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19 October 1948

EMERGENCY NATIONAL PLAN FOR OVERT PSYCHOLOGICAL WARFAREPROBLEM

To prepare an emergency national plan for overt psychological warfare based on the assumption that war with the U.S.S.R. and its satellites has been forced upon the United States.

FACTS

Public Law 402 (80th Congress) authorized the Department of State to conduct an information service to disseminate abroad information about the United States, its people, and policies. This is an integral part of overt psychological warfare.

The SANAC Subcommittee (SSE) on Psychological Warfare has authority, in the absence of a national wartime organization for overt psychological warfare, to coordinate implementation of approved overt psychological plans in any war emergency which might suddenly arise. The SANAC Subcommittee is also responsible for the:

- (a) Preparation of national plans and implementing directives relating to overt psychological warfare;
- (b) Preparation of plans for orderly and effective organizational transition from peacetime to wartime status. *f 304 Series*

NSC-4 established an Interdepartmental Consultative Staff, on a permanent basis, to advise the State Department on all information measures in peacetime.

SANACC 504/14 approved the J.C.S. recommendation that the nucleus of a psychological warfare organization under the National Security Council should be established as soon as practicable. SANACC 504/14 is under consideration of the National Security Council.

The Office of War Information and the Office of Strategic Services supported by the Department of State and the military services conducted overt psychological warfare operations in World War II.

CONCLUSIONS

Psychological Warfare will be an important and potent weapon in event of war between the United States and the Soviet Union. Overt psychological warfare should be authorized immediately upon the outbreak of hostilities.

Overt psychological warfare plans should be ready and approved for immediate implementation in event of war or emergency. Such plans must be continually revised in keeping with the changing international political situation, and national policies related to this field of activity.

The preparation and amendment of overt plans should be accomplished by using the experience and facilities of the State Department, NSC-4 group, and departments of the National Military Establishment.

In event of war, a national agency should coordinate the overt psychological warfare operations of the primary supporting agencies for such operations, namely,

- the Department of State;
- the Departments of the National Military Establishment; and
- such agencies which may be established by legislation or Executive Order.

OSD & DOS review(s) completed.

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Enclosure "A" is an Emergency national plan for overt psychological warfare which should be continuously revised.

RECOMMENDED

The Subcommittee recommends that the "Conclusions" with Enclosure "A" be approved.

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1. Psychological Warfare is defined as the planned use, during time of war or threat of war, of all measures, exclusive of armed conflict, designed to influence the thought, morale, or behavior of a given foreign group in such a way as to support the accomplishment of our military or national aims, with the following objectives:

- (a) To assist in overcoming an enemy's will to fight;
- (b) To sustain the morale of friendly groups in countries occupied by the enemy;
- (c) To improve the morale of friendly countries and the attitudes of neutral countries toward the United States.

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5. Responsibilities.

Psychological Warfare requires an organization under authoritative control from the national policy level through well coordinated and completely integrated command and planning levels to the operating units at home and abroad. In accordance with Public Law 402 - 80th Congress, MSC-4, and the definition of psychological warfare (cited in paragraph 1 above) the responsibilities for information programs and psychological warfare should be allocated by the National Security Council, or competent national authority, as follows: (It is assumed that the NME will actually participate in psychological warfare operations, only in wartime, or threat of war as determined by the President.)

- (a) To the National Security Council - Lamination of national policy for information programs and psychological warfare.
- (b) To the Secretary of State -
 - (a) Foreign policy aspects of the contents of out-pat of information programs and psychological warfare.
 - (b) Development and implementation of programs to improve the morale of friendly countries and the attitude of neutral countries toward the United States.
- (c) To the Secretary of Defense - (including Secretaries of Army-Navy-Air Force.)
 - Prior to war*
Development and implementation in wartime of programs to support the accomplishment of primarily military aims, namely:
 - (a) Programs to assist in overcoming an enemy's will to fight;
 - (b) Programs to sustain the morale of friendly groups in countries occupied by the enemy.
- (d) To the Joint Chiefs of Staff - Strategic planning for and direction of military forces participating in national P.W. programs.
- (e) To the Chief of Staff, U.S. Army - Development of programs to demoralize and subvert enemy ground forces; and implementation by U.S. Army forces and unified commands assigned to Army.
- (f) To the Chief of Naval Operations - Development of programs to demoralize and subvert enemy naval and naval air forces; implementation by naval forces and unified commands assigned to Navy.

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- (g) To the Chief of Staff, U.S. Air Force - Development of programs to demoralize and subvert enemy air forces; implementation by U.S. Air Forces and unified commands assigned to Air Forces.
- (h) To Theatre Commanders (Unified Commands) in actual or projected theatres of operations. Implementation of psychological warfare plans and directives.

The current operations of the Department of State, in fulfillment of the provisions of the Public Law 402 and NSC-4, must be considerably expanded and merged with national psychological warfare programs to meet the demands of war or threat of war. Advance planning and interdepartmental coordination must provide for immediate implementation of comprehensive programs commencing with H-day. The nature of this weapon makes the period H-day to D-day the most important of the entire emergency.

EMERGENCY PHASES

The important periods of the emergency are:

- I - H-day to D-day
 This period may be short but nevertheless it is the most crucial during a national emergency. A maximum national effort must be made commencing with H-day to reach the peoples of the world to tell them our war and post-war objectives. After D-day most radio receivers in enemy-controlled areas will be destroyed or confiscated. Every facility must be used to disseminate information and persuasive ideas to the people of the world so they have confidence in the U.S. and its policies (during war and post-war)
- II - D-day to the beginning of successful Allied Offensives
 During a period of possible Allied reverses, the people in enemy areas, and areas threatened by the enemy must be recruited and persuaded, lest through despair they actively support the enemy.
- III - From the Beginning of Successful Allied Offensives to V-day.
 The Achilles' heel of an enemy in war is his armed forces; with the beginning of enemy reverses and defeats, effective Allied psychological warfare must include the disintegration of the enemy armed forces, and outline for them the ways and means of ending the war with some assurance of future security and survival.