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16 May 1952

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

In compliance with your instructions there is submitted herewith a general analysis of the report of Mr. Gordon Gray to you dated 22 February 1952, on the organization and work of the Psychological Strategy Board. This report with its conclusions and recommendations is concurred in by the three members of the Board.

In his analysis Mr. Gray reviews the events of the past few years which led to the creation of this new instrument of Government and traces the development and work of the Board since its inception. In addition, Mr. Gray has outlined the progress which has been made in resolving problems arising from the differences among the Government agencies concerned and in obtaining a concerted psychological effort.

The Board concurs that the report should not be published.

In suggesting publication, Mr. Gray was undoubtedly motivated by the desire to obtain better public comprehension of the Government's psychological warfare efforts and to enlist public support in the solution of the problems involved. The merit of these suggestions

PSB COMMENTS
ON GRAY REPORT**SECRET**

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is fully appreciated but the clear disadvantages from the disclosure of the sensitive and classified material in the report amply justify your decision not to publish it.

On the other hand, from its study of the report and in light of the present world situation, the Board feels that it would be helpful if at an appropriate opportunity you chose to restate to the country and to the world the principles and policies guiding our psychological effort in the cold war as well as the problems that are faced and the work that has so far been accomplished, including possible reference to the Board's relation to that work. Such a statement might elaborate upon certain of the most significant themes of Mr. Gray's report. It would provide an opportunity to clarify the thinking of certain segments of the American public and of our allies, who may not yet be fully persuaded of the scope and vigorous nature of American policy with respect to the cold war. This would do much to accomplish what we believe to have been Mr. Gray's objectives in suggesting publication of the report. It would also provide an opportunity for you publicly to acknowledge Mr. Gray's contribution to the work of the Board.

Mr. Gray has suggested four specific changes affecting the Board. These are:

① First, that the Director be made Chairman of the Board, possibly without a vote.

The title Director indicates a somewhat higher level of responsibility than was originally contemplated when the office was first

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created and the scope of the Director's duties has sometimes been misunderstood and deserves some clarification. However, the Director now sits with the Board, and as all proceedings are rather informal and decisions are based on unanimity of opinion, we believe on balance that no change in the composition of the Board need be made at this time. Arrangements have been made to rotate the duty of presiding officer, and for the Director to take his turn in that capacity. This will accomplish to some extent the purpose of Mr. Gray's recommendation, without conjuring up the objections which a more radical change might arouse.

- ② Mr. Gray's second and third suggested changes contemplated that the Director sit with the National Security Council as needed, and
- ③ that he informally report to the President at regular intervals. The latter suggestion involves your personal views and preferences. As to the former the Council has a tendency to grow, and you have had to trim it down once or twice already. Mr. Gray's purpose would be accomplished if the Director attended Council meetings as required and pursuant to invitation by the Council's Executive Secretary.

- ④ Mr. Gray's fourth proposed change is that a member of the Joint Chiefs of Staff should sit with the Board. Having one of the Joint Chiefs or its Chairman attend the Board meetings as a consultant and military advisor would simply be a strengthening of the representation of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, prescribed in your directive of 4 April 1951 organizing the Board. If you approve this suggestion,

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it may be accomplished by invitation to the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff as the needs of the Board require.

RECOMMENDATIONS

You have already taken the recommended action as regards non-publication of the report.

With respect to the other suggestions in Mr. Gray's report, the Board respectfully recommends that: (a) no change in organization be made at this time; (b) the Chairmanship of the Board be rotated with the Director taking his turn as presiding officer; (c) the Director be called on to attend National Security Council meetings as the needs of the Council require and at the invitation of the Executive Secretary to the Council; and (d) you indicate to the Joint Chiefs of Staff your approval of having the Chairman, or one of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, meet with the Board as a consultant and military advisor as the need arises.

WALTER B. SMITH
Chairman
Psychological Strategy Board

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