

SPEECH

by

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CHANGING INTELLIGENCE IN A CHANGING WORLD

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...Ladies and Gentlemen:

I am very happy and honored to have this opportunity to come to Chicago tonight to talk to this Association which has kept alive over thirty years the missions of the Counter-Intelligence Corps of the United States and has maintained the same love and loyalty to the United States in the more difficult times of peace...more difficult to maintain in times of peace than it is in times of great national stress.

Before an audience like this, I have no need to go into the need and importance of intelligence. I might add that I was struck by the fact as I came into the hotel in front of the Tribune Tower I saw the statue of Nathan Hale. We have an exact replica of that statue outside the Central Intelligence Agency in Washington. I must confess that I sometimes look at it with mixed feelings. He was one of our very first agents, but he was caught on his very first mission, and he had all the evidence on him which made it a little difficult, and, you know, unfortunately, what happened in consequence.

But, today we face a situation in which a great mass of the people do not really perceive any threat against us. And yet it is odd in a sense that not since the American Revolution, of which we are about to celebrate the bicentennial, has any foreign country had the power to use against us if they wish to do so as the Soviet Union has today and China may have tomorrow. And yet, at a time when we need vigilance, when we need watchfulness, there is an assault on intelligence. There is an attempt to make the American people feel that there is some/shameful or something shady or something undesirable or un-American about intelligence. Well, if you go back in our history, it is quite difficult to make this stand up in light of what the facts were. Perhaps one of the greatest users of intelligence in our national history was George Washington. And I would like to repeat today what he wrote in a letter to Colonel Elias Dayton who was his chief of intelligence in New Jersey, and I quote: "The need for procuring good intelligence is so obvious that I need not emphasize it again. All that remains is for me to tell you that these matters must be kept as secret as possible, for lack of such secrecy these enterprises generally fail, no matter how promising the outcome." Yet we are told today that it is un-American

to have any secrets; we should tell everybody everything.

Well, you know, you get into all of these things and you find some rather odd things in our history. George Washington organized several kidnap plots to try to kidnap Benedict Arnold, and you know what would have happened to Benedict Arnold if they had been successful. Benjamin Franklin for three years before the Revolution was the Assistant Postmaster of the Colonies. For three years before the Revolution, I say, before the Revolution, he was running a mail intercept service on the British, reading all their mail--they caught him. He lost his job. Afterwards, when he went to Paris, he designed a printing press on which he printed forged passports, forged documents of all sorts.

When the life of a nation is at stake, and the life of a nation is not always just at stake during wartime. There can be threats made on the life of a nation at other times. George Washington ran a listening post along side of the British headquarters in Philadelphia, and very fruitful it was. John Jay had an agent in Jersey City who interviewed travelers going into British-occupied New York and who interviewed travelers coming out of British-occupied New York. Well you can span a long part of our history and come down to a much more modern time when President Truman, in the 1950s, made the

following statement: "It matters not to the United States whether its secrets become known through the publication in the press or the agents of spies. The damage to the United States is exactly the same in both cases. I, for one," said Mr. Truman, "do not believe the cause of the nation is served by going on the basis that everyone has the right to know all of our secrets." And, indeed, a nation which has an inability to keep its secrets, is a threatened nation indeed. And we are now embarked on a series of great investigations to determine whether any great nation can run its secret intelligence services, so to speak, in a goldfish bowl. We may succeed; we are an unusual people; but if we do, it will be just like going to the moon. We will have been the only ones who ever did it.

You know, in the old days the United States was unreachable and unbeatable. We have two great oceans, we had weeks, months, years, to get ready. We don't have those any more, unfortunately. We cannot stumble along on the basis that at the right time we'll find out, because we Americans have had a passion for dismantling our intelligence services after our wars. We generally start out our wars with a very bad intelligence service.

We build it up to a really great service. And then we dismantle it again. Now this time we've taken a little longer to dismantle it. We had the Korean War, the Vietnamese War, but the dismantlers, the wreckers are getting ready to try to dismantle it again. We started World War II with a tiny number of people in intelligence. But one of the reasons that led to the formation of the Agency, of which I have the honor to be the Deputy Director, is that in a great investigation we had in 1945 and '46, it was ascertained that all of the pieces of information that could have told us what was going to happen--how Japan was going to attack us--were somewhere in the U.S. Government. But everybody who had it was squirreling away his little piece of information, and there was no central point in which these could be brought together and the President warned what might happen.

As a result of this investigation in 1946, in 1947 Congress, at the request of President Truman, passed the National Security Act which created the Central Intelligence Agency, which was to perform intelligence functions and which was to perform, in the words of Congress, "...such other things as the National Security Council may direct." These were not spelled out in detail and I am quite certain that Congress did not want to spell them out in detail. But Congress did create the Central Intelligence Agency knowing that it was going to engage in espionage.

Now there are various ways in which you acquire intelligence. The first and the most obvious is overt intelligence, which you get from the newspapers, from the public broadcasts, from travelers, from the U.S. embassies from all sorts of open, above-board sources. That is one of the ways you collect intelligence and a great deal; a surprising amount of intelligence can be collected that way. For instance, during World War II we got an awful lot of order of battle, of enemy order of battle, of the German armies, of where the units were, by death notices in the German paper, where they would describe the death of some relative who had been in such and such a unit, and this enabled us, by reading the newspapers simply, to ascertain where that unit was. Then you have technical intelligence. Technical intelligence we have is, in my opinion, one of the great contributions the United States has made to the art of intelligence. The use of the tremendous technical know-how of the American people to uncover secrets and to keep the United States abreast of what's going on in the rest of the world, to keep the United States aware of the forces that may be used against us, of capabilities that may be developed for use against us.

We have made incredible strides in this field. I am not going to go into details, but 15 years ago in this country there was a great discussion as to whether or not there was a missile gap. Well the state of our technical intelligence today is such that you couldn't have such a discussion. We know what the missile situation is, not maybe to the last infinitesimal detail, but we know in an approximate way what the relationship is. And then, thirdly, you have human intelligence, an extraordinarily important source that has not been displaced by the technical or by the overt. Technical means will get you a lot of information, but it won't get you inside a man's head or it won't get you inside a building. You need people. Sometimes a man can tell you something that would cost you 250 million dollars to find out through some technical means. And so we have to weave these three sources together--these three forms of intelligence together--to make sure that our country is not taken by surprise. And yet, you know, when you look at our situation and the Soviet situation, what a difference you see.

Our problem is to piece together the fragments of information we have. General Andropov, who is the head of the KGB, or General Ivashutin, who is the head of the Soviet Military Intelligence, have a different problem. They are so submerged by information from the

United States that they have to try to discern what's real and what's phony. And with the kind of mentality they have, they probably think what's going on now is a great big put-up plot of ours to distract them from the real intelligence effort of the United States.

You know, they can buy an American magazine which will give them the cross-cut of an American missile silo with the dimensions and the size of the retaining wall, and everything else. That sort of stuff would cost us millions of dollars to get from the Soviet Union by one means or another.

One of the other great contributions I think America has made to intelligence has been the application of intellectual analysis to the evidence which is present. One of the things I have found in the Central Intelligence Agency, which I marvel at, is the continuity of people there who have been working on the same problems for 15, 20 or 25 years and that know that problem so that the slightest change immediately draws their attention. And this continuity is a very precious thing indeed.

Now, with regard to these investigations, we feel that they could be helpful providing they are conducted in a responsible, positive and constructive way, providing they do not become a political football. The security of

the United States is far too precious to all of us to be used as a football. As for the oversight of the Congress which was proscribed in the National Security Act, we fully accept that, we are prepared to accept any form of oversight which the Congress will direct. For many years the Congressional oversight was exercised through the Armed Services Committees of House and Senate and through the Appropriations Committees of the House and Senate. For years they chose to exercise this through the person of the Chairman or one or two members of the thing. More recently they have chosen to exercise it more completely. And we have no problem with this; we have no secrets from our oversight committees and I am happy to tell you, to the best of my knowledge up to date, we have never had a leak out of one of our oversight committees. Obviously from all of these investigations, there will result some new guidelines. Guidelines as to how intelligence should be conducted in the United States. We will live by whatever guidelines and whatever oversight they prescribe. We can live with any oversight they prescribe. But we hope these guidelines will contain the mechanism for change for the perception of what is right and wrong changes over a period of years. In 1935 you could have run in some parts of the United States segregated schools; in 1975 you cannot run a segregated school in the

United States, and in 1925 you would probably have gotten in trouble for trying to run any other kind of a school. We are perfectly willing to change; but we hope that the American Congress will build into those guidelines some mechanism for introducing these perceptions of what is right and what is wrong.

The other day we had a group out to the Central Intelligence Agency and the question of assassinations came up and someone said, "Well, gee, if you could have assassinated Hitler in 1944 or 1945, it would have been great." And someone else said, "But if you could have done it in '37 or '38, think how many human lives you would have saved." So, we are willing to live with whatever guidelines they want to give us. But we just ask that as the perceptions of the American people change, that the guidelines change. When the American people feel threatened, they were willing to authorize far more to be done; when they do not feel threatened, the perception is more restrictive as to what can be done.

The Central Intelligence Agency is made up of Americans just like every other American in this room. I am as proud of my three and a half years of association with them as I am of the thirty-five years I have spent in the United States Army. I have found the same kind of people: Americans like other Americans who live by the

same standards of other Americans. One of the things that grieves me, and I am not an old CIA man--I have been there only recently--is the power of innuendo and abuse that has been heaped upon these people: the guilt by association; the guilt by implication. We see fantastic things: Mr. Butterfield was a CIA infiltration in the White House--that is spread in seven columns in the newspaper. When it comes out that he isn't, that's one little column on page three. But the impact is there. Not long ago a man went on a television program, by the name of Sturgis, and claimed that he was a former CIA employee who had plotted the murder of Castro. We knew he was going to say this and we called the director of that show, before the show, to tell him that Sturgis had never, at any time, ever worked for the CIA. But he was introduced on the television program as a former employee of the CIA. These are some of the problems we have to contend with.

I really marvel. The CIA and the other members of the Intelligence Community: Army Intelligence, Air Force Intelligence, Naval Intelligence, and the FBI are American. Their role is to defend the United States and yet they are being regarded as though they were some hostile foreign to the United States. Yes, we may have had over-zealous

people, we may have done some things that judged by the standards of today were wrong, but I would submit in the particular case of the CIA--and I am sure it is true of the other services--50, 60, 70,000 people have gone through this organization since it was founded, and if you take a town of 50, 60, 70,000 people I am willing to believe that our record would stand up very, very well by comparison.

You know, here we are in the middle of a rummaging through the garbage pails of history, spending all our time answering questions about what happened in the 1950s, and the 1960s. I hope we will soon get to the 1970s and the 1980s because that's when your freedom and mine is going to be decided...whether the United States is going to be a free nation.

Right now we are being pilloried for our alleged sins of commission. What I worry about is that around 1990, one of Mr. Colby's successors will be called up for an investigation, and they will say to him, "You mean you didn't do this; you mean you failed to do this; you mean you didn't follow that?" We will then be accused of the sins of omission. All I hope is that when that investigation takes place, it takes place in English and not in Russian.

With regard to the assassinations, I fully agree with the policy enunciated by the Director, Mr. Colby. He said he did not feel it was in the interests of the United States to point the finger at anybody inside or outside the CIA in this matter. Congress is investigating this matter and they will report on it. With regard to the drugs and the Olson case of which you have all heard, the President spoke on that and I think he spoke for all of us--what a regrettable thing it was.

But I would like to take you back a minute to the environment under which those things happened. American soldiers, American prisoners in Korea, for the first time in American history, not only refused to come home, but they denounced their own country. Cardinal Mindzenty, who had withstood all the pressures the Nazis had brought to bear on him suddenly appears hollow-eyed to confess any crimes the Communists want him to confess. The average perception in our country in those days was that this was done with drugs. We feared these drugs would be used against us. There was an attempt all across American society not just the Armed Forces or the CIA--many distinguished institutions of learning and other Government agencies were interested in this problem. They were attempting to find an answer to them because the American people

felt threatened by it. Now we don't feel threatened by it, so we are being judged, all of us, in the light of hindsight. But I would just like for you to go back to the t i m e s. Those of you, and most or many of you can remember this time when we were convinced that the other side had developed some kind of mind-controlling drugs and might well use them on us. Either on the battlefield, or on our Ambassadors, or on our military personnel and we were seeking to find some counter to these things and this is what led to what happened.

Now you have heard a great deal about some of our shortcomings that have been analyzed in the Rockefeller Commission. I'd like to quote you an extract from the Rockefeller Commission which hasn't been quoted as frequently as some of the other quotations and I cite one: "A detailed analysis of facts has convinced this commission that the great majority of the CIA's domestic activities comply with its statutory authority...end of quote. I then give you another quote, also from the Rockefeller Committee about which you haven't heard very much. And I quote again: "The Agency's own actions, undertaken for the most part in '73 or '74,"--that is well prior to the beginning of these investigations--"have gone far to terminate the activities upon which this investigation has focused." But today we

have the situation, and people often ask me, "Do you see a conspiracy?" I don't know whether there is a conspiracy to blind United States intelligence or not right now, but I see in the forefront of it many of the old America's wrongers: America is wrong no matter what happens, my country, may she always be wrong so I can criticize her. We have the pharasaical people who say, oh, yes, all that intelligence-gathering is great for the wicked British, French, Russians, Germans and somebody else, but we Americans are pure, we don't do that sort of thing. Well, we're not purer than anybody else. And I would rather like to think that we went down rather like the publican who said, "Lord, I am a sinner, forgive me," and not like the Pharasee who said, "Oh, Lord, I thank Thee that I am not as other men." And I do not personally believe that the American people are a pharasaical people.

You know, not long ago I was in Europe and I was talking to some chiefs of foreign intelligence services, and this is one of our problems: the credibility of the U.S. intelligence, as I would say it, is at the lowest point since World War II. Perhaps that's an exaggeration, but it is not what it used to be. These people see this thing going on and they don't understand what we're doing. The head of the foreign intelligence service said to me,

"You know, I used to believe that the flagellantees and penitentees were small religious sects in southwest United States, but now I see you've got them all over the country." These people who are always finding America wrong, everything we do immoral, and unlike the other nations of the world who aren't doing awful things. These people who tell us that we must throw all this out so that we can be cleansed by it. Well we may be cleansed in the sense that we may be cleaned out by it. This idea that you can pour out all your secrets on the table to anybody else is just insanity as far as the security of the United States is concerned. These same people run down the United States' achievements. And you know there are people willing to do this all over the world. When they can quote Americans for it, it's even better.

Not long ago I was in Asia, in China, and I was taken around a temple and a museum and my guide was a little Chinese girl. When it was all over she said to me, "What do you think of all this?" And I said, "It leaves me thoughtful as I contemplate 6,000 years of your history compared to the 200 hundred years of our history." And she smiled and she said, "Yes, that is only half a dynasty isn't it?" I said, "Yes, but in that half a dynasty we went from a rock on the New England coast to the silent

face of the moon." In a shorter space of time than any other nation on earth, we have traveled further. I was in Paris when the astronauts came back, who had been to the moon, and the Mayor of Paris said to them, "In it's 2,000-year history, Paris has received many distinguished guests, but none have ever come from as far as you have." And we had not yet celebrated our 200th birthday. When you look at our history, from man's first flight (and to the moon, is a little more than half a century. And, as I say, we have a lot of imperfections in our society, we have a lot of things to correct, but we know our society is imperfect and we are working on correcting it. Only those who think they are in Paradise cannot improve on it.

We have, as I said, many shortcomings and many injustices, but we are working on correcting them. But we have given a larger percentage of our people a fairer share of the good things of life than any society man has evolved in 6,000 years since we came out of the caves.

I spoke a little while ago to people of the intelligence community and not just CIA, because the attack is shifting and getting broader now to the whole intelligence community. You know, everybody talks about rights. Sometimes people forget the rights of the people of the intelligence community. If those who serve the United States, in a very difficult and very silent way, they have the same right

to the presumption of innocence until proved guilty as any other citizen. And I am not sure they are always getting it these days. The people who have worked in American intelligence, I believe, put before the President of the United States every day the best intelligence in the world.

You know you hear a lot of differences about the CIA and Army and Navy and Air Force. Well I want to tell you that there may be a little esprit de corps rivalry but we all work together. We do not live in separate compartments. We work in close unity. Hal Aaron and I meet at least once a week. So do all the other people in our community. Our analysts talk to one another every day, because we know the magnitude of the problems that we face.

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We hear of detente, but what do we see? We see the Soviet Union deploying four new systems of inter-continental missiles--third generation missiles. We see them deploying new bombers; we see them deploying new and more powerful submarines; we see them adding tanks to every division in the Soviet Army; we see a qualitative improvement in their training; we see a qualitative improvement in their weapons. What they have today is far more

than they need for deterrence or defense. What use will they make of that capability? It is our responsibility in the American intelligence community to tell the American people what we think they will do with that. And we ~~are~~ ~~trying to do~~ this, under perhaps the most difficult circumstances that any intelligence community in any time in any country has had to do. You know, one of the great problems is that we face a new kind of a war. Twenty-five centuries ago a Chinese writer by the name of Sun Tzu wrote a book called The Art of War. It's a very complicated book and a very difficult book to read, but he did enunciate some ways to take your enemies apart. And if any of them sound familiar to you, you can tell that in 25 centuries human nature has changed very little. He made this first general consideration. He said, "Fighting is the crudest form of making war." And then he goes on to tell you how to undo your enemies. Number one: "Cover with ridicule everything that is valid in your opponent's country. Denounce their leaders and at the right time turn them over to the scorn of their fellow countrymen. Aggravate by every means at your command all existing differences in your opponent's country. Agitate the young against the old." There are 13 of these altogether and if you read them they read like the story of our time, of what is happening in our time. And he wound up with this general consideration.

He said, "Winning a hundred victories in a hundred battles is not the supreme excellence. The supreme excellence is subjugating your enemies without having to fight them."

I spoke a little while ago about detente and God knows those of us who have known the horrors of war hope that detente will contribute to the lessening of tensions on the world...among the countries of the world. But one must keep one's eyes open. I heard a little story from one of my European colleagues not long ago. It was about two young Americans who went to Moscow and they went to visit the zoo and they were being taken around by a young Russian and he showed them the various cages with the various animals and in one cage they saw a huge Russian bear. Tremendous claws and tremendous teeth. And in the same cage was a rather worried-looking lamb who appeared to be in good shape. The young American said to the young Russian, "That's odd; why do you put those two in the same cage?" And the young Russian said, "This is to prove that peaceful coexistence is possible." And the young American said, "Well, that's pretty impressive." and his young buddy said, "It sure is." The young Russian looked around and seeing no one was there, he said, "Of course, you understand, every morning we have to put in a new lamb."

You know, we Americans are a remarkable people. We have our virtues, we have our shortcomings, but I think we are great. Another party told me this story. He said, "A Frenchman, an Englishman and an American were captured on a cannibal island in the Pacific by a bunch of cannibals. The King of the cannibals said, 'Well, you're all going to be eaten for lunch tomorrow and I am going to execute you at 8 o'clock in the morning. But before I do I am going to give you each one wish but does not include setting you free.' So he turned to the Frenchman and he said, 'What do you want?' And the Frenchman said, 'Well, if I am going to be executed in the morning, I think I'd just as soon spend the remaining time with that beautiful cannibal girl over there.' So they said, 'Okay,' and they untied him and he went off into the woods with the cannibal girl. Then they said to the Englishman, 'What do you want?' He said, 'I want a pen and paper.' They said, 'What do you want a pen and paper for?' He said, 'I want to write a letter to the Secretary General of the United Nations and protest against the unjust, unfair and unsporting attitude you have adopted towards us.' So they gave him a pen and a paper and they put him in a hut and they untied him. And then they said to the American, 'What do you want?' He said, 'I want

to be led into the middle of the village. I want to be made to kneel down and I want the biggest cannibal here to kick me in the rear end.' The King of the cannibals said, 'That's a pretty odd request, but then the Americans are an odd people and I promised him. Okay, I'll do it.' So they led the American into the middle of the village and they made him kneel down and they untied him and the biggest cannibal there took a running start, kicked him and knocked him 15 feet. Now the American--he was sprawling--had been hiding a submachine gun under his clothes. So at this point he took out the submachine gun and he cut down the nearest cannibals and the rest of them fled. The Frenchman, hearing the gunfire, came out of the woods; the Englishman, hearing the gunfire, came out of the hut and they looked at the American and they said, 'Do you mean to say you had that Tommy gun the whole time?' He said, 'Sure.' And they said, 'Why didn't you use it before now?' And the American very earnestly said, 'But you don't understand. It wasn't until he kicked me in the rear end that I had any moral justification for it.'"

Throughout our history, the men and women who have worked in American intelligence have made a major contribution towards keeping this country great and free and a democratic nation. We intend all of us to go on doing that, providing we are not crippled; providing we are not prevented from doing it by misunderstanding and by mis-guided people who, as I said before, think there is something immoral and wrong in defending the United States. We no longer have the time and distance factor we had before. The real issue before us is not the truth or falsehood of allegations of events that occurred or did not occur 15 or 20 years ago. The real issue before us is: will the American people have eyes and ears to know what's going on or will we, giant that we are, stumble into the future blind and deaf until the day we have to choose between abject humiliation and the worst kind of blackmail. I have overwhelming faith in the good sense of the American people. I have overwhelming faith that this will not come to pass, and we will, with God's help, be able to keep this nation in the future what it has been in the past. The last best hope of mankind.

Thank you very much.