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15 September 1947 (Navy Draft)

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SWNC SUBCOMMITTEE SPECIAL STUDIES AND EVALUATIONS

Note by the Chairman

1. The enclosure presents a study of the background facts of psychological warfare and the functions and activities of the government agencies related thereto supplementing the presentation by the ad hoc Committee in SWNCC 304/1 and 304/2. The enclosure relates, more definitively, basic requirements to activate a national organization for psychological warfare and certain relationships on upper levels entering into the structure of such an organization for time of war (or threat of war as determined by the President.)

2. The State-War-Navy Coordinating Committee is requested to note the indications in the enclosure that the Subcommittee intends to prepare special studies as follows:

a. A more extensional study than is presented in SWNCC 304/1 and 304/2 of the required work by the Subcommittee in relation to policies, plans, and studies for immediate employment of psychological warfare considering the probable short time to mobilize.

b. A special study of "Black" propaganda in relation to "White" propaganda and in relation to sabotage, conspiracy and subversion.

c. A special study of the problems of integrating civilian and military personnel into a wartime organization for psychological warfare.

d. A study of the management of information and propaganda with special reference to a situation in which a sense of combat exists within the Continental United States.

NAVY review(s) completed.

RALPH BLOCK
Chairman

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E N C L O S U R E

State-War-Navy Coordinating Subcommittee Special Studies and Evaluations

PROBLEM

1. To determine the responsibilities and functions of a wartime organization for Psychological Warfare, taking into account the related functions and activities of other government agencies and in view thereof, to recommend an initial planning concept of a suitable organization within the government for the discharge of these functions in time of war.

ASSUMPTIONS

2. It is assumed that:

a. More destructive aggressive psychological warfare than exists against the United States in the political field at the present time will be initiated both from without and within prior to the beginning of active military aggression by an enemy or enemies.

b. Active military aggression by an enemy or enemies will be initiated against the United States without a Declaration of War against the United States.

c. The time interval that may be available to mobilize for war may be of the order of a few hours or at the most a few months under the most favorable conditions.

FACTS BEARING ON THE PROBLEM

3. A National Security Council has been established by the National Security Act of 1947 with the function to advise the President with respect to the integration of domestic, foreign, and military policies relating to the national security so as to enable the Armed Services and other departments and agencies of the Government to cooperate more effectively in matters involving national security. This Act specifies the composition of the National Security Council, namely, the President, the Secretary of State, the Secretary of National Defense, the Secretary of the Army, the Secretary of the Navy, the Secretary of the Air Force, the Chairman of the National Security Resources Board and such other officers as the President may designate according to the terms of the Act.

4. The Joint Chiefs of Staff as established by the National Security Act of 1947 will continue to act as the principal professional military advisers to the President and the Secretary of Defense.

5. The Subcommittee on Psychological Warfare (PWC) was established on 30 April 1947 as the agency of the State-War-Navy Coordinating Committee (SWNCC) under the terms of SWNCC 304-1/2 charged with the preparation of policies, plans and studies for immediate and continuous employment of national psychological warfare in time of war (or threat of war as determined by the President). On 5 June 1947 the SWNCC Subcommittee on Psychological Warfare (PWC) adopted the cover name of SWNCC Subcommittee for Special Studies and Evaluations. This Subcommittee has been authorized, in the absence of a National Wartime Organization for Psychological Warfare, to coordinate implementation of approved psychological warfare plans in any emergency which might suddenly arise.

6. No other wartime organization of the Government has been established for psychological warfare.

DISCUSSION

7. The report of the Committee of the Senate on Armed Services (Senate Report 259 - 5 June 1947) stated in part:

"In looking to the future, it is apparent from the potentialities implicit in scientific developments, that the world is entering an era in which war, if it comes, will be fought at speeds and accompanied by devastations that stagger the imagination. Consequently, in order at once to guard our safety and support our efforts to promote and maintain the peace of the world, it is essential that this country move without delay to provide itself with the best organization for security which can be devised."

8. In estimating the situation with a view to recommending a suitable organization within the Government for the discharge of psychological warfare functions in time of war, it appears essential to appraise the related situation in world affairs within which such an organization, when made operational, might bring psychological weapons into action. In the area of world affairs there are forces at work now in a great power struggle.

It is noted that active psycho-political warfare, if not psychological warfare, operations against United States policies and interests is now being conducted under the control of, dominated by, or in sympathy with powerful foreign groups, such operations appear to be based on carefully designed plans of military character carried out systematically. Current intelligence supports the view that extensive operations are being conducted against our interests. Overt operations both without

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and within the United States against United States interests are using the media of radio and press, the devices of infiltration, and utilizing the conveniences of democratic platforms and freedoms for revolutionary agitation and propaganda.

9. The National Security Act established the National Security Council as the primary advisory body to the Chief Executive on matters pertaining to national security. National policy embraces integrated military-political-economic policy in support and in pursuit of national security. Psychological warfare requires direction and phasing in coordination with military-political-economic operations to the best accomplishment of national aims. Such overall direction and phasing appear to lie within the powers of the National Security Council. It appears essential that the National Security Council should relate such considerations to the direction of psychological warfare.

10. The Executive, the Department of State and the National Military Establishment have primary functions, interests and responsibilities in the direction and support of a psychological warfare agency of the Government, and contain resources which can be made available to that agency's use.

11. The Office of International Information and Educational Exchange in the Department of State is charged with the performance of informational activities "which consist of or are concerned with informing the people of other nations about any matter in which the United States has an interest". (Executive Order 9808, 31 August 1946).

12. The War Department on 10 January 1947 and the Navy Department on 10 June 1947 charged their services with responsibilities related to training, organization and equipping forces capable of employing psychological warfare methods, techniques and facilities.

13. Information is being disseminated to the people of the United States by Government agencies as follows: Bureaus and Offices for Public Information of the Army, Navy, and Air Force Departments, the Division of Public Affairs of the Department of State, and the Public Relations Agencies of the various Departments.

14. It is the responsibility of the Central Intelligence Agency to coordinate the production of all foreign intelligence and to produce national intelligence. Therefore, the Central Intelligence Agency is the only agency qualified to give coordinated intelligence support for planning and is so functionally organized at the present time. The Department of State, the Armed Forces and the Central Intelligence Agency at this time are not staffed adequately to cope with planning for wartime psychological warfare.

15. Consequent to Executive Order #9821 (20 September 1945) which terminated the Office of Strategic Services effective 1 October 1945, no psychological warfare activities and functions such as were performed by the Office of Strategic Services in World War II are the responsibility of any existing government agency.

16. In World War II the effectiveness of psychological warfare operations was adversely affected by:

- a. Lack of trained personnel.
- b. Lack of appreciation of the power, purposes, and uses of psychological warfare.
- c. Procedural delays.
- d. Deficiencies of integration and coordination in organization.

Following the termination of combat operations psychological warfare personnel were demobilized and psychological warfare agencies were inactivated and liquidated with thoroughness and rapidity. As a consequence, no appreciable advantage was taken of lessons learned in World War II to organize personnel and resolve methods into an integrated and coordinated organization for psychological warfare in time of war.

17. The Department of State, the Armed Services and the Central Intelligence Agency have no funds appropriated for psychological warfare purposes. Rapid and thorough demobilization since V-J Day has reduced psychological warfare manpower. The only personnel now detailed to psychological warfare duties are listed below:

Navy Department	1 officer full time, 1 alternate
Army Department	1 officer part time, 1 alternate
Air Force Department	1 officer part time, 1 alternate
State Department	1 official part time, 1 alternate
Central Intelligence Agency	1 officer part time, 1 alternate

18. No psychological warfare specialist reserves, organized as such, exist within the National Military Establishment or the Department of State.

19. The Departments of Army, Navy and Air Force and the Central Intelligence Agency require:

- a. Policy and strategic guidance.
- b. To be apprised of the character and extent of their contribution to the accomplishment of the national psychological warfare objectives;
- c. Allocations of resources of manpower and other operating resources commensurate with tasks assigned.

20. The President may within his powers issue instructions to the Secretary of State and the Secretary of Defense which would, without a public declaration of a state of emergency, set in motion limited psychological warfare operations.

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21. The Charter of the SWNCC Subcommittee for Psychological Warfare, (SWNCC 804-1/2), describes the Subcommittee as "the agency of the SWNCC, charged with the preparation of policies, plans, and studies for immediate and continuous employment in time of war (or threat of war as determined by the President). This section of the Charter represents part of the solution of the Problem, section a, (to recommend) "A peacetime organization in a ready-for-mobilisation status". Such a status is deemed to include readiness rapidly to implement approved policies and plans immediately to deploy psychological warfare personnel in the furtherance of approved operations. Related to these objectives, the following situational factors appear to be significant:

a. Neither SWNCC nor the subcommittee have authority over any appropriated funds in the measure essential to carrying out these objectives.

b. Activation of psychological warfare, subsequent to secret instructions by the President to the Department of State, and the Military Establishment, would depend largely on provision from the Executive Emergency Funds.

c. A public declaration of emergency would conceivably be followed by a request for and Congressional appropriation of funds for essential purposes arising out of the emergency.

d. The establishing of a Psychological Warfare Organization by Executive Order, as a part of the comprehensive program for future security of the United States as expressed in the National Security Act of 1947, would require immediate appropriation of funds for its activation.

e. No organized body of personnel trained for psychological warfare exists in the Executive Department nor is there any provision for adequate training of personnel for psychological warfare. To provide such training there would be required:

(1) The establishing of a school for psychological warfare training.

(2) A program to provide personnel to be so trained and to include personnel recruitment into the Reserve.

(3) A program for training personnel, duration of training three months to one year.

22. The translation of national policy into overall strategic plans of military, political, economic, and psychological warfare operations requires complete coordination to avoid conflicting processes or objectives and to insure that the total resources are employed to a furtherance of the national objectives.

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The apportionment of resources and effort among these several operations is dependent upon strategic essentiality and evaluated risks in the changing situation.

23. The formulation of psychological warfare plans and policies in accordance with national policy and in coordination with military, political and economic planning, requires the existence of a policy and planning body which to be effective must be under the authority and direction of a single responsible head who is to be responsible for the functional operations of the agency. It is considered that the individual so charged should report directly to the National Security Council, and to the President as its Chairman. This policy and planning body must include representation from the Joint Chiefs of Staff and representatives of the Department of State, Army, Navy and Air Force and the Central Intelligence Agency, who are qualified to participate both as individuals and representatives of their respective organizations.

24. Selection and designation of representatives to such a planning and policy board should be made in consideration of the appointees' related experience and knowledge and appreciation of the power, purposes, capabilities and applications of psychological warfare. Training should be accomplished within the military establishment to broaden the general appreciation of psychological warfare, to provide adequately trained personnel to satisfy planning and policy functions, and to provide reserves adequate to operational needs consequent to psychological warfare activation or mobilization.

25. To comply with its directive, "to coordinate implementation of approved psychological warfare plans in any war emergency which might suddenly arise", the Subcommittee should:

a. Collaborate now with respective Staff Sections of the National Military Establishment and the Department of State which are concerned with psychological warfare plans, operations, communications, and logistic support in order to ^{be} get ready for such a war emergency.

b. Recommend, as soon as it is able to do so, drafts of executive orders and legislation appropriate to the establishing of a wartime Psychological Warfare Organization including provisions for its Director and the obtaining of allocation of funds essential to the operations of the Organization.

c. Be guided by the proposition that the Subcommittee and its members, upon the establishing of a wartime Psychological Warfare Organization, will assist its Director in establishing close coordination of implementation of approved psychological warfare plans.

26. As approved in SWGCC 304-1/2 plans and directives developed by the Subcommittee, which are to be implemented in actual or projected military areas, theaters or commands, will, following their approval by SWGCC, be transmitted by rapid communication, to the military commanders concerned by the Joint Chiefs of Staff, only, and that the implementation of such plans and directives will be the responsibility solely of the commanders concerned.

27. For discussion of special studies to be undertaken by the Subcommittee see Appendix A.

CONCLUSIONS

28. It is concluded that:

a. The wartime Psychological Warfare Organization (hereinafter referred to as the Organization) should be established under the National Security Council.

b. The Organization should be directed by a Director who should be the head thereof; the Director should:

(1) Be appointed by the President from among individuals in civilian life or from commissioned officers of the Armed Services;

(2) Report directly to the National Security Council and to the President as its Chairman;

(3) Be empowered to provide unified direction and authoritative coordination of the national psychological warfare effort and activities, and operations related thereto, using established agencies to perform their appropriate functions.

(4) Be the Chairman of a Policy and Planning Board which should include representation from the Joint Chiefs of Staff, and representatives of the Departments of State, Army, Navy, Air Force and the Central Intelligence Agency, whose qualifications and official position warrant their participation, both as individuals and as representatives of their respective organizations; and representatives from such other Government agencies whose participation may be found to be appropriate.

c. The Organization should be provided with the necessary authority by executive order or under law, and thereafter should be provided with strategic guidance, information, and allocations of resources of manpower, funds, facilities and materials essential to proper functioning.

d. The Organization should have access to or be provided with such intelligence as relates to psychological warfare and as may be essential to the accomplishment of the Organization's approved functions, missions and tasks.

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e. The Organization should plan, and subject to approval of plans by the National Security Council, develop, control and coordinate all foreign and domestic psychological warfare activities, and coordinate, in consonance with approved policies, the war informational activities of all Federal departments and agencies.

f. A psychological warfare specialist category should be established to facilitate personnel placement and that training should be instituted at this time within the National Military Establishment:

(1) To broaden the general appreciation of psychological warfare capabilities as a weapon;

(2) To provide adequately trained personnel to satisfy planning and policy functions;

(3) To provide reserves adequate to operational needs consequent to activation of psychological warfare or mobilization.

g. Rosters and files, descriptive of personnel as relates to loyalty and qualifications, should be established, maintained, and be available for the Organizations's purposes embracing:

(1) Trained civilian personnel on duty in the Department of State;

(2) Personnel on duty in World War II in the Army, Navy, Air Force, ONI, OES and other activities which directly participated in psychological warfare.

(3) Personnel trained incident to training program. (f 2 and 3 above).

RECOMMENDATIONS

29. It is recommended that:

a. The Conclusions be approved for planning purposes and for implementation indicated in subparagraphs f and g.

b. Thereafter, transmit this report to the Secretaries of State and Defense and to the Secretaries of the Army, Navy, and Air Force, the Joint Chiefs of Staff and the Director of Central Intelligence, for guidance and appropriate action.

SECRETAPPENDIX "A"DISCUSSION OF SPECIAL STUDIES

1. Performance of "Black" propaganda functions related to sabotage, conspiracy and subversion are nowhere now assured, in time of war, within the structure of the Government. In order to combine the "Black" and "White" processes so that they may cooperate to obtain overall psychological warfare objectives, coordination should be effected on the various levels of policy and implementation within the structure of the Psychological Warfare Organization. Special study will be required to ascertain how the foregoing may be assured and accomplished.

2. In World War II, Government agencies became the principal sources of releasable information about the war. In collaboration with the Office of Censorship, the press and the radio operated under rules of voluntary censorship. Experience of World War II (see Appendix "B") indicates that honest information on the progress of a war should be imparted in a regular manner to maintain public confidence. Such dissemination should not contain information which is deemed to be confusing to the public, should not contain statements believed not to be in accordance with the facts nor should it omit facts which need to be stated in order not to be misleading to the public. Notwithstanding these criteria, no information should be issued which would be deemed to be of aid and comfort to the enemy.

3. In the event that the Continental United States is attacked or that a part thereof becomes a zone of combat, new problems of management of information and propaganda are introduced, differing from those experienced in previous wars. The risks associated with voluntary censorship may not be acceptable nor compatible with the aims of national survival in future war. Special studies will be required in these premises.

4. Differences in status, privileges, promotions, pay and training between civilian and military personnel created problems of command, discipline, general morale, logistics and housekeeping in the World War II organization for psychological warfare. These and other related personnel problems require special study by the Subcommittee.

SECRETAPPENDIX "B"

In the Executive Orders establishing the Office of War Information, the Director was empowered to:

- a. Formulate and carry out, through the use of press, radio, motion picture, and other facilities, information programs designed to facilitate the development of an informed and intelligent understanding, at home and abroad, of the status and progress of the war effort and of the war policies, activities, and aims of the Government.
- b. Coordinate the war informational activities of all Federal departments and agencies for the purpose of assuring an accurate and consistent flow of war information to the public and the world at large.
- c. Obtain, study, and analyze information concerning the war effort and advise the agencies concerned with the dissemination of such information as to the most appropriate and effective means of keeping the public adequately informed.
- d. Review, clear, and approve all proposed radio and motion picture programs sponsored by Federal departments and agencies; and serve as the central point of clearance and contact for the radio broadcasting and motion picture industries, respectively, in their relationships with Federal Departments and agencies concerning such Government programs.

And -

8. The Director of the Office of War Information and the Director of Censorship shall collaborate in the performance of their respective functions for the purpose of facilitating the prompt and full dissemination of all available information which will not give aid to the enemy.
9. The Director of the Office of War Information and the Defense Communications Board shall collaborate in the performance of their respective functions for the purpose of facilitating the broadcast of war information to the peoples abroad.

The revised Executive Order of 10 March, 1943 stated:

- (1) The Office of War Information will plan, develop and execute all phases of the Federal program of radio, press, publications and related foreign propaganda activities involving the dissemination of information.

Under the authority thus vested, the Director of OWI issued a regulation to the heads of all Executive Departments and Agencies (No. 7 - 17 May, 1943)

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in which it was stated the Director would disapprove any release which (a) is deemed to be confusing to the public; (b) contains statements believed not to be in accordance with the facts; (c) omits facts which need to be stated in order not to be misleading to the public. The Regulation stated further that it was "not to be construed to require the issuance of information which is deemed to be of aid and comfort to the enemy".