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INFORMAL MINUTES OF SPECIAL MEETING OF DIRECTOR AND CONSULTANTS, INTERDEPARTMENTAL FOREIGN INFORMATION ORGANIZATION, FRIDAY, MARCH 30, 1951, AT 3:30 P.M., ROOM 4166 NEW STATE

PRESENT:	Department of State	Mr. Barrett Mr. Armstrong Mr. MacKnight
	Joint Chiefs of Staff	Admiral Stevens
	Central Intelligence Agency	Mr. Jackson Mr. Wisner Mr. Reber
	Executive Secretary - PSB	Mr. Davison

General Magruder was unable to attend the meeting.

As Mr. Barrett was temporarily called out of the room, Admiral Stevens summarized the reasons for the meeting. It was called because a pressing need was felt for intelligence in the fields of psychology, anthropology, public opinion etc., to support psychological warfare activities. Yet the CIA was trying to divest itself of the responsibility for coordinating and evaluating this intelligence. It was recognized that the State Department was probably in the best position to collect intelligence of this type, but most members of the Board felt that an operating agency should not have the responsibility for coordinating and evaluating it. The best arrangement, therefore, might be for the State Department to perform the collection function but for the CIA to coordinate and review the intelligence. Need for clarifying responsibilities in this field was especially pressing in view of the fact that the National Plan for Psychological Warfare, which is currently under consideration, must specify who has the responsibility.

Mr. Jackson disagreed with this interpretation of CIA responsibilities and stated that the law required the Agency to coordinate the intelligence <u>activities</u> of the various departments, but that this did not include review of the content of intelligence which was collected. It would take a National Security Council directive to the CIA to force the Agency to review intelligence content, and this directive would have to be issued over the objections of the Agency itself.

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Admiral Stevens cited an example of a case in which he felt the estimate of an independent agency would be necessary. The Air Force has charge of delivering the atom bomb and regards collection of intelligence regarding the possible effects of the atom bomb as falling within its province. On the other hand, the psychological and political effects of dropping an atom bomb are of considerable interest to the Department of State. It is clear that the State Department would be reluctant to accept the Air Force estimate of these effects without a further check and it is equally clear that the Air Force would hesitate to accept the verdict of the State Department. Consequently, an overall estimate by an independent agency is required.

Mr. Jackson replied that careful study had been made of CIA's responsibilities in this field and that the Dulles Committee had recommended against the Agency assuming a review responsibility for intelligence on a continuing basis. The CIA is willing, however, to make recommendations regarding the coordination of intelligence activities.

Mr. Armstrong observed that a NSC directive assigned the collection of sociological, psychological, and similar types of intelligence to the Department of State, and that the Department was repidly becoming better equipped to provide such information as well as political intelligence.

Admiral Stevens then inquired whether the CIA's responsibility for making national intelligence estimates would not bring it into the field of coordinating psychological warfare intelligence in any case. Mr. Jackson replied that the CIA would, of course, provide national estimates but that this was done in individual cases and would not involve evaluation of psychological intelligence on a continuing basis. The fact that a given subject was of concern to several departments did not automatically make it a responsibility of CIA. The test was whether the matter was beyond the competence of any intelligence body within one of the departments. If so, then the intelligence agency in the department concerned should refer the matter to the CIA.

Mr. Barrett cited the case of intelligence regarding public opinion in China. To what extent had the "hate America" campaign taken hold, etc.? It was beyond the competence of any one department to answer this question. State had some information, the Army had some also. Would this provide a basis for a request to CIA to provide a national estimate?

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Mr. Jackson replied that a request for information of this order should be made initially to the State Department If it then appeared that a national estimate was involved, the CIA would step in. Determination as to what constitutes a national estimate, however, is made by the IAC. In the event that the Strategy Board requests such information from the State Department and is not satisfied with the results, it could complain to CIA. Also if the State Department had difficulty in securing necessary information from other intelligence agencies to fill such a request the CIA would back it up.

Mr. Barrett mentioned that General Magruder had made two points in this connection: First, intelligence regarding public opinion in any given foreign area would in effect be an evaluation of the VOA operation. Was it proper for the State Department to have the last word in evaluating its own efforts? Second, while the State Department conducts the bulk of the foreign information and psychological warfare programs, it does not carry all of them. For both these reasons, General Magruder felt that the CIA might be a more appropriate agency to do the job.

Mr. Jackson replied that insofar as coordination of intelligence activities was involved, this field was of concern to the CIA, but otherwise it would not be.

Mr. Barrett summed up the discussion as follows:

It is the view of CIA that the transfer to the State Department of responsibility for intelligence on PW is a correct interpretation of the directive under which CIA is operating. In the case of very important intelligence estimates which affect a number of agencies, there is nothing to prevent the CIA from making a final evaluation. In the case of such requests as those regarding public opinion in China, the request should be directed to the State Department R Area, and CIA could be brought into it only if the R Area were unable to handle the request.

Mr. Wisner asked which agency should make a request for an estimate of psychological reactions to use of the A bomb. Mr. Barrett said that he believed that JCS should make this request. Mr. Armstrong suggested that the Strategy Board might try making such a request. The Executive Secretary was instructed to bring up this matter at a future Board meeting.

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Mr. Jackson then suggested the following wording for paragraph 21 of the National PW Plan (paragraph defining responsibility for the collection of PW intelligence):

> "In accordance with general principles to be worked out between the NPSB and the heads of the five intelligence agencies, the CIA will see that appropriate intelligence support is provided for psychological warfare and that the intelligence activities of government departments and agencies in this field are properly coordinated."

Those present saw no immediate objection to this wording in view of the preceeding discussion.

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