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8 December 1949

MEMORANDUM TO: Assistant Director, ORE

SUBJECT: Development of an Integrated Intelligence Production Program

REFERENCE: ORE's Memorandum to DCI dated 2 December 1949

1. There is no question about the desirability of a production plan for national intelligence on the Far East, but we think it should be transmitted in a different way to the participating members of the Intelligence Advisory Committee, rather than to the National Security Council itself.

2. COAPS therefore cannot recommend that the Director sign the memorandum to the Executive Secretary of the National Security Council transmitted as one of the enclosures with the above mentioned reference, for the following reasons:

a. I am sure that the Director would wish to stick to normal procedures in transmitting his recommendations by way of the Intelligence Advisory Committee members to the National Security Council, not to the IAC members by way of the NSC. In this instance, this is normal CIA coordination so it needs not go "up" to anyone.

b. National security plans and policies should be based on intelligence, not vice versa.

c. The National Security Council would consider your A or B enclosures with the above reference as operational duties of the Director of Central Intelligence, and would not give consideration to such details. The DCI is sure of this.

d. The National Security Council does not impose its will or give detailed instructions to CIA in specific matters and thence to the IAC members, who are, for the most part, in the departments of which the NSC members are the Chiefs.

e. Its general instructions to CIA and the IAC, Sections 4 of NSCID No. 1 and 1(e) of NSCID No. 3, give adequate authority to the Director of Central Intelligence to use and to submit this proposed production plan for national intelligence to the Intelligence Advisory Committee agencies.

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3. We think your Tab B enclosure is too detailed for the IAC Members themselves. Experience has shown that they would devote their "consideration" to pulling it apart and take a very long time doing it since it is such a voluminous document. When they appoint producers to work with you on the concept advanced in the attached memo, then your Comprehensive Production Plan can be presented as CIA's project in which we should like participation of the IAC agencies. At the working level, we think, they will go along with it much better than at the top level.

4. We have considered submitting it to individual Secretaries in lieu of the NSC group, but see no way of by-passing the IAC Members who are the ones who have to help with the work and are our other-agency contacts. We are quite ready and willing to hear any other suggestions pro and con on this matter.

5. We recommend, therefore, a memorandum somewhat similar to the enclosed draft of 7 December 1949. Let us have your views on this, orally or otherwise, at your early convenience.

FRESCOTT CHILDS, Chief  
Coordination, Operations  
and Policy Staff

Encl.

Draft of Memo to IAC  
dated 7 Dec. '49

PC/dhl

cc: DCI ✓  
Exec.

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7 December 1949

DRAFT OF MEMORANDUM TO: IAC Members  
In lieu of ORE's Memorandum for the Executive  
Secretary, National Security Council

SUBJECT: Long Range Planning for National Intelligence  
Production

1. It has appeared to me that the production of national intelligence has not been adequately systematized and that consequently it tends to be characterized by irregularity and short-term emergency requirements. Under such circumstances, the producer, while able to engage in spot reporting and estimating with full confidence in its pertinence to national security problems, is left largely to his own resources in appraising the long range national requirements for his intelligence product. As a result, his efforts in the latter respects are in danger of being one-sided or even wasteful.

2. In view of this situation, I have had a study made of the principal considerations and objectives, which, from the standpoint of United States security, should govern the planning and production of national intelligence on the Far East. In the course of time, it is hoped to complete similar concepts and production plans on other parts of the world.

3. The development of integrated national intelligence production plans is a key to coordination of intelligence production, which in turn, is the basis of coordination for all other foreign intelligence activities throughout the governmental structure. While it is recognized that a long range production plan will not eliminate the occurrence of unpredictable intelligence requirements, it will provide high-level, long-range guidance prerequisite to adequate national intelligence planning.

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4. It is believed that the principal considerations which, from the standpoint of United States security, should govern planning and production of intelligence on the Far East are as follows:

a. Possibilities for control in the Far East, to include:

(1) Vulnerability of the Far East, area by area, to control unfavorable to the United States.

(2) Capabilities for the acquisition, exercise, and denial of control in the Far East by parties to the US-USSR struggle.

b. Potentialities of the Far East in war and peace, to include:

(1) Possibility of the formation of a comprehensive war making complex in the Far East independent from, but in support of, other centers of Soviet power.

(2) The existence or emergence in the Far East of elements of power employable by the major contenders in a protracted world struggle on terms less than war.

5. If you agree (??) in principle with such concepts (??), <sup>(??)</sup> or Based on such concepts, I should like to have the participating members of the IAC designate representatives from their production offices to discuss a long range production plan with the Assistant Director of ORE/CIA.

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2 December 1949

MEMORANDUM TO: The Director of Central Intelligence  
FROM : Assistant Director for Reports and Estimates  
SUBJECT : Development of an Integrated Intelligence Production Program

The attached papers are submitted for your consideration in implementation of Paragraph II 1 b of the attachment to Central Intelligence Agency General Order No. 23.

/s/

THEODORE BABBITT

Attachments

1. Staff Study
2. Proposed memorandum to National Security Council with two attachments

100% CIA  
Although AF + OIR know of  
our general concern for  
policy planning in  
this area and office  
that A probably  
satisfactory to IAC

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STAFF STUDY

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### THE PROBLEM

1. To determine whether definitive guidance to the Central Intelligence Agency from the national planning and policy level of the United States Government should be obtained for the purpose of enabling The Director of Central Intelligence, in conjunction with the Intelligence Advisory Committee agencies, to devise integrated national intelligence production plans, in fulfillment of his responsibility for coordinating the national intelligence effort; and if so, what procedure should be adopted for obtaining such guidance.

### FACTS BEARING ON THE PROBLEM AND DISCUSSION

2. a. The value of national intelligence is directly proportional to its pertinence to national security problems and objectives.

b. The relative degree of pertinence of various categories and types of intelligence to such national security problems and objectives can be assessed adequately by only two groups of individuals:

(1) The national security planners, or consumers of national intelligence, by virtue of their familiarity with long and short-range requirements.

(2) The national intelligence producers, by virtue of their continuous study of information and developments.

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c. It is therefore evident that the timeliness and applicability of national intelligence depends upon sustained coordination between its consumers and producers.

d. The flow of intelligence production requirements from consumer to producer has not been systematized, and consequently tends to be characterized by irregularity and short-term emergency requirements. Under such circumstances the producer, while able to engage in spot reporting and estimating with full confidence in its pertinence, is left largely to his own resources in imagining the long-range requirements of his intelligence product. As a result his efforts in the latter respect are in danger of being one-sided, or even wasteful.

e. It may be contended that the National Intelligence Objectives (DCI 4/1), issued in conformance with National Security Council Intelligence Directive No. 4, furnish adequate guidance for the planning of intelligence production. This contention is believed erroneous for the following reasons:

(1) The National Intelligence Objectives, although serving as an ideal frame of reference, are in effect a synopsis of all information desired by the United States Government, and are consequently of little value for guiding a finite intelligence effort.

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(2) The National Intelligence Objectives can in no sense be interpreted as sustained coordination between the consumers and producers of national intelligence.

(3) No matter how carefully the National Intelligence Objectives may be designed or revised, they can have little reality until based upon National Security Objectives, which have yet to be produced at the national planning level.

f. In view of the nature of the National Intelligence Objectives, and in the absence of systematized guidance from the planning echelon of government, the national intelligence production and coordination machinery follows in the wake of national planning, instead of constituting a basis for its formulation.

g. Because of heavy and time-consuming responsibilities, it cannot be presumed that the National Security Council will in the near future institute a procedure for systematic guidance to intelligence producers. Nevertheless, the importance of such a procedure to the security interests of the government is so apparent that the National Security Council can hardly refuse consideration of reasonable proposals from a responsible official such as the Director of Central Intelligence.

h. With this thought in mind, the Office of Reports and Estimates has developed an approach for stimulating guidance from intelligence consumer to intelligence producer in such

manner as to make the consumer's contribution relatively easy and acceptable. The approach would be based on a careful study by the Office of Reports and Estimates of policy papers, intelligence reports, and intelligence requests pertaining to a selected region or field of interest. From this study would be derived a concise intelligence concept, which may be defined as an expression of the principal considerations which, from the standpoint of United States security, should govern the planning and production of national intelligence on any given area of the world. This concept would then be presented to the National Security Council for verification of its applicability to national security problems and objectives. Following its approval or modification by the National Security Council, the concept would be used as a basis for developing a comprehensive plan of intelligence production designed to meet the considerations and objectives set forth in the concept. At subsequent intervals, the concept would be reviewed to insure its continued applicability in the light of new developments.

i. The derivation and submission of concepts, as well as the development of implementing plans, should be examined in relation to the following principal functions of the Director of Central Intelligence:

- (1) Chief Intelligence Officer and Adviser to the National Security Council.
- (2) Coordinator of the National Intelligence effort.

In his first capacity, it is assumed that the Director of Central Intelligence can, without prior consultation with the Intelligence Advisory Committee, approach the National Security Council on any intelligence matter which does not involve commitments, responsibilities, or prerogatives of the members of the Intelligence Advisory Committee. Conversely, the Director of Central Intelligence, in his second capacity, is required by National Security Council Intelligence Directives to obtain Intelligence Advisory Committee comment on proposals directly affecting the activities of its members.

j. It is believed that the Office of Reports and Estimates approach mentioned in paragraph h above not only supports the two principal functions of the Director of Central Intelligence, but also serves to clarify the fundamental distinction between those functions, as follows:

(1) An intelligence concept, upon which an intelligence production plan can be based, is an ideal expression of intelligence goals or objectives, unencumbered by the limitations of actual collection or production facilities. It is the step which must logically precede intelligence planning, and should therefore be verified by the National Security Council before presentation to the Intelligence Advisory Committee as a basis for planning. Such a procedure would permit the Director of Central Intelligence to function initially as an adviser by presenting concepts to

the National Security Council, and subsequently as a coordinator by presenting approved intelligence goals to the Intelligence Advisory Committee for planning action.

(2) If, however, the Director of Central Intelligence were to negotiate intelligence concepts with the Intelligence Advisory Committee before presenting them to the National Security Council, it is believed that he would be abrogating the role of principal intelligence adviser to the National Security Council, and would be engaging the efforts of the Intelligence Advisory Committee in directions which might prove erroneous after consideration by the National Security Council.

#### CONCLUSIONS

3. That sustained coordination between the consumers and producers of national intelligence should be established as an activity bearing directly upon the national security.

4. That the National Intelligence Objectives, because of their sweeping inclusiveness and remoteness from concrete security problems, are unsuitable for providing sustained guidance or coordination.

5. That the Director of Central Intelligence, as intelligence adviser to the National Security Council and as coordinator of the national intelligence effort, is required to recommend methods for sustaining coordination between the consumers and producers of national intelligence.

6. That coordination can most readily be achieved by submitting periodically for approval or modification by the National Security Council, concepts of intelligence production for each major area of the world.

7. That integrated national intelligence production plans should be developed by the Central Intelligence Agency in collaboration with the Intelligence Advisory Committee agencies, based upon the intelligence concepts approved by the National Security Council.

#### RECOMMENDATIONS

8. That the Director of Central Intelligence approve the foregoing conclusions.

9. That, if approved, the conclusions be initially implemented by forwarding the attached memorandum with enclosures to the National Security Council.

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