibly they learned a lesson from the Marshall Plan and have no stomach for inciting us into a new competition on any grand scale in the uncommitted areas of the world.

But if we should ignore these warning signs and go missile-minded to the exclusion of adequate defense against other dangers, the Sputnik can become a kind of Trojan horse. We might win the military race and yet lose great areas of the world that are vital to our own national security.

The international communist apparatus with its communist parties and cells, its economic, technical, and military aid programs based on Moscow, Prague and Peiping, has a closely orchestrated, well disguised mechanism for the advancement of its cause. The economic side of it outwardly looks somewhat like our own -- until the objective is uncovered.

Communists work in and through the parliaments of many countries of the world. They try to use the democratic processes in order to defeat the basic aims of a free form of government. They had a part in writing many of the constitutions in the free world in the early post-war days and did so with the very objective of putting strong authority nowhere and helping to produce chaos everywhere.

The policy of keeping countries divided -- Germany, Korea, Viet Nam and until recently Austria and Laos -- was an example of their techniques. This development is beginning to boomerang as the free peoples in the divided areas are furnishing studies in contrast between what a people working in freedom can do as contrasted with people under the domination of Moscow or Peiping.

Soviet progress in the scientific and technological field is used as a powerful argument in their appeal to the uncommitted areas.

Well before Sputnik the peoples in these areas were deeply impressed by the fact that the USSR in less than four decades had come from being a backward country into the position of the second greatest power in the world and a leader in the scientific field.

Certainly we should be more effective in bringing home to these people what has actually transpired in the areas that have been subject to Soviet colonialism or have been the unwilling objects of Soviet exploitation and domination.

Unfortunately, distance seems to lend enchantment and we can hardly expect the people of Java, to take only one instance, to understand fully the dangers which Soviet communism means for them.

Meanwhile in the Middle East, Africa and in South and Southeast Asia, the Soviet programs of arms and economic and scientific aid have helped to fan the flames of nationalism and anti-colonialism. The total of communist aid, economic, scientific and military, does not approach ours but they have cleverly concentrated on certain particular countries where they feel they can make the most impact.

Soviet educational programs are helping to build up a reservoir of technicians equipped in the lore of foreign countries. They also bring to Moscow University and other Soviet and satellite institutions large numbers of native students for training, particularly in the scientific

fields. If the Soviet scientific educational program continues at its present pace, they will have a growing reserve of trained scientists for export.

I trust that one of the results of this meeting may be to help us to find in the free world competent technicians willing to journey to the four corners of the earth to help build up the indigenous capabilities of the new countries. In any study of our own human resources to meet the scientific challenge it is well to remember that this cannot be done solely on the drawing boards of our own scientific institutions. It will also have to be done in the steel mills of India, on the dams of the great rivers of Asia and Africa, and in the industrial plants of the newly freed countries.

The contest for the minds and allegiance of millions of people is just beginning to be engaged. We cannot afford to neglect it.

I have tried to sketch the nature of the military, subversive and economic challenges of the USSR as we face them today. As one looks at the longer perspective, it is necessary to take into account the plans of Communist China to press forward on its own program of industrialization and militarization.

We have the capacity to meet these present challenges. They are definite in nature, measurable in amount and have back of them

far less in the way of assets, human and material, than we and our allies can muster if we will. But this is not just one confrontation. The challenge may be one of considerable duration.

The Soviet Union is still programming a rapid increase in its industrial production. It boasts that it will eventually close the gap between its own production and ours. If this program is even partially realized and also assuming some increase in the consumer's share of the total national production, the Soviet, if they are so minded, can year after year put ever increasing amounts into their military establishment and foreign economic programs.

To the extent that the Sino-Soviet peoples are willing, with Spartan determination, or with unquestioning obedience to arbitrary authority, to follow such a policy, they can make the going harder and harder for us. Undoubtedly, no small segment of their future effort, as in their past, will go into science.

A distinguished Indian editor who visited successively the USSR and the United States, put this question repeatedly to the people with whom he talked, "What is the purpose of your system, of your society?" As well can be imagined, he received a multiplicity of answers from Americans, but in one form or another, they had to do with the improvement of the lot of the individual, man and

woman. In the Soviet Union, he reports, he received one universal response from people of low and high degree, "The purpose of our system is the advancement of science."

For many years I have felt that the greatest hope for the future in our relations with the Soviet Union lay in their advancement in education even though in the short run this has been largely harnessed to their military machine.

Education, particularly in science, was essential to permit the Soviet effectively to compete in the power struggle in which it had engaged itself. It has accomplished this initial purpose.

Great scientists are great thinkers and thought has no narrow military limitations. It would seem incredible if the horizons of Soviet scientists and educators do not become greatly widened over the years and their talents devoted more directly to meeting the needs of the Soviet people for a more satisfying form of life.

It would be pleasant indeed if an enforceable international agreement could be reached that no more than say 5 or 10 per cent of the gross national product of a country could be diverted from the needs of the people to the production of armaments. As this is hardly practicable we must place our hopes that the future education in the Soviet Union will produce so many people who will demand this

result that no government could act otherwise.

While we must be ready for those forms of sacrifice which are necessary to meet the challenge of the Soviet Union, we must also seize the opportunities offered to help their education build a new life for the Soviet people.

Education may then be the key to the solution of problems which otherwise would seem insoluble.

We have recently been celebrating the 150th anniversary of the birth of General Robert E. Lee. It is interesting to note a passage in the book by a German Major of the Royal Prussian Engineers who was in the United States as a military observer in the Civil War. He was commenting on the fact that Lee's philosophy in his role as commander was to get his forces to the right place at the right time, and then trust his division and brigade commanders to do the rest. As an instance of this he writes the following, "During the battle of Chancellorsville, May 3, 1863, at the height of the combat, I stood beside the General under pretty heavy fire and an interesting episode of the battle was taking place before us. In spite of the great excitement in which the progress of the battle kept the great leader, he spoke to me, to my great astonishment, about the future education of the people."

Robert E. Lee had the genius for getting at the basic truths.

"EVOLUTION IN THE COMMUNIST WORLD"

ADDRESS GIVEN BY ALLEN W. DULLES, DIRECTOR OF THE CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY AT THE MASSACHUSETTS INSTITUTE OF TECHNOLOGY MID-AMERICA CONFERENCE HELD IN CHICAGO, ILLINOIS, ON 16 FEBRUARY 1957

It is a great pleasure to have this opportunity to meet with the Mid-America Conference. Its sponsor, the Massachusetts Institute of Technology, is playing a central role in the shaping and maintaining of America's scientific genius. Like our country which it serves so well, MIT has made important and dramatic forward strides in the past half century.

Winston Churchill, at a convocation of this institute eight years ago, spoke admiringly of MIT's resolution to maintain a faculty of the humanities. Your fruitful contacts with so many foreign students and scholars and your launching of a Center for International Studies are further examples of a broad and imaginative approach to the place of technology in the modern world.

There have indeed been many changes since those earlier days when MIT was a small institution on Boylston Street, Boston. America then was a young nation relatively free of the troublesome concerns of world politics. But times do change; and we in this country have never shrunk from the challenge of changing conditions.

In fact, having generally accepted the idea that we live in a world of change, it is perhaps rather surprising that we have been

somewhat slow to recognize that this principle also applies to political and social life in the Communist world.

We ascribed to Hitlerite Germany a political solidity which it never had though it took a World War to prove this. Today many of the experts on Soviet and Satellite problems have been forced to revise their calculations and pay closer attention to new forces within the Communist world which have been dramatically revealed during the year 1956.

When Khrushchev denounced Stalin a year ago, he said those fatal words which destroy faith and which once said can never be explained away. The flood of self-questioning let loose by the anti-Stalin crusade has plumbed the depths of doubt about the integrity of the Communist political structure.

When history is written the Khrushchev statement of February 1956 may well be described as the Kremlin's admission of the general crisis of Communism.

#### Stalin's Legacy

Stalin died in March 1953, leaving one of the most reactionary, despotic police states the world has ever known. He had given himself a name which meant steel. He expressed his views in a journal named "truth." He had concentrated more power in his own hands than had been commanded even by his own great historical idol, Ivan the Terrible. For nearly thirty years he had exercised arbitrary rule over his own and many other peoples. He had killed most of his friends, and transplanted or annihilated innumerable people.

The prospect of ruling this leviathan without Stalin awed his successors. Indeed the official announcement of his death spoke of the need to "prevent any kind of disorder or panic." This defensive note on the part of the heirs to a seemingly all-powerful state may have been the first of the many hints we were to get of the complexity of the problems faced by Russia's new rulers.

The evolution of the USSR over the last four years can be explained in terms of the new Soviet leaders' response to three main problems: problems with themselves, problems with their own and subject peoples, and problems with the outside world.

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#### A Problem within the Leadership

The first problem that the new leaders faced was an elementary one: that of clearly re-establishing their ultimate authority. This is no simple problem in a revolutionary regime with no roots in either historical traditions or popular consent. Dictatorships are rarely transferrable or inheritable, and Stalin like most dictators made no provision for the succession. He had been busy playing his lieutenants off against one another; he appears to have had no real number 2 man -- just a group of number 3 men.

This group set up an uneasy oligarchy, the so-called "collective leadership." Shortly they agreed to get rid of Stalin's Police Chief, Beria, and mitigated some of the worst excesses of his secret police system.

But these very changes were only to help bring to the surface internal problems that had been artificially suppressed during the Stalin era.

A Problem with their Peoples

One of these problems was that of restoring initiative and enterprise to a people numbed by long years of discipline and fear. Little Stalins had set themselves up at the local level throughout Russia, and the Satellites, and people everywhere in the Soviet sphere had decided to play it safe.

Thus, while the "system" may have been functioning satisfactorily in terms of the relative increase in industrial production, it was slowly running out of steam.

Having let up a little on the stick of the secret police, the oligarchy tried to budge the populace with a carrot.

In the economic sphere, this "carrot" took the form of the so-called "new course" announced by Malenkov in the summer of 1953. This policy promised to give greater attention to the manufacture of consumer goods, which had long been subordinated to the basic Soviet emphasis on heavy industry.

In the intellectual sphere, a prominent Soviet writer called for a new turn to "sincerity" in literature. Writers and artists began to speak of a "thaw" as arrests ceased within their ranks and long-imprisoned artistic and literary figures trickled back from Siberia. The leaven of mass education was beginning to work; and while this

paid off handsomely in the field of technology, it had other consequences which proved most unwelcome to the worried men in the Kremlin.

The regime soon found that use of the carrot had to be checked. In the months leading up to the Writers' Congress of December 1954, attempts were made to reassert the Communist Party's right to regulate art and literature; and Khrushchev reasserted the primacy of heavy industry at the time of Malenkov's demotion early in 1955.

However, the Soviet leaders discovered that they could not go back all the way to conditions as they had prevailed under Stalin; for they found themselves faced with the most serious of all challenges to a totalitarian regime, the revolution of rising hope and expectations.

When a tyrant gives real hope to the oppressed, then, in the long run, the position of tyranny as a system tends to become hopeless.

Rising expectations were most serious and hardest for the USSR to control on the periphery of Stalin's empire in the East European satellites. The new economic course was taken farthest in Hungary under Imre Nagy in 1953 - 1955; Hungary went considerably beyond the Soviet Union in playing down heavy industry in favor of consumer goods, and even de-emphasized one of the most hated of all Stalinist exports, the forced collective farm.

Meanwhile, writers in Poland as well as Hungary were going farther than their Soviet counterparts in voicing the pent-up feelings of their countrymen.

Of special importance was a poem which became a cause célèbre behind the iron curtain, "A Poem for Adults", by the Polish poet, Adam Wazyk, which was published in Poland in August 1955. Wazyk spoke with the scourging hate that both writers and ordinary people were coming to feel toward the hypocrisy of their Communist overlords.

He recalled how a forerunner of Marx:

"...charmingly foretold  
that lemonade would flow in seas.  
Does it not flow?  
They drink sea-water,  
crying  
'lemonade'  
returning home secretly  
to vomit."

These were ominous rumblings. They can be read in retrospect as harbingers of the great upheavals in Poland and Hungary. However, the problem of rising expectations was a common problem throughout all the lands which Stalin had ruled. Indeed, popular expectations proved far in front of the policies of the reactionary regimes administering Stalin's colonial empire.

#### A Problem with the Outside World

Throughout all their troubles, Communist politicians have to continue believing that they are riding the wave of the future. The expectation of the Communists continues to be, as Khrushchev recently

put it, that "we will bury you," - the "you" being the Free World. Nevertheless, Khrushchev appears to have concluded that Stalin's policies had ceased to be profitable; that, so to speak, our "burial", the predicted doom of capitalistic society, was being unnecessarily delayed.

To shift the metaphor a little, Stalin had been piled up on the line of scrimmage in Korea, as he had been earlier in Greece and Berlin. The new quarterback was deciding that instead of continuing to run line-bucks, he should try a few end runs, reverses, and forward passes to test the enemy's secondary. Accordingly, the Soviet leaders finally agreed to a truce in Korea and took a compromise settlement in Indo-China.

When menacing threats of the Stalinist variety failed to prevent a continued growth in free world unity -- evidenced by the further consolidation of NATO and the adherence of West Germany -- the pressure increased for drastically new tactics.

#### The Smiles Campaign of 1955

Thus, beginning in the late Spring of 1955, the Soviet leaders launched their famous "smiles" campaign. In a remarkable series of policy reversals, they sought to dispel the evil image that the world had acquired of the USSR and to win new friends and the ability to influence people abroad.

They agreed to an Austrian peace treaty; began to court Tito with an elite pilgrimage to Belgrade; relinquished their Porkkala base

in Finland; and struck friendly poses - with Molotov waving a cowboy hat to American photographers and Khrushchev and Bulganin posing smilingly at the Summit Conference at Geneva.

In a second round of activity later in the year, the Soviet leaders began to deliver economic and military aid to non-Communist states; stepped up their public relations campaign with a trip to India and Burma; and stopped their monotonous vetoing of new members' applications to the United Nations.

The Soviets seemed to be making some progress with their new policy as 1955 went into history -- even though their stand at the Foreign Ministers Conference in the Autumn of 1955 made it clear that they did not intend to budge on basic international issues.

As it turned out, however, these smiles and concessions may have cost the Soviet leaders dearly; for, if they did mislead some people abroad, these actions continued to feed rising expectations in the far-flung Soviet empire.

#### The Two Great Events of 1956

Two great events in 1956, deeply affecting the Communist world, followed from the new Soviet domestic and foreign policies. The first was the attempt to persuade the leading communists in the USSR and the Satellites that the Soviet leaders had really broken with the dreadful past of the Stalin regime. The second was the attempt by Poland and Hungary to secure the freedoms which they felt were implicitly being promised them by Moscow.

Although Stalin's heirs had downgraded his importance fairly consistently since his death, Khrushchev's secret revelation of Stalin's crimes at the Twentieth Party Congress in February 1956 represented a real turning point.

These revelations destroyed the myth of infallibility of the Soviet system and its leaders. It was this belief in infallibility, which -- however wrong -- had inspired the faithful and given them the courage to sacrifice everything including common sense and their very lives to advance the cause of Communism.

Many questions - including the obvious one of "where were you, when all this was going on?" -- continue to be asked in the Soviet Union. Stalin's heirs had been morally compromised. The ideological foundations of this secular religion had been seriously shaken.

The circumstances surrounding the Khrushchev secret speech remain a mystery to this day. It was delivered at an unexpectedly summoned meeting of the Twentieth Party Congress attended by the 1400 members from the USSR, but with the exclusion of visitors and delegates from the rest of the Communist world.

Apparently it was felt that it was too heady medicine for the Soviet people, since the secret speech has never been published in the USSR and only small parts of it have been allowed to creep out in the Soviet press, though copies of the speech were distributed among Soviet and Satellite leaders.

It is hard to understand the Kremlin's apparent failure to assess accurately the damage to their position from the publicity which the speech would eventually receive. Some very impelling domestic reason must have made them take the calculated risk they assumed.

Possibly they felt that such a thorough denunciation was required if initiative was to be liberated from the pall of fear at home, and if the image of the USSR abroad was to be brightened.

The second event unsettling the Communist world in 1956 was, of course, the uprising in Hungary and Poland. When the Soviet leaders made their peace with Tito in June 1955, they implicitly recognized, as Stalin never had, that genuinely different national paths were permissible within the Communist world. This idea was given some encouragement at the Twentieth Party Congress, which urged Communist Parties to use different, perhaps peaceful rather than violent means in seeking to gain power in non-Communist states. During the state visit of Tito to Moscow last June, the Soviet leaders formally recognized the validity of different paths of socialist development.

But no sooner had they done this, than the people in Poland and Hungary began to demand the right to determine their own destinies. Hardly had Tito returned home, when the workers in Poznan rose up to demand "bread and freedom".

The contagion spread to Warsaw in spontaneous meetings of workers and others who demanded an end to Soviet rule. In Hungary the people went even further in their assertion of complete independence of Moscow.

Throughout the summer Soviet policy zigged and zagged. When they were confronted with the events of late October, the Soviet leaders acquiesced reluctantly to some important changes in Poland, and temporarily appeared to do the same in Hungary before falling back on cruel repression.

Through it all, the Soviet Union was discredited internationally; and no non-Communist was left to justify the savage slaughter of the heroic Hungarian people. Small nations in Asia, which are special targets for Communist blandishments, recognized the moral of Hungary; and young countries like Burma, Nepal, and Laos voted for condemnation of the Soviet Union.

In the face of these events, the Khrushchev position of trying to take bits and pieces of both a Stalinist and a non-Stalinist policy became increasingly untenable.

If the Soviet leaders want to increase productivity and initiative they have to lift controls still further. If they want to improve their reputation abroad, they cannot continue to act as they are doing in Hungary. But, if they go too far in conciliating the people, they fear for their own positions.

#### Stirrings in the USSR

There are stirrings in the USSR as well as the Satellites. Pressures for change appear to be coming from industrial managers and professional classes, who seem anxious to gain a greater share in running the economy. These groups appear to have increased their responsibility

at the expense of professional party administrators in the recent reshuffling of the planning apparatus.

Perhaps even more disturbing to the Soviet regime are the rumblings of discontent which involve the very groups which Communism claims to favor: the workers and the students.

From the workers in the USSR there have been growing indications of discontent in the past year, including several strikes and strike attempts and demands to know more about the patterns of worker administration and control which have come into being in the Polish workers councils.

Even more important, perhaps, is the increasing unrest among the students; which has been evidenced in riotous meetings and illegal handbill-type journals. The regime has staked much on its appeal to youth and the "new Soviet intelligentsia" which it hoped years of careful indoctrination would produce. But it has found, that, in educating large numbers of youths to fill the positions required for the administration of a large modern state, it has taught people to think and ask embarrassing questions for themselves.

The youth in the Soviet Union are suffering from boredom with the drabness of their system. This discontent cannot very logically be dismissed as a "holdover from the past"; and the regime cannot dismiss it all as "hooliganism" -- the Soviet version of juvenile delinquency.

Student unrest in the USSR, like recent events in Poland and Hungary, show what many of us seem to have forgotten: that the love of freedom has deep roots.

The bravery of the youth in Budapest, who had known only totalitarian rule, serves as a reminder that modern weapons do not provide the final answer to moral forces.

There are numerous signs in Soviet intellectual life that this human desire for individual integrity and free expression is making itself felt. The major Soviet journals in the fields of history, philosophy and literature have all come under official Communist Party censure recently for deviations from the party line. There has been a revival of interest in long-neglected writers including Dostoyevskii, whose major writings had been taboo under Stalin. Probably the most widely-discussed single book in Russia today is a new novel with the distinctly non-Communist title of "Not by Bread Alone."

The hero of this novel is a persecuted inventor who succeeds not because, but in spite of, the system. A true individualist, he refuses to be bought off at the end by the very men who had sent him to Siberia on trumped-up charges. He hangs on them the label of "meshchanski (middle class, philistine) communist", thus bringing back to the Russian vocabulary a traditional adjective of abuse from Tsarist times.

There is no pattern to tell us precisely how this intellectual ferment may affect the political development of a modern totalitarian

and technocratic state. But it is doubtful indeed that these pressures for change can be satisfied merely by Khrushchev's combination of limited reforms and exhortations to observe party discipline.

In particular, the disaffection of thinking youth - their restless desire for real integrity and honesty in their society - must deeply concern a regime which needs their services and shapes its claims to allegiance on an ideology.

#### The General Crisis of Communism

For many years now that ideology has predicted the doom of capitalism -- recently with a little less assurance as to the date of Doomsday. The Communist leaders have not, however, given up the dogma that World War I marked the beginning of a new epoch which would witness the general crisis of capitalism. According to all good Communists, this general crisis would embrace many individual crises caused by wars over markets and colonies, by workers' revolutions in protest against economic depressions, and by capitalist greed. These "inner contradictions", the doctrine preached, would inevitably lead to the collapse of capitalism and the triumph of the Communist system.

Today, with a great deal more assurance, we can advance the thesis that it is they rather than we who face a general crisis. A Yugoslavian Communist, Milovan Djilas, alerted the world to this crisis of Communism in his famous article of last November. He said this: "Despite the Soviet repression in Hungary, Moscow can only slow down the processes of change; it cannot stop them in the long run. The crisis is not only

between the USSR and its neighbors, but within the Communist system as such. National Communism is itself a product of the crisis, but it is only a phase in the evolution and withering away of contemporary Communism... World Communism now faces stormy days and insurmountable difficulties."

With the flood of self-questioning loosed by the anti-Stalin crusade and by the events in Hungary and Poland, the Soviet system certainly evidences inner contradictions that are harder to cope with than anything now facing the non-Communist world.

The Soviet leaders have been trying for some time now to cover up the cracks in their ideological plaster by talk of a "return to Leninist norms of party life." They tell their people to avoid the "cult of personality" by going back to Lenin for guidance; but is not this a new "cult of personality"? And who is to say what part of Lenin is to be kept and what rejected? Why should they not follow the advice Lenin gave in May 1917, that: "If Finland, if Poland, if the Ukraine break away from Russia there is nothing bad about that. What is there bad about it? Anyone who says there is, is a chauvinist.... No nation can be free if it oppresses other nations."

#### The Challenge to the USSR

No regime could stand still in the face of events such as those of the past few years. Sooner or later, the challenge facing the USSR at home and abroad must be met.

A well-known passage in Toynbee's Study of History is relevant to the USSR today: "The unanswered challenge can never be disposed of, and is bound to present itself again and again until it either receives some tardy and imperfect answer or else brings about the destruction of the society which has shown itself inveterately incapable of responding to it effectively."

What is the shape of the society which might develop out of the evolutionary forces presently at work in the USSR if the Kremlin leaders do not blindly seek to reverse them?

Domestically, the USSR would take cognizance of human dignity in its society. Censorship of thought would be eliminated and greater emphasis placed on satisfying the economic wants of the individual. Here it must be noted that the USSR has taken a forward step in doing away, at home, with the special tribunals and some excesses of the secret police.

In the foreign field, such a development would require the USSR to accept a genuine cooperation with other nations as distinct from the tactical, Leninist idea of a temporary truce. It would have to concede to those lands it has occupied the freedom of political choice. It would have to assume a constructive role in the United Nations.

Of course, such an outcome is not yet in sight. The future is still cloudy, and the possibility of an attempted reversion to a hard line remains.

Nevertheless, the reality of pressures for change is undeniable, and they seem unlikely to diminish with the passing of time. An evolutionary accommodation to these forces may even be more likely than the convulsive developments which the history of the ancien regime in France or the Roman Empire might lead one to expect.

#### Continued Danger

Of course, it would be folly to assume that international communism is on the verge of collapse. It continues to possess and develop increasing physical power; and we face the very real danger that it may bolster up its position in two particularly sensitive areas.

The first of these is, of course, the Middle East where a general policy of aid, infiltration and stirring up troubled waters offers considerable prospects for creating serious mischief.

The second area of danger -- which is perhaps not receiving as much public attention as it deserves these days -- is the Far East. Communist China, during the past few years, has been posing an ever-increasing threat to many nations in the area which are relatively unsophisticated in the ways of Communist subversion. Within the Communist world, the prestige of Communist China has been relatively enhanced by the fact that its leaders have not been so morally compromised by the revelations about Stalin.

#### Macaulay's Prophecy

While there is no justification for complacency in the Free World, there are some real signs of hope. Sporadic success abroad will not

change the basic problems within the USSR if we correctly assume that the evolutionary process has started. And even in Communist China, as revolutionary fervor dims, the reaction may come as man's reaching for freedom and human dignity asserts itself.

In a prophetic speech in 1833, Macaulay spoke words which might well be pondered by the leaders of the Communist world as they face the problems that lie before them today. Macaulay was urging his countrymen not to shrink back in fear from the possibility that education and modernization would lead the people of India to seek independence.

"What is that power worth," asked Macaulay, "... which we can hold only by violating the most sacred duties, which, as governors, we owe to the governed?... We are civilized to little purpose if we grudge to any portion of the human race an equal measure of freedom and civilization. ... do we think that we can give them knowledge without awakening ambition?...."

And Macaulay concludes: "It may be that the public mind of India may expand under our system till it has outgrown that system; that by good government we may educate our subjects into a capacity for better government, that having become instructed in European knowledge, they may at some future age demand European institutions. Whether such a day will ever come I know not. But never will I attempt to avert or retard it. Whenever it comes it will be the proudest day in English history."

When the day of freedom for Russia and the peoples under Soviet rule may come, no one can prophesy. But when it comes, it will be the proudest day in Russian history.

If that day is to be hastened, we cannot afford to be timid in asserting profound faith in our democratic institutions, and in acting decisively on that faith. I sincerely believe that the time has come when no reasoning, thinking peoples with freedom of choice can continue to believe that Communism is the wave of the future. The lasting, enduring values are in our free way of life.

3 Feb 58	Yale University	The Soviet Challenge
16 Feb 57	Chicago, Illinois	Evolution in the Communist World
12 Dec 56	Princeton University	The Challenge of Soviet Industrial Growth
27 Nov 56	Yale University	Woodrow Wilson: Prophecy and Perspective For The Present
14 Nov 56	Washington, D. C.	The Weaknesses of the Communist Dictatorship
4 May 56	University of Pennsylvania	The Communist Attack on Parliamentary Government
20 Apr 56	University of Cincinnati	The Industrial and Technical Challenge of The U.S.S.R.
13 Apr 56	Los Angeles, California	Purge of Stalinism
31 Jan 56	New York City, New York	The Economy And Scientific Manpower Resources of The Soviet Union
28 Oct 55	Mercer University	
3 Oct 55	Philadelphia, Pennsylvania	
1 Jun 55	Columbia University	On Education in The Soviet Union
9 Apr 54	Richmond, Virginia	
29 Jan 54	Women's Forum on National Security	
14 May 53	Providence YMCA	
10 Apr 53	Hot Springs, Va.	Brain Warfare