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16 FEB 1950

MEMORANDUM FOR PARTICIPATING MEMBERS OF THE INTELLIGENCE ADVISORY
COMMITTEE:

SPECIAL ASSISTANT, INTELLIGENCE
DEPARTMENT OF STATE
DIRECTOR OF INTELLIGENCE, GENERAL STAFF
UNITED STATES ARMY
DIRECTOR OF NAVAL INTELLIGENCE
DIRECTOR OF INTELLIGENCE, HEADQUARTERS
UNITED STATES AIR FORCE

SUBJECT: Conferences With United States Government Officials
Returning From Abroad

1. The high intelligence potential of conferences with United States Government officials returning from abroad depends in large part upon the opportunity they provide to secure from such officials their personal and uninhibited views and opinions. This depends in turn on the guarantee which can be given to such officials that their remarks, however informal, will be honored by absolute and rigorous security precautions on the part of all attending such conferences.

2. In order to insure that such security precautions are taken to the fullest possible extent, certain steps are proposed to increase existing security guarantees and thereby further reduce the danger of security violations. Since several security violations have occurred in the recent past in connection with participation of the intelligence agencies in such conferences, I consider it desirable to tighten up on the security aspects of this matter and to regularize other procedural aspects thereof.

3. The attached draft of a proposed agreement covering operational relationships in this matter is submitted for your concurrence and/or comment. After the final text of this paper is agreed upon by all concerned, it is proposed that it be issued as an "Interagency Operating Procedure" on this subject.

4. It is believed that there are other operational and procedural relationships which need clarification and standardization. Often these matters apply to CIA's relationship with only one or a few of the intelligence agencies. After agreement is reached on these matters by the

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agencies concerned, published agreements at the appropriate policy level will provide the desired machinery for this purpose.

5. I should appreciate receiving your early reply, both regarding the substance of the enclosure and regarding the issuance from time to time of agreed-to "Interagency Operating Procedures" which are not so broad in application as the policy National Security Council Intelligence Directives or the implementing Director of Central Intelligence Directives.

Signed

R. H. HELLENKOSTER
Rear Admiral, USN
Director of Central
Intelligence

Enclosure:
Draft of Proposed Operating
Procedure, with enclosure

PC/mhb
COAPS-14 February 1950

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PROPOSED INTERAGENCY OPERATING PROCEDURE

SUBJECT: Conferences with United States Government Officials
Returning from Abroad

AGENCIES PARTICIPATING IN THIS AGREEMENT:

Central Intelligence Agency
Department of State
Department of the Army
Department of the Navy
Department of the Air Force

Conferences with United States Government officials returning to the United States from areas which are of significant intelligence interest constitute a valuable source of information for intelligence purposes and may be of great assistance to intelligence specialists by virtue of the opportunity such conferences provide to secure from such officials their personal and uninhibited views and opinions. In order to free such officials from the unnecessary burden of repeating their remarks to successive groups of intelligence specialists, it is agreed that the initial interagency intelligence conference will be conducted under the auspices of the Central Intelligence Agency for the benefit of all agencies participating in this agreement. To clarify and standardize certain principles governing the scheduling and conduct of such conferences, the following operating procedures and allocation of responsibilities are agreed upon:

1. The intelligence organizations of the Departments of State, the Army, the Navy, and the Air Force will inform CIA of officials of their departments who return to the United States after service or official travel in foreign areas which are of

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significant intelligence interest. CIA will keep itself informed, through established liaison channels, of officials of other departments and agencies of the U. S. Government who return to Washington from such areas.

2. Conferences with selected officials who pass through Washington will be scheduled in accordance with the following provisions:

a. The scheduling will be done by CIA through the intelligence organizations of the Departments of State, the Army, the Navy, or the Air Force for officials of these Departments; and by CIA through established liaison channels for officials of other departments and agencies of the U. S. Government.

b. These conferences will be scheduled at a time and place agreeable both to CIA and to the Departments or Agencies concerned.

c. Due notification of scheduled conferences will be given by CIA to the intelligence organizations of the Department of State, the Army, the Navy, and the Air Force, in order that qualified intelligence specialists of these organizations may participate therein, within the limits of available facilities.

d. CIA will provide suitable facilities for such conferences.

e. CIA will provide transportation facilities and other appropriate courtesies for the official participating therein.

f. CIA will be responsible for the conduct of such conferences.

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3. These conferences are for the benefit of the intelligence specialists having direct interest in the areas and subjects to be discussed. All those attending should be prepared to question the officials from a specialized intelligence viewpoint, since such conferences are not meant for general orientation or passive participation. The need-to-know principle should govern the selection of those designated to attend such conferences.

4. Intelligence specialists who are not able to attend the conferences, or who do not wish to present their questions orally, may submit them to the presiding officer either before or during the meeting. Questions so submitted should bear the name and organization of the intelligence specialist submitting them.

5. Because of the informality and classified nature of such conferences, special security precautions are essential. All of those whose names are submitted for attendance must have been cleared for TOP SECRET by their respective intelligence organizations, and should know in advance of the substance of the attached Security Agreement, a copy of which they will be asked to sign before each conference.

6. CIA is able to interview United States Government officials returning from abroad who do not pass through the Washington area, in a manner similar to its operations under the provisions of NSCID No. 7. CIA will do this in the interests of and according to requirements submitted by the intelligence organizations of the Departments of State, the Army, the Navy, and the Air Force.

Enclosure:
Security Agreement

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CONFERENCE WITH U.S. GOVERNMENT OFFICIAL RETURNING FROM ABROAD

NAME and TITLE of OFFICIAL: _____

DATE, TIME, and PLACE of CONFERENCE: _____

SECURITY AGREEMENT

I, the undersigned, having already been certified as cleared for TOP SECRET by the intelligence organization which I represent, understand that my participation in this conference entails on me special security responsibilities. I understand that this conference is classified and that the official whose name appears above has been requested to give his personal, uninhibited and informal views and opinions on the areas and subjects to be discussed. Therefore, I agree to the following special security precautions:

a. To give an appropriate classification to items of intelligence information derived from this conference, and to disseminate them only in such a way that their immediate source will not be disclosed.

b. To make no dissemination of personal views or opinions expressed at this conference, and to make use of such personal views or opinions only in the evaluative process of intelligence production, without revealing their immediate source.

c. To ask no questions about clandestine operations nor about clandestine sources of any U.S. intelligence organization.

I understand, in conclusion, that my signature affixed hereto constitutes a record of my attendance at this conference, and that any indication of even an inadvertent unauthorized disclosure of matters discussed hereat will result in a thorough investigation.

TYPED NAMES AND AGENCY

SIGNATURES

_____	_____
_____	_____
_____	_____
_____	_____
_____	_____
_____	_____

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