

28 July 1953

MEMORANDUM FOR: THE DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE

SUBJECT : Recommended Position on State Proposal to Revise
PSB D-23

1. It is recommended that CIA support PSB D-23 as drafted, and oppose the State recommendation to excise Phase II of the Plan and certain phrases in the body of the Plan which led up to Phase II. It is essential to our entire program to have NSC approval of the principle that this Agency is authorized to plan and develop guerrilla and para-military forces for activation when conditions permit. If State remains firm in its objection to Phase II, it is recommended that the following sentence be added:

"Concurrently with the implementation of this strategy, plans will be developed for its expansion if and when conditions warrant this expansion."

2. The following comments on State's arguments are advanced:

[Redacted]

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[Redacted]

If properly implemented, therefore, it would not result in the loss of U.S. prestige and influence. In this connection, it is recalled that all the earlier drafts of the paper advocated U.S. leadership exercised through powerful regional coordinators. CIA objected on the ground that U.S. leadership, while powerful and effective, must not be visible. In our opinion the latest draft makes note of this factor.

b. The last sentence of paragraph 2 of [Redacted] comments contains a factual error. There will be no appreciable increase in the total number of [Redacted]. However, [Redacted] more of the present total will be trained.

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c. It is our belief that the Ambassador's statements in paragraph 4 reflect a misinterpretation of past developments, misinformation about current programs, and a lack of understanding of covert techniques. The following points are pertinent:


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
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25X1 3. CIA supports the argument advanced by PSB, in paragraph 2 of [redacted] memorandum, that Phase II in PSB D-23 is not laid down as a final decision to act but indicated as a direction for contingency planning and preparation "for utilization of [redacted] as a base -- when and if conditions permit." It is noted that the State Department draft of 24 July 1953 still carries in Section II, Analysis of the Problem, all the arguments which make it apparent that Phase II must be developed. That section is based on the thesis that it is important that [redacted] be developed as the logical strategic base for counter-operations against the Communists. (See page 6.)

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Chief
Far East Division

