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Approved For Release 2003/05/05 : CIA-RDP80R01731R003500150002-0

27 December 1950

TO: Mr. Theodore Babbit, AD/PR

FROM:  D/IP

SUBJECT: Comment on first draft report of the Psychological Intelligence  
Committee to the DCI

The attached represents the modifications suggested by D/IP in the original draft of  "Report to the Director of Central Intelligence on Foreign Intelligence Support for the National Foreign Information Program and Psychological Warfare."

These suggested modifications follow three general lines. (1) D/IP considers it advisable to limit the recommendations of the report to the field of national intelligence, making no recommendations concerning intelligence activities of other agencies directed toward purely departmental purposes. (2) As regards form, D/IP considers some rearrangement of material to be advisable, particularly the transfer of certain recommendations from Enclosure A to the Report proper. (3) As regards factual content, D/IP does not, in the absence of the various "Tabs," undertake to review the Enclosure as a whole; but it would strongly suggest a more precise statement than that now contained in Enclosure A concerning D/IP and some of its work. With respect to the statements made on p. 15 concerning the intelligence "country papers" requested by the Interdepartmental Foreign Information Staff and the JIG, Joint Chiefs of Staff (at approximately the same time but not jointly, as might be inferred from the present form of the statement), D/IP believes it is misleading to introduce these papers in the context of the National Intelligence Survey, since they are envisaged as much more specialized studies than any that might have been included in the NIS program. It is also to be noted that the list of priority countries needs some minor revision, and that no regular production schedule has in fact been established for this job. For the statement about CIA commencing at the bottom of p. 9 D/IP recommends the substitution of the following:

The Central Intelligence Agency

a. Within the Office of Research and Reports there is a small unit of four people, established in early November as an Interim Psychological Intelligence Division to:

- (1) coordinate activities designed to meet CIA's existing commitments to the Joint Chiefs of Staff and to the Interdepartmental Foreign Information Staff in this field of intelligence.
- (2) meet certain psychological intelligence commitments within CIA of both a short-term and long-term character;
- (3) assist in planning and organizing a more adequate means of meeting CIA present and presumed future

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**SECRET**

**SECRET**

**Page 2**

25X1

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**SECRET**

DEPUTY DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE

29 March 1954

Assistant Director for Research and Reports

Coordination of Psychological Intelligence Activities

1. The attached draft "Report to the Director of Central Intelligence on Foreign Intelligence Support for the National Foreign Information Program and Psychological Warfare" is forwarded for your information in connection with the question of the allocation of responsibilities for the coordination of psychological intelligence activities.

2. The slow progress in this field to date and the inadequacy of present facilities make it most urgent to arrive at a early decision as to responsibilities.

3. It is recommended that the matter be laid before the Board as soon as possible.

151

THE CLERK (RABBIT)

cc: AD/IC  
AD/PC

**REPORT**  
**TO THE**  
**DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE**  
**ON**  
**FOREIGN INTELLIGENCE SUPPORT**  
**FOR THE**  
**NATIONAL FOREIGN INFORMATION PROGRAM**  
**AND**  
**PSYCHOLOGICAL WARFARE**

**PROBLEM**

1. To survey the foreign intelligence support for the national foreign information program and psychological warfare, and to make recommendations for its improvement.

**FACTS BEARING ON THE PROBLEM**

2. The Director of Central Intelligence, by letter dated 13 January 1950, to the members of the Intelligence Advisory Committee, requested the appointment of one member from each of the respective agencies to serve on an interdepartmental committee for the foreign information program and planning for overt psychological warfare, to be organized under the chairmanship of a member from the Central Intelligence Agency (Reference hereinafter will be to the Psychological Intelligence Committee).

3. Upon receipt of nominations from the Departments of State, Army, Navy, Air Force and the Joint Chiefs of Staff, the chairman convened the first session of the Psychological Intelligence Committee on April 13, 1950.

~~SECRET~~

Page 3

4. From that date to the present the Psychological Intelligence Committee has had 24 meetings, three of them being held to consider a proposed charter for the committee and the remaining meetings being spent in surveying and discussing the existing foreign intelligence support for the national foreign information program and planning for psychological warfare.

5. At the present time, although the US Government has vastly increased its defense appropriations and is currently spending around \$125 million annually for its overt foreign information and psychological warfare programs, there are not more than 25 people in all the IAC agencies continuously engaged in research and analysis which directly supports the endeavor under consideration.

#### DISCUSSION

6. For a detailed statement of the findings of fact and discussion, see Enclosure A.

#### CONCLUSION

7. The existing foreign intelligence support for the national foreign information program and planning for psychological warfare is inadequate for both present and wartime operations.

#### RECOMMENDATIONS

8. As a matter of national policy it is important that the total facilities available for intelligence support of the US psychological warfare effort be substantially increased, and that this be done with all possible speed. The complex and highly specialized nature of the operations involved make the time factor of unusual significance here.

9. It is recognized that intelligence support responsibilities cannot all be assumed centrally, and must in part be borne by the individual agencies.

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so supplementing their activities for departmental intelligence purposes as to contribute also to national intelligence needs in this field (as provided in NSC 59). It is suggested that these departmental contributions to national psychological intelligence be allocated along the following lines:

a. Central Intelligence Agency

- (1) Coordination of the national intelligence activities of the several government departments in support of national psychological warfare planning;
- (2) Provision of coordinated intelligence support for national psychological warfare programs, using its own research and intelligence facilities where appropriate;
- (3) Coordination of intelligence support for national intelligence estimates which involve important psychological factors;
- (4) Provision of intelligence support for CIA operations in this field.

b. Department of State

- (1) Extensive research on susceptibility analyses of enemy, allied and neutral peoples;
- (2) Analyses and evaluations of foreign public opinion, particularly with respect to major US policy moves;
- (3) Analyses of substantive foreign propaganda and of propaganda and overt psychological warfare operations of enemy, allied and neutral countries;
- (4) Collaboration with private research groups on problems in this field.

**SECRET**

**SECRET**

Page 4

**g. Department of the Army**

- (1) Working assistance on susceptibility analyses of enemy, allied and neutral countries, derived from military morale studies relating to these countries;
- (2) Contributions of specialized military knowledge to current intelligence estimates of the general propaganda and psychological warfare situation, and on particular problems as they arise -- e.g. on the current situation in China or Korea.

**h. Department of the Air Force**

- (1) Working assistance on susceptibility analyses of enemy, allied and neutral countries, derived from air force morale studies relating to these countries;
- (2) Contributions of specialized Air Force knowledge to current intelligence estimates of the general propaganda and psychological warfare situation, and on specific problems as they arise -- e.g. for example, the reactions to be expected from bombed populations under given conditions.

**i. Department of the Navy**

- (1) Working assistance on susceptibility analyses of enemy, allied and neutral countries, derived from naval morale studies relating to these countries;
- (2) Contributions of specialized naval knowledge to current intelligence estimates of the general propaganda and psychological warfare situation, and on specific problems as they arise.

10. All the government agencies concerned should be urged as a matter of high priority to make their intelligence facilities adequate for meeting these

**SECRET**

**SECRET**

Page 5

responsibilities, as regards

- a. full complement of suitably trained personnel;
- b. adequate reporting instructions for the field;
- c. provision of special training facilities for indoctrination of additional personnel as needed.

11. The assistance available from outside experts on psychological warfare problems should be augmented by

- a. in so far as possible, making all such consultants of one government agency available, on suitable request, to the other interested agencies;
- b. where the consultant facilities thus provided are still inadequate, adding new consultants to the CIA panel.

12. Each IAC agency should also set aside funds for subsidizing basic research in this field to supplement its own intelligence activities.

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