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18 October 1949

MEMORANDUM FOR: MR. CHILDS

SUBJECT: Comments on Draft of Proposed Memorandum
from the DCI to the NSC Prepared by the
Office of Counsel

1. To my mind the proposed memo contains the sum of the deficiencies which were inherent in previous drafts prepared by some of the Offices of CIA, namely, it does not sufficiently protect the Director. We must fully recognize that such a step as he might take in sending a paper of this type to the NSC is really inviting a "head-rolling" contest, and that he must be in a unique position of solidarity on every word expressed by him if he takes such initiative. Thus, when the attached memorandum uses such words as "refusal" on the part of the agencies to give certain material, and "blocks" which the agencies are placing in the way of CIA fulfilling its designated mission we are lodging very serious indictments against powerful and long-established executive departments and agencies of the Government, the heads of which comprise to some degree the judicial body before whom the Director places his case, i.e., the National Security Council.

2. I believe we are on very weak grounds in criticizing the "IAC mechanism." The so-called "mechanism" for the Intelligence Advisory Committee is the procedure which we have endorsed and followed in the last few years and is not that prescribed by NSCID No. 1. In commenting on the Dulles Report, the National Security Council concurred in the observation and conclusion that the IAC was conceived soundly "as an advisory body." Nowhere in NSCID No. 1, which created the IAC, is the thought expressed that the IAC should be other than advisory in scope. Furthermore, NSCID No. 1 does not call for unanimity when the Director uses the IAC to test out the "advice and recommendations" which he may send to the National Security Council. In fact, NSCID No. 1 not only recognizes, but is sympathetic toward the view that in using the IAC the Director will not find unanimity, but rather the expression of individual agency viewpoints which will be looked upon as "non-concurrences." Hence, instead of asking for a

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revision of NSCID No. 1 to overcome the "board of directors" philosophy, which has controlled so much of the deliberations of the IAC, what we really need to do is to suggest that the Director take a definite stand when papers are submitted to the National Security Council for decision. It is probable that the stand of the DCI will, in practically all instances, parallel that of the majority opinion. However, even that is not obligatory and it is quite conceivable that the occasion, or occasions, may arise when the DCI in transmitting a paper to the NSC may concur in the minority viewpoint. We must also recognize that by the adoption of this procedure, which is called for in NSCID No. 1, the DCI may adopt a viewpoint which differs materially from any of the advisory concepts expressed by the members of the IAC.

3. My statements are not to be misinterpreted as saying that the National Security Council Intelligence Directives, as written, do not need revamping. My apprehension is on the point of contending that the revision of NSCID No. 1 will overcome the difficulties experienced today in our IAC dealings.

SHANE MacCARTHY

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10-7085

21 October 1949

MEMORANDUM FOR: MR. CHILDS

SUBJECT: Comments supplementing my memorandum of 18 October 1949 regarding the proposed report of the Director to the NSC

Preface

Considering the lengthy investigative process which has been conducted in the intelligence field for the last year and a half, which culminated in the Dulles report and the issuance of the NSC 50, the NSC must be somewhat tired of all of this "negativeness." Because of the fact that the Dulles report and the NSC 50 were presumed to evaluate the total intelligence situation, I doubt if the NSC will be sympathetic toward any proposal which will start now a chain reaction of new intelligence investigations and examinations. Regardless of our high or low esteem for the Dulles report and the NSC 50 based thereon, our primary aim at this juncture should be to work progressively toward strengthening the organization for intelligence throughout the Federal structure in the interest of national security. Any step which we take should not be the motivating factor for starting internecine squabble at high level. God forbid that we should ever be responsible for starting a "dirty-linen washing contest" in any degree similar to the struggle on policies and strategy now going on between the Navy and the Air Force. Even if the National Security Council's Staff is willing to take our viewpoints and have them sent to higher level, we must remember that the ingrained, antagonistic feelings of some of the Departments will throw back ideas at us just as hard as we sling our shoes at them. Accordingly, I plead for salutary caution if the Director is going to take the step which he proposes.

1. To overcome many of the difficulties confronting the Director in carrying out the responsibilities assigned to him under the National Security Act of 1947 and the subsequent Directives from the NSC, I believe that the total remedy falls into two compartments:

a. Those steps which can be taken today by the Director under present authorities and policies and.

b. Those items that need additional clarification and new Directives.

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Those steps which can be taken today by the Director under present authorities and policies.

(1) For the last few years, the Director has operated on the very solid principle that coordination by using the cudgel-tactic of direction will bring little result because of the lack of goodwill that will result among the agencies being coordinated. However, experience has shown quite clearly that the goal of prior agreement has resulted in watered-down products, innumerable delays and circuitous procedures. Thus, I believe today, the Director should decide that the period of "coordination by prior cooperation" has ended and that even though the IAC agencies will still have an opportunity to express their viewpoints, unanimity will not be necessary before we send papers to the NSC for a decision.

(2) In keeping with this concept of strengthening the hand of the Director to assume "forthright initiative and leadership", the NSC approved the NSC 50 recommendation to make him, not only a member, but also Chairman of the Intelligence Advisory Committee. This step on the part of the NSC gives more potency to the hand of the Director.

(3) Even though the word "material" as used in NSCID 1.2 is very limiting in its application, it seems to me that we can do much more toward formalizing the authority given to the Director to make "surveys and inspections of departmental intelligence material"

(4) Much of our difficulty of today stems from attempting to operate with "leadership" of directives issued by the leader, i.e., the DCI, when such directives are puny and weak to accomplish their objectives. The reason they are so flimsy is the policy of goodwill which we have followed in allowing each Agency to have a "crack" at the concepts in an effort to achieve unanimity of acceptance before issuance. Because of practical bitter experience, we should no longer allow the lack of unanimity to delay the issuance of proposed DCI's. We would achieve more strength in the proposed directives if we sent them to the NSC for decision in accordance with Paragraph 3.c, NSCID 1.

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(5) We should, today, examine our established policies and procedures to see if more can be done to get "free and unrestricted interdepartmental exchange of intelligence information" between Departments and Agencies of the Government as is called for in NSCID 2.7.

(6) Have we, up to the present, taken sufficient steps to seek specifically "the assistance of the IAC intelligence agencies" to minimize the necessity of agencies developing intelligence outside of their fields of dominant interests? (NSCID 3.c(4)).

(7) Have we worked out a production "plan" in collaboration with the IAC agencies in order to obtain from them departmental segments in the total mosaic of national intelligence? (NSCID 3.e(3)).

(8) In the area of producing "intelligence reports or estimates undertaken mutually", have we, with sufficient definitiveness and continuous follow-up, requested and received "such special estimates, reports and periodic briefs or summaries prepared by the individual Departments or Agencies..."? (NSCID 3.g (4)). (underscoring supplied)

(9) Have we, as the central responsible coordinating body, taken the leadership in promoting exchange of information "on projects and plans in the production of staff intelligence"? (NSCID 3.g (5)).

Unless we can furnish non-quibbling, concrete answers to the questions raised in the last few paragraphs, instead of speaking about departmental negative attitudes, I believe the Director might be in a very vulnerable spot in making his presentation to the NSC, unless, in so doing, he clearly indicates that his actions in these various fields are par-
alleling his new decision to coordinate by direction.
(underscoring supplied)

Those items that need additional clarification and new Directives

(1) If the DCI is to be responsible for coordination with the potency desired by the NSC, the Council must take certain steps to lend strength to his hand in the accomplishment of this task.

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(2) The responsibilities of the Director should be more clearly enumerated so as to make known to everyone, especially the intelligence Departments and Agencies, what is the exact meaning of the function of "coordination." It should be further clarified that it is only in this field of coordination that the Director is asked to seek the advice of the IAC, and that beyond his duties of coordination are many staff functions which are still within the immediate responsibility of the DCI and are not of operational concern to the IAC agencies.

(3) Since the directives issued by the DCI are his implementing policies for operations in specific fields of endeavor, the inherent weaknesses of these directives bring about many of the problems under which we operate today. The statement of the NSC that the DCI directives, when issued, carry the weight of Council directives is just so many words of noble vintage unless the implementation function on these directives is adequately supported. However, this important and very essential function cannot be done by the DCI because the NSC specifically states "the respective intelligence chiefs shall be responsible for insuring that such orders or directives, when applicable, are implemented within their intelligence organizations." Accordingly, under present operational policy, we formulate the ideas, issue the directive and then assume a complete attitude of indifference as to the practicality of its application, and that we do because the NSC so orders.

(4) In discussing the production of Basic Intelligence (NSCID 3.a (5)) the DCI is "responsible for coordinating production and maintenance and for the editing, publication, and dissemination of these National Intelligence Surveys..." whereas in Paragraph 3.a (3) of the same directive, it is plainly established that "changes in the outline or allocations shall be effected by agreement between the DCI and the agencies concerned. (underscoring supplied). Thus, the NSC must itself determine whether, in their clamor for "forthright initiative and leadership" they will agree to consistency of thought and expression in their directives.

"To direct with strength, or
To direct with prior sugar-coated
agreement
That is the question!"

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(5) Certainly the timely and adequate dissemination of Current Intelligence is within the purview of the coordination responsibility of the DCI. However, regardless of the optional feature of following the unanimity concept of NSCID 1 as to the use of the IAC by the DCI, NSCID 3.1b (3) clearly states "Interagency dissemination of current intelligence shall be based on Interagency agreement" (underscoring supplied)

(6) The same principle of NSC 50 which calls for "forthright initiative and leadership of the Director of the Central Intelligence" sanctions participation by the IAC "more actively in the continuing coordination of intelligence activities." (underscoring supplied) This combine of suggesting in the one sentence the accomplishment of results by "leadership" and then asking for "coordination" with IAC is somewhat self-contradictory and neutralizes much of the effectiveness of the NSC 50 recommendations. It is tantamount to saying to the Director "you do it and be responsible, but in so doing, you must work with and accept the viewpoints of other people." His hands are free but his feet are fettered. For example, Section 4 of NSC 50 lists many questions which require "coordination" and hence must be resolved by the more active participation by the IAC in seeking and applying the necessary remedies. This view is substantiated by the recommendation which calls for action, not by the DCI "with forthright leadership" but by the "Director of Central Intelligence and the Intelligence Advisory Committee."

Conclusion

I reemphasize the element of care and caution in the proposed undertaking and because of this apprehension, I am convinced that if the Director approaches the NSC with a position of strength, above and beyond the jurisdictional differences that exist between departmental and central viewpoints in,

- a) telling the Council concretely about his decision to adopt a more hard-hitting type of direction because of his experiences of the past few years and,

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- b) seeking from the Council their blessing on his decision, and specific written clarification of his responsibilities in some of the fields causing most of the trouble today, he will obtain the kind of power and authority which he needs to accomplish his mission and at the same time will not have fomented ill will on the part of the agencies with which he must still work.

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Elt-0-6552

22 September 1949

MEMORANDUM FOR THE DIRECTOR

SUBJECT: Organization of ICAPS

1. In compliance with your request for comments on the memoranda of September 13th from the AD/00 and September 15th from the Executive, both on the above subject, there follows detailed comments on the points raised in the two memoranda.

a. Rotation of Personnel in ICAPS

[redacted] has a point that there are disadvantages to the rotation of personnel, but on the other hand, it also has very definite advantages on a staff such as ICAPS. The danger to watch is too frequent rotation, or transfers of several from this small staff at the same time.

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At the moment we are working under that handicap, because we have received three new members (60%), all brand new to this organization, within the past few weeks. That, however, will probably not happen again, and I imagine the agencies will not be too adamant about withdrawing their men from ICAPS on the dot of two years, but may allow them to stay for three or four.

We think that the presence of agency personnel on this joint staff of the Director gives an objectivity of approach and purpose which is essential in the evaluation of problems on an impersonal and unprejudiced plane. A little new blood every few years is good for such a staff, and for CIA. Furthermore, it is particularly important in a coordinating agency such as CIA to have a staff of men with experience in outside agencies, not just within CIA.

b. Planning Staff

We think that a new planning staff "composed of professional intelligence civilians" for the overall organization is unnecessary. It would soon become ingrown, and, particularly if they were on that staff only temporarily from other CIA offices, ~~and thus~~ it would not be truly objective.

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The various offices now have planning staffs, and they are the ones which should have men selected on the basis of "planning ability, operational experience, and long-term duty in the agency." They would be assigned to their respective offices in CIA but should, especially under the new General Order 24 of September 20th about the new ICAPS organization, present their wishes and desires and ideas, etc. to the reconstituted ICAPS daily or weekly or whenever they wish, for the overall CIA or interdepartmental aspects of the matter under consideration. It would not be at all necessary for them to be assigned to ICAPS or to a new overall planning staff to do this "without allegiance to any other component." It is hoped that under the reorganized status of ICAPS we shall have much more frequent and closer connection with the planning groups in various offices. They will be close to their offices so will know what is desired on the working level and should have ideas for improvement which can be synthesized in ICAPS, AND, when necessary to do so outside the organization, taken up with the IAC agencies. We think that the "reconciliation of interdepartmental papers among the Assistant Directors" is a task that can be performed without augmented personnel in ICAPS, and the basic preparatory work on such papers can be done in one or more of the offices concerned.

c. Composition of ICAPS


If under the new organization it is found that the present staff of ICAPS is inadequate to handle all of its new duties, we shall request additional personnel, but you will recall that for many months during the last couple of years most of us thought that ICAPS was over-staffed, when it was devoting itself only to interdepartmental work -- even when it was not fully staffed. In our new duties as we understand them, the Management Office will do considerable "leg work" throughout the different offices of CIA. If the first of Mr. Armstrong's four problems is accepted, the so-called staff work of ICAPS for the IAC can undoubtedly be performed much more expeditiously without the present time-consuming Standing Committee Meetings. If ICAPS is going to be such a staff, it will do the work and have individual consultations with the ~~representative~~ ^{representative} Standing Committee members, rather than collective meetings, in the hope that interdepartmental work will thus move along more smoothly and more expeditiously than in the past.



PRESCOTT CHILDS
Chief, ICAPS

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cc: Executive



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Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

TO : Director of Central Intelligence

DATE: 15 September 1949

FROM : Executive

SUBJECT: Augmentation of the Coordination, Operations and Policy Staff (previously ICAPS)

Reference: Memo to Deputy Executive from Acting AD/00, subject: ICAPS, dated 13 September 1949

1. It is believed that the basic idea expressed in attached reference is sound, capable of implementation, and would be a further healthy step in connection with both internal and external coordination in CIA substantive matters.

2. While I do not necessarily subscribe to the statement that the personnel of the subject staff group cannot carry out staff functions now being assigned to them, I do feel that capable representation on this staff from our operating offices would increase its effectiveness.

3. Recommend that after the new designation and functions of the present ICAPS are announced (this should be within a few days), the Executive be charged with selecting, in collaboration with the appropriate Assistant Directors, a capable professional representative from each of the overt offices for temporary detail for a period not less than one year as additional members of ICAPS. Such members, while detailed, should be subject only to the supervision and control of the Chief of ICAPS but should maintain sufficient contact with the offices from which detailed to insure adequate consideration of the operating problems of each such office in our overall planning and programming.



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Encl. See Reference

16 SEP 1949

ICaps: please comment.



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R. H. HILLENKOETTER
REAR ADMIRAL, USN
DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE

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Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

TO : Deputy Executive

FROM : Acting Assistant Director for Operations

SUBJECT: ICAPS

DATE: 13 September 1954

1. ICAPS, because of the policy of rotating its personnel from and back to the IAC Agencies, is not the ideal group to perform the top level substantive planning for CIA. Its members are not usually trained in intelligence prior to entering upon duty in CIA; and when they have become experts on CIA and intelligence, they are assigned elsewhere.

2. In order to overcome this unavoidable handicap, it is suggested that consideration be given to transferring the planning responsibilities of ICAPS to a new Planning Staff. Such a staff would be most effective if its personnel were composed of professional intelligence civilians carefully selected by the Executive from each of the existing offices of CIA on the basis of planning ability, operational experience and, where requisite, long term duty in the Agency. An executive decision would have to be made as to whether officers assigned to the staff should be responsible to their Offices of origin, whether they should periodically be rotated back to their Offices, or be assigned permanently to the staff without allegiance to any other component of CIA.

3. It would seem advisable that the functions of the Planning Staff include the following:

a. Preparation of interdepartmental policy papers as directed by the DCI.

b. Reconciliation of interdepartmental papers among the Assistant Directors.

c. Review of CIA substantive activities to determine whether its responsibilities under the Defense Act and the NSCID's are being carried out.

d. Preparation of long term planning papers.

4. If the recommendation of this memorandum is accepted, it is further suggested that ICAPS be made responsible for the review of interdepartmental papers prepared by the Planning Staff, and subsequent action thereon, in addition to its IAC liaison activity and any OGD function assigned in accordance with NSCID No. 50.



Colonel, USAF

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