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29 July 1952

MEMORANDUM FOR: Deputy Director, Intelligence

SUBJECT: State Department policy with regard to release of intelligence and policy papers to CIA

REFERENCE: Fisher Howe's letter of 11 July 1952

1. Transmitted herewith are comments by OIC, OHR, OSI, and OGI on the above subject. OHE's memo to you of 18 July, subject "Requirements", provides its comment on the same problem.
2. My own views coincide closely with those held by OHE. I believe that CIA will not successfully perform its mission until it has access to the briefing papers prepared in advance of conferences, and to the cable traffic which reports on day-to-day developments in the conferences. The argument that these are too sensitive to be seen by CIA is not very sound, for they receive fairly wide circulation in the policy desks of State and, very often, in the Department of Defense and NSA as well. OIC expresses the belief that they are also seen by the R area of State, which screens them and decides which may be seen by CIA. I'm unable to disprove this hypothesis, but I do doubt its accuracy: I suspect that the R area's insistence that it must have copies of everything which goes to CIA may sometimes work to our disadvantage, as it serves to widen the distribution.
3. I agree with OHE that we will not get satisfactory coordination with State until the R area is bypassed by a policy level understanding between the DCI and the Secretary of State. The covert offices have direct liaison with the policy areas of State, and with the Secretary's office, through Mr. Joyce of the Policy Planning Staff. I believe that the overt offices also require such a channel, though it is certain that the R area will object to any such proposal.
4. It must be noted that we have been getting much better service on cables from the Executive Secretariat since Monday, July 21st. The volume of S/S cables has more than doubled, and it has included much material of a sort which we formerly did not receive. I do not know whether this improvement will prove more than temporary, or whether it is due to efforts by Fisher Howe on our behalf.

James M. Andrews
Assistant Director
Collection & Dissemination

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18 July 1952

MEMORANDUM FOR THE DEPUTY DIRECTOR/INTELLIGENCE

SUBJECT: Requirements

1. Following up on our recent conversation, I wish to re-iterate the critical and continuing problem which O/NE faces in making estimates without benefit of existing information of intelligence value.
2. The following are examples of information which O/NE, despite continued efforts on its part, is still unable to get on a timely and systematic basis:
 - a. NIE-55/1, an urgent estimate on Communist capabilities and intentions in Korea, is almost impossible to write without knowledge of the truce discussions at Panmunjon, at United Nations Headquarters, and through India. On none of these is adequate information available in O/NE.
 - b. Both NIE-47, on Communist Intentions and Capabilities in Asia, and NIE-35/2, on Indochina, require access to the minutes of Letourneau's recent conferences in Washington. We have not received these minutes as yet.
 - c. NIE-63, on France, and other papers, would be improved if we had access to the briefing papers prepared for Mr. Acheson's talks with Mr. Eden and Mr. Schuman, and to the minutes of these talks. (We now understand that State proposes to make the minutes available as a result of a CIA direct request for both.)
 - d. NIE-64 (Parts I and II), Soviet Capabilities - Probable Courses of Action; There must have been some part of the recent conversations between Messrs. Acheson and Kennan which would be of value to us. Nothing has been received.
3. O/NE believes that, instead of repeatedly having to attempt to secure documents of this nature on an ad hoc basis with frequent unsatisfactory results, means should be found to assure that it

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receive these essential papers on a regular "need to know" basis from both State and Defense. In O/NE's opinion, past experience indicates that the only satisfactory means of achieving this objective is through a policy level understanding between the DCM and the Secretaries of State and Defense, which would result in a clear directive to the personnel of these agencies to make such information available to O/NE.

[Redacted Signature]

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Acting Assistant Director
National Estimates

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