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Approved For Release 2003/04/22 : CIA-RDP80R01731R003400010035-8

**MAY 8 1951**

PRELIMINARY STAFF MEETING

NATIONAL PSYCHOLOGICAL STRATEGY BOARD  
(NPSB)

- 1) Procedure for finding possible candidate for office of Director.
- 2) Selection of staff for Board, its location, and clerical personnel.
- 3) Constitution of a Panel of Consultants or Advisors representing State, Defense, JCS, CIA, etc.
- 4) Relation of such panel to Psychological Operations Coordinating Board (presided over by Mr. Barrett) and Panel of Consultants for CIA.
- 5) Preparation of analysis of present operations in the field of covert psychological warfare (including covert operations now being undertaken or planned by the various departments and agencies of the United States government.)
- 6) Projects in this field undertaken by outside agencies, such as the
- 7) Responsibility of NPSB in the field of covert economic warfare.
- 8) Role of NPSB in the field of deception and counter-deception, i. e., the analysis of measures of deception practised against us.
- 9) Program to induce defection, etc.
- 10) NCFE, NCFA and similar organizations.

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Approved For Release 2003/04/22 : CIA-RDP80R01731R003400010035-0

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DRAFT

8 May 1951

MEMORANDUM FOR: RECORD

SUBJECT: NSPD meeting, Tuesday, 8 May 1951  
1100 a.m. to 1230 p.m.

Present: General W. B. Smith, General Magruder,  
Admiral Stevens, Assistant Secretary Barrett,  
Mr. Allan Dulles, Mr. Frank Wisner, Mr. Philip  
Davidson, Mr. Max Millikan, and Mr. R. A.  
Winston, Recorder.

(The following approximate quotations are from rough long-hand notes.)

General Smith: We have some notes here for the NSC. We can see there brought out so plainly what we brought out before. Our problems are progressively passed on. Taken collectively, they could be handled more easily.

General Magruder: That's true. Scarcely a week goes by now but that we have some new example. Last week I heard the story about an organization in OSS which used to handle this sort of thing. This function is missed tremendously now.

Mr. Dulles: We have something like it in our present organization.

General Smith: It is something that should be entirely independent of an altruistic agency. I am told that this was discussed at some length at a high level, whereupon the Signal Corps of the Army suddenly

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woke up to their opportunity when they were asked, "Why have you overlooked this marvelous, wonderful opportunity, CIA, and don't you think you had better wise up to it," and there you are.

General Magruder: You would be surprised at the number of instances of that sort of thing that occur.

Mr. Dulles: There are plenty of opportunities to get going.

will get started in a few days.

General Magruder: General, can we turn that fan off?

Mr. Barrett: Please do. I thought we would all be taking off in a minute.

General Smith: In all this, I am reminded of the story of the soldiers' creed: "If it moves, salute it; if it doesn't move, pick it up; if you can't move it, paint it!"

Mr. Dulles: General, will you tell the lie detector story that you told us the other day?

General Smith: We had a man who refused to take the lie detector test. They told him that his chief took it, Smith took it, Dulles took it, and that he ought to take it. Still he objected. Finally,

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he said, "Well, if you force me to, I'll tell you why I don't want to take it. I did a terrible thing during the war. I don't know what I might say if I take this test." Then, after a few drinks, someone asked him again about this, and asked, "Was it as bad as all that?" He said, "Yes. I'll tell you what it was. I was away for three years during the war, and during that time I was unfaithful to my wife, and now I am afraid that if I took this test, I would have to tell about this!"

In these cases I have only one question: that we get these name checks. You would be surprised at the number of elderly gentlemen who come to work for the Government and whose lady visitors slip away from the house early in the morning. The only question is, are there any homosexuals involved?

We had a meeting, Mr. Lovett and myself--frantic search for a director--and we produced nothing--not even a probable candidate. Being the junior, I was elected chairman--two votes to one. (I am chairman of six other committees, too.) After that, the meeting then adjourned.

Approved For Release 2003/04/22 : CIA-RDP80R01731R003400010035-0

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We should start on a staff level to get underway to forming an organization. You gentlemen should sit down with me and get an ad hoc task force to frame a working part of this psychological strategy group. Assume: First, the director is a front. You can get planning and operations in the absence of a director. So, you must have some form of an organization to focus your activities. Second, you must have some form of machinery. I believe that the present machinery within the Government is adequate. Its main job under a director would be coordination of plans and parceling out of tasks. Third, for presentation to the Board at its next meeting, those two points, plus a first shot at a program, or project one. You will find a multiplicity of jobs--each one small, but in totality enormous, financially and otherwise, so there has got to be an auditing and appraising--which will necessitate an organization. That is the beginning. (To Mr. Barrett) Mr. Secretary, what have you to contribute?

Mr. Barrett: I may not have too much to contribute, but I think

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that there has been a great deal of fuzzy thinking in this.

Numerous people have been involved in this, both from the State

Department side and the White House side. There are some awfully

unclear opinions, and some surprising differences within the State

Department. I would like to see us go about by getting, if possible,

an agreement by this Board <sup>on</sup> ~~and~~ the director, and possibly ~~some~~ from

there to the staff, the machinery, and the rest of it. As you have

stated, General, the machinery is there. It is a coordinating job.

My question would be, does this Board do an overall coordinating

job, or do we concentrate on doing all jobs ~~which~~ of a non-conventional

nature that we may have. As one example, there is China, and quoting

Dean Rusk, as in NSC 40-something-or-other, "How do we put this

*laugh  
puzzle*

together and come up with a plan for overt psychological warfare

and for covert psychological warfare?" On this we come up with a

problem: Should it be an overall policy job on a war-time basis, or

should it continue on a peace-time basis? If it is war-time, it is one

job, and if it is peace-time, it is another. What are your thoughts on this?

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General Smith: My thinking is this. Psychological warfare is already being coordinated on a large scale--mostly covert, but some of it overt. The trouble is that we haven't been able to advertise what we have been doing. There are several phases of our work--NCFE and others--which you cannot advertise for obvious reasons. For example, Bill Benton thought that VOA should do a lot more than it is doing. He bellowed like a wounded bison, now that he is on the other end of the stick. Benton wanted us to set up a big program, but he doesn't know what we do over here as it is. It would be nice to satisfy the public demand if we could, but we run into this problem of the State Department wanting to control all of a big organization if it is set up, and the Defense Department reluctant to turn it all over to State. (I am speaking very frankly on this.) Admiral Souers sent his opinions to me for comment, and I said the machinery is in existence and needs to be pulled together and coordinated. Also, you need a small strategic planning group.

*(add portions on dictated tape)*

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*R. D. Meason*  
SP/DCPW, Recorder

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General Smith: (Cont'd:) You do not have in government a basic approved strategy for this kind of war. In the last war the chiefs of staff sat down and outlined the detail. (Here he gave several examples.) That is all right - on a framework like that you can hang anything. But, for example, we haven't even a policy on <sup>Chiang Kai-Shek</sup> ~~Chiang Kai-Shek~~ and the Nationalist Government. But we have the NSC to establish major policy, so that you don't need a big organization, but you need a psychological warfare executive to deal through and with existing agencies and under them a Board to parcel out jobs to organizations and agencies capable of performing these things. This conception is accepted in part, but they also want a front man who will be responsible -- a man whom the Press and the public can put the finger on and say that he is responsible for conducting psychological warfare. <sup>What</sup> ~~But~~ I visualize is this: the staff or agency operating under the Director will be a small group representing those agencies of government which are <sup>now</sup> ~~are~~ doing or are capable of conducting psychological warfare. The

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Approved For Release 2003/04/22 : CIA-RDP80R01731R003400010035-0

NSPB, for all its high-sounding title, will be a sub-committee for translating psychological warfare objectives, and turning them over to the Director's staff for parceling out to agencies capable of performing these tasks. As an example, the State Department will handle some of these and the Services have and will develop others even though mechanisms already exist for handling them. These will also be coordinated by the Director and his staff. I have not, I never have, and I do not visualize building up a big agency to do this job. These men in State and Defense will be on a command level. That is the only way to get the job done. Mr. Lovett and Mr. Webb are overworked men and will not be able to put much time into this paper, so you have got to insure that the personnel and facilities of your departments are able to work on it. You will have to be completely ruthless in getting the people to do this work. We will draft some competent juniors to assist us on an ad hoc basis. We should specify what should be done, how it should proceed, what the necessary mechanisms

Approved For Release 2003/04/22 : CIA-RDP80R01731R003400010035-0

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necessary mechanism for getting it started, and that is my whole thinking. I think I have talked too much already.

General Magruder: It seems to me that we have the troops and facilities but that we completely lack somebody to do the direction . In this we are like a group of armies without a staff. We have one advantage in this in that the prestige of our leaders is such that they speak for their departments. However, <sup>we</sup> ~~the~~ need management as well as planning. We have only self-initiating <sup>projects</sup> ~~programs~~ at the present time -- it can't be cumulative or connected on this basis. We must have good talent to begin with. Before that you must have: an answer to this Board business where NSC leaves off. The next steps are the guidance, the timing, the programming so that the operating agencies can go from there and conduct their own programs. I have seen a paper on East Asia and another paper on Southeast Asia, giving the areas and the problems. This should be supplemented by other papers. Then I saw another paper on  -- an excellent

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[ ] -- an excellent paper -- to my mind this was an answer to MacArthur's statement "there is ~~an~~ no alternative to my way ~~and~~ <sup>but</sup> frustration". If NSC approves that paper, then this Agency could take it and put it into action. The policy is there, and the framework is there. We must not plan in a vacuum, and we should avoid Ivory-Towered thinking. Our plans must be practical. ~~There is~~ There is no use to have plans if we can't carry them out. For example, if OPC can do only a limited job in three months, we should prescribe only that which can be done. But if something more can be done in six months and if you knew what it was you could do it, but as it is we have no directives and no guidance.

General Smith: It all adds up to this: while we have the equipment and power, we are not doing the job we should. The question of timing is very important. (Here he gave several examples, including <sup>the</sup> situation in [ ] and in the case of

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the [ ] loan.)

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Approved For Release 2003/04/22 : CIA-RDP80R01731R003400010035-0

Allen found that the World Bank was about to give a "No" on the question of a loan to [ ] I took it up with the State Depart-

ment. We wanted to get a loan of [ ] to

strengthen [ ]. The time was short. If, when we had shot half

[ ]

have lost it all. So Allen arranged for temporizing a bit. That's psychological warfare. But, you have to coordinate all of this, and that's where you have got to provide the mechanisms for it.

(To Admiral Stevens) ~~With the mechanisms~~ Steve, what do you think?

Admiral Stevens: With the mechanisms we have you have got to coordinate everything. But I don't see how you can insure that some branch of the government which is involved won't stumble in carrying it out.

Mr. Dulles: That is right. You never know when some clerk in the Treasury Department will stop something like this.

General Smith: That is

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General Smith: That is psychological warfare. You have got to weigh the factors: you can't insure the factors, any more than you can protect yourself from a damn fool, but whatever we do, we must not pyramid this into a bureaucracy.

Admiral Stevens: Here we have the most convenient mechanism for rapid decisions -- a decision-rendering agency is most important. We have an agency through which new policies can be approved by the NSC. Another difficulty is that the Presidential directive paper does not divide this into cold war or hot war phases. We have an agency for planning hot war decisions and we need a cold war planning agency. There is nobody responsible for conducting the cold war. This puts quite a light on the Board's powers. If it is in cold war they can work independently of the JCS, but when you get into hot war you are wrapped up in JCS hot war directives.

General Smith: Remember, you have hot war on one-half of your periphery, and cold war on the other and when you have that situation you don't have trouble in the organization or any quibbling. You are quite right that we do have this situation now but it will be

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Approved For Release 2003/04/22 : CIA-RDP80R01731R003400010035-0

troublesome as you go along. Therefore, <sup>if</sup> it works out properly, it would be a staff for cold war.

General Magruder: Yes, we have a cold war which started three years ago.

General Smith: -- and which we hope may go on for another ten years.

General Magruder: There is another thing which we are up against -- the assumption that is, that the cold war can't be won so that there is very little planning on it. If the JCS will start with the assumption and decisiveness that the cold war can be won -- a state of mind will develop which will make it so. -- and this wouldn't interfere with the hot war build-up. If the Orthodox chiefs of government, ~~State, Defense, and~~ ~~State and~~ ~~Department of Defense~~ such as JCS, State, and Department of Defense adopt this state of mind then ~~it~~ it will help a great deal. I think that we should not only assume that we can win the cold war but that we can also avoid the hot war.

General Smith: The JCS

Approved For Release 2003/04/22 : CIA-RDP80R01731R003400010035-0

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Approved For Release 2003/04/22 : CIA-RDP80R01731R003400010035-0

General Smith: The JCS decisions will have a <sup>profound</sup> ~~strong~~ effect on/cold war psychological side, therefore, they have got to be brought in on everything we do. Everything they do has a terrific effect, such as whether they call in or defer a draft quota. In the cold war, the questions of timing are <sup>most</sup> ~~more~~ important.

General Magruder: Look at the confusing, contradictory announcements that have gone out lately. This Agency should have in charge of it an individual important enough to take charge, a man who can bring in the timing and do such things as deciding when Presidential and other announcements will be given in order to utilize them properly.

Admiral Stevens: Even in cold war, the principal function of the Board is a decision-rendering agency. An example of this is the provision

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At present, there is no place to go for a decision.

The principal questions will be what was involved -- the mechanisms

in existing government Approved For Release 2003/04/22 : CIA-RDP80R01731R003400010035-0

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this. There will be many questions the JCS can give you an answer on, but they cannot be stampeded and they are not set up to give quick decisions. Crash meetings of the JCS are possible but they are not routine. How will ~~your~~ decisions get before this Board? There must be ample machinery. In this there is no intent to supplant other organizations, like Mr. Barrett's. But decisions should come to you from existing agencies -- and then buck the questions to this Board. There won't be many of these questions and they will have only the important things. I believe that they will fall back on the Board only in an emergency.

General Smith: The fewer the better.

Admiral Stevens: The functions of the staff are not to answer problems and not to produce papers. The functions are to formulate questions, not to produce the papers.

General Magruder: (To Admiral Stevens) Steve, in an army, the subordinates are in constant <sup>contact</sup> with the commanders. We need a broad framework in which

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Approved For Release 2003/04/22 : CIA-RDP80R01731R003400010035-0

framework in which to operate on this staff.

Admiral Stevens: The charter puts the primary responsibility the formulation of policies. My point is that the formulation of policies can be gotten by telling these agencies, rather than the staff.

General Smith: If the staff formulates this, we do not have, definitively, the policies necessary. We don't have it sufficiently to say that this is our objective and this is how we will do it. We must assure that there are agencies which are doing it and that these agencies can do it. We can't set up a ~~division~~ Director and a staff and set in all the details. -- these exist. ~~some~~ *etc largely* ~~editing~~ editing and ~~assembling~~ assembly.

Admiral Stevens: On the question of propaganda, we need an intelligent body that will sit down and work on the problem. They should work on the individual details. Such papers should come out and pass on to the Board's organization. One more point I would

like to make:

Approved For Release 2003/04/22 : CIA-RDP80R01731R003400010035-0

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like to make: what is decided on functions and duties should be kept out of a formal paper. In the case of Davidson's paper there was a very violent reaction and that was enough to convince me that if we used the same tactics we would have a charter wrangle for months. So, it is my recommendation that if you prepare such a paper, keep it to yourselves. No one will agree on it but you.

General Magruder: It is pretty fuzzy, as we said.

Admiral Stevens: I wouldn't unfuzz it. That will be in your favor.

General Smith: Let's not unfuzz it. (Mr. Wisner can add something to this passage)

Admiral Stevens: The function of the JCS representative is rather important. He should function to point out wherein such instructions will have the concurrence of the JCS.

General Smith: The Secretary of Defense can worry about that. That is Bob Lovett's job. Once you decide, let him coordinate. The

JCS ~~mandate can~~

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JCS members can argue, but we don't want to. Decisions taken by the Board can be very broad. We will limit what we propose to do, and the representatives of State, Defense, and CIA will decide what to do and JCS can go on from there.

Mr. Dulles: Where do we go from here? What is our next move? If there is a ~~Director~~ Director, he has got to have a staff. Will there be a panel of consultants?

General Smith: They will come up with ideas.

Mr. Dulles: By countries and by areas, what is being done today by the State Department and Defense Department and others? We need a balance sheet for the Board to look at.

General Magruder: The Director must depend on the highest class of men to be made available from each of the agencies concerned -- but not to bring any in cold from civil life.

General Smith: We have Dr. Milikan. Now are there any conflicts? (To Mr. Wisner) Frank?

Mr. Wisner: I am in

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Mr. Wisner: I am in practically full agreement, except for a few details. I have a question in my mind as to the type of man needed: these men should be on the policy side plus some experience on the psychological warfare side. They need both.

Admiral Stevens: You need people versed in government to formulate questions and let OPC do the job.

General Smith: You must also meet <sup>a</sup> ~~the~~ public demand. Without a front, the public and Congress will be dissatisfied. You will have a lot of projects, but there is no harm in a <sup>many</sup> ~~lot~~ projects. Perhaps one out of a hundred projects will be acceptable. We have not even here <sup>of</sup> psychological warfare experts present. Whoever the President appoints as the Director will get thousands of ideas.

Mr. Dulles: He will really be open to the outside breezes.

General Smith: As an example, I had a suggestion passed along to me which contained seven pages of what CIA should do on psychological warfare, and a lot

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warfare, and a lot of it was a lot of God damn dribble - much of it.

Admiral Stevens: Don't develop ideas yourselves, otherwise, you will have the situation of a group of amateurs competing with a lot of professionals. The staff is merely a front for the public -- to separate the sheeps from the goats -- to take good ideas and work on them. We could get some men like Paul Mitzer on this.

Mr. Dulles: Regarding Paul Mitzer, don't rob Peter to pay Paul.

General Smith: We<sup>th</sup> have the President's directive. You have got it. There is an order. Within its terms we have got to frame something. This must do good, not harm. It must be effective, not destructive. You can't worry too much about the effect. You can get plenty of good ideas. Filter and reject the trash

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the trash. You will find a grain of wheat among a lot of chaff here and there.

~~subcommittee~~ Put it into the machine. Pass it

on to the Board to people able to draw on their own agencies for

advice. Then pass it on to the NSC for approval. Then instruct

their agencies. The terms are in the Charter and it is broad in

scope. Include this: what is to be the operating procedure, and

how is it to function? Who will do the work? <sup>You</sup> ~~We~~ should get hold

of some bright young minds from the State Department, Defense, and

CIA. I will provide <sup>a</sup> ~~the~~ chairman, but you had better have somebody

on this.

Admiral Stevens: I will put someone on this.

Mr. Barrett: I will, too.

General Magruder: So will I.

General Smith (to General Magruder): You represent Defense, so  
<sup>factfully</sup>  
draw up ~~factually~~ the differences between cold war and hot war.

(To General Magruder) You can go to Bob Lovett and draft anyone.

You are the main agent. (To the entire group) Draw up an ad hoc

committee ~~to~~ for

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committee for the mutual study. Organize the functions and responsibilities for the staff. If you want to go into the mechanics, go ahead.

Mr. Wisner: Will this be a formal paper to be circulated for concurrence?

General Smith: It will be a paper not to be circulated for concurrence. Get the representatives together and prepare a paper for them.

General Magruder: A concept for them to consider.

General Smith: ~~Outline~~ Outline how to proceed in absence of a Director. We represent agencies to carry out psychological warfare. How should we get started now?

Admiral Stevens: This study should set up a framework to see that existing mechanisms don't get their toes stamped on.

General Smith: ~~Make the damn thing brief~~ Make the damn thing brief.

This is what we

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This is what we need: How many, <sup>and</sup> how many from each department, where they should sit, then show which are the agencies, plus the outside agencies; such as Treasury, ECA, Commerce, and everything else. The President can draw on others from time to time and issue directives and proposals from time to time.

General Magruder: It should not be in terms of a charter.

Mr. Wisner: One or two points: (To Mr. Barrett) In view of the scope of this thing, shouldn't ~~Doc~~ Doc Matthews have a representative?

Mr. Barrett: Yes, and a top information guy, too.

Mr. Wisner: There is a vacuum in government in economic warfare. Some agency in the government should provide guidance in economic warfare. This excludes overt aspects of economic warfare but not covert.

General Magruder: NSC 10/2 sets this up. Forget that it cannot be set up in ~~time~~ <sup>time</sup>, but in place of it you have a Board set up to carry out covert

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carry out covert psychological warfare.

Mr. Wisner: Let the Board consider that it can provide guidance in that field.

Mr. Dulles: For example, in the case of [ ] time is running out. By the time that the study could be prepared the opportunity might be lost. By next week we can bring up something for [ ] if we get together now.

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General Smith: You can't get the Board together now because Mr. Webb is away. I am the small fry, therefore, I am the chairman. Those men, within their lines of authority, have done all they can. We must proceed on [ ] as we have done before.

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Admiral Stevens: Tell CIA to take on [ ]

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Mr. Dulles: What about your organization? You will have fifteen different things in three or four departments of the government. They won't wait <sup>for us.</sup> You will have five or six in State and five or six in MDAP and others in JCS.

Mr. Barrett: I agree in part. There is a danger in getting

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tied up in this study. But we have three men who work together smoothly and who work well together. But this thing has big possibilities: this Board will be one of the few mechanisms in government which can move fast. I would like to get your broad psychological objectives -- not more than two pages at the most.

Then we can single out the three, four, or five things which need priority attention. One of these I have listed here; this

25X1 is [ ] That will be State Department. Next is [ ] which 25X1 is 99% OPC. This can be coordinated with the State Department.

25X1 Next, is [ ] which is almost ready. Then there

25X1 is the [ ] plan which is almost ready. Now, with the authority of these three men you can start some concerted action. State

25X1 should take the lead on [ ] OPC should take the lead on [ ] 25X1

25X1 and [ ]

General Magruder: Take the question of the Board: OPC is

25X1 concerned with [ ] and there are many other divisions, including

Colonel Stilwell's

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Colonel Stilwell's division, but it is hap-hazard, not cumulative  
and consecutive. Nothing would please ADPC and Stilwell more than  
a broad directive to enable his people to go ahead. We need broad  
instructions. The Board won't go into detailed planning. We need  
a concept broader and more consecutive than this. What are the  
internal objectives? What types of activity? The next echelon  
will have to plan in detail. The Board should keep it in practical  
terms and indicate areas where we can increase our facilities as  
necessary.

Mr. Barrett: (To General Smith) It is 12:30 and I have to go.

I have a formal luncheon at 12:30.

General Smith: Let's get these points then: (1) what is the  
extent of my responsibility; (2) through what means, and (3) and  
what am I going to do. Lovett, Webb, and myself are given this  
responsibility. These are the questions they want answered, and  
they want them at the next meeting and they want action on them.

I have a luncheon myself at 12:30.

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(At this point the meeting was adjourned)



R. A. WINSTON  
SP/DCFW  
(Recorder)

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PRELIMINARY STAFF MEETING  
NATIONAL PSYCHOLOGICAL STRATEGY BOARD  
(NPSB)

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