

2 February 1951

*Baudon*  
MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION:

SUBJECT: Intelligence Support for Psychological Warfare

PARTICIPANTS: Capt. McCool, USN, JIG  
Col. Kleitz  
Lt. Col. Philbin  
Mr. Millikan  
Mr. Reber



From the conversation the following points emerged:

1. There was complete acceptance of the transfer of social, political and cultural intelligence to the State Department this field would include part of the intelligence support for psychological warfare - the sociological, academic, long-range aspects. This part could properly be done in State regardless of where the operational responsibility is finally located.

2. Another part of the intelligence support for psychological warfare is the application of day to day operational intelligence. This part of the job would be based to a considerable degree on military intelligence, and the resulting analyses would be essential information for the three military services and the civilian operating people (VOA for example) whether that be State or a new independent agency.

3. There needs to be one place which will receive intelligence from the three services and ensure cross-fertilization between them, at the same time adding in the sociological contributions from State. This is the intelligence coordination job that must be done.

4. This coordination could be done in one of four main ways:

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a. By State's sociological intelligence people. The military object strongly on the grounds that this would produce an over-emphasis on the academic and theoretical factors without really providing the operating people with the practical and current support they need.

b. By the military themselves. (They say they do not have the numbers of personnel nor the skills required.)

- (1) centrally - this the military says is impossible. There is <sup>now</sup> the central point and the JIG cannot provide it.
- (2) separately in each service - this would involve duplication, and the coordination between the three is poor.

c. By the civilians operating agency.

- (1) A new independent agency - if created. This suggestion would involve creating an additional intelligence unit to be placed within the new agency.
- (2) in the State Department if no new agency is created
  - (a) in the P area next to the operating people.
  - (b) in the R area but somewhat separated from the academic, sociological researchers.
  - (d) in CIA.

5. The arguments for CIA doing the job are:

(a) CIA is in business to collate and coordinate intelligence relating to the national security. It was set up because the coordination was so poor between the three military services and State.

(b) If CIA does not do this job, its role in the coordination field becomes purely supervisory, with the chief burden for coordination falling on the intelligence agencies principally involved.

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(c) CIA now has certain functions (OSI and ORR) on which they take a much more active coordination role, actually collecting and evaluating the material, although these offices can hardly be considered services of common concern. The reasons for CIA's activities in these fields may be that in our judgment they were not receiving proper attention elsewhere. If so this same reasoning would apply to psychological intelligence.

6. The arguments against CIA doing the job are:

(a) CIA is not operating in this field, so its only function would be to coordinate for others.

(b) As a matter of principle the parties primarily interested should do the coordination themselves directly and CIA should only have to oversee the arrangements.

(c) Intelligence support should always be as close as possible to the operators who are its end users. The collating should normally be done in the agency which is the primary user of the intelligence product.

7. The principles applied in psychological intelligence should be applicable to economic intelligence as well. On the same theory applied in returning political, sociological and cultural intelligence to State, if a new Foreign Economic Administration is created, economic intelligence should be turned over to it. On the same theory psychological intelligence should be coordinated and largely performed by the agency chiefly responsible for psycho operations. These deductions would be correct unless the action is rejected that was stated in the last paragraph: that intelligence support should be as close as possible to the end-user. If this is rejected the

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CIA should gradually absorb the other foreign intelligence functions of the Government.



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CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY  
 OFFICIAL ROUTING SLIP

TO		INITIALS	DATE
1	AD/RR		
2			
3			
4			
5			

FROM		INITIALS	DATE
1	O/IC		2/5
2			
3			

- APPROVAL
- INFORMATION
- SIGNATURE
- ACTION
- DIRECT REPLY
- RETURN
- COMMENT
- PREPARATION OF REPLY
- DISPATCH
- CONCURRENCE
- RECOMMENDATION
- FILE

RE [Redacted Box]

CIA. 2/6.

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