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TO : Mr Childs

DATE: 5 Aug 1950

FROM :

SUBJECT: Comments on your comments re my draft.

(1) It is certainly true that the chaos in our collection activities (Government-wide) is a basic deficiency. It is equally true that we shall never get anywhere in any aspect of intelligence until we straighten out the mess.

(2) It is also true that there is nobody, repeat nobody, anywhere in the Government, who is making an effort to straighten out the mess. I have this point on my side in this controversy: **THE STATUS QUO IS INDEFENSIBLE.**

(3) It does not seem to me that it is a correct statement to say that CIA is "dependent" for its collection on other agencies. The law charges CIA with the coordination of intelligence activities relating to the national security - this charge comprehends collection activities. If the collection activities of the Government that relate to the national security are not being conducted satisfactorily, there is a good prima facie case that this situation is the fault of CIA. I think the status of CIA should be expressed this way: The intelligence

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organizations of the Government are dependent upon CIA for the coordination of their collection activities.

- (4) As far as our ever getting 100% satisfaction is concerned, such a perfect situation can never be anything more than our goal. But there is no reason why we should surrender simply because there is probably little chance of our ever getting 100% satisfaction. If we try to improve the situation, perhaps we can get a 10% improvement or even more. Any improvement at all would be all to the good.
- (5) It is true that if and when the new basic NSCID is approved, CIA will be in a better position to coordinate the collection activities of the Government. But we need not wait for the basic NSCID. In fact, with the international situation being what it is, we must not wait. We must actively call the attention of the agencies to the existing deficiencies. Whenever dealing in intelligence channels fails to bring results, we must report deficiencies at the top, to the Secretaries or to the NSC. If our recommendations which accompany such reports are constructive and, when necessary, carry funding suggestions, I am positive that they will bring results. Why give up? In battle surrender brings disgrace; is this not true in other aspects of life?
- (6) In the meantime, there is absolutely no reason whatsoever to let the status quo continue within CIA.
- (7) I thoroughly agree with your Remark (1) - see (5) above; this is where my Collection Policy Division comes in. In order to comply with your suggestion, COAPS must, in the first place, be recognized as having an authorized interest in the collection activities of the Agency - in detail, not just on a "broad stroke of the brush" basis. We will only be rebuffed if we try to do something about collection without recognition. In the second place, we will require at least a couple of individuals full-time on the collection job in order properly to investigate cases. Furthermore, these individuals must be experienced; they must understand collection capabilities as well as the needs of the production elements of the Agency.
- (8) I agree with your Remark (2); in other words somebody is required to formulate collection policy for the Agency, to be issued by the Director.
- (9) In your Remark (3), again we see the need for policy.
- (10) I don't think the suggestion in your Remark (4) will improve the status quo. Why should we advocate the Director's abdicating what is clearly his command responsibility, when it has already been well-proven that delegation will not work? I have never heard of any principle of organization to the effect that all command responsibilities must be delegated to the extent that the director renders his agency impotent. The correct principle is rather to the effect that command responsibilities must be exercised by the responsible party except in those exceptional cases where delegation can in truth be made to work. As for requirements and priorities, there must be governing policy, issued by the Director, to guide the offices. Under your suggestion, we have the Director abdicating in favor of a committee which is given the responsibility - we opposed such an idea in the Webb Staff Study, why should we favor it here?

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(11) In your Remark (4), you advocate in effect that CIA be organized as a sort of loose confederation of offices. While this may be all right for the "holding company" type of department or agency in our Government, it does not appear right for CIA. CIA's offices must operate as a team toward the fulfillment of the mission of the Agency, with the least possible lost motion and waste of time; for this reason the team captain must be prepared to make frequent decisions in order to expedite the work of the Agency looked upon as a whole.

(12) My remarks in (10) and (11) apply to your Remark (5). We should remember that CIA is, quite rightly, organized functionally. There are problems inherent in this type of organization which might not exist if the Agency could be organized regionally or in any other way that would produce a neat row of offices all exactly alike. Under the latter type of organization the offices would be self-contained and, at any rate, would understand each other's methods and needs, etc, thoroughly. The Director could sit back in his easy chair and do nothing but survey the globe occasionally. But that is not the way CIA is organized, we have not given each office all the functions of the Agency across the board for a region. Instead, we have given each office distinct functions of the whole Agency. Thus, the offices are not self-contained, but each office requires the services of all the others in order to function. Furthermore, because each office has specialized functions, each must be manned by specialists or at least the personnel tend to become so, hence there is often a lack of understanding in one office of the problems of the others. Under such a set-up, it is self-evident that there must be strong central control. As for the staff, it exists to assist the Director, because after all, he is only one very human man who, although he must make decisions, is entitled to have matters presented to him objectively in the interest of the Agency as a whole, so that he can make up his mind without being forced to carry out intricate investigations and absorb thousands of details personally. If the Director were superhuman, he would require no staff.

(13) As for the impact of the emergency on the question of whether or not to reorganize, my view is that we should not reorganize unless we know it to be necessary. I don't think the Management recommendations will accomplish much in the absence of positive direction of the Agency. If, after we've made an effort positively to coordinate our collection activities, and through doing so we have obtained some people who really know what they are talking about - if then it appears to these people that some reorganization is required, let them make appropriate recommendations to the Director. Let's don't reorganize merely for the sake of reorganizing or to make a neater organization chart.

(14) I shall give you my recommendations separately concerning Recommendation 1, but the fundamental step is given in my draft.

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