

*Psychological Intelligence*  
*etc.*

DATE

TO: Assignment Director for Research & Reports  
Central Intelligence Agency

FROM: Charles R. Norberg, Chairman  
DCI's Psychological Intelligence Committee

SUBJECT: Report to the Director of Central Intelligence

Attached hereto for forwarding as a "Report to the Director of  
Central Intelligence on Foreign Intelligence Support for the National  
Foreign Information Program and Psychological Warfare".

Attachment:

Report to the Director of  
Central Intelligence.

USAF review(s) completed.

NAVY review(s) completed.

ARMY, DOS and USIA review(s)  
completed.

IFIS:CRNorberg:veo

REPORT  
TO THE  
DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE  
ON  
FOREIGN INTELLIGENCE SUPPORT  
FOR THE  
NATIONAL FOREIGN INFORMATION PROGRAM  
AND  
PSYCHOLOGICAL WARFARE

PSYCHOLOGICAL INTELLIGENCE COMMITTEE

Charles R. Norberg, CIA, Chairman  
Melville Ruggles, State  
Samuel McKee, Army  
Lt. Comdr. Fitzpatrick, Navy  
Col. Raymond Slesper, Air Force  
Lt. Col. Kleitz, JIG, Joint Staff

DRAFT

Approved For Release 2004/10/21 : CIA-RDP80R01731R003500150005-7

REPORT

TO THE

DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE

ON

FOREIGN INTELLIGENCE SUPPORT

FOR THE

NATIONAL FOREIGN INFORMATION PROGRAM

AND

PSYCHOLOGICAL WARFARE

PROBLEM

1. To survey the foreign intelligence support for the national foreign information program and psychological warfare, and to make recommendations for its improvement.

FACTS BEARING ON THE PROBLEM

2. The Director of Central Intelligence, by letter dated 13 January 1970, to the members of the Intelligence Advisory Committee, requested the appointment of one member from each of the respective agencies to serve on an interdepartmental committee for the foreign information program and planning for overt psychological warfare to be organized under the chairmanship of a member from the Central Intelligence Agency (Reference hereinafter will be to the Psychological Intelligence Committee).

SECRET

Approved For Release 2004/10/21 : CIA-RDP80R01731R003500150005-7

3. Upon receipt of nominations from the Departments of State, Army, Navy, Air Force and the Joint Chiefs of Staff, the chairman convened the first session of the Psychological Intelligence Committee on April 18, 1950.

4. From that date to the present the Psychological Intelligence Committee has had 24 meetings, three of them being held to consider a proposed charter for the committee and the remaining meetings being spent in surveying and discussing the existing foreign intelligence support for the national foreign information program and planning for psychological warfare.

#### DISCUSSION

5. For a detailed statement of the findings of fact and discussion, see Enclosure A.

#### CONCLUSION

6. The existing foreign intelligence support for the national foreign information program and planning for psychological warfare is inadequate for both present peacetime and emergency or wartime operations.

#### RECOMMENDATIONS

7. As a matter of policy, each of the member agencies of the Intelligence Advisory Committee should be advised of the immediate urgency and necessity for improving their facilities in order to provide adequate intelligence support commensurate with their respective responsibilities in this field.

8. Generally, the following recommendations are made:

a. Allocation of intelligence responsibilities

(1) Responsibilities for providing intelligence support for the

national foreign information program and psychological warfare should be allocated as provided for in the discussion, Enclosure A, Page ---;

b. Consultants

(1) There should be established as soon as possible an inter-departmental group of consultants to advise the Director of CIA, his representatives or appropriate government organizations with regard to intelligence problems and activities in this field;

c. Personnel

(1) A training school and program should be immediately inaugurated for the purpose of indoctrinating and training available personnel from all IAC agencies in this specialized field;

(2) The highest priority should be given by all agencies to the recruitment of additional personnel for this work.

d. Funds

(1) Each IAC agency should devote sufficient funds not only for the conduct of basic research in this field, but as well, for the processing and evaluation of pertinent research and intelligence at the highest level in each agency.

e. Time

(1) Each IAC agency should be put on notice that in the present critical situation and particularly with regard to the question of intelligence support for the national foreign information program and psychological warfare, TIME IS OF THE ESSENCE.

9. Specifically, the following recommendations are made:

SECRET

Page 10

a. Department of State, Intelligence

- (1) Proceed with despatch to disburse the appropriated funds for increased research activities and intelligence support operations in this field;
- (2) Press for the recognition throughout the P Area of the value of and necessity for foreign intelligence support;
- (3) Overhaul channels of distribution of intelligence materials so that their receipt in adequate quality and quantity by users is timely;
- (4) Revise reporting instructions to the field to provide for an adequate flow of timely information to include provision for immediate cable reporting of urgent information and, as well, an analysis of opinion and attitudes on a weekly basis.

b. Department of the Army, Intelligence Division

- (1) Immediately organize a Psychological Warfare Intelligence Unit appropriate to its needs;
- (2) Issue an adequate reporting instruction to the field.

c. Department of the Navy, Office of Naval Intelligence

- (1) Immediately organize a Psychological Warfare Intelligence Unit appropriate to its needs.

d. Department of the Air Force, Director of Intelligence

- (1) Immediately recruit qualified personnel to fill existing T/O vacancies in this field.
- (2) Issue adequate reporting instructions to the field.

SECRET

e. Central Intelligence Agency

- (1) Immediately reorganize its intelligence producing units to provide for efficient production of intelligence estimates, memoranda and reports in this field commensurate with its responsibilities;
- (2) Aid in the stimulation of intelligence information collection in this field;
- (3) Give the highest priority to recruitment of qualified personnel to fill existing or to be created T/O vacancies in this field.

SECRET

DRAFT

CLOSURE A

DISCUSSION

I. GENERAL

1. The Korean situation has indicated that, in the global power struggle currently being waged between the democratic nations and the communist imperialist nations, the USSR has willingly undertaken a grave risk of precipitating a general world war. At such a time, it is imperative to greatly strengthen the intelligence support for the national foreign information and psychological warfare programs of the government.

2. That these programs are of paramount importance was attested by the President of the United States when, in a White House press release of August 30, 1950, he stated:

"At a time when the Kremlin is sparing no effort to spread the most flagrant lies about this country and our allies we must forge ahead with this great and extensive campaign. Truth must prevail throughout the world if we are to have just and lasting peace".

In addition, the Secretary of State has said that the Soviet Union's propaganda effort now borders on open psychological warfare and is a major threat to this country's foreign policy objectives; that if the United States is to succeed in those objectives it must seize the psychological offensive, basing that offensive on truth.

3. It is now recognized as fundamental government doctrine that foreign information programs in periods of peace and psychological warfare programs in periods of national emergency or war are established instruments of national policy and must be constantly directed toward the achievement of national aims.

4. Existing arrangements within the government structure have crystallized the organizational pattern for conducting the foreign information and psychological warfare programs but there is no present agreement with respect to foreign intelligence responsibilities in this field.

5. The purpose of this report is to state the existing informational and psychological warfare arrangements and to suggest a pattern for their intelligence support.

## II. NATIONAL LEVEL

### A. Existing Organizational Arrangements

1. NSC-59/1, a report to the President by the National Security Council on the foreign information program and psychological warfare planning, approved March 9, 1950, creates within the Department of State an organization to:

- a. Initiate and develop interdepartmental plans, make recommendations and otherwise advise and assist the Secretary of State in discharging his responsibilities for the national foreign information program in time of peace;
- b. Make plans for overt psychological warfare, including recommendations for preparations for national emergencies and the initial stages of war. Such plans should be continuously coordinated with joint war plans through the planning agencies of the

Department of Defense and while such plans have a direct impact on war plans they shall be subject to the concurrence of the Joint Chiefs of Staff.

2. This organization, known as the Interdepartmental Foreign Influence Organization (IFIO), consists of:

- a. A Director appointed by the Secretary of State after consultation with other departments and agencies represented on the National Security Council.
- b. Policy consultants representing the Secretary of State, the Secretary of Defense, and the Chairman of the National Security Resources Board.
- c. A consultant representing the Director of Central Intelligence for matters relating to coordination with planning under the NSC-10 series.
- d. A consultant representing the Joint Chiefs of Staff on NSC-57 and NSC-10/2 matters.
- e. A staff composed of full-time personnel representing the Department of State, the Department of Defense, and the Central Intelligence Agency.
- f. A liaison representative to the staff from the National Security Resources Board and such liaison representation or staff membership from other departments and agencies of the government as may be determined by the Director after consultation with the consultants.

3. The Central Intelligence Agency provides the intelligence support for the planning functions of the Interdepartmental Foreign Information Staff (IFIS), which services IFIO.

4. An organizational chart of IFIO is attached hereto at Tab 1.

5. By letters dated on or about October 2, 1950, to Departments and agencies represented on IFIO, the Acting Secretary of State indicated that the present interdepartmental organization established under NSP-59/1 was to be immediately constituted as a National Psychological Strategy Board to advise the Secretary of State for Public Affairs on situations where joint political and military action is required in the psychological warfare sphere to carry out U.S. national policy:

a. The board includes representatives of the Secretary of State, the Secretary of Defense, the Joint Chiefs of Staff, the Director of Central Intelligence and the National Security Resources Board;

b. The board has a liaison officer from the Central Intelligence Agency who is available for intelligence purposes;

c. There are liaison representatives to the board from the National Security Resources Board and the ECA;

6. An organizational chart of the NPSB is attached hereto at Tab 2.

7. By letters dated 13 January 1950 to members of the IAF, the Director of Central Intelligence indicated that he was activating an intelligence committee in order to mobilize the foreign intelligence effort of the government for the purpose of more effectively supporting the national foreign

information program and planning for overt psychological warfare.

- a. The committee, called the Psychological Intelligence Committee, has representation from the Departments of State, Army, Navy, Air Force and the JCS under the chairmanship of the Central Intelligence Agency's representative;
- b. An organizational chart of the committee is attached hereto at Tab 3.

B. Proposed Organizational Arrangements

8. NSC-74, a report to the National Security Council on a plan for national psychological warfare and currently under discussion by Council members, states that the organization established pursuant to NSC-59 1, augmented by existing elements within the Department of State, provides a nucleus for expansion and rapid transition to meet the requirements in the initial stages of war.

9. For the initial stages of war the Director of Central Intelligence will:

- a. Make detailed plans and preparations to employ psychological warfare to the maximum in support of this plan;
- b. Execute covert psychological warfare;
- c. Provide coordinated intelligence in accordance with requirements established by the Interim Psychological Warfare Board, utilizing to the maximum extent practicable the facilities and capabilities of the other IAC agencies;
- d. Coordinate the intelligence activities of the several government

DP-1

SECRET

departments and agencies in support of national psychological warfare.

10. On D-Day, or earlier, at the discretion of the President, the Interdepartmental Foreign Information Organization (IFIO) will be augmented and designated the Interim Psychological Warfare Board (IPWB) for the initial stages of war or the Interdepartmental Foreign Information Board (IFIB) if activated earlier than D-Day.

a. An organizational chart of IPWB is attached hereto at Tab 4.

11. The board referred to in Paragraph 3 above will be composed of a chairman or, in his absence, an acting chairman designated by and representing the Secretary of State, a vice chairman designated by and representing the JCS and one representative each from the Departments of State, the Department of Defense and from the Central Intelligence Agency for covert psychological warfare matters. The board shall also include liaison representatives from the Central Intelligence Agency for intelligence purposes and from such other governmental agencies as may be determined by the board.

12. To meet the essential requirements of the subsequent stages of war, the Interim Psychological Warfare Board could be reconstituted and designated the National Psychological Warfare Board (NPWB).

a. An organizational chart of the NPWB is attached hereto at Tab 5.

13. Thus, the National Psychological Strategy Board as now constituted, can be easily phased into the IFIB or the IPWB.

### III. DEPARTMENTAL LEVEL

#### A. Existing Organizational Arrangements

SECRET

SECRET

1. Department of State

- a. Within the Office of Intelligence Research, there has been for the past year a small nucleus varying from 4 to 6 in number, who have been engaged in producing intelligence materials specifically useful for supporting the current operations of the Public Affairs area of the Department.
- b. For the purpose of providing general intelligence representation in support of information operations, the Department has an intelligence advisor to the Assistant Secretary of State for Public Affairs and an intelligence advisor to each of the geographic bureaus. These advisors act as liaison to the Public Affairs area generally and specifically to the Public Affairs specialists.
- c. Special mention should be made of the Program Evaluation Branch, IBD, OII, which evaluates the effectiveness of the worldwide output of the Voice of America. As part of its work it sponsors large scale research projects in the field carried out by recognized private and academic research organizations, including public opinion research organizations.
- d. Special mention should also be made of the External Research Relations Staff which maintains contact with extra-government research activities for the purpose of making their output in the field of social science research available to the government and also of avoiding duplication in contracts of

SECRET

such government sponsored research. This staff also maintains contact with public opinion polling mechanisms operating overseas and is the channel for so acquiring studies of public opinion attitudes abroad.

e. The general publications of OIR useful in this field are:

- (1) Daily Intelligence Comment;
- (2) The DIC Supplement;
- (3) Trends in Soviet-Communist Tactics;
- (4) World Reaction to Korean Developments;
- (5) The Korean Bulletin;
- (6) Jintsun;
- (7) PIC, i.e., materials for the Weekly Review of Policy Information;
- (8) Intelligence Memoranda.

f. The serial publications of OIR, useful in this field are:

- (1) Soviet Affairs Notes;
- (2) Soviet Affairs Monthly;
- (3) Countering Soviet Propaganda.

2. The Department of the Army

a. There is in existence no special unit in the Intelligence Division designed particularly to support the psychological warfare planning and operations of the Army.

3. The Department of the Navy

a. There is in existence no special unit in the Office of Naval

Intelligence designed particularly to support the psychological warfare planning and operations of the Navy.

4. The Department of the Air Force

- a. Within the Directorate of Intelligence special arrangements have been made for considering the psychological and sociological aspects of determining individual air targets and air target systems, together with supervising the collection of particularized intelligence information useful in such target research work. There are 11 job positions earmarked for this effort.
- b. The Human Resources Research Institute of the Air University programs and supervises the extra-government basic research in the field of psychological warfare intelligence, e.g., a project at Columbia University to develop new methods and refine existing methods to improve the collection and processing of intelligence for psychological warfare.
- c. The RAND Corporation, Social Science Division, under the direction of Dr. Hans Speier, develops and executes any research projects in the field of psychological warfare deemed of value to the Air Force. This is undoubtedly the best single effort of research work currently being done in the field of psychological warfare.

5. The Central Intelligence Agency

- a. Within the Office of Research and Reports there is a small unit of four people just established as an Interim Psychological Intelligence Division to study problems in this field and to

SECRET

Excluded

coordinate related intelligence production efforts within the agency.

b.



25X1

c. The general publications of CIA useful here are:

- (1) Daily Summaries;
- (2) Weekly Summaries;
- (3) Monthly Review of the World Situation as it Relates to the Security of the United States;
- (4) Special ORE's;
- (5) Intelligence Memoranda;
- (6)

25X1

B. Proposed Organizational Arrangements

6. Department of State

a. The Office of Intelligence Research has proposed an extensive increase in intelligence facilities specifically committed to

SECRET

operational support of the Department's foreign information service;

b. A brief discussion of this proposed increase is attached hereto at Tab 6.

7. The Department of the Army

a. The newly created Psychological Warfare Division of G-3 has proposed a unit to provide intelligence support for planning and to evaluate the psychological warfare operations of the Department;

b. A brief discussion of this proposed unit is attached hereto at Tab 7.

8. The Department of the Navy

a. The Office of Naval Intelligence does not propose to create an intelligence unit specifically designed to support planning for or operations of naval psychological warfare.

9. The Department of the Air Force

a. No increase in existing intelligence facilities to support Air Force psychological warfare planning or operations has been reported.

10. The Central Intelligence Agency

a. The Central Intelligence Agency proposes the creation of a new psychological warfare division which will assist in discharging CIA's responsibilities in the field of psychological intelligence.

b. A brief discussion of this proposed unit is attached hereto at Tab 8.

#### IV. RECAPITULATION AND ASSIGNMENT OF RESPONSIBILITIES

1. In recapitulation it can be seen that although the United States Government is this year spending around  million for its overt information and psychological warfare programs, a mere fraction of this sum is being devoted to their intelligence support.

25X1

2. In all of the IAC agencies, there are not more than 25 people continuously engaged in research and analysis which directly supports the endeavor under consideration. It is imperative that additional people be either newly employed or trained on the job to immediately begin acquiring the intelligence skills necessary for this work.

3. Since each of the departments concerned have distinct information and psychological warfare operational responsibilities the intelligence support responsibilities cannot all be assumed centrally and must in part be borne by the individual agencies as indicated in the following paragraphs:

##### 4. Central Intelligence Agency

- a. Coordinate the intelligence activities of the several government departments and agencies in support of the national foreign information and psychological warfare programs;
- b. Provide coordinated intelligence support for such national programs;
- c. Provide intelligence support for agency operations in this field;
- d. Coordinate on an international level support for an allied informational or psychological warfare effort.

SECRET

TOP SECRET

5. Department of State

- a. Provide intelligence support for departmental informational or psychological warfare operations;
- b. Particularly provide:
  - (1) Intelligence requirements for the conduct of departmental informational or psychological warfare operations;
  - (2) Vulnerability analyses of enemy, allied and neutral persons;
  - (3) Analyses and evaluation of foreign public opinion surveys;
  - (4) Surveys of world-wide reaction to major United States governmental policy moves and changes;
  - (5) Analyses of substantive foreign propaganda and off propaganda or psychological warfare operations of enemy, allied and neutral countries;
  - (6) Close collaboration with governmental and private research groups.

6. Department of the Army

- a. Provide intelligence support for departmental informational or psychological warfare operations;
- b. Particularly provide:
  - (1) Intelligence requirements for departmental informational or psychological warfare operations;
  - (2) Vulnerability analyses of enemy, allied and neutral military personnel and organizations;
  - (3) Analyses and estimates of enemy, allied and neutral propaganda

SECRET

and of propaganda or psychological warfare operations as they  
affect military interests:

(4) Maintain a current intelligence estimate of the international  
informational or psychological warfare situation as it affects military  
interests.

7. Department of the Navy

a. Provide intelligence support for departmental informational or  
psychological warfare operations;

b. Particularly provide:

(1) Intelligence requirements for departmental informational  
or psychological warfare operations;

(2) Vulnerability analyses of enemy, allied and neutral naval  
personnel and organizations;

(3) Analyses and estimates of enemy, allied and neutral propaganda  
and of propaganda or psychological warfare operations as they  
affect naval interests;

(4) Maintain a current intelligence estimate of the informational  
or psychological warfare situation as it affects naval interests.

8. Department of the Air Force

a. Provide intelligence support for departmental informational or  
psychological warfare operations;

b. Particularly provide:

(1) Intelligence requirements for departmental informational  
or psychological warfare operations;

(2) Vulnerability analyses of enemy, allied and neutral Air Force personnel and organizations;

(3) Analyses and estimates of enemy, allied and neutral propaganda and of propaganda or psychological warfare operations as they affect Air Force interests;

(4) Maintain a current intelligence estimate of the international or psychological warfare situation as it affects Air Force interests.

9. A chart indicating the organizational pattern of assignment of the foregoing intelligence responsibilities is attached hereto as Tab 9.

#### V. RELATED RESEARCH AND INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES

1. Several sections in certain chapters of the National Intelligence Surveys contain information of potential use for planning and operations of psychological warfare. This is particularly true of Chapter IV (Sociological) and Chapter V (Political).

2. At the inception of the NIS program it was decided not to produce a separate section on psychological warfare. In consequence, the Interdepartmental Foreign Information Staff, together with the JIC, Joint Chiefs of Staff, has requested CIA for individual intelligence country papers to support psychological warfare planning. Such papers are currently being produced on a priority basis for the following countries: USSR, Czechoslovakia, Germany - East & West, Poland, Hungary, Rumania, Bulgaria, Albania, China (including Sinkiang, Inner Mongolia, Outer Mongolia and Manchuria), North & South Korea, Indochina.

SECRET

Enclosure  
371 C

Yugoslavia, Iran, Formosa, Austria, Turkey and Greece. These papers should be available by late spring of 1951.

3. At Tab 10, there is a compilation of psychological warfare research within the Departments of the Army, Navy and Air Force.

4. It should be noted that each of the services are currently engaged in extensive external research which potentially will lend considerable support to their departmental operations. Thus, the Department of the Air Force, through the RAND Corporation, the Department of the Army, through the Office of Research Operations and the Department of the Navy, through the Office of Naval Research, are each engaged in activities relating to their operational psychological warfare responsibilities. The Department of State makes extensive use of external research facilities afforded by facilities of universities and private research organizations.

5. It should be further noted that each of the services are currently engaged in field intelligence activities, interviewing prisoners of war and defectors, as evidenced by the  operations.

25X1