

SECRET

INDEX

- TAB A Memorandum for Record, dated 7 October 1949, "Departmental Participation in the Preparation of CIA Reports and Estimates."
- TAB B Memorandum for Record, dated 14 October 1949, "Importance of a CIA Master Plan For Production."
- TAB C Memorandum for Record, dated 24 October 1949, "The Requirements of a CIA Master Plan for Production."
- TAB D Memorandum for Record, dated 6 February 1950, "The Nature of a CIA Master Plan for Production."

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7 October 1949

MEMORANDUM FOR RECORD

SUBJECT: Departmental Participation in the Preparation of CIA Reports and Estimates

1. The present DCI 3/1 prescribes an unwieldy procedure for departmental participation in the preparation of CIA "national intelligence reports and estimates," from which CIA is partially released only under "exceptional circumstances." The procedure has three main features, consisting of CIA solicitation of specific departmental contributions for each paper, followed by continued consultation with departmental representatives while the paper is in preparation, and wound up by the submission of the final draft for departmental concurrence or dissent. In the end, CIA is obligated to include the statements of concurrence or dissent with the paper as published.

2. This procedure has already defeated its purpose, which was ostensibly to make "national intelligence reports and estimates" more valuable to the user under the principle of collective responsibility. Whatever was its purpose, however, the procedure has been discredited due to its ponderosity which detracts from the value of the product because a paper can rarely be timely unless CIA simply disregards the procedure. The specific departmental contributions would be unnecessary if there were a true free-flow of produced intelligence, in accordance with a master plan. In any event, a CIA paper is valuable because it is a CIA paper, and the related IAC concurrences or dissents, the latter often not in the field of primary responsibility of the dissenting agency, are in many cases mere gratuitous appendages. In other cases the dissents are positively harmful, since the orientation is toward the support of departmental interests or the defense of departmental policy with consequent loss of objectivity.

3. Specifically, the principle of collective responsibility, if that was the original basis for the procedure prescribed by DCI 3/1, has been discarded by NSC approval of paragraph 5 b- Comments of NSC 50, which states in part: "..... we do not believe that the Director and the IAC should be bound by the concept of collective responsibility, because this would inevitably reduce coordinated national intelligence to the lowest common denominator among the agencies concerned."

4. The procedure would be ponderous even if the intelligence agencies were conveniently located relative to each other and gave full and

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instant cooperation to CIA. But the procedure is ridiculously ponderous on account of the fact that each IAC agency is responsible primarily to the head of its own department. It is the IAC agency, not CIA, which determines whether the preparation of a given contribution or participation in the preparation of a given paper will be given adequate priority to meet CIA's need. If this fact is coupled with the fact of the dispersed locations of the IAC agencies, and the two considered in the light of "running around" principle, the procedure appears almost insane.

5. As the General Counsel has pointed out, there is absolutely no question of the intent of Congress as implemented in the National Security Act of 1947. The primary peace-time mission of CIA is to prevent the surprise of the United States by any turn in the international situation or by a sudden armed onslaught. The responsibility that CIA carries out this mission rests on the DCI alone. In fact, his responsibility with respect to the national security is unique in its clarity and weight.

6. The heads of the IAC agencies have no such responsibility. The State Department intelligence organization has a vague responsibility for the support of the conduct of foreign affairs, but there is considerable confusion even within the State Department as to just what this responsibility is. Actually, it is a moot point as to whether State should have an intelligence organization, as such, at all. The intelligence organizations of the IAC have a mission of preparing for war, and that is all. This statement can be enlarged upon, but the enlargement can always be boiled back down to the basic statement. Military intelligence does not function normally as such without contact with the enemy in combat.

7. Considering the relative status of the DCI versus the heads of the IAC agencies, it is indeed utterly presumptuous for anyone to advance the "Board of Directors" concept of the IAC or to saddle CIA with any such procedure as that prescribed by DCI 3/1. There is no reason why CIA, an independent agency, should permit its documents to become vehicles for the satisfaction of departmental conceits. In fact, inclusion of extraneous matter in a CIA paper detracts from its value through dilution, and the recipient is forced to become an intelligence officer himself in order to reconcile opposing comments and dissents.

8. What should be stated as the most important function of the IAC agencies is the obligation to support CIA both in the collection of information and in the production of intelligence. If departmental production effort were then conducted in accordance with a CIA master plan, some order would begin to appear from chaos. In the production of CIA papers, full account should be taken of all available departmental produced intelligence, but there departmental participation in CIA production should stop. When necessary, papers on a given subject could be solicited from appropriate departments by CIA, but such papers should be finally approved by the intelligence chiefs concerned before receipt by CIA, and they should become simply grist to the mill.

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
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9. Although the IAC agencies would have to give some priority to production for CIA under the procedure outlined above, and once in a while some purely departmental project might be held up, it is very doubtful that the departments would really be hurt. As a matter of fact, CIA guidance might well set them on the track better to serve themselves.

10. The one proviso is that the CIA master plan would have to be thoroughly coordinated with the Joint Chiefs of Staff and with the NSC Staff to insure that all planning requirements were met.

11. RECOMMENDATION. As the question of amending the various NSCIDs and DCIs comes up from time to time, I recommend that any and all of them be amended in the spirit of the above discussion wherever they conflict.



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14 October 1949

MEMORANDUM FOR RECORD

SUBJECT: The Importance of a CIA Master Plan for Production

REFERENCE: My Memorandum For Record dated 7 October 1949, Subject: "Departmental Participation in the Preparation of CIA Reports and Estimates"

1. The reference memorandum gave the reasons why the present system for departmental participation in the preparation of CIA reports and estimates, as prescribed by DCI 3/1, should be scrapped. On the positive side, the memorandum went on to develop the concept that departmental participation in CIA production should be obtained by the generation of a free flow of departmental produced intelligence to CIA in accordance with a master plan. The recommendation was to the effect that as the question of amending various NSCIDs and DCIs comes up from time to time, any and all of them should be amended in the spirit of the discussion.
2. The purpose of the present paper is to emphasize the importance of the expeditious development of a CIA master plan for production.
3. Among other responsibilities, the National Security Act of 1947 charges CIA, under the direction of the NSC, with: (1) advising the NSC in matters concerning such intelligence activities of the government departments and agencies as relate to national security; (2) making recommendations to the NSC for the coordination of such intelligence activities and; (3) producing and disseminating intelligence relating to the national security, using, where appropriate, existing agencies and facilities. When these clauses of the Act are considered in the light of the recorded intent of Congress, there is no doubt that the responsibilities of the Director are clear. Furthermore, there is no doubt that the NSCIDs and DCIs are in violation of the law in so far as they tend to vitiate the ability of the Director to carry out his responsibilities, which, in fact, they do.
4. Recently the Dulles Survey Group averred, "The responsibility of CIA with respect to the coordination of intelligence activities has not been fully discharged." This statement has been approved by the NSC via paragraph 2a(1), NSC 50. The Dulles Survey Group also expressed dissatisfaction with CIA's production effort, this dissatisfaction having been echoed by the NSC through the approval of paragraph 5, NSC 50. With these actions of the NSC in mind, emphasized by CIA's own conviction that the Agency now finds itself in an unsatisfactory situation, it appears mandatory that suitable action be taken to resolve the problems involved in the coordination of intelligence activities.

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5. The coordination of intelligence activities is a broad field, including operations, production, collection, and dissemination, both CIA and departmental - but production is the phase where action should start. If we could formulate a definite production program for CIA that would meet the requirements of strategic planning and would call for and receive the cooperation of the IAC agencies, we could, in effect, orient the entire national intelligence effort, because CIA production, if CIA is to utilize rather than duplicate departmental effort, is dependent upon departmental production. Since operations, collection, and dissemination are simply supporting activities to production, the problem of their coordination would be on the road to solution if we had a generally accepted national production plan. At the very least, we would have begun to expose and clarify their deficiencies in a clear atmosphere.

6. The three provisions of the National Security Act of 1947, which are condensed in paragraph 3 above, are certainly adequate authority to formulate a master plan for production. In fact, they may even be construed to imply a congressional directive to do so.

7. Although, in many respects, the NSCIDs and DCIs are actually illegal, they do give the Director, even though not in strong language, the machinery for the promulgation of a master plan for production. The pertinent references are as follows: paragraphs 4, 8, and 10, NSCID No. 1; paragraphs 1e and 2, NSCID No. 3; NSCID No. 4; DCI No. 4/1. Paragraph 1e(3), NSCID No. 3 is the most cogent of these references. It reads: "The Director of Central Intelligence shall plan and develop the production of national intelligence in coordination with the IAC agencies in order that he may obtain from them within the limits of their capabilities the departmental intelligence which will assist him in the production of national intelligence."

8. In the light of the above discussion, the key to the coordination of intelligence activities as a whole is the coordination of production. The basis for the coordination of production is a master plan. The law and the directives give the Director the authority and the machinery to formulate and promulgate a master plan.

9. There is no doubt that the NSCIDs and DCIs require drastic revision to eliminate their tendency to vitiate the ability of the Director to carry out his responsibilities. Put more positively, they should be revised to give the Director more authority. But such revision will be a difficult and long drawn-out process, particularly since it can be pointed out that CIA has not so far come forth with positive leadership in the form of that prerequisite of all intelligence activities, a master plan for production. The IAC agencies are already subject to a sufficiency of ad hoc harassment within their own departments. In their eyes, a further grant of authority to the Director can, under present circumstances, but add more ad hoc harassment.

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10. Meanwhile, although the NSCIDs and DCIs are so worded at the present time as to enable the IAC agencies to avoid their responsibilities to CIA, they do not rule out the adoption of a role of unflagging effort by the Director to mold the national intelligence structure. Granted that their vagueness and qualifications will constitute road blocks which must be overcome on the way to the goal desired, still it is sound tactics to overcome such road blocks one by one. Conversely, even if it were possible to create a new system over night by the simultaneous revision of all the directives, nothing would be accomplished unless the IAC agencies were disposed to conform to the revised directives.

11. All in all, it appears that the first action to be taken by CIA to resolve the problems involved in the coordination of intelligence activities is to formulate and promulgate a master plan for production. The revision of the NSCIDs and DCIs should be undertaken gradually as the master plan begins to have an effect. The sooner the master plan is formulated the sooner it can be used as a coordinating instrument.

12. The requirements of a master plan and the tactics to be employed to make it effective are subjects in themselves which can be examined separately.

13. Conclusions: In conclusion it follows that:


a. It is mandatory that CIA take effective action to coordinate intelligence activities and to create a situation in which the Director can truly carry out his responsibilities;

b. The key to the coordination of intelligence activities is the coordination of production;

c. The basis for the coordination of production is a master plan; and

d. The revision of the NSCIDs and DCIs should be subordinated to progress with the master plan.

14. Recommendation: It is recommended that for the present the main effort of CIA in the coordination of intelligence activities, and in the process of creating a situation in which the Director can truly carry out his responsibilities, be devoted to the expeditious development of a master plan for production.



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24 October 1949

MEMORANDUM FOR RECORD

SUBJECT: The Requirements of a CIA Master Plan for Production

REFERENCE: (a) My memorandum for record dated 7 October 1949, Subject: "Departmental Participation in the Preparation of CIA Reports and Estimates."
(b) My memorandum for record dated 14 October 1949, Subject: "Importance of a CIA Master Plan for Production."

1. Reference (b) recommended that for the present the main effort of CIA in the coordination of intelligence activities and in the process of creating a situation in which the Director can truly carry out his responsibilities be devoted to the expeditious development of a master plan for production. Reference (a) discussed the desirable extent of departmental participation in the preparation of CIA reports and estimates, such participation to be obtained through the utilization of departmental produced intelligence provided in accordance with the master plan.

2. The purpose of the present paper is to establish the requirements of a master plan for production. In order to determine the requirements of a master plan, the relationship of CIA production to that of the departments must be examined.

3. Section 102 (a) (3) of the National Security Act of 1947 gives CIA the duty, under the NSC, "to correlate and evaluate intelligence relating to the national security, and provide for the appropriate dissemination of such intelligence within the Government using where appropriate existing agencies and facilities: Provided . . . : Provided further, That the departments and other agencies of the Government shall continue to collect, evaluate, correlate, and disseminate departmental intelligence:" The Act does not otherwise specifically mention production.

4. Thus the principal production effort of CIA under the law must be devoted to the production of what has been defined by NSCID 3 as "national intelligence." To quote the directive: "National Intelligence is integrated departmental intelligence that covers the broad aspects of national policy and national security, is of concern to more than one Department or Agency, and transcends the exclusive competence of a single Department or Agency or the Military Establishment." There is no doubt that this definition can be improved upon, but there is equally no doubt that excessive duplication is wasteful of funds and effort and a fertile source of confusion through the production of conflicting reports and estimates. There is, therefore, no sound argument which can be advanced

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against the implication in this definition that departmental production must be utilized by CIA in the production of national intelligence to the greatest extent practicable.

5. From this point of view, it is plain that the basic material for CIA production must consist in great part of produced intelligence received from the departments, yet the sum of departmental production does not add up to the total need of CIA for evaluated material to be used in the production of national intelligence. Therefore, it goes without saying that the Agency must undertake some original production itself. CIA's original production effort may be expanded from time to time to take in fields of common concern approved by the NSC. From the CIA point of view, let us categorize as primary production all the in-flowing departmental produced intelligence, together with the intelligence produced by CIA either to fill gaps or in fields of common concern.

6. But, as already pointed out, the principal production effort of CIA must be devoted to the production of national intelligence, to obtain which, in a given case, the related primary production of the departments and of CIA itself is reviewed and synthesized. The effort in this respect and the result may be termed comprehensive production.

7. Under the ideal situation which may be deduced from the law, CIA's production effort should be limited to (1) primary production which does not duplicate departmental effort either because of lack of departmental interest or responsibility or because of departmental agreement, and (2) comprehensive production. But for a number of reasons, the ideal situation has never materialized, and CIA has found itself rather often in competition with the departments. These reasons appear to be those outlined below:

a. CIA has had no production program either for internal guidance or for the overall coordination of intelligence activities.

b. The IAC agencies are unwilling clearly to define their own production efforts.

c. CIA has a tendency to accept requests for intelligence that clearly should have been addressed to another agency, but they have been sent to CIA purely as a matter of convenience to the high-ranking requester.

d. CIA has been called upon by higher authority for intelligence clearly within the field of another agency, but in which case the requester has wanted an answer free from departmental bias.

e. The "standing operating procedures for departmental participation in the production and coordination of national intelligence,"

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prescribed by DCI 3/1 and amplified by DCI 3/2, have proved unworkable according to any reasonable standard as a means of avoiding duplication or of obtaining departmental support for CIA production. (See Reference (a))

8. Reference (b) discussed the importance of the formulation and promulgation of a CIA master plan for production as the prerequisite to any other action the Director may take toward the coordination of intelligence activities. The effect of such a plan should be not only to give badly needed guidance to CIA's own production effort, but to guide the departments in meeting the requirements of CIA for departmental produced intelligence. The plan should not attempt to delineate the entire production of each department since such action is the prerogative of the respective heads of the departments under superior supervision, and in any event, the intelligence production of any one department will be the sum of that production required for internal use plus that required by CIA. As a matter of fact, however, an announced program for CIA production, limited to that work required to be undertaken to fulfill the legal responsibilities of the Agency, would tend to eliminate departmental competition automatically.

9. Such a plan must be thoroughly coordinated with the Joint Chiefs of Staff and with the NSC Staff to insure that all foreseeable planning requirements are met. Afterwards CIA should steadfastly refuse to undertake production work in response to requests addressed casually to the Agency but concerning matters clearly the responsibility of a particular department. Such requests should simply be forwarded to the proper department for action. When action by CIA in the field of a particular department is required in order to eliminate departmental bias, each such request should clearly be so labeled. The planners and policy makers at high level must be given fully to understand that unforeseen requests upon CIA cannot be made casually if the Agency is to operate effectively, since intelligence production must have been programmed to be of high quality. On the other hand, a considered request from high level constitutes a mandate to CIA requiring amendment of the Program, if not previously foreseen, to provide for the necessary collection and production effort, particularly since each such request poses the likelihood of a chain of similar requests in the future.

10. The objections which are raised against the concept of a master plan as an essential instrument overlook in the first place the axiom that production must be programmed in order to be of high quality. The objectors, in stressing that such a plan will have no immediate effect in inducing a flow of produced intelligence to CIA, also overlook the consideration that because what they say is true, it is all the more important to get the plan in operation as soon as possible in order to advance the date of its becoming effective. Postponing action on a plan simply gives an ever longer life to chaos.

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11. It is true that a production plan such as visualized cannot at once create a full flow of produced primary intelligence to CIA. But the flow induced by the plan, starting with a trickle, could eventually be made to grow into whatever size stream is contemplated by the plan. The plan should provide that while the flow is yet a trickle, specific departmental support for each report or estimate would be solicited by CIA. But as the flow increased, the area of such specific departmental contributions would continue to decrease, until finally, upon undertaking a given project, CIA's requests on the departments would be limited only to insuring that the holdings of related departmental produced intelligence were up to date. In any event, whatever departmental support is solicited at any time, it should be prescribed that the ensuing papers be final departmental produced intelligence, approved by the intelligence chiefs concerned, to be used as grist to the CIA mill. (In this connection see Reference (a)).

12. Conclusions: With the above discussion in mind, the requirements of a CIA master plan for production can be stated:

a. Such a plan should govern the entire field of production of CIA and the IAC agencies, both as to area and subject matter.

b. The plan must be coordinated with the Joint Chiefs of Staff and the NSC Staff.

c. The plan should key together CIA comprehensive production with departmental primary production.

d. The production programmed for CIA should be confined to that sphere for which CIA is legally responsible, namely comprehensive production with the addition of such primary production as is needed to fill gaps in departmental production or such as falls in agreed fields of common concern.

e. The plan should make clear to each of the IAC agencies the requirements of CIA for produced intelligence.

f. The plan should include a time element which would generate a flow of primary production to CIA.

g. The plan should provide a method of obtaining specific departmental support for CIA reports and estimates whenever holdings of departmental produced intelligence are inadequate to the current project, such support to consist of appropriate papers in final form.

13. Recommendation. It is recommended that the CIA master plan for production be formulated in accordance with the requirements listed in the conclusions above.



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6 February 1950

MEMORANDUM FOR RECORD

SUBJECT: The Nature of a CIA Master Plan for Production

REFERENCES: My memoranda for records:

- (a) Departmental Participation in the Preparation of CIA Reports and Estimates, 7 October 1949
- (b) The Importance of a CIA Master Plan for Production, 14 October 1949
- (c) The Requirements of a CIA Master Plan for Production, 24 October 1949

1. The purpose of this paper is to supplement Reference (c) by discussing in somewhat more detail what a CIA master plan for production should or might be like. It is recognized at the outset, however, that any speculation in this vein by a staff officer is highly subject to error, and that only the producing components of CIA have the experience requisite to a full development of the concept of a master plan. This discussion is presented simply to clarify the concept of the writer of this series of memoranda. For these reasons, no concrete conclusions are reached.

2. The foremost characteristic of a CIA master plan should be its elasticity, particularly in the early stages of its application. As experience built up over a period of time, more and more detail could be programmed, and the characteristic of elasticity would decrease in importance relative to the amount of detail covered, but elasticity should remain the foremost characteristic. It must be remembered, nevertheless, that "elasticity" does not imply a sacrifice of form; the plan must not be just yieldingly amorphous.

3. To put the concept of flexibility in another way, a CIA master plan for production should be so conceived and so composed that it would constitute a skeletal framework which would endure as long as the basic global situation. Upon this framework would be hung the developing substance of programs derived from the plan, but responsive to the play of international forces.

4. The central basis for the plan should be the result of both analysis and synthesis of the fragmentary guidance furnished by the various agencies which are consumers of CIA produced intelligence, the

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component fragments being logically arranged and rationalized and made into one whole by interpolation, all in the light of CIA's own estimate of the global situation. The phrase "fragmentary guidance" is used because experience indicates that the fragmentary is all that can be expected along these lines; actually guidance may never be received except in the form of requests over a period of time, on the basis of which future requests can be predicted. The agencies from which CIA should seek guidance are principally the NSC, the NSRB, and the Departments of State and Defense. The subject of guidance will be discussed further in a subsequent paper.

5. Such a basic concept, conditioned by our state of knowledge of the various parts of the world, should lead naturally to the presentation of a broad plan for CIA comprehensive production. As a preface to this plan, there should be stated in broad terms the production mission of CIA, which must be composed so as to cover what practice has shown is required to be produced in order to fulfill CIA's responsibility under the National Security Act of 1947 for the production of "national" or "strategic" intelligence. The plan should outline the fields in which CIA is required to produce national intelligence, should establish area priorities, and should explain the scope of reports and estimates of this nature and the point of view (national security versus departmental responsibility) from which they are approached. The plan should also outline the way in which CIA would utilize primary reports and estimates (CIA and departmental) as the raw material for comprehensive production.

6. The next phase of the master plan would turn to the IAC agencies for support of the CIA plan for comprehensive production. From an analysis of the substantive competence of the several IAC agencies would stem plans for primary production for each, limited strictly to what is desired by CIA in the way of support. Each agency plan should be prefaced by an appropriate statement, again in broad terms, of extra-departmental responsibilities to CIA for primary production. Each plan should cover general subject and area priorities, as well as the scope of reports and estimates to be programmed and the point of view from which it is desired they be approached.

7. Having exhausted the potentialities of the departments for primary production, the master plan would proceed to fill the gaps at this level with a plan for CIA primary production. Thus the sum of all contemplated primary production would equal the total support required by the plan for CIA comprehensive production. Any primary production by CIA in fields of common concern would be planned in the same spirit as the effort to fill gaps, since agreements that CIA should undertake such production would create arbitrary gaps in departmental production which CIA would simultaneously proceed to fill.

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8. After presenting plans for CIA comprehensive production and departmental and CIA primary production, the master plan would undertake a certain amount of actual programming of both CIA and departmental production. The extent of programming to be undertaken would vary in two respects. First, it would vary in respect to elapsed time after the date of inception of the plan, in that as experience grew through application of the plan, more and more programming could be provided. Second, the extent of programming would vary in respect to two categories into which production, both primary and comprehensive, could be divided from the standpoint of CIA ability to foresee requirements. These two categories are: (1) those reports and estimates, the requirements for which can be foreseen well in advance, and (2) those reports and estimates, the requirements for which are relatively difficult to foresee. Each of these categories is discussed separately below.

9. As for the first category, the subject matter and coverage would in general be comparatively fundamental in nature, in fact this category would include the basic intelligence production of the NIS Program, plus other less static production, including both reports and estimates. Although not true of all items, such intelligence takes considerable time to produce as well as being of long term application. ORE 17-19, "The Strategic Importance of the Far East," is an example of CIA comprehensive production which would fall under this category.


10. Under the first category there is a major subdivision which might be referred to as "periodic reports and estimates." Such production would comprise that required to keep current our national estimate of those aspects of the international situation which, although fundamental, are fluid. The CIA share in this sub-category would include such periodic summaries or reviews or estimates of the current situation in various areas as it became desirable to publish. CIA should also prepare periodic estimates of the future national capabilities of our most likely enemies and our major allies. Very important under this sub-category would be the primary production required by CIA to keep abreast of those fluid aspects of the international situation within the sphere of the IAC agencies. The best examples in this sub-category are in the military field. For instance, periodic reports would be required from the Department of the Army on the order of battle of the ground forces of selected nations. Thus CIA would be kept informed of all important changes in the disposition of major units, the composition of major commands, the composition of the higher command and staff hierarchy, etc. Reports of this nature might be required as often as monthly for some nations. Periodic estimates would be required from the Department of the Army of the fighting quality and capabilities of the ground forces of selected nations for the same reasons, although perhaps not so often.

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11. Reports and estimates in the first category could be rather extensively programmed, since the requirements could be foreseen. Requirements for the second category, however, would be somewhat more difficult to foresee. Programming would therefore be more limited in point of projection into the future, yet because most such production would be required for prompt use, requirements would be relatively more specific and detailed than those pertaining to the other category. The program would be subject to frequent or periodic revisions and additions, which should, however, be systematic.

12. Of course, there will always be that production not included in the categories described above, the requirements for which cannot be foreseen at all. The master plan should provide a means by which CIA could obtain departmental support in response to unforeseen requirements placed upon CIA by proper authority (see paragraph 12 g, Reference (e)). In this respect, the clarification afforded by the plan of the general requirements of CIA for departmental support should facilitate meeting contingencies.


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Executive Registry

DEC 9 1949

Chief, COAPS

Assistant Director for Reports and Estimates

Development of an Integrated Intelligence Production Program

REFERENCE: Your memorandum to AD/ORE, same subject, dated 8 December 1949

1. Reference memorandum has been carefully considered, and your comments and suggestions are appreciated.

2. Nevertheless, the principles and procedures for developing integrated national intelligence production which were contained in the series of papers you have just examined, are still considered valid by this Office.

3. It is therefore requested that the ORE memorandum to the Director of Central Intelligence, subject as above, dated 2 December 1949, be presented for his consideration, despite your inability to recommend all aspects of our position. It is requested that you advise me of the date and hour at which this presentation will be made to the Director in order that I may attend with you.

THEODORE BABBITT

Dec. 13th
Babbitt telephoned PC to hold in abeyance this entire project until further notice. PC

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