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THE FUTURE OF AMERICAN SECRET INTELLIGENCE [redacted]

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". . . Coordination . . . has remained little more than a combination of liaison and clearance. Liaison in turn means little more than the assignment of an individual, or perhaps a small staff, to the function of maintaining the routine flow of papers between two offices engaged in related activities. Clearance (or concurrence) normally means that any action or judgment in a field of overlapping jurisdictions must have the consent of all concerned. Clearance thus becomes a rule of unanimous consent with all the weakness this implies. The idea of coordination as the development of teamwork with maximum efficiency as its object is seldom recognised as an object of hope.

The degree to which clearance is required in the working of any organization will vary inversely with the practical success of the division of functions laid down. This statement is not based upon the illusion that any organization can be perfect, so that there need be no overlapping authority whatever. But the more faulty the division of function and the deligation of authority, the more will clearance requirements be multiplied.

This should be understood as eternally placing a question mark on every requirement of clearance in the eyes of those responsible for organization planning. The more clearance required, the more one should look to ones basic organization to see if a realignment cannot provide more distinct and realistic areas of authority, sharper responsibility, and reduce the role of compromise and office policies. . . .

The Stages of Work

- (1) The collection of raw information
- (2) Classification, indexing, and reference
- (3) Analysis and interpretation
- (4) Combined interpretation

" . . . there must be a Central Intelligence Agency

Third: It must perform the necessary coordinating functions. . . .

(1) Know all intelligence schedules and functions. . . . and if necessary make recommendations to the Bureau of the Budget for better alignment of functions.

(5) Receive copies of all budget requests covering expenditures of personnel authorizations for intelligence work, examine them, and if necessary consult with the agency concerned and with the Bureau of the Budget concerning changes that the central agency may consider necessary.

Only such a combination of powers can give the central agency the necessary influence and power, while maintaining the flexibility and variety of departmental intelligence."

" . . . cuts . . . allocated downward . . . with no general study of the intelligence system as a whole. . . . Instead of substituting a single operation for several which collectively cost too much, it made each operation less effective and left the duplication untouched. It would have been better to do the job four times over than not to do it at all; but . . . "

"The important role of the Bureau of the Budget in the future of strategic intelligence must not be limited by its dubious role in the past. The Central Intelligence cannot, anymore than any other agency short of the White House, bear the onus of forcing directives upon other intelligence agencies.

. . . .

This problem of how to back up a coordinating function so that the term "coordination" will not be a fraud. . . ."