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DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE
THE NATIONAL WAR COLLEGE
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20319

NWCMN

21 November 1975


Lieutenant General Vernon A. Walters
Deputy Director of Central Intelligence
Central Intelligence Agency
Washington, DC 20505

Dear General Walters:

Thank you very much for addressing the students in our intelligence elective on the issues of intelligence planning and anticipating consumers' needs. It was especially generous of you to work out the alternate lecture time at the last minute when your responsibilities precluded your being with us as originally scheduled. The response to your presentation has been very favorable. The course director tells me that many students have characterized this as the liveliest and most candid session in the course. I think it was particularly useful that they had this opportunity to understand the contribution senior military personnel make to the highest levels of the intelligence community's policy support.

Thank you again for your continued support to our National War College program.

Respectfully,


JAMES S. MURPHY
Major General, USAF
Commandant



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DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE
THE NATIONAL WAR COLLEGE
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20319

NWCMN

7 November 1975

Lieutenant General Vernon A. Walters
Deputy Director of Central Intelligence
Central Intelligence Agency
Washington, D. C. 20505

A handwritten signature, likely of the sender, consisting of a stylized 'W' followed by a flourish.

Dear General Walters:

I was delighted to hear that you will be able to speak to The National War College on Thursday, 20 November, at 1:30 p. m. to those of our students taking the elective course "Intelligence and National Security," addressing the topic "Anticipating Consumers' Interests and Needs."

This seminar, which will be the last regular session in the course, will highlight the family of documents recently devised to provide a framework for planning intelligence collection and analysis. We would appreciate your describing the history and dynamics of establishing this approach to intelligence planning and commenting on its success in the first several years of use. We would also be extremely grateful for any insights you might care to offer on the difficulties of anticipating foreign policy support in a rapidly changing world and securing useful feedback from busy policymakers. Needless to say, any other general insights you may wish to offer on the future of intelligence would be gratefully received and fit well into this particular session.

Perhaps you would lead off with 40-50 minutes of initial remarks. Following a short break, the group will reconvene for questions and answers for the balance of the two hours.

The National War College has a well-established policy of holding all remarks in presentations such as yours in strictest confidence. This, we believe, permits the speaker to discuss his subject freely and with complete candor.

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
In the event you desire additional information, please do not hesitate to call on any of us here at the College. [redacted] the course director, is our faculty member most familiar with the scope and purpose of your topic. He may be reached at [redacted]

STAT

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We look forward to welcoming you to The National War College on 20 November.

Sincerely,


JAMES S. MURPHY
Major General, USAF
Commandant

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General Walters:

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[redacted] faculty member at NWC/ICAF from OER, will come in and talk to you this afternoon around 4:30 about the Intelligence Elective Group of 30 people which he is bringing to the Agency on 6 Nov for briefings.

Although you indicated you would prefer to talk to them 6 Nov, rather than 20 Nov at NWC, he would like to explore with you possibility of your doing it later because the students would be better read in and be able to ask more intelligent questions. He would like to have you cover the 'planning of intelligence', giving the students a sense of what the consumers are going to want and looking to the future. He feels that your participation in USIB enables you to give them the best coverage of this subject. If you were to talk to them on the 20th (and he will bring them out here at your convenience), it would be their next to last session and the subject of your talk would be more beneficial than now. Also, on the 6th, he has two other speakers lined up. But he doesn't want to risk not having you at all, so will abide by your wishes.

Part of the group will be from the NWC and part from the ICAF, therefore getting them all together for lunch might be difficult. Col Bush is pushing for lunch, but if its alright with you, I could explain to him that your schedule is too tight to allow for lunch this time around.

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6 Oct 75

General Walters:

LTCBob Bush called from National War College. The Intelligence Elective Group (about 25 people) that he talked to you about is coming out to the Agency on 6 Nov for a tour and briefing starting at 1330 to 1530. If you are free on that day, they would like to have you talk to them. Col Bush asked if there was a possibility that you could have lunch with them if they came out early, as their guest of course.

If you can't see them on 6 Nov while they are here, they would like to have you go to the National War College on 20 Nov to talk to them (or they will come back here if that is more convenient for you). *6/11*

You can't see them on 6th. Shall I arrange for 20 Nov at NWC? No conflict on your calendar for 20th. Yes No

Nancy

LTC Bush: 323-5810

They are planning a 12:30 lunch on
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20 Nov.

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General Walters:

who was in to see you Friday afternoon about speaking to the NWC/ICAF Intelligence Elective group on 20 Nov, sent up the attached syllabus. He will also send you a memo, going into more detail about what he wants you to cover.

Nancy
11/3/75

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ESP 503

Intelligence and the National Security Planning Process

The National War College
**ELECTIVE COURSE
SYLLABUS**


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INTELLIGENCE AND NATIONAL SECURITY

STAT



Course Director

A handwritten signature in cursive script, appearing to read 'Donald T. Nelson, Jr.'.

Donald T. Nelson, Jr.
Colonel, US Army
Chairman, DMNSA

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INTELLIGENCE AND NATIONAL SECURITY

Scope of the Course

1. Purpose.

This course is designed to (a) provide an introduction to the nature of national intelligence, (b) examine the intelligence production process, (c) assess the usefulness of the intelligence product, and (d) examine the limits of national intelligence activity in a democratic society.

2. Scope.

The course will touch on major contemporary problems of all intelligence agencies without attempting to catalog the interests or activities of any single organization. (A spring Group Study Project of the Industrial College of the Armed Forces provides detail on specific agencies' missions and functions.) It will treat the evolution of national intelligence and stress the interaction of consumer interests and needs on the one hand and intelligence planning, production, and review on the other. Except insofar as they pertain to the role of intelligence in a democratic society, it will not treat covert action programs.

Academic Procedures

1. Class sessions.

Each of thirteen seminars will last two hours. The basic format of each session but the last will be the same. A guest lecturer or panel will speak during part of the first hour. This will be followed by questions and discussion for the balance of the period. The discussions will accent informality, and students will be expected to participate actively in tapping the guests' expertise.

The last session, to be conducted by the class and Course Director, will consist of a problem on intelligence collection requirements. Intended to synthesize what students have learned about both intelligence resources and consumers' needs, it will presume some familiarity with the political, social, and economic conditions in a particular country chosen by the Course Director. Students are encouraged to read a copy of the pertinent National Intelligence Estimate (NIE) (on file in the Classified Records Library) at an early stage and to remain alert to current periodical coverage on this country over the term.

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2. Reading Requirements.

There will be assigned and, occasionally, optional readings for the various topics. The assignments will be kept as brief as possible in the interest of assuring complete readership among class members. This will be crucial to course operation because many complex intelligence issues currently arising can only be understood in the light of the basic issues and conflicts identified in the readings.

A number of the readings to be used over the term warrant separate mention. One, Lyman Kirkpatrick's, The U.S. Intelligence Community, will be available in sufficient copies that each student will have continued access to it. Mr. Kirkpatrick brings to this direct, readable book the insights of an "insider" who was Inspector General and Executive Director-Comptroller of CIA for many years. Another reading, Intelligence and National Security: Changing Aspects of the Policy Making Process in the Nixon Administration, by Captain James Lucas, provides extensive detail on the structure of the intelligence community and the National Security Council. Since only one seminar session is devoted to current structure, students may wish to use this long paper as a key reference. Accordingly, copies of it will be kept on reference in the main library.

The continuing national dialogue on the activities of intelligence agencies will yield additional readings to which you will be alerted over the term. Two of the earliest and most significant official publications are the reports of the Rockefeller and Murphy commissions. Although we will refer to them in class by their popular names, their official titles are:

Report. U.S. Commission on CIA Activities within the United States. Washington, D.C. U.S. Government Printing Office. 1975.


Report. U.S. Commission on the Organization of the Government for the Conduct of Foreign Policy. Washington, D.C. U.S. Government Printing Office. 1975.

Some of the course readings are classified materials and are kept on file in the Classified Records Library. The periodical series referred to in this syllabus as Studies is in this category; five or more copies of assigned readings from it have been filed for your use. Other classified readings are on file in folders bearing the title of the individual seminar session. The national estimate, referred to above, is filed under "Specifying Targets and Requirements."

3. Further Instructions.

Further guidance on readings, administrative procedures, or the assigned problem will be accomplished either by written handouts or announcements by the Course Director immediately following the break in individual sessions.

NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY STRUCTURE



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PART I

* * * *

THE ORIGINS OF THE INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY

1. Scope.

The postwar evolution of the US national intelligence community will be examined in the light of (a) the lessons of history, (b) the instructions and agreements of the Executive and the Congress, and (c) the competing demands of interest groups.

2. Introduction.

The rubric of "intelligence" is so broad that it can subsume just about every kind of information on another party or nation. The information explosion and widening of literacy in modern times have moved many facts and insights out of the clandestine world and into the open press. Recently, new technologies have allowed access to information carefully concealed--or occasionally not even known--by responsible governments. Against this shifting sense of what constitutes their raw material, producing agencies seek to define and distill that which is most relevant to the conduct of national security affairs. As might be expected, consumer interests and producers' insights continually interact to define and redefine the parameters of the resulting national intelligence.

Although various facets of intelligence and secret service work have early antecedents in the United States, the systematic production of national intelligence in peacetime is still a new phenomenon. At the end of World War II, lingering shock over Pearl Harbor combined with the learning experience from the Office of Strategic Services (OSS) to generate a consensus favoring some measure of centralized responsibility for intelligence collection and analysis. This ultimately led to provisions in the National Security Act of 1947 for the creation of the National Security Council and the Central Intelligence Agency. The broad consensus implicit in this law did not conceal or override departmental jealousies, however, and many of the current jurisdictional debates on military and political intelligence, budget review, and congressional oversight have their roots in the wordings and interpretations of the legislation of this period. Over the years, this basic structure and the older intelligence components have evolved into the community shown in the diagram on page iv.

Having never fully resolved the issues of departmental responsibility, the intelligence community has struggled for nearly 30 years to fit its activities into American political patterns. The difficulties inherent in meeting

security requirements in an open democracy, the changing needs of the Presidency, the exigencies of supporting US foreign policy planning, and the demands of military budgeting are only some of the many sources of pressure on the intelligence organizations. Response to these pressures has resulted in more connective tissue and review components at senior levels of the intelligence community and subtle reshaping within agencies.

The speakers on this topic will provide the logical and structural background upon which other topics will rest. A leading community historian will provide insights on the beginnings of US national intelligence. An authority on intelligence community organization and congressional oversight will speak on these key issues. The last speaker in this bloc will discuss internal and external pressures that continue to contribute to change in organization and missions within the intelligence community.

3. Readings.

General
(Required)

a. Sherman Kent, Strategic Intelligence for American World Policy (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1966), pp. 3-10.

History
(Required)

a. Monro MacCloskey, The American Intelligence Community (New York: Richards Rosen Press, 1967), pp. 19-46.

b. Harry H. Ransom, The Intelligence Establishment (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1970), pp. 48-64, 73-81.

Legal Basis and Structure
(Required)

a. Lyman B. Kirkpatrick, The U.S. Intelligence Community: Foreign Policy and Domestic Activities (New York: Hill and Wang, 1973), pp. 23-44.

b. U.S. Commission on the Organization of the Government for the Conduct of Foreign Policy, Report (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1975), pp. 91-97.

c. U.S. Commission on CIA Activities Within the United States, Report (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1975), pp. 58-67, 71-82.

d. U.S. Blue Ribbon Defense Panel, Report to the President and the Secretary of Defense on the Department of Defense (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1970), pp. 44-46.

(Optional)

a. Monro MacCloskey, The American Intelligence Community (New York: Richards Rosen Press, 1967), pp. 57-62.

b. James W. Lucas, Intelligence and National Security: Changing Aspects of the Policy-Making Process in the Nixon Administration (Washington, D.C.: Defense Intelligence School, 1973), pp. 40-58, 67-70.

Definition and Redefinition
(Required)

a. Roger Hilsman, To Move a Nation: The Politics of Foreign Policy in the Administration of John F. Kennedy (Garden City, N.Y.: Doubleday, 1967), pp. 63-88.

b. Paul W. Blackstock, "The Intelligence Community Under the Nixon Administration," Armed Forces and Society, February 1975, pp. 231-250.

c. U.S. Commission on the Organization of the Government for the Conduct of Foreign Policy, Report (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1975), pp. 97-105.

(Optional)

a. Lyman B. Kirkpatrick, The U.S. Intelligence Community: Foreign Policy and Domestic Activities (New York: Hill and Wang, 1973), pp. 160-176.

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PART II

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INTELLIGENCE CONSTRAINTS IN A DEMOCRATIC SOCIETY

1. Scope.

The purpose of this unit is to highlight and contrast--where appropriate--the strongly held convictions of (a) those primarily concerned with limiting intelligence activities in the interest of safeguarding individual freedoms and (b) those primarily concerned with assuring protection for intelligence sources in the interest of national security.

2. Introduction.

Individual disclosures to the press, the publication of books by former intelligence personnel, and a variety of specific reviews by executive and congressional components have all accelerated the opening to public view of national intelligence procedures. This unveiling has been accompanied by clear agreement among all parties that certain specific activities--largely in the realm of covert action--were outside the intelligence charter. Nevertheless, their occurrence--the issue of frequency aside--has raised demands for a broader, continuing public exposure of intelligence sources and methods.

Both before and during this period of exposure, the Director of Central Intelligence, in his role as head of the United States Intelligence Board, called for stronger provisions to assure protection of sources and methods. Others have also raised the prospect that further airing of operational intelligence information may seriously impair access to needed clandestine information and, thereby, the ability of the intelligence components to operate effectively.

The speakers in this unit, a congressional staff member and a former intelligence collector, will present their particular views of the public's "need to know."

3. Readings.

The Congressional Perspective
(Required)

- a. Studies, Summer 1974, pp. 1-20. (Available in Classified Library.)
- b. U.S. Commission on CIA Activities Within the United States, Report (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1975), pp. 9-47, 55-57.

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c. Lyman B. Kirkpatrick, The U.S. Intelligence Community: Foreign Policy and Domestic Activities (New York: Hill and Wang, 1973), pp. 72-81.

(Optional)

a. Studies, Summer 1966, pp. 31-42. (Available in Classified Library.)

b. Lyman B. Kirkpatrick, The U.S. Intelligence Community: Foreign Policy and Domestic Activities (New York: Hill and Wang, 1973), pp. 59-67, 70-72.

The Collector's Perspective

(Required)

a. Lyman B. Kirkpatrick, The U.S. Intelligence Community: Foreign Policy and Domestic Activities (New York: Hill and Wang, 1973), pp. 67-70.

b. William Montalbano, "Agent Quits the CIA in Anger," and Mike Ackerman, "Spy's Story: CIA is Paralyzed . . . I Could No Longer Do Job," The Miami Herald, June 8, 1975, pp. 1, 14A.

c. Charles J.V. Murphy, "Uncloaking the CIA," Fortune, June 1975, pp. 88-91, 197, 199, 200, 202-204.


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THE INTELLIGENCE PRODUCTION CYCLE

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PART III

* * * *

INTELLIGENCE PROCESS

1. Scope.

The production of written national intelligence within the system will be viewed from the perspective of (a) collectors, (b) analysts, and (c) senior intelligence officers, research supervisors, and staff reviewers. This unit will provide the principal exposure to daily intelligence activities and, thereby, a basis for better understanding critics' and consumers' attitudes.

2. Introduction.

Policymakers of all persuasions seek and receive intelligence in forms ranging from the raw, uncollated field report to the thoroughly discussed and dissected interagency research paper. As a number of speakers and readings in this course will stress, the proclivity for "do-it-yourself" interpretation of raw intelligence often is driven directly by the policymaker's prior experience (or inexperience) in using intelligence products. Moreover, some forms of intelligence (such as photography) are often so striking in content that particular background or statements of context appear unnecessary. In any event, executive access to any stage of intelligence production justifies the notion that, practically speaking, intelligence can be regarded as finished work anywhere along the line.

When professionals speak of finished intelligence, however, they have a discrete product in mind. Its genesis is either a specific information request from senior officials or a need for relevant research perceived by analysts and/or collectors. Once defined in terms of national interests or objectives, the question is reframed by analysts into a very rough hypothesis based on data at hand. At this stage new, detailed questions, often elaborating older standing requirements for the same topic, are presented to collectors if time permits additional field work. The analyst immediately begins digging out and organizing additional material from both classified and unclassified sources. A draft of the findings is typically reviewed at several levels before publication or transmission to the requestor. As in any research setting, the successive reviewers typically bring to their work decreasing familiarity with details and an increasing sense of global perspective and policy interest.

The underlying intelligence cycle is shown in the chart on page 8. The whole process may take as little as a few hours (if it is drawing on accumulated expertise and data or is driven by immediate needs) or months to years

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(if it requires substantial new spadework and thought). Products range from newspaper articles or short memos to reports of twenty, a hundred, or more pages.

Speakers will touch on the major aspects of finished intelligence production but will simply not have time to develop all the relevant issues and problems. Although a separate lecture at the end of this unit will consider samples of intelligence output, students are encouraged to look over the samples as soon as possible to provide a broader base for active questioning and discussion in the earlier sessions.

3. Readings.

General
(Required)

a. Harry H. Ransom, The Intelligence Establishment (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1970), pp. 15-16.

Collection (Human)
(Required)

a. Lyman B. Kirkpatrick, The U.S. Intelligence Community: Foreign Policy and Domestic Activities (New York: Hill and Wang, 1973), pp. 3-18.

b. U.S. Commission on the Organization of the Government for the Conduct of Foreign Policy, Report (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1975), pp. 122-127.

c. Studies, Summer 1963, pp. 95-100. (Available in Classified Library.)

Collection (Non-human factors)
(Required)

a. Ted Greenwood, "Reconnaissance and Arms Control," Scientific American, February 1973, pp. 14-25.

Analysis (both units)
(Required)

a. Sherman Kent, Strategic Intelligence for American World Policy (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1966), pp. 159-179.

b. Roger Hilsman, The Crouching Future: International Politics and U.S. Foreign Policy; A Forecast (Garden City, N.Y.: Doubleday, 1975), pp. 1-56.

c. Harry H. Ransom, The Intelligence Establishment (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1970), pp. 42-45.

Survey of Output
(Required)

- a. Materials folders on file in Classified Library. Scan contents.

Quality Control Through Review
(Required)

- a. Materials folders on file in Classified Library. Scan contents; read case study.

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PART IV

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INTELLIGENCE PLANNING

1. Scope.

This unit will focus on anticipating intelligence research needs and defining consumer interests.

2. Introduction.

A very large share of intelligence production supports foreign policy decisions and interests of the moment. The broad span of our international concerns, domestic political pressures, and the limited time-horizon of national budgeting are among the factors that assure most intelligence resources will be devoted to current reporting and short-term forecasting. Nevertheless, analysts are continually haunted by the recognition that better long-range planning could substantially improve their product by allowing more time for (a) data collection, (b) inspection of alternate hypotheses, and (c) more searching product review.

At the heart of better planning is a clearer understanding of what the consumer needs. This is partly determined by expressed national objectives, but many of these are too general to provide distinctive guidance and some may even appear implausible in the face of newly developed intelligence. Consumer needs also depend heavily on the individual policymaker's perceptions of the role of intelligence and the intelligence community in decision-making, and these differ widely and change often.

Irrespective of whether the analyst receives "adequate" guidance on needs, he must state his own requirements clearly to field collectors. This presents a considerable challenge, aspects of which we will share in this course through a final problem session. The class will be divided into three groups, each of which will be responsible for drafting collection requirements in one of the following areas: military; political; economic. The groups will meet outside class hours long enough to eliminate redundancy in the requirements listed by each member, to assure the best phrasing of questions, to pick one major question for each member to describe and defend in class, and to assign priorities to their collection requirements. The last session will consist of a review of the questions by class members and professional intelligence analysts.

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3. Readings.

Anticipating Consumer Needs
(Required)

a. Sherman Kent, Strategic Intelligence for American World Policy (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1966), pp. 180-206.

b. Lyman B. Kirkpatrick, The U.S. Intelligence Community: Foreign Policy and Domestic Activities (New York: Hill and Wang, 1973), pp. 82-113.

c. Richard J. Levine, "Why We Misjudged Vietnam," The Wall Street Journal, April 23, 1975, p. 18.

(Optional)

a. Joseph De Rivera, The Psychological Dimensions of Foreign Policy (Columbus, Ohio: C.E. Merrill Pub. Co., 1968), pp. 52-64.

Specifying Targets and Requirements
(Required)

a. Materials folder on file in Classified Library. Read national estimate. Scan requirements statements and other materials as appropriate to assigned problem.