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21 December 1949

MEMORANDUM FOR: CHIEF, COAFS

SUBJECT : Revision of NSCID 1

1. The attached draft of a National Security Council Intelligence Directive sets forth what, in our opinion, was the Congressional concept of how CIA would work. We believe that none of the basic principles are new, but some of them have not before actually been applied. There are, however, some novel aspects, mainly procedural, which this proposal would bring up.

2. If this paper were accepted, there would be no series of NSCID's. Under the charter here set forth, the Director would control implementation through DCI's, except when he determines that a major policy question is raised of specific interest to the NSC. He would then make an appropriate recommendation and, if approved, the policy decision would become an amendment or a supplement to this paper. Some of the present NSCID series would therefore fall to the level of DCI's, and those which remained as NSC policy matters should be very short policy statements, mainly of responsibility, to be thoroughly implemented by DCI's. On the other hand, certain procedural aspects, normally subject for a DCI, would involve policy. Thus the manner of forming and coordinating recommendations to the NSC probably deserves an expression of NSC intent. Such major policy papers on procedure probably should not be incorporated into this Directive, but could accompany it as procedural appendices.

3. Under our concept, an important subject, as, for instance, overseas defectors, could be handled by a supplemental paragraph to this paper, assigning basic responsibility for exploitation and handling, followed by a DCI setting forth detailed procedures. By and large, this paper should be the only lengthy paper submitted to the NSC.

attach: Draft NSCID 1

cc: Exec
ORE
OSI

/s/
LAWRENCE R. HOUSTON
General Counsel
Legal Staff

State Department review completed

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NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL INTELLIGENCE DIRECTIVE

Pursuant to the provisions of Section 102 of the National Security Act of 1947, as amended, and for the purposes enunciated in paragraphs (d) and (e) thereof, the National Security Council hereby authorizes and directs that the following policies, duties and responsibilities will govern the conduct of United States foreign intelligence activities in the interest of national security, and national aims and objectives. The recommendations of the Central Intelligence Agency, required by Section 102(d)(2), on matters concerning such foreign intelligence activities of the Government departments and agencies as relate to national security, will, when approved by the National Security Council, issue as amendments or supplements to this Directive.

I. Jurisdiction.

1. The jurisdiction of the Central Intelligence Agency embraces all foreign intelligence activities of the Government. The Central Intelligence Agency shall have no police, subpoena, or law enforcement powers, or internal security functions.

II. The Director of Central Intelligence and the Central Intelligence Agency.

1. The Director of Central Intelligence shall function within his jurisdiction as the intelligence officer of the

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National Security Council and as its executive agent for the purpose of coordinating the foreign intelligence activities of the several departments and agencies of the Government.

2. The necessary authority is hereby delegated by the members of the National Security Council to the Director of Central Intelligence, so that his decisions, orders and directives concerning the foreign intelligence activities of the Government shall be considered as emanating from them, in their executive capacity, and shall have full force and effect as such, provided that any agency shall have access, through appropriate channels, to the National Security Council, in connection with such directives.

3. The Director of Central Intelligence or representatives designated by him shall make such surveys and inspections of departmental intelligence activities and facilities of the various departments and agencies of the Government as he may deem necessary in connection with his duty to advise the National Security Council and to make recommendations for or to bring about the coordination or improvement of intelligence activities. This authority is subject to the provisions of Section 102(e) of the National Security Act of 1947, as amended, regarding the Federal Bureau of Investigation.

4. The Central Intelligence Agency shall function under the Director of Central Intelligence as the intelligence

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facility of the National Security Council and the President of the United States.

5. The Director of Central Intelligence shall be responsible for the protection of intelligence sources and methods from unauthorized disclosure.

III. Coordination of Intelligence Activities.

1. Coordination of intelligence activities by the Central Intelligence Agency shall be designed primarily to strengthen the entire governmental intelligence structure and to achieve a fully integrated United States intelligence effort in objective support of policy planning, strategic planning, and operational decisions at all appropriate levels within the Government. A fully integrated intelligence effort is considered to mean that:

a. the combined intelligence production effort of the Central Intelligence Agency and the departmental intelligence agencies is continuously oriented toward the requirements of United States national security interests and objectives in all foreign areas.

b. the combined intelligence collection and source exploitation effort of the Central Intelligence Agency and the other intelligence agencies effectively meets the requirements of the combined intelligence production effort.

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c. all categories of intelligence requirements bearing on the national security are specifically identified and defined and the responsibilities for collection and production are appropriately allocated throughout the governmental intelligence structure.

d. the interchange of intelligence, intelligence information, and other information which has utility for intelligence purposes is effected between the Central Intelligence Agency and the other intelligence agencies under appropriate security provisions, and in accordance with the respective requirements of the intelligence agencies concerned.

2. The Central Intelligence Agency shall be responsible for the coordination of intelligence activities to meet the foregoing objectives, and is authorized to employ such measures as the Director of Central Intelligence deems necessary in order to fulfill this responsibility. The chiefs of the intelligence agencies of the Departments of State, Army, Navy, Air Force and Justice, the Joint Chiefs of Staff and the Atomic Energy Commission shall be responsible for assisting the Director of Central Intelligence in carrying out the intelligence coordinating responsibilities of the Central Intelligence Agency in support of the foregoing objectives.

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3. An Intelligence Advisory Committee shall be established in order to advise the Director of Central Intelligence on matters pertaining to the Agency's responsibilities for coordinating the intelligence activities of the several Government departments and agencies and on other appropriate matters in the field of intelligence and to maintain the relationship essential to such coordination.

a. The Intelligence Advisory Committee shall consist of the Director of Central Intelligence as Chairman, who shall be the presiding officer thereof, the Directors of Intelligence of the Departments of State, the Army, Navy, and Air Force, the Joint Staff (JCS), the Atomic Energy Commission, and the Director of the Federal Bureau of Investigation (or their representatives).

b. The Director of Central Intelligence shall invite the head (or his representative) of any other agency having functions related to the national security to sit with the Intelligence Advisory Committee, whenever he deems such action necessary or desirable.

IV. Production and Dissemination of Intelligence by the Central Intelligence Agency.

1. The Central Intelligence Agency shall plan, produce and disseminate the intelligence relating to the national security for the President, the National Security Council and its staff, and for such governmental departments and agencies as the

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National Security Council shall, from time to time, specifically designate. Such intelligence shall be considered National Intelligence, and shall be produced for such designated agencies either separately in connection with their specific responsibilities, or collectively in connection with matters of concern to more than one department or agency.

2. The Central Intelligence Agency shall also produce:

a. intelligence in fields of common concern, which the National Security Council determines can be more efficiently produced centrally; and

b. intelligence not otherwise available which is required to support the Central Intelligence Agency production and operations as well as those of other appropriate governmental agencies.

3. Whenever the Central Intelligence Agency deems it advisable, or upon specific request of the National Security Council, the Agency shall, prior to publication for general dissemination, request the appropriate departmental intelligence agencies to review Central Intelligence Agency reports and estimates for the purpose of ascertaining departmental views on those aspects of national intelligence which fall within the field of their respective individual departmental or agency intelligence responsibilities. Intelligence so reviewed shall

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carry a statement of agency concurrence therein, or a comment which sets forth the substantial points of difference; provided, that delays in the receipt by the Central Intelligence Agency of such comments shall not bar the timely dissemination of national intelligence.

4. The Central Intelligence Agency shall disseminate intelligence which it may have produced or intelligence information collected through its own sources, to the appropriate departments and agencies of the Government whenever such dissemination is appropriate to their functions relating to the national security. Such dissemination shall be made under security regulations and procedures established by the Director of Central Intelligence.

V. Additional Responsibilities of the Central Intelligence Agency.

1. The Central Intelligence Agency shall perform, for the benefit of the intelligence organizations of the Government, such additional services of common concern as the National Security Council determines can be more efficiently accomplished centrally and such other functions and duties related to intelligence affecting the national security as the National Security Council may from time to time direct.

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2. Departmental requirements in support of an integrated United States intelligence effort shall receive the cooperation and support of the Central Intelligence Agency.

3. The Director of Central Intelligence shall make arrangements with the respective departments and agencies to assign to the Central Intelligence Agency such experienced and qualified officers and members as may be of advantage for advisory, operational, or other purposes, in addition to such personnel as the Director of Central Intelligence may directly employ. In each case, such departmental personnel will be subject to the necessary personnel procedures of the department concerned.

VI. Additional Responsibilities of Governmental Intelligence Agencies to Central Intelligence Agency.

1. In accordance with the provisions of sections 102(d) and (e) of the National Security Act of 1947, as amended, and with the approval of the President, and subject to the special proviso of Section 102(e) regarding the Federal Bureau of Investigation, all departments and agencies of the Government shall make available to the Central Intelligence Agency for correlation, evaluation, and dissemination, all intelligence or intelligence information relating to the national security in their possession.

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2. The dissemination of such intelligence and intelligence information to the Central Intelligence Agency shall be made regardless of the source of such information. To this end, the so-called "Third-Agency Rule", which provides that classified information originating in one agency shall not be disseminated outside the receiving agency without the consent of the originating agency, is specifically abrogated insofar as the Central Intelligence Agency is concerned.

3. In cases, however, where the originating agency requests that special security considerations govern the dissemination of specific material to third agencies, such requests shall be given the maximum considerations by the Central Intelligence Agency and shall be complied with to the maximum extent which the Director of Central Intelligence shall determine is compatible with the national security.

4. "Such intelligence as relates to the national security" shall include all intelligence and intelligence information which the Director of Central Intelligence determines is required by the Central Intelligence Agency for the production of national intelligence.

5. The intelligence organizations in each of the departments and agencies of the Government shall maintain with the Central Intelligence Agency and with each other, as appropriate to their respective responsibilities, a continuing interchange of

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intelligence information and intelligence available to them. "Operational" information and scientific, technological, diplomatic and other information which has utility for intelligence purposes is included in this directive, as well as information available only under special security handling restrictions. In the latter case, each intelligence organization will promptly make arrangements with the Director of Central Intelligence to make such material available to the Central Intelligence Agency under appropriate security safeguards. The flow of such material shall be immediate, spontaneous and comprehensive. No department or agency shall hold back, or delay the transmittal of such material to the Central Intelligence Agency.

6. All requests from the Central Intelligence Agency for such material shall be honored immediately by all departments and agencies of the Government to the fullest extent of their capabilities.

7. The departments and agencies of the Government shall provide, produce or collect such intelligence and intelligence information in their fields of primary responsibility as the Central Intelligence Agency may request for its use or that of one of the other departments or agencies. Within the limits of their capabilities they shall provide, produce or collect such additional intelligence and intelligence information in other fields as may be requested by the Central Intelligence

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8. In order that the Central Intelligence Agency may adequately discharge its responsibilities to the National Security Council, timely departmental action in meeting Central Intelligence Agency commitments and deadlines is imperative. Upon specific request of the Central Intelligence Agency first priority shall be given in each departmental intelligence organization to the requirements of the Central Intelligence Agency. Such priority shall apply to field and departmental collection action, production of departmental contributions to Central Intelligence Agency production, and the coordination of Central Intelligence reports and estimates.

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AGENDA AND SUMMARY OF COMMENTS
IAC MEETING ON QUESTION OF STAFF COORDINATION

1. Exchange of information on initiation of projects.
 - A. Procedures for coordination process set out in DCI/1 and DCI/2, however, the situation remains entirely unsatisfactory from CIA point of view.
 - B. No project planning is currently being accomplished by IAC Agencies even to the extent of an actual work program for the next month's operation.
 - C. ORE will examine detailed mechanism, coordinate with IAC Agencies and submit entire coordination procedure to COAFS for IAC Standing Committee action.
2. Extent and character of so-called "working-level" coordination with IAC analysts.
 - A. Analysis of coordination troubles reveals that the question of priorities within IAC Agencies for the production of a paper after the draft stage has been completed causes considerable difficulty.
 - B. Recommendations of interchange of initiated projects through the media of intelligence production plan, fully coordinated and implemented, will do much toward solving this problem.
3. Deadlines for comment and concurrence, problems of IAC Agencies in meeting deadlines.
 - A. General comment indicated that priority pressure within respective IAC Agency precludes the possibility of strict adherence to CIA imposed deadlines.
4. Authority of representatives at coordination meetings as compared with "working-level" coordination.
 - A. Persons attending IAC coordination meetings are not vested with the authority to commit their agencies but rather to convey their own opinions on the subject paper and are consulted by the respective intelligence chiefs who sign the concurrence or dissent.

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5. Evaluation of coordination meetings.

- A. General agreement reached that a conference is held to bring ideas of IAC together and changes to draft should be made by IAC Agency involved in original production.
- B. Coordination will restrict itself to substantive content and not include extensive editing of subject paper.

6. Considerations of the function of coordination.

- A. CIA receives dissents to intelligence papers that are not "substantial dissents", they are expressions of thoughts by IAC Agencies on how paper might have been written.
- B. CIA likewise receives conditional concurrences which if accepted and were incorporated into the paper, would then have to be recirculated and other IAC Agencies concurring in the first paper might not like the additions.
- C. Despite best attempts IAC Agency action on comments, concurrence or dissent to CIA paper constitutes partial responsibility for co-authorship.
- D. CIA's definition of concurrence is that the IAC Agencies see nothing which contravenes the conclusions that the agency concurring might have given.
- E. Revision of NSCID #5 would solve many of these apparent problems:

Para. 2.

"Each of the departmental agencies is responsible to its respective department in the fulfillment of the departmental mission, and to the Director of Central Intelligence in connection with departmental responsibilities for support of national intelligence production."

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PROPOSED REVISION OF NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL DIRECTIVE #3

PRODUCTION OF INTELLIGENCE AND COORDINATION

OF INTELLIGENCE PRODUCTION

Pursuant to the provisions of Section 102 of the National Security Act of 1947, and for the purposes emanated in paragraphs (d) and (e) thereof, and Section I and II of NSCID #1, the National Security Council hereby authorizes and directs that the following policies, objectives and responsibilities are established for the production of intelligence and for the coordination of its production throughout the governmental intelligence structure.

I. Basis and Responsibilities for Intelligence Production Planning

1. Intelligence shall be produced throughout the governmental intelligence structure for two main purposes, namely:

a. to reduce to a minimum the element of surprise in foreign conditions, situations and developments which affect US national security and objectives.

b. to provide support for national planning, strategic planning, and a basis for operational decisions at all appropriate levels within the government with respect to all foreign areas, conditions, and situations which pertain to US national security and objectives.

2. CIA and each of the other intelligence agencies represented on the IAG, hereinafter referred to as the departmental agencies, are responsible for the production of intelligence for both of the above stated purposes. For these purposes CIA is responsible to the President, the National Security Council, and to such other governmental agencies or bodies as the NSC shall from time to time specifically designate. Each of the departmental intelligence agencies is responsible to its respective department in fulfillment of the departmental mission, and to the Director of Central Intelligence in connection with departmental responsibilities for support of national intelligence production.

3. In view of the magnitude and diversity of intelligence coverage required to satisfy all needs at all levels of the governmental structure, careful planning is needed to insure the continuous application of the entire intelligence effort to the requirements of US national security objectives. Such planning must recognize and provide for simultaneous fulfillment of the individual and collective intelligence requirements of departmental and higher policy and planning levels of the government.

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4. In view of the fact that intelligence is effective only when it is closely linked with the policy planning, strategic planning and operational elements of the government, planning for such intelligence shall be accomplished under the guidance of the National Security Council.

5. The Director of Central Intelligence shall be responsible for the preparation, coordination, implementation and maintenance of integrated national intelligence production plans to meet the entire needs of national security. In the fulfillment of this responsibility he is authorized to issue such supplemental intelligence production directives pursuant to paragraph 8, NSCID #1, as may be required, and to conduct direct and active liaison for this purpose with the Policy Planning Staff of the Department of State; the planning committees of the Joint Chiefs of Staff; the operations planning staffs of the military departments, and such other agencies as the NSC may designate.

6. The Chiefs of the intelligence agencies of the Departments of State, Army, Navy, Air and of the Joint Chiefs of Staff shall be responsible for the preparation, coordination, implementation and maintenance of departmental intelligence production programs in support of such national intelligence production plans issued by the Director of Central Intelligence. Such intelligence production programs shall provide for the requirements of the departments as well as for departmental support to the national intelligence plan.

7. The above mentioned plans and programs will provide for utilization of research support from non-IAC governmental agencies and non-governmental research facilities to the maximum practicable extent, in accordance with applicable security regulations.

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CONFIDENTIAL

OIR - 5136

December 19, 1949

December 19, 1949

Robert Farley

State

NA

REF NA Political Dec. 23, 1949 Dec. 23, 1949

/The Diet and Political Parties.

JAPANESE ATTITUDES TOWARD PEACE TREATY PROBLEMS. PART I. IR

PROBLEM (What questions will be answered in this paper)

- What are Japanese attitudes toward the question of separate versus an overall peace treaty?
- What are Japanese attitudes toward security questions?
- What are Japanese attitudes toward territorial questions?

INITIALS OF COLLABORATOR

ESTIMATED WORK REQUIRED

PROPOSED DISTRIBUTION

plus

ESColbert/JM

PROPOSED CLASSIFICATION

Confidential

WSHunsberger

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

OFFICE OF REPORTS AND ESTIMATES

MEMORANDUM FOR THE SPECIAL ASSISTANT TO THE SECRETARY OF STATE
FOR INTELLIGENCE

SUBJECT: Notification of Initiation of Intelligence Estimate


1. The following intelligence estimate has been undertaken
by the Office of Reports and Estimates of the Central Intelligence
Agency:

Designation:

Title:

Scope:

Estimated completion date of draft:



ORGANIZATION OF PUBLICATIONS DIVISION
OFFICE OF REPORTS AND ESTIMATES

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Next 1 Page(s) In Document Exempt

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DISTRIBUTION OF THE CIA DAILY SUMMARY

The President
Secretary of State
Secretary of Defense
Secretary of the Army
Secretary of the Navy
Secretary of the Air Force
Chairman, National Security Resources Board
Executive Secretary, National Security Council
Chief of Staff, US Army
Chief of Naval Operations
Chief of Staff, US Air Force
Director of Plans and Operations, General Staff, US Army
Deputy Chief of Naval Operations (Operations)
Deputy Chief of Staff, Operations, US Air Force
Director of Plans and Operations, US Air Force
Special Assistant to the Secretary of State, Research and Intelligence
Director of Intelligence, General Staff, US Army
Chief of Naval Intelligence
Director of Intelligence, US Air Force
Secretary, Joint Chiefs of Staff
Assistant Secretary of Navy for Air
Joint Intelligence Group, Joint Staff

Coordination, Operations and Policy Staff

18 November 1949

Assistant Director for Reports and Estimates

Distribution of the CIA Weekly Summary

1. The present distribution list of the CIA Weekly Summary is in urgent need of revision. The list has been expanded from its original number on a piecemeal, ad hoc basis. As it now stands, the distribution is both too large and haphazard. Moreover, the CIA Weekly Summary, which is designed primarily for the attention of top-level personnel in the US Government, now gets a wide distribution among intelligence working-level personnel and other operational people who can derive only limited benefit from it. CIA needs to service these personnel in some more satisfactory way.

2. ORE proposes three lines of action for dealing with this problem:

(a) The formulation of a written policy on distribution of the CIA Weekly Summary and the establishment of a procedure for action upon new requests for the CIA Weekly Summary;

(b) The revision of the present distribution list in the light of this policy;

(c) The establishment of a new weekly publication, The CIA Weekly Review, to provide more adequate service for intelligence and operational personnel and to service those individuals who are removed from the distribution of the CIA Weekly Summary.

3. a. Proposed statement of policy on distribution of the CIA Weekly Summary.

The CIA Weekly Summary is an analytic review of trends and developments of topmost importance to US security. It is designed primarily for the attention of the President and the members of the National Security Council. It undertakes to provide them periodically with brief, current intelligence estimates of the world situation. Distribution of the CIA Weekly Summary beyond these individuals will be made only on a need-to-know basis and will require joint review by CIA and the intended recipient of the usefulness of the publication for his office.

b. Proposed distribution of the CIA Weekly Summary.

The distribution list in Tab "A" is believed to be adequate for the fulfillment of the CIA Weekly Summary's functions. It is substantially the same distribution now given the CIA Daily Summary

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and thus would meet the requirements of security if the Weekly Summary were made a Top Secret publication. The deletions from the present distribution of the CIA Weekly Summary (see Tab "B") include: 1 each from the Chief of Naval Operations and the Chief of Staff, Air Force; 2 from State Department Research and Intelligence; 9 from Intelligence Division, U.S. Army; 9 from Office of Naval Intelligence; 4 from Air Intelligence; 5 from OGD, Department of State; and 5 copies to miscellaneous recipients.

c. Proposed procedure for handling new requests for the CIA Weekly Summary.

New requests for distribution of the CIA Weekly Summary may be received by DCI, AD/ORE, or AD/OCD. Such requests are to be routed to COAPS who will inform AD/ORE and AD/OCD of the receipt of the request and will interview the intended recipient in order to ascertain his need for the publication. Action in granting or refusing the request will then be taken by a committee including representatives from COAPS, ORE, and OCD.

4. a. Prospectus for The CIA Weekly Review.

The CIA Weekly Review is a review of significant developments in the various parts of the world during the preceding week. It is designed primarily for intelligence and operational personnel who need a weekly review of available current intelligence in fields of their chief concern. The publication will be published in detachable sections so that the recipients may remove the portions pertaining to their geographic area if they so desire.

b. Proposed distribution of The CIA Weekly Review.

Despite the limitations imposed on the distribution of the CIA Weekly Review b. the lack of adequate reproduction facilities, it is believed that all present recipients of the ORE Division Weeklies (see Tab "C"), as well as those cut off from the CIA Weekly Summary, can be serviced. In order to reach the necessary operational and intelligence personnel in the IAC agencies, a maximum distribution of 50 copies would probably be more than adequate: 9 each to ID, A-2, OMI, and OIR, and 7 each to the operational level of Department of State. Using OIR as an example, each regional branch (there are a maximum of 7 in each Division) could be supplied with that portion of the Weekly Review which covered its area of responsibility and 2 additional copies would be available for consideration by higher level personnel needing global coverage

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in the discharge of their responsibilities. It is therefore proposed that COAPS canvas the IAC agencies to determine their exact needs, bearing in mind that present reproductive facilities will limit distribution outside CIA to approximately 50 copies.

c. Proposed procedure for acting upon new requests for The CIA Weekly Review.

New requests for distribution of The CIA Weekly Review may be received by DCI, AD/ORE, or AD/OCD. Such requests are to be routed to AD/ORE, who will inform COAPS and AD/OCD of the receipt of the request. The recommendation of AD/ORE in granting or refusing the request will be routed to COAPS for review and approval.

/s/

THEODORE BABBITT

Enclosures: Tab "A" -- The CIA Weekly Summary Proposed Distribution
Tab "B" -- The CIA Weekly Summary Present Distribution
Tab "C" -- Present Distribution of ORE Division Weeklies
Tab "D" -- The CIA Weekly Review Proposed Distribution
Tab "E" -- The CIA Weekly Review Sample Issue (6 copies)

L/Pub:RJSmith/co
Distributions:
COAPS (6)
AD/ORE (2)
D/Pub (1)

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DISTRIBUTION OF THE CIA WEEKLY SUMMARY

- 1. The President
- 2,64 Secretary of State
- 3,4 Secretary of Defense
- 5. Secretary of the Army
- 6. Secretary of the Navy
- 7. Secretary of the Air Force
- 8,70 Chairman, National Security Resources Board
- 9,71 Executive Secretary, National Security Council
- 10. Assistant Secretary of the Navy for Air
- 11,69 Chief of Staff, US Army
- 12,13,14. Chief of Naval Operations
- 15,16,17. Chief of Staff, US Air Force
- 18. Director of Plans and Operations, Gen. Staff, US Army
- 19. Deputy Chief of Staff (Operations), US Air Force
- 20. Deputy Chief of Naval Operations (Operations)
- 21. Director of Plans and Operations, US Air Force
- 22,23,24. Special Assistant to the Secretary of State for
Research and Intelligence

- 25,26,27,28,29,
30,31,32,33,34 Director of Intelligence, General Staff, US Army
- 35,36,37,38,39,
40,41,42,43,44 Director of Naval Intelligence
- 45,46,47,48,49. Director of Intelligence, US Air Force
- 50. Director of Intelligence, Atomic Energy Commission
- 51. Executive Secretary, Military Liaison Committee,
Atomic Energy Commission
- 52,53,54,55,56. Chief, Acquisition & Distribution Div., OSD, State
- 57. Director, Federal Bureau of Investigation
- 58. Secretary, Joint Chiefs of Staff
- 59. Chief, Policy Planning Staff, Department of State
- 60. Secretary of State (Attention: Policy Reports Staff)
- 61. Deputy Director, Joint Intelligence Group, Joint Staff
- 62,63 Secretary, Joint Intelligence Group, Joint Staff
- 65. US Air Force Representative of Joint Strategic
Survey Committee
- 68. Administrator, Economic Cooperation Administration

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Present Distribution of OEB Division Weeklies

ID

Current Intelligence Division	5	[Redacted]	(1)
			(1)
			(3)
Eurasian Branch	2		
Middle East Branch	4		
Far Eastern Branch	1		
[Redacted]	1		

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A-2

Air Estimates Branch	[Redacted]	7	[Redacted]
Directorate		3	
Civil Air Section		1	
Air Estimates Branch		2	
Study and Analysis Section			
Chief		1	

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OIR

[Redacted]		1	[Redacted]
NEA Division Chief		3	
Eastern European Branch		11	
Far Eastern Branch		5	
Latin American Branch		3	

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ONI

OP 322	11	WE (2) TC (5) FE (2) SE (2)
OP 35 	7	All except WE
Middle East Section	1	WEA
SE Asian Section	1	WEA
EE Section	1	WEA

Army

Transportation Corps	2	TC
MATS	2	TC

State

Division SW European Affairs	1	WEA
Division Near East Affairs	1	WEA
Greek, Turkish, Iran Affairs	1	WEA
Division South Asian Affairs	2	WEA
Office of African Affairs	1	WEA

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FUNCTIONS OF THE PUBLICATIONS DIVISION, ORE

As the ORE component having staff responsibility for scheduling, editing, and publishing of ORE reports, estimates, current intelligence summaries and evaluations (except the basic National Intelligence Surveys) the Publications Division will:

1. Recommend to the Estimates Production Board, on the basis of consultation with appropriate ORE components, the nature, scope, terms of reference, format, periodicity of the various media required to present the intelligence production of ORE.
2. Draw up terms of reference, in collaboration with the producing divisions and subject to the approval of the EPB, for specific reports, estimates, and current intelligence items, either in response to specific requests or on the initiative of D/Pub or the producing divisions.
3. Select, present, publish, and arrange for dissemination of those items of current intelligence prepared by ORE producing components which in the interests of national security should be brought to the attention of the President, members of the National Security Council, and the policy planning levels of the US Government.
4. Review and adapt ORE reports and estimates and obtain final clearance for them in ORE.
5. Coordinate the production of ORE publications both within CIA and with the IAC agencies and obtain final concurrence or dissent from the IAC agencies on such publications.
6. Determine final form of presentation of reports and estimates, including the use of graphic materials, and arrange for their publication.
7. Provide CIA watch services in order to insure continuous coverage of current situations and developments.

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Doesn't the continuation of
nitell. prod. program involve
a - knowing what has been
produced - where it is.
b - what is being produced
c - what should be produced
Taking into account A & B.
d - Arrange that it be
systematically disseminated
& identified.

Therefore, re attached, if
RR quit producing these, who
should produce them, or should
they ~~be~~ be produced & can they
be as systematically disseminated
regardless of where produced.

JDR

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
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8 February 1950

PRESENTING
ONE CONCEPT OF A CIA MASTER PLAN FOR
PRODUCTION

The memoranda herewith (see Index) are intended to clarify my own concept of a CIA master plan for production. They serve the purpose of aligning my own thinking as well as providing a ready means for comparing notes with others who are considering the same subject.

The series is incomplete. The obvious addition necessary to completion is a paper on the tactics to be followed to ensure the successful implementation of such a plan. At the moment, I think this paper will appear before long as TAB E. Any suggestions as to how to correct, round out, or complete my train of thought will, nevertheless, be appreciated.



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