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11 October 1950

MEMORANDUM FOR MR. REBER

SUBJECT: A Program for COAPS

REFERENCE: Draft Memorandum for the DCI, Subject: "The Control of CIA"

1. The problems which the DCI must solve are astronomical in numbers and magnitude. Yet it is not hard to formulate a program for an approach to the solution of these problems, on the basis that we must identify the more fundamental problems and solve them, and in the expectation that in the end many problems will tend to fall of their own weight, once the fundamentals are solved.

2. The most fundamental of all the problems is to devise a means to increase the "span of control" of the DCI, in other words, to augment his scope as an individual so that he can measure up to the fantastic proportions of his job. My solution is to give him a policy staff - see my draft "The Organization of the CIA Staff".

3. Utilizing this staff the DCI must then proceed to exercise strong central control of the Agency. The draft referred to above makes this suggestion to the DCI in the discussion justifying the creation of the policy staff.

4. Assuming that the policy staff is created, and that COAPS becomes the "Intelligence Staff" which I recommend, we must then lay out a program. Incidentally, we can do something about such a

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program even as COAPS, but I feel that the change I recommend will enable us to do a much better job.

5. As a program for the Intelligence Staff, I recommend that we proceed as follows:

a. The Utilization of the IAC - Let us organize proper secretarial support for the IAC. Every matter considered by the IAC should be embodied in a clear, concise paper. The DCI should be fully briefed for meetings, adequate minutes should be prepared, and matters before the IAC should be followed up so that they are expeditiously disposed of. On a controversial problem, we ought to force the issue aggressively so that it does not remain on the books without solution for months, or even a year or so, as in the past. This IAC problem is not really the top problem in order of importance, but it is a current one which we cannot avoid. We can get no respect for CIA until the IAC is made a business-like body.

b. The CIA Production Mission - Let us define the production mission of CIA. This is fundamental to putting CIA's own house in order, which we must do before the Agency can carry out its coordination function effectively.

c. The CIA Organization for Production - Then, let us formulate recommendations for a sound production organization within the Agency. Scientific production is now illogically separated from other national intelligence production. ORE is a sprawling, compartmented organization

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so loosely put together with so many separate pieces that it is impossible of control. The divisions have no common concept of purpose, and are pulling in all directions at once.

d. A Production Plan - Next, let us stimulate the drafting of a plan for the guidance of the production activities of the Government. Such a plan should define the responsibilities of all the producing agencies, and should provide means for mutual support. Very important for CIA, the plan should provide for departmental support of national intelligence production.

e. A Collection Plan - Simultaneously, with our attack of the production problems, let us deal with collection. I say "simultaneously" because there is much we can do without awaiting a final solution of all the production problems. (It is true, nevertheless, that we can never have completely effective collection until the national production effort is rationalized and organized.) The basic thing to do about collection is to explain and put into use the "intelligence cycle" in CIA, and then externally. Such action will lead to the formulation and maintenance of a collection plan for the Government. We must originate and then steer this activity throughout.

f. Policy Guidance for Collection Activities - Concurrently with our activity under 5e, let us

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progressively build up policy guidance for the collection activities, first, of CIA, and then of the rest of the intelligence agencies. The collection field is alive with frictions, duplications, voids, uncoordinated requirements, failures to put first things first, and just plain poor reporting. We must seek out these deficiencies and destroy them. Within CIA, we can obtain our objectives by obtaining decisions from the DCI. It is only he who can make such decisions, because there are so many conflicting interests within the Agency, pro and con, that problems cannot be solved by negotiation and cooperation among equals; they can be solved only by direction.

g. The CIA Organization for Covert Operations -

Let us formulate recommendations for a sound organization for covert operations within the Agency. Our action may be taken at any convenient time, considering the rest of this program, but the sooner the better. With OSO and OPC separated as they are at present, they lack coordination, and there is a grave danger that operations mounted in the field by the two offices may come into mutually destructive conflict with each other. It is axiomatic that covert operations require central control. Within the comprehensive successor to OSO and OPC, I believe that we shall find upon examination that a major

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element should be set up to give undivided attention to the collection of information, as opposed to other types of covert operations.



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i. Policy and Doctrine - As we implement this program we shall be required to develop policy and doctrine for the control and conduct of the intelligence activities both of CIA and of the remainder of the Government. Such fragmentary treatment will not, however, suffice in the end. Let us, therefore, work constantly toward development of a comprehensive body of policy and doctrine to guide CIA in the first instance, but later to be extended to guide all intelligence activities of the Government. The lack of a common philosophy is a major cause of the present confusion in intelligence circles.

6. With reference to the items of the program suggested in paragraph 5, I have tried to provide sufficient accompanying remarks only to make clear to what I refer in each case. But I am prepared to make positive recommendations concerning each item.

Recommendations

7. I recommend:

a. That you send forward to the DCI the memorandum, "The Control of CIA", which I have furnished you in draft form, and

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which asks for approval of the establishment of an "Intelligence Staff";

b. That you proceed to set up the "Intelligence Staff", provided such action is approved by the DCI;

c. That you adopt the program suggested in paragraph 5, for implementation either by the "Intelligence Staff" or by COAPS, whichever we turn out to be, realizing that we shall be less effective if we remain COAPS;

d. That, in executing the program, you follow the concept brought out in the memorandum, "The Control of CIA", to the effect that CIA's own house must be put in order before the DCI can be successful in the fulfillment of his coordinating responsibility.



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