

**CONFIDENTIAL**SUMMARY OFPSYCHOLOGICAL WARFARE ACTIVITIESPACIFIC OCEAN AREAS

(Extracted from Report by Chief, Psychological Warfare Branch, CINOPAC, CINCPAC)

\* \* \* \* \*

1. During the SAIPAN campaign, for the first time, JAPAN's ultimate fate became reasonably susceptible of demonstration to her people. Therefore, in June 1944, a Psychological Warfare Section was established in the Joint Intelligence Center, Pacific Ocean Areas.
2. At the time of its establishment, no written directive concerning the functions of the Section was issued. The Section Head was directed to plan and execute strategic and tactical propaganda against the enemy in the Pacific Ocean Areas, using assigned personnel and working in conjunction with civilian Government agencies engaged in related activities. The Section expanded considerably in a few months' time and operated with sub-sections on SAIPAN, MAJURO, and OKINAWA. On 20 July 1945, the Section was reconstituted as the Psychological Warfare Branch of CinCPac-CinCPOA, and its projected activities were enlarged.
3. On 15 August 1944, the Section published its first bulletin on psychological warfare. This was revised and, in December 1944, an edition containing all available useful information on both the psychological and technical aspects of propaganda was issued and given wide dissemination within and without the theatre. At the same time, a compendium of more than one hundred (100) leaflets that had been prepared by the Section was published and distributed as a supplement to the basic work. That collection of leaflets has itself been supplemented several times.
4. Functionally, the work of the Section was of three (3) types: (a) Strategic propaganda directed against the Japanese Homeland and important off-shore possessions; (b) Tactical propaganda directed against enemy troops and enemy civilians on islands in the process of capture by American amphibious forces; and, (c) Propaganda directed against garrisons on by-passed islands in the MARSHALLS, MARIANAS, and CAROLINES.
5. The strategic propaganda program was carried on by two (2) means -- leaflets and radio broadcasts. Leaflets were prepared by the Section, alone or in conjunction with the Office of War Information, HONOLULU. Dissemination of the leaflets by carrier and landbased aircraft was arranged. Tests were conducted by the Section to develop a suitable leaflet-dropping container, and the M-16 cluster adapter and the M-26 parachute flare case were adopted to fit the need. Radio propaganda was handled entirely by the OWI, with CinCPac-CINCPAC cognizance and approval. Short-wave broadcasts from the OWI station on OAHU, and medium-wave broadcasts from the OWI station on SAIPAN, were made daily from 26 December 1944 to the end of the war.

JCS and NSC review(s) completed.

**CONFIDENTIAL****CAPS**

**CONFIDENTIAL**

6. In October 1944, carrier aircraft of the Third Fleet made the first drops of leaflets, hitting FORMALOSA and OKINAWA. This opened the strategic leaflet campaign in which approximately one hundred million (100,000,000) leaflets and newspapers were dropped on JAPAN before the war ended. The first drops on the home islands of JAPAN were made on 16 February 1945, when Fifth Fleet carrier aircraft hit the TOKYO area. The great majority of strategic leaflets were distributed by B-29s of the XXI Bomber Command, who made their first propaganda drops on OSAKA on 4 March 1945. The initial drops on KYUSHU were made by Fifth Fleet planes on 18 March 1945.

7. During the final three (3) weeks of the war, an intensive campaign against the Japanese Homeland was carried on in conjunction with the B-29 campaign. Special leaflets dropped in this period were calculated to hasten the cracking of enemy morale, and included: (1) Warnings that Japanese cities named in the leaflets would be bombed by B29s; (2) Notification to the Japanese people of the complete text of the POTSDAM Ultimatum of the three (3) powers (the United States, Great Britain, and China); (3) News of the first "atomic bomb" attack and warning that other such attacks would follow if JAPAN did not capitulate; (4) News of the Soviet Union's entry into the war against JAPAN because of JAPAN's refusal to accept the terms of the POTSDAM Ultimatum; (5) Warning of greater bombing attacks to follow, and an appeal to the Japanese people to "petition the Emperor" to accept the POTSDAM Ultimatum; (6) News of the first Radio TOKYO announcement that JAPAN would accept the POTSDAM Ultimatum.

8. During the last two (2) months of the war, Japanese reaction to this propaganda campaign, as expressed over Radio TOKYO, indicated the enemy's grave concern with "thought warfare" and its "paper bombs". A group of Japanese officer prisoners expressed the opinion, three (3) weeks before the end of the war, that the Radio TOKYO commentaries on American propaganda indicated official JAPAN's fear of the subversive effect of the leaflets. This was especially true of the "MARIANA JIHU" ("MARIANAS REVIEWS"), a weekly newspaper prepared by the Section and the OWI, and dropped over JAPAN every week for the last five (5) months of the war.

9. The section did its first tactical propaganda work in providing leaflets for use in the PELELIU operation. The Section next prepared a tactical leaflet program for the IWO JIMA operation and such leaflets were used, commencing 18 February 1945, being dropped from both carrier aircraft and land-based artillery spotter planes.

10. The only large-scale use of tactical propaganda was in the OKINAWA campaign. About five million (5,000,000) leaflets, prepared by the Section and printed on OAHU, were dropped on OKINAWA and IE SHIMA, starting seven (7) days before the main landings and continuing for several weeks after. Ashore, a CincPac-CincPOA Psychological Warfare Team, on temporary duty with G-2, Tenth Army, directed the entire propaganda program against the Japanese 32nd Army.

**ICAPS****CONFIDENTIAL**

**CONFIDENTIAL**

During the operation, the team produced six issues of a special newspaper and seventeen (17) leaflets as on-the-spot tactical propaganda. These and other materials flown in from OAHU and SAIPAN, aggregating three million (3,000,000) leaflets, were distributed to enemy troops by torpedo bombers, artillery spotter planes, and specially adapted M-34 105mm shells. In the final days of fighting on OKINAWA, Japanese troops surrendered in unprecedented numbers, the majority waving CinCPac-CinCPOA "surrender leaflets" which guaranteed them humane treatment upon surrender. As of 30 June 1945 — three (3) months after the initial landings — ten thousand seven hundred fifty five (10,755) prisoners of war had been taken on OKINAWA — a total exceeding that of prisoners taken in the entire PHILIPPINES campaign to that date.

11. In February 1945, a special program to attempt to induce the surrender of the garrison on by-passed WOTJE, in the MARSHALLS, was begun. Special leaflets, interspersed with bombings, were dropped. Voice broadcasts were made to the island from a specially equipped PV-1 plane operating at about five thousand (5000) feet. As a result of this program, a number of enemy troops were induced to desert the island and surrender to a waiting Navy craft. At the end of the war, similar programs were in progress against MILE and MALOKIAP, in the MARSHALLS; WAKE; ROTA, in the MARIANAS; and BABELTHUAP, in the PALAUS.

12. In a comparable type of work, the Section lent assistance to the island commands in their mopping-up campaigns on GUAM, TINIAN, SAIPAN, and OKINAWA. Experience in the MARIANAS demonstrated that remnants of Japanese forces on captured islands could more profitably be disposed of by inducing their surrender than by combat patrolling. This endeavor was climaxed in June 1945 when a Japanese Major and thirty three (33) men surrendered as a group on GUAM.

13. During the fourteen-month life of the Section, the number of personnel engaged grew from six (6) to sixty eight (68) (included 30-man crews of B-24 Polly planes). An advance office, to supervise the production of leaflets and liaison with the B-29 commands, was established on SAIPAN in January 1945. An officer of the Section was available at CinCPac-CinCPOA Advance Headquarters, GUAM, after its establishment. As additional duties, the Section Head acted as CinCPac-CinCPOA liaison officer with the Office of War Information, the Office of Strategic Services, and the Foreign Broadcast Intelligence Service of the Federal Communications Commission.

14. After the Japanese indicated their desire to surrender, the Psychological Warfare teams in the field assisted the local area commanders in establishing contacts with the Japanese garrison forces and in the actual surrender ceremonies. Additional language personnel were sent out from the section office at PEARL HARBOR to assist in these duties. Preliminary contacts were frequently made by Psychological Warfare personnel who volunteered to go ashore on Japanese-held islands for the purpose.

15. Essentially, psychological warfare is the expression of an integrated program involving military intelligence and operations, political forces, historical and ethnic backgrounds of peoples and nations, and diplomacy on the highest level. It does not admit of abrupt creation and dissolution. It requires

**CONFIDENTIAL****ICAPS**

**CONFIDENTIAL**

Approved For Release 2006/03/17 : CIA-RDP80R01731R003600020018-6

a continuous accumulation of pertinent facts and a discerning evaluation of such facts. Psychological warfare should be extensively studied during peacetime, at least by a nuclear organization which might properly be placed in the war plans, rather than the intelligence division. Preferably, there should be a joint Army, Navy, and State Department Psychological Warfare Branch which operates directly as an agency of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. This agency should follow intently all developments in the fields of information, education, political and psychological warfare. In addition, this organization should train a reserve corps of officers, in sufficient quantity, who, if an emergency should arise, could be mobilized to undertake this duty. Such a corps would then have available a backlog of training and information that would have been chosen with discrimination and maintained with consistency.

16. With the scientific progress made in the closing stages of the war in developing instruments and weapons of warfare, current methods of disseminating propaganda leaflets and of projecting sound and radio broadcasts will soon be outmoded. Improvements in the rocket bomb and the revolutionary nature of atomic developments should be studied by technically trained personnel with a view toward adaptation to psychological warfare's technical needs. The latest developments and scientific possibilities of a technical nature should be constantly made available to the aforementioned organization so that they can always be up-to-date.

17. While on top levels all government departments, both military and civilian, may contribute to shaping psychological warfare policy, in the execution of such during wartime only military personnel or personnel completely integrated with the military should participate. Psychological warfare demands a singleness of effort that can best be obtained by a single, well-coordinated chain of command. The unwillingness of civilian organizations to become absorbed into the required military organization is a factor to be considered. Furthermore, between military and civilian organizations there exists an inequality in the standards of responsibility, of privileges, of monetary compensation, of discipline, and of classification. All of this militates against the orderly coordination of forces.

18. In World War II many new and specialized forms of intelligence and operations activities were developed and contributed measurably to victory. Not all of these activities were fully understood, nor their value appreciated, by the armed services. Therefore, an additional responsibility of peacetime psychological warfare, is to make known its potential value to other branches of the service.

**ICAPS**

4  
Approved For Release 2006/03/17 : CIA-RDP80R01731R003600020018-6

**CONFIDENTIAL**

Psychological Review 30 October 46.

1. Hunter org submitted by Johnson -
2. Definitions submitted by Mr. Tyler.
3. Explained why has no authority to operate in Beach field  
(Will entertain SWINAC suggestion?)
4. What is relation of Beach (and all CIA) relative to  
Hunter commander. -

Thursday October 10, 1946  
Same place

1430

UAPS