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ER-2-265 6/A

4 October 1951

MEMORANDUM FOR: Deputy Director of Central Intelligence

VIA: Executive Assistant to DCI

FROM: Deputy Director (Plans)

SUBJECT: F. B. I. Letter Dated 27 September 1951

1. In accordance with your request of late this afternoon, I have read the above mentioned letter as well as Mr. Douglass' memorandum of comment dated 2 October. While I am inclined to agree in general with the content of the memorandum of comment, I have distinct reservations as to the desirability of furnishing the memorandum in its present form to any of the important officials who were the addressees of the original F. B. I. letter.

2. I feel that the memorandum could and should be rounded out and strengthened as to substance by obtaining views of Mr. Bohlen and [redacted] I have spoken to [redacted] about this and I understand that he will endeavor to attain the views of Mr. Bohlen and [redacted] at the earliest possible date.

3. I believe that the form of the memorandum of comment, i.e. the language and method of expression could be polished up. The last paragraph in particular strikes me as rough and inept. This is merely a question of expression and draftsmanship.

4. I have nothing to add of a substantive nature to what I have said above except that the memorandum of comment does not appear to deal with all of the points and inferences raised in the F. B. I. letter.

[redacted]

FRANK G. WISNER (CW)

Encl (2)

Ltr. dtd Sept. 27 to DCI  
from Dir., FBI

Memo dtd Oct. 2 (ER-2-2656)  
to DCI from ADCI (2 copies)

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5 October 1951

COMMENTS BY MR. BOHLEN

The Politburo does throw matters open for discussion and there may often be a division of opinion. After the discussion has gone on long enough, however, Stalin gives the nod to one side or the other and this then becomes the party line and the ranks are closed. Also, Mr. Bohlen does not lean too strongly toward the theory there is a possibility that the mildness of recent Russian actions and reactions (including Gromyko's San Francisco performance) may be due to the fact that the present party line has not been established and discussion is still going on.

*frozen*

He agrees that if something should happen to Stalin, a triumvirate should be the logical solution. He pointed out certain inconsistencies in paragraph 2 on page 1 of the Hoover letter. It is stated that two-thirds of the Politburo desire war. He further states that they do not desire to consider trouble in Europe but are in favor of concentrating in the East. Bohlen feels that this proves they do not mean real war but rather a continuation and extension of the present cold war. He feels that if they wanted a real war, they would probably move in Europe.

*With possibly Hoover as Stalin's head*

Mr. Bohlen believes <sup>to present</sup> that the first paragraph on page 2 of the Hoover letter is probably Stalin's feeling. Taking the two paragraphs together, he believes that Hoover's source really means that there may be a temporary division between those who want peace and those who want an extension of the cold war and that the party line may not have been determined as yet.

In general, he agrees with Mr. Douglass' memorandum.



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