

SECRET

8 July 1948

MEMORANDUM FOR: THE EXECUTIVE DIRECTOR

SUBJECT: Meeting of SANACC Subcommittee
on Psychological Warfare

1. The SANACC Subcommittee on Psychological Warfare met at 1000 today in Mr. Block's office with the following members present:

- Chairman - Mr. Ralph Block - State Department
- Comdr. David Knoll - Navy Department
- Col. Clyde Rich - Air Force
- Col. William McNamee - Army Department
- [Redacted] - CIA

25X1


2. Commander Knoll informed the members of the meeting which he attended with Mr. George Allen, Assistant Secretary of State, and Mr. Oechener's group to discuss various topics with Lt. Dreyer, USNR, who had just returned from a tour of duty in Odessa and Moscow.

a. Commander Knoll said that much of the discussion hinged around whether we were preparing the Russian people for the future or taking them back into the past.

b. The point was made that great care should be exerted in the exact use of language, e.g., Russians like to be called "Russians" as distinguished from "Communists."

c. There was no question of anybody at the meeting regarding the fact that the Voice of America is propaganda.

25X6



e. Lt. Dreyer stated that much thought should now be given to what goes over the Voice in the first few days of actual shooting war with USSR since radios will be confiscated within a short time after the declaration of hostilities, as was done in the first days of World War II.

OSD & DOS review(s) completed.

SECRET

SECRET

Approved For Release 2006/03/17 : CIA-RDP80R01731R003500200021-3

2. Commander Knoll stated that he was very impressed by Mr. Allen's keen attention and by the questions that he asked. He added, however, that the point is whether he (Mr. Allen) will give enough time to this subject.

3. Commander Knoll suggested that Mr. Block should speak to someone in SANACC about attempting to get a formal answer from the National Security Council on paper 304/11. Without any ostensible show of enthusiasm, Mr. Block agreed to see what he could do about it.

4. Mr. Oechsner recently informed Mr. Block that Mr. Villard had been requested by the National Security Council to ask Mr. George Allen whether Oechsner's group should take over the planning phases of white propaganda as well as the current coordination. Mr. Oechsner had not yet seen Mr. Allen on the subject. Apparently Mr. Villard has left town so Mr. Oechsner will personally follow through with Mr. Allen.

5. I observed that if Mr. Allen said "Yes" to the suggestion from the National Security Council, it would automatically put me out of business. Commander Knoll and Colonel Rich violently said, "No, our Secretaries have something to say about this." Mr. Block, however, was inclined to go along with my viewpoint.

6. Mr. Block wants to prepare the policy statement which the Subcommittee is now working on so that it will be ready for the SANACC meeting on 22 July 1948.

[REDACTED]

MEMBER, ICAPS

25X1

SMacC/ml1

SECRET

8 July 1948

STATE-ARMY-NAVY-AIR FORCE COORDINATING
SUBCOMMITTEE FOR SPECIAL STUDIES AND EVALUATIONS

MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD


Appearance before the SANACC Subcommittee for Special Studies and Evaluations of Mr. Wallace Carroll, newspaper man and former Deputy Director for European Areas of the United States Office of War Information, 25 June 1948.

Mr. Carroll's activities for OWI in World War II included operations both in Europe and direction of European operations from OWI Headquarters in Washington. He made the following points:

(a) Propaganda is not a science but an art. Anthropologists and sociologists can effectively analyze and interpret the significance of events in target areas, but to formulate effective propaganda themes and messages, to organize what is to be said, you need people who bring imagination and intuition to the aid of reason. The best propagandist is a playwright, a man who takes a theme and in his presentation of that theme penetrates into the psychology of the people to whom you are talking.

(b) Exiles and underground leaders of target areas should be used sparingly and carefully, if at all, in outlining propaganda. German exiles who worked for OWI hated Hitler so greatly that all they could do essentially was to call names. This head-on attack on Hitler produced a German reaction in the opposite direction of what we were trying to obtain. Any future propaganda attack by a United States agency should carefully avoid attacking the head man; an attack on those who surround him would be much more effective.

25X1



SECRET

COPY NO. _____

8 July 1948STATE-ARMY-NAVY-AIR FORCE COORDINATING
SUBCOMMITTEE FOR SPECIAL STUDIES AND EVALUATIONSMEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD

Appearance before the SANACC Subcommittee for Special Studies and Evaluations of Colonel Charles A.H. Thomson, USA, Brookings Institution, 19 May 1948.

Colonel Thomson was Secretary of the Overseas Planning Board of the United States Office of War Information on a loan from G-2; later Psychological Warfare Officer for Plans and Directives under Brigadier General McClure, SHAEF. Based upon his experience during World War II in the capacities indicated in the foregoing, Colonel Thomson made these points:

(a) A national P.W. agency must conduct operations; coordination alone will be inefficient and ineffective.

(b) Established intelligence agencies were inadequate to fill the needs of P.W. in wartime;

(c) Long range political planning is the 'sine qua non' for effective P.W.;

(d) Propaganda must have a closer relation to tactical planning than to strategical planning;

(e) Regional Offices in theatres will have more timely and better information for planning P.W. operations;

(f) There is a need for a better appreciation of the P.W. capabilities and limitations in the top echelons of U.S. political and military leaders, especially to provide for future cooperation in emergency or wartime;

(g) Good, timely, effective "white" operations lessen the need for extensive "gray" or "black" operations;

(h) In wartime the Military Establishment must assume full responsibility for P.W.; while the State Department accepts full responsibility under the N.S.C. for dissemination of truth and guidance.

(i) State Department should no longer be considered as

- 1 -

SECRET

the Senior Service that has final voice in the determination of U.S. broad national policies.

(j) Good timely interesting news (U.S. concept) is the best propaganda.

In the development of the topics enumerated, Colonel Thomson said:

"Unless you have something to operate you can't accomplish anything in psychological warfare. You can do all the policy coordination you please but you have to have operational factors to make your coordination effective in day to day operations on agreed objectives. You need transmitters, printing presses, people to write news, and people to write radio scripts.

"One of our chief difficulties at the beginning was that the State Department had no long range strategic planning on what kind of a world we wanted; and State Department policy guidance was ineffective because of the inadequacies of the Department's low level representation.

"The Overseas Planning Board of OWI had as one of its most important functions the approval of a weekly central directive to govern operations. This was divided into background facts and policies and guidance. In addition, there were also daily guidances to various areas. OWI's basic difficulty that placed it behind the eight-ball was due to its lack of information about future plans. This caused a separation between OWI at home and OWI operations in the field; local direction by the military coordinated field operations for purposes and in a direction of which Washington was uninformed. The authority of OWI in Washington was decreased by the fact that OWI field authorities had a better tactical relationship. As a result many propaganda decisions were made on a basis of military expediency rather than on long term political foundations. If OWI had been out in on basic planning at home or had either had access to basic planning

in the State Department and the War Department, or had been more intimately related to both, it would have received important information through proper channeling that would have built up its operational authority.

"As a general rule, at the beginning of World War II people in the armed services did not know what propoganda could do to assist military objectives. It was necessary first to disabuse them of romantic notions about propoganda, and second to teach them what was essential in the way of machinery geared up to do the job. The ignorance of military authorities about propoganda robbed OWI of its bargaining power which would have been stronger if military heads would have understood the functioning and possibilities of propoganda. Effective operations of this kind require that propoganda themes be keyed to current intelligence. Intelligence of neither State nor War Departments was sufficiently adequate or detailed to govern day to day operations from this point of view. Essential policy planning intelligence does not require a large number of people for a propoganda agency but effective servicing of your own propoganda operators and policy people requires your own intelligence setup, organized functionally and qualitatively from the point of view of your own requirements."