

*Not used*  
SUBJECT: Functions of the Propaganda Branch

To: A.C. of S., G-2 From: Dir/Information Date: 3 May 46 Comment No. 3  
Col. Klocko/6034

1. With reference to Comment No. 2., Propaganda Branch contributes only incidentally to the production of intelligence. Its primary peacetime preoccupation is with the preparation of training items, programs, manuals, texts and doctrine on psychological warfare so that the wartime lessons learned on this important subject will not be lost. Present activities of this branch do not naturally fall under the missions of OPD or of the Collection Group of MID, but most nearly under the mission of the Combat Intelligence and Training Group of MID. It is felt, moreover, that deactivation would be an unwise step, since perpetuation of knowledge gained through war experience is essential, and on the outbreak of the next war the necessary rapid and smooth expansion of PW activities will be facilitated (either within G-2 or as a W.D. Special Staff Division).

2. There are, however, certain nontraining functions of the present Propaganda Branch of the War Department which, because of their very close alliance with similar functions of the State and Navy Departments, and because of their dependency upon our national foreign policy, could best be discharged by the Central Intelligence Group of the National Intelligence Authority. The placing of these functions on this level would insure continuity of planning and coordination of operation of our national propaganda and psychological warfare effort. At the same time, the Military Intelligence Division would retain, with a restricted charter, a portion of the old Branch to deal only with the War Department aspects of psychological warfare and propaganda (TAB) E).

3. The outline of functions contained in TAB D is a statement of the duties and functions now being performed by the Propaganda Branch. These functions neither conflict with nor duplicate the duties of any other War Department Staff Division. Pending action on the transfer of a portion of these duties to the Central Intelligence Group, it is believed that they properly describe the functions of the Propaganda Branch. Furthermore, these functions deal with psychological warfare rather than with propaganda, and for this reason, it is felt that the present Propaganda Branch should be redesignated the Psychological Warfare Branch.

4. It is recommended that the A. C. of S., G-2:

a. Sign the attached memorandum to the Director of the Central Intelligence Group.

b. Pending final action by CIG on a. above

(1) Approve the functions of the Propaganda Branch as stated at Tab D,  
and

(2) Redesignate Propaganda Branch as Psychological Warfare Branch

b. Coordination:

Combat Intelligence and Training Group (Col. Rogers, ext. 5391)

CIG (Col. Nicholas, ext. 77606).

**RESTRICTED**

Approved For Release 2006/03/17 : CIA-RDP80R01731R003600020029-4

C. V. ALLAN  
Colonel, GSC  
Director of Information

**6 Incls.**

- Incl 1 - Memo for Dir/CIQ
- Incl 2 - Tab A
- Incl 3 - Tab B
- Incl 4 - Tab C
- Incl 5 - Tab D
- Incl 6 - Tab E

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**TOP SECRET**



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**WID 912**

**Functions of Propaganda Branch**

**STAT**

**Policy Staff (For Concurrence)  
A.C. of S., G-2 (For Approval)**

**Propaganda Br.**

**5 Apr. 46**

**1**

**I. DISCUSSION**

1. The basic functions of the Propaganda Branch are set forth in WD AGO letter, AG 321, (18 February 1944) OB-G-B-4, dated 21 February 1944. (TAB A.)
2. These functions are further outlined in War Department General Staff Circular No. 5-2, dated 19 October 1944, Subject: Organization. (Tab B.)
3. The Director of Intelligence is charged with the responsibility for supervision of Army participation in propaganda and psychological warfare under the provisions of Paragraph 5b (6) (g), Report of Board of Officers on Organization of the War Department, dated 28 December 1945 which states "Supervise Army participation in propaganda and psychological warfare."
4. With the exception of the transfer of responsibility from the Propaganda Branch to Civil Affairs Division for "information control" in the occupied areas (Memo from the Assistant Deputy Chief of Staff to the Assistant Chief of Staff, G-2, and Director, CAD, dated 11 February 1946), (Tab C.), there has been no revision of the functions and duties of the Branch to conform to peace-time needs and other changes.
5. In view of the experiences in all theaters of operations with psychological warfare and propaganda there is a great need for education, training, indoctrination, and planning in order to avoid the difficulties involved and mistakes committed in World War I and repeated in World War II.
6. The word "Propaganda" does not adequately describe the functions of the Branch and, in addition, carries a connotation of scorn and ridicule in the mind of the average American, Army and civilian alike.

**II. ACTION RECOMMENDED**

1. That the Branch be redesignated the Psychological Warfare Branch.
2. That the proposed statement of duties and functions for the Psychological Warfare Branch as outlined in Tab D be approved and incorporated in current functional charts.

**COPY ~~XXXXXXXXXX~~**

**4 Incls.  
Tab A  
Tab B  
Tab C  
Tab D**

[Redacted Signature Box]

**Colonel, G-2  
Chief, Propaganda Branch**

**STAT**

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Director of Information

Col. K. K. Wright

10 Apr 46

2

Col Huston/6508

SUBJECT: Functions of the Propaganda Branch

Request your comment based on following considerations:

- a. If Propaganda Branch can contribute to the production of intelligence, it should be placed under Chief, Collection Group.
- b. If Propaganda Branch cannot contribute to the production of intelligence, it should be either deactivated or transferred to OPD or CIG.

Encls  
2/3

**K. K. WRIGHT**  
Colonel, OSC

---

TO: A. C. of S., G-2      FROM: Chief, Collection Group      6 May 46      COMSANT NO. 3  
Col Michels/6711/md

1. Propaganda involves two aspects: (1) the dissemination of U. S. information to foreign countries in the interests of the U. S. and (2) the collection and analysis of propaganda promulgated from one foreign country to other countries, including the U.S.

The former mission involves functions listed in Tab D; it is operational in character and as such has no place in the intelligence field. During the war, when military considerations superseded all others, it was logical to have psychological warfare activities closely coordinated with military operations. In peace time civil (diplomatic) functions become paramount and psychological activities should be closely coordinated with the State Department; therefore, no active psychological warfare activity, except for training, should exist in the War Department during the peace period.

Reference the second mission above. It is believed that in peace time a propaganda branch for collection is unnecessary. Propaganda in peace is promulgated by means of radio, newspapers (or other publications) and sometimes through secret methods. From the viewpoint of collection, this material can be gathered by our existing collecting agencies. The study of this material for intelligence purposes is properly a function of the Intelligence Group.

2. It is therefore recommended that the Propaganda Branch as now constituted be deactivated, but that elements be preserved and transferred to the Combat Intelligence and Training Group, to perform the functions listed in Tab E.

3. Coordination: Combat Intelligence and Training Group (Col. Rogers, ext. 5391).

**TOP SECRET**

C. V. ALLAN

Chief, Collection Group

5 Incls

Tab A-E incl.

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6/27/46

~~████████████████████~~  
Chief, CI&T Group  
~~██████████~~

Exec. Dir., ID

9 May 46  
Col. Treacy/74970/ky<sup>4</sup>

For Comment.

E. K. WRIGHT  
Colonel, GSC  
Executive Director, I.D.

Incls:  
n/o

**CAPS**

TO: Exec. Dir., ID FROM: CI&T Group DATE: 10 May 46 COMMENT NO 5  
Col Rogers/flr/5391

1. Concur in forming a Psychological Section in Intelligence Training Group by transferring 2 officers, 1 CAF-5, and 1 CAF-4 of present Propaganda Branch, and in inactivating Propaganda Branch.

2. The function "under the direction of Chief, Intelligence Training Group, to supervise Psychological Warfare Training within the Army" should be added to those listed in Tab E. "JCS" in paragraph f of Tab E should be changed to "other government agencies".

3. The added personnel should be in addition to that recommended by this Group under the proposed reorganization. If not, the Psychological Warfare Section should not be established in Training Group as inadequate personnel would force the sacrifice of functions considered actual responsibilities of the Director of Intelligence.

4. RECOMMENDATIONS:

It is recommended that:

- a. Propaganda Branch be inactivated.
- b. Psychological Warfare Section be formed in Intelligence Training Group by transfer of 2 officers, 1 CAF-5, and 1 CAF-4 with a corresponding increase in ceiling strength of the intelligence Training Group.
- c. That planning, policy, and operations be offered to the CIG and the State Department within their respective spheres.

P. E. PEABODY  
Brigadier General, GSC  
Chief, Combat Intelligence &  
Training Group

Preparation of Staff Study by Chief, Propaganda  
Branch

Chief, Propaganda Branch  
THRU: Chief, Collection Group

Executive Director,  
I. D.

16 May 46  
Col Treacy/74970/gm

1. Chief, Propaganda Branch will prepare for signature of the Director of Intelligence a staff study for submission to the Chief of Staff, thru the Director of Information, Operations Division and the Civil Affairs Division, setting forth the desirability of the establishing of a Psychological Warfare Division as a Division of the War Department Special Staff.

2. The staff study will be a complete, concise analysis of the functions of the Psychological Warfare Division and will emphasize the fact that many of these functions are operational in nature and also have important aspects of research and technical development. The study will include among its conclusions the fact that while the Intelligence Division has an interest in the activities of the Psychological Warfare Division, such interest is not the primary one.

3. Knowledge of the preparation of this staff study will be restricted to the minimum number of personnel required in its preparation.

FOR THE A. C. OF S., G-2:

Incls: n/c

E. K. WRIGHT  
Colonel, GSC  
Executive Director, I. D.

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WAR DEPARTMENT  
Washington 25, D. C.

AG 321 (18 Feb 44)OB-S-B-M

EVH/sc-2B -939 Pentagon

21 February 1944.

SUBJECT: Functions of Propaganda Branch, Military Intelligence  
Division, W.D.G.S.

TO: The Commanding Generals,  
Army Air Forces;  
Army Ground Forces;  
Army Service Forces;  
Commander-in-Chief, Southwest Pacific Area,  
The Commanding Generals,  
Theaters of Operations;  
Defense Commands; Departments;  
Base Commands;  
The Commanding Officers,  
Base Commands.

1. In accordance with direction of the Deputy Chief of Staff, the establishment and organization of a Propaganda Branch in the Military Intelligence Division, War Department General Staff, has been completed. This Branch functions under the direct control of the Assistant Chief of Staff, G-2, War Department General Staff.

2. Functions: Propaganda Branch, Military Intelligence  
Division, shall:

a. Be responsible for the coordination of all propaganda functions for the War Department.

b. Be responsible for the preparation and dissemination of Propaganda items for the use of the Office of War Information, Coordinator of Inter-American Affairs and other non-military and quasi-military organizations.

c. Advise the Assistant Chief of Staff, G-2, War Department General Staff of all propaganda problems presented by Commanding Officers of overseas theaters.

d. Advise and coordinate War Department action on all propaganda matters brought before the Joint Chiefs of Staff and Combined Chiefs of Staff.

e. Process all Office of War Information and Coordinator of Inter-American Affairs propaganda plans through the Joint Chiefs of Staff.

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
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f. Coordinate its activities with the similar Branch in the Navy Department.

g. Coordinate its activities with the State Department and other interested agencies of the Government.

By order of the Secretary of War:



ROBERT H. DUNLOP  
Brigadier General  
Acting The Adjutant General

COPIES FURNISHED:

Assistant Chief of Staff, G-2, War Department General Staff (20);  
Assistant Chief of Staff, G-2, War Department General Staff,  
Attention: Propaganda Branch (25).

DISTRIBUTION I

WAR DEPARTMENT GENERAL STAFF CIRCULAR  
No. 5-2

WAR DEPARTMENT  
OFFICE, CHIEF OF STAFF  
Washington, 19 Oct. 1944

ORGANIZATION

Military Intelligence Division, G-2  
(Exclusive of Military Intelligence Service)

EXTRACT

\* \* \* \* \*

4. Propaganda Branch.

- a. Coordinates all propaganda functions for the War Department.
- b. Prepares and disseminates propaganda items for the use of Office of War Information, Coordinator of Inter-American Affairs and other non-military and quasi-military organizations.
- c. Advises the Assistant Chief of Staff, G-2 on all propaganda problems presented by commanders of overseas theaters.
- d. Advises on and coordinates War Department action on all propaganda matters brought before the Combined and Joint Chiefs of Staff.
- e. Processes all Office of War Information and Coordinator of Inter-American Affairs propaganda plans through the Joint Chiefs of Staff.
- f. Coordinates its activities with the similar office in the Navy Department, State Department, and other interested agencies of the Government.
- g. Chief of Branch is Army member of the Joint Chiefs of Staff liaison with the Office of War Information and Coordinator of Inter-American Affairs.

(1) Operations Section. Handles administrative, personnel, and policy matters; prepares weekly and other special military guidance for Office of War Information and Coordinator of Inter-American Affairs; maintains liaison and coordinates activities with War Department and other government agencies; selects intelligence items and obtains clearance for use by Office of War Information and Coordinator of Inter-American Affairs; and studies and prepares reports on foreign propaganda.

(2) Research and Analysis Section. Analyzes foreign propaganda and prepares daily reports and periodic studies of same; analyzes Allied intelligence reports to determine effectiveness of Allied propaganda.



TAB B

C O P Y

GENERAL HEADQUARTERS  
UNITED STATES ARMY FORCES, PACIFIC  
OFFICE OF THE COMMANDER-IN-CHIEF

17 May 1946

Dear Louis:

I am taking the liberty of sending you a copy of my report on Psychological Warfare against Japan. Some were sent to the War Department, but easily might not have come to your attention. The report looks more formidable than it really is—actually the narrative is only nineteen pages.

I know you will want to consider the possibility of lifting Psychological Warfare into the Central Intelligence Group picture. In my opinion, Psychological Warfare is an essential implementation of military intelligence and must be studied thoroughly in peace time. One of the reasons in the past why we have misjudged armies and peoples is because we failed to understand their temper, psychology and mental behavior patterns. With radio broadcasting and dropping of news sheets from the sky, we can now communicate with our enemy daily during war. It would be criminal neglect not to be prepared to exploit this field.

Sincerely yours,

/s/ Homer Sellers

Assistant Director  
Central Intelligence Group  
New War Department Building  
21st and Virginia Avenue, N.W.  
Washington, D. C.

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11 FEB 1946

MEMORANDUM FOR THE ASSISTANT CHIEF OF STAFF, G-2, AND THE DIRECTOR,  
CIVIL AFFAIRS DIVISION:

SUBJECT: Transfer of Coordination of Foreign Information Functions

1. Effective on or about 15 February 1946, responsibility for the coordination of foreign public information functions in the War Department is transferred from the Military Intelligence Division to the Civil Affairs Division. The Assistant Chief of Staff, G-2, and the Director, Civil Affairs Division, will arrange, to their mutual satisfaction, the actual date of transfer.
2. Pertinent files together with the allotment of personnel and those individuals performing foreign public information duties within the Military Intelligence Division will be transferred to the Civil Affairs Division by the Assistant Chief of Staff, G-2.
3. The Civil Affairs Division will submit a manning table of organization and statement of duties and responsibilities for approval.

BY DIRECTION OF THE DEPUTY CHIEF OF STAFF:

/s/ H. I. Hodes  
H. I. HODES  
Brigadier General, GSC  
Assistant Deputy Chief of Staff

**PROPOSED FUNCTIONS AND DUTIES OF PWB, MID**

1. Advises the Director of Intelligence on all psychological warfare matters and problems.
2. Coordinates all psychological warfare functions for the War Department with the exception of "information control" matters in occupied areas, administered by U.S. Military Government, which shall be the primary responsibility of the Civil Affairs Division.
3. Develops plans and policies governing War Department participation in psychological warfare and advises as to existence of conditions involving psychological warfare.
4. Plans and directs analysis of psychological warfare operations against or affecting the military interests of the U.S. whether of domestic or foreign origin.
5. Reviews the Federal program of foreign propaganda affecting U.S. military interest and advises Federal agencies on the War Department's views on such matters.
6. Reviews information and education material furnished U.S. forces insofar as these may concern psychological and political characteristics of foreign peoples or may themselves constitute statements of national policy.
7. Provides War Department liaison and coordination with other U.S. government and allied agencies on psychological warfare matters.
8. Formulates plans, background studies, directives and samples for pre-belligerent or wartime psychological warfare against all antagonists and potential enemies.
9. Coordinates the preparation of training aids, programs, manuals and texts on psychological warfare for staff and service schools, reserve and national guard training.
10. Coordinates the collection, analysis and distribution of information concerning technical devices for use in psychological warfare.
11. Furnishes members to Joint Chiefs of Staff sub-committees on psychological warfare matters.
12. Chief of the Branch acts as Army members of the Joint Chiefs of Staff liaison with the Office of International Information and Cultural Affairs (OIC) of the State Department.

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**TAB E**

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Partial Functions to be Retained by

Psychological Warfare Branch, Combat Intelligence & Training Group

- a. Formulate training doctrine and coordinate training programs for military psychological warfare units.
- b. Coordinate procurement and distribution of training aids and literature for training programs of military psychological warfare units.
- c. Collect and disseminate technical data on psychological warfare devices.
- d. Maintain War Department liaison with major commands, Staff Agencies and Services on psychological warfare matters.
- e. Maintain liaison with and provide source materials on psychological warfare tactics and techniques for the military service schools and higher staff colleges.
- f. Furnish War Department representation on JCS activities concerned with psychological warfare matters.

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TAB C

23 Dec 45

Brief Summary of War Department Participation in Psychological Warfare

1. In World War I, the Psychologic Subsection of M.I.2, Military Intelligence Division, was charged with the collection of information on enemy propaganda, formation of plans for the maintenance of American and Allied morale, civilian and military, and for the destruction of enemy morale. It was responsible for psychologic estimates and daily psychologic reports, from which were prepared studies of German propaganda operations and objectives. It was responsible also for the planning of leaflet warfare, including dissemination by aircraft or trench patrols.
2. Interest in psychological warfare was allowed to lapse in the period 1919-1941, and no provision was made in the organization of the War Department for army participation in psychological warfare activities.
3. In June 1941, the Special Studies Group was organized by direction of the Secretary of War under Brigadier General Sherman Miles, then acting AC of S, G-2. The group was headed by Lt. Col. Percy G. Black, F. A.. Its mission was to provide a psychological analysis of enemy nations, neutrals, and our own people, to promote projects in domestic and foreign psychology accurately timed to the objectives of war plans, and to act as War Department spokesman on questions of psychology in order to coordinate the activities of other government or individual groups engaged in active propaganda work to the national military objective. In March 1942, just prior to the reorganization of G-2, the extreme secrecy concerning the activities of this group was lifted to the extent of renaming it the Psychological Warfare Branch, G-2.
4. Also in March 1942, under directive of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS 12), the Joint Psychological Warfare Committee was created for the purpose of planning psychological warfare in combat theaters and enemy-controlled areas. The JPWC was to initiate, formulate, and develop plans for psychological warfare, to act as coordinating agency, and to integrate psychological warfare with military strategy.
5. In December 1942, JCS 155, divided the responsibility for Psychological Warfare and propaganda as follows: OSS was responsible for planning, development, coordination and execution of the military program of psychological warfare and for the compilation of such information as might be required for military operations; Overt propaganda was to be executed by OWI, and economic warfare by BEN. Theater commanders were to control psychological warfare in their areas, and the functions of OSS were restricted to those in support of military operations. The Psychological Warfare Branch was therefore abolished (MIS Memo 147, 31 Dec 1944).
6. In March 1943, Colonel H. D. Kehm of Operations Division, WDGS, was appointed to act as liaison officer between JCS on the one hand and OWI and CIAA on the other. His duties were:

(a) To sit as member of the Overseas Planning Group of the OWI.

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(b) To maintain contact with all planning agencies of the JCS and to furnish the OWI with details of JCS plans, consistent with security, in order to insure correlation between military and propaganda plans.

(c) To transmit requests from the JCS to the OWI relative to propaganda activities desired for the purpose of furthering military operations.

(d) To present to the JCS all basic and special propaganda plans which require their approval.

7. Since this arrangement did not prove satisfactory, in August 1943 the Deputy Chief of Staff directed that the Operations Division and G-2 jointly submit recommendations on the question of a War Department agency for psychological warfare. In compliance with this directive a report was rendered in which the recommendation was made that a War Department agency be established, preferably under the AC of S, G-2, with the function of effecting the requisite coordination and control of propaganda, and that the chief of this section be appointed as JCS liaison officer with OWI and CIAA.

8. Accordingly, by direction of the Deputy Chief of Staff, a Propaganda Branch was established in the Military Intelligence Division under direct control of the AC of S, G-2, (MID Memorandum No. 78, 15 Nov. 1943, (Tab A).

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TAB A

C  
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P  
Y

THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF  
Joint Strategic Survey Committee  
Washington 25, D. C.

22 December 1945

SUBJECT: Research and Analysis of PWB Activities in World War II.

TO: Lieutenant General J. E. Hull,  
Operations Division, War Department

1. As a result of inquiries I have made in the War Department and other agencies in Washington since I returned from overseas, I am unable to determine whether or not any over-all study is being made of our Psychological Warfare (PWB) activities in World War II. I consider it important that such studies be made now before personnel experienced in PWB matters are so widely scattered as to be no longer available for such a task and before the many lessons learned (and which may or may not be included in Theater reports) fade from the memories of the personnel who participated in recent PWB operations.

2. At the beginning of the war our knowledge of Psychological Warfare was limited to that obtained while observing at a distance the extremely successful employment of this new weapon by the Germans in the early phases of the war. However, we knew little if anything about the techniques or organization required to fit it into the operations of our own armed forces. Initially we leaned heavily on the British, who were still groping for the proper set-up, but generally we learned by bitter experience. We soon realized that PWB was a useful and valuable weapon of warfare when properly employed but an extremely harmful one if not used in accordance with principles which were as clearly defined as those applicable to the employment of other recognized weapons of warfare.

3. To avoid a repetition of the PWB mistakes we made in World War II and to take full advantage of the experience gained in that war, I recommend that a comprehensive study be made of this subject at an early date with a view of:

a. Analysing all available PWB material of World War II, including particularly the PWB reports from the various theaters of operations, to establish sound PWB principles, techniques, organization, equipment and procedures for future employment of this weapon.

b. Establishing short courses in our staff schools to provide future commanders and staff officers with a general understanding and appreciation of this new weapon of warfare.

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d. Examining the feasibility of establishing a small PWB section in the War Department to provide continuing study of this subject, or failing that, to assign this responsibility to an existing section or agency best prepared to assume it.

/s/

L. L. LAMNITZER  
Major General, U. S. Army.

**ICAPS**

Excerpts from Chapters I and II of  
"The Psychological War Division, SHAEF, An Account of Its Operations"  
Published by PWD, SHAEF, Bad Homburg, Germany, October 1945

I. INTRODUCTION

Psychological Warfare Division, Supreme Headquarters Allied Expeditionary Force, was a special staff division of SHAEF charged with responsibility for the prosecution of psychological warfare in the area of continental Europe controlled by the Supreme Commander. Unlike the other divisions of SHAEF, PWD had both staff-planning and operational functions.

The missions of PWD were:

- (a) To wage psychological warfare against the enemy.
- (b) To sustain the morale of the people of friendly nations occupied by the enemy and to cause the people of these countries to acquiesce in the wishes of the Supreme Commander.
- (c) To conduct so-called Consolidation Propaganda operations in liberated friendly countries.
- (d) To control information services in Allied-occupied Germany.

PWD was the agency which coordinated psychological warfare operations within the jurisdiction of the Supreme Allied commander. However, it must be borne in mind that certain civilian agencies of the British and American governments dealt in strategic propaganda, which, because of the range of powerful radio transmitters, entered this theater.

Beyond this, political policy directives underwhich PWD operated stemmed originally from civilian agencies. The political policies of American and Britain are developed by the State Department and the Foreign Office. The propaganda aspects of these policies were developed on the American side by the Office of War Information and on the British side by the Political Intelligence Department of the Foreign Office (PID) and the Ministry of Information (MOI). Directives governing these propaganda policies reached PWD through military channels, however, and with the approval of the Combined Chiefs of Staff. Thus, although the origins of PWD's directives were civilian in character, the operation of PWD itself was a military one under military command.

Psychological Warfare Division, SHAEF was the first agency, military or civilian, to coordinate successfully in Western Europe the efforts of the numerous military and civilian agencies which had waged Anglo-American psychological warfare since the beginning of the war.

On the American side there had existed for some years in MIS, G-2, War Department, a small Psychological Warfare Section. In the late summer of 1941, a few months before Pearl Harbor, the Office of the Coordinator of Information (COI) was established in Washington. The COI had within it the elements which later were separated into the Office of Strategic Services (OSS) and the Overseas Branch of the Office of War Information (OWI). The COI initiated official American government short wave broadcasts to enemy and enemy-occupied countries in the Autumn of 1941.

On the British side, PID, MOI and the BBC were directing broadcasts and dropping leaflets on enemy and enemy-occupied countries from the beginning of the war in September, 1939.

In the Autumn of 1942 -- after the COI was split into OSS and OWI -- the London Liaison Section of OWI, and PID, agreed to issue each week a Joint Psychological Warfare Directive to which the various psychological warfare agencies of the two countries would be subject. This was the first major instance of practical cooperation between the psychological warfare agencies in Britain and America. This Joint Directive continued as the political policy directive for PWD until the end of its operations.

The closest lineal ancestor of PWD/SHAEP appeared in November 1942 when, at the orders of General Eisenhower, a Joint military-civilian Anglo-American Psychological Warfare Unit was attached to Allied Force Headquarters after the Allied landings in French North Africa. This agency was known as the Psychological Warfare Branch, AFHQ, and it laid many of the foundations on which PWD/SHAEP later was to build a much larger and more intricate structure. It was in PWB/AFHQ that the early lessons of Anglo-American civilian-military cooperation were learned and where much of the trial-and-error involved in the new field of combat psychological warfare operations was undergone. Certain of the personnel which had had experience in PWB, later became a part of PWD. Brigadier General Robert A. McClure, Chief of PWD had been Chief of the Information and Censorship Section of Allied Force Headquarters, of which PWB was a branch.

On November 13, 1943, Brigadier General McClure arrived in London from AFHQ to assume the duties as chief of the Publicity and Psychological Warfare Division. On February 14, 1944 he was appointed Assistant Chief of Staff, G-6, which was the new designation of the P and PW Division. On April 13 announcement was made of the discontinuance of the G-6 Division as a general staff division of SHAEP. In its place two special divisions were announced. One was the Public Relations Division under Brigadier General Thomas J. Davis and the other, the Psychological Warfare Division under Brigadier General McClure. The SHAEP General Orders announcing the foregoing also stated that, where necessary, the Public Relations Division and the Psychological Warfare Division would share communications and censorship facilities.

Although the internal organization of PWD/SHAEP changed materially through the months, PWD's relationship to other Staff Divisions and to the Supreme Allied Commander remained substantially the same from this point onward until the dissolution of SHAEP.

SHAEP was dissolved officially as of 2400 hours 13 July 1945. With the dissolution of SHAEP, the Anglo-American aspect of PWD's operation disappeared. On the British side an organization known as the Information Services Control Branch, Control Commission for Germany, came into being. On the American side, the successor to PWD was designated the Information Control Division, Hqs. U.S. Forces European Theater, and the Information Control Service, U.S. Group Control Council. Brigadier General McClure was Chief of both of these American organizations.

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Through most of the life of PWD, until the beginning of the German Information Control operation, the Chief of PWD was assisted by four deputies, one representing each of the four civilian agencies which contributed personnel to PWD, namely, OWI, OSS, PID, and MOI. For a period there was fifth who served as the Chief's deputy on purely military matters.\* Some months before the German surrender, the civilian deputy representing OSS was withdrawn for other duties, and later the post of military deputy was abolished.

While the four civilian deputies functioned, the various operating sections were divided among them as their primary responsibilities.

These sections were:

- |                          |                              |
|--------------------------|------------------------------|
| (a) Plans and Directives | (e) Press                    |
| (b) Intelligence         | (f) Films                    |
| (c) Radio                | (g) Publications and Display |
| (d) Leaflets             | (h) Special Operations       |

Civilian and military administration, warehousing-transport-supply, and personnel were placed under the Executive Office.

In AFHQ, PWB (The prototype of PWD/SHAEP) had performed all staff and operational functions in the field of psychological warfare. A history of all psychological warfare activities in AFHQ and a history of PWB/AFHQ could not but be the same paper. This was not literally true of PWD/SHAEP.

SHAEP Operation Memorandum No. 8 dated March 11, 1944, defined the responsibilities for the control, coordination, and operation of psychological warfare within the Allied Expeditionary Force. In paragraph 5B under the title "Combat Propaganda," the memorandum stated that "combat propaganda will be confined within the terms of directives issued by SHAEP to ARMY GROUPS and, as necessary, to Allied Naval Expeditionary Force and Allied Expeditionary Air Force." Paragraph 5C then stated "In order to execute psychological warfare plans prepared under these directives, Army Groups will raise, administer and operate psychological warfare field operational units capable of carrying out" these activities.

Paragraph 6 of the memorandum, titled "Consolidation Propaganda," stated that consolidation propaganda would normally be carried out by Supreme Headquarters, Allied Expeditionary Force. When desirable and practicable, tasks will be decentralized to Army Groups under special directives." Finally, paragraph 7 of the memorandum re-emphasized that "the successful outcome of psychological warfare demands centralized control and coordination of propaganda themes and aims. Any departure from the principle can only lead to ineffective or disastrous results." Sub-paragraph C under paragraph 7 stated that "Any departure required by Commanders-in-Chief (Commanding Generals), Army Groups, or subordinate commanders from the terms of directives issued to them will be referred to and receive the prior concurrence of Supreme Headquarters."

\* The deputies were: Mr. G. D. Jackson (OWI); Mr. R. H. S. Grossman (PID); Mr. Dennis Routh (MOI); [redacted] (OSS); Colonel Harold D. Kohn.

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Thus the conduct of Combat psychological warfare was removed from PWD/SHAEP. On the other hand, Consolidation Propaganda operations were made the specific responsibility of SHAEP. Finally PWD/SHAEP's policy control of Army Group Psychological Warfare through directives was established.

Within the context of Operation Memorandum No. 8, PWD/SHAEP's general functions were:

- (a) Staff planning.
- (b) Issuance of policy directives to Army Groups.
- (c) Supply of certain personnel and equipment to Army Group combat teams.
- (d) Supervision of training of personnel for Army Group teams.
- (e) Production and dissemination of leaflets by strategic aircraft.
- (f) Certain strategic radio.
- (g) Consolidation propaganda in friendly liberated countries.  
(This was done by a separate organization stemming from PWD which was known as Allied Information Service (AIS).
- (h) Operation of captured fixed radio transmitters on the continent.
- (i) Liaison assistance in certain circumstances to G-1 and G-5.
- (j) Control of information services in Germany.

This paper will attempt to describe in some detail all of the foregoing functions.

## II. BACKGROUND

In the beginning, PWD was largely without personnel or equipment. It was an idea rather than an operation. In order to pass from the idea stage to the operational stage it was required that the four civilian agencies detail personnel and equipment to PWD. Like the other Divisions of SHAEP, PWD was to utilize British and American personnel interchangeably. Beyond this, and unlike the other Divisions of SHAEP, PWD was to utilize civilian personnel from the four civilian agencies in both planning and operational functions. It must be borne in mind that because of the nature of psychological warfare, and in view of the background of the civilian agencies, civilians at first formed the largest group of trained operational personnel available to PWD.

Despite the experience gained in PWE/AFHQ, the agencies in London did not at first comprehend the relationship that was to exist between them and PWD/SHAEP in the western European military operation. This relationship was, in point of fact, quite simple: all psychological warfare activities against the enemy, and all consolidation propaganda activities conducted in liberated countries were to be conducted or controlled by PWD/SHAEP as the representative of the Supreme Commander. PWD was to be, in effect, the umbrella under which everyone, military and civilian, engaged in psychological warfare activities would function. The civilian agencies were to assign personnel to PWD, and so long as such individuals were on assignment to PWD, they were under the immediate direction of the Chief of PWD and not under the direction of the chiefs of the several agencies. Instructions and directives governing the activities of these individuals did not reach them directly from their original agencies, but through military channels and the office of the Chief of PWD.

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It was envisaged, that, when military exigencies no longer demanded, military control of Consolidation Propaganda activities and certain of the civilian personnel would be returned to the civilian agencies, which would then take over, on a national rather than joint basis, and as civilians, the continuing tasks which had been begun under military control by PWD.

Under the terms of Operation Memorandum No. 8, referred to in Chapter I of this paper, Army Groups began the task of assembling psychological warfare teams in the early spring of 1944. Only one Army Group, the 21st, was to be in the field at the beginning of the Normandy operation. At the same time, the Headquarters of a U.S. Army Group was located in London. This Army Group was to become operation when the Third U.S. Army would join the First U.S. Army in France. Then the First Army would be withdrawn from 21st Army Group and a purely American Army Group would operate beside the British 21st. The 12th U.S. Army Group became operational in July 1944, and control of the P. W. Team of the First U.S. Army reverted to the Psychological Warfare Branch of 12th Army Group.

On the American side, the basis of personnel for psychological warfare in the field was a purely military unit known as a Mobile Radio Broadcasting Company (MRBC). The first MRBC had been assigned to PWD/APHQ. As time went on, the 2nd, 3rd, 4th, and 5th MRBCs operated with the American armies in France. Other personnel, both military and civilian, was attached for the purposes of lift, administration, etc. to one or another of the MRBCs. On the British side there was no such unit basis as this and personnel was attached to the Psychological Warfare Branch, 21st Army Group on an individual basis.

In both Army Groups, the Psychological Warfare Branch was part of a combined Publicity and Psychological Warfare Division, similar to that which had existed in SHAEF before April 13, 1944, when Publicity and Psychological Warfare were separated.

Assignment of personnel by the civilian agencies and by the British and American forces to PWD/SHAEF proceeded through the late winter of 1943 and spring of 1944. When the Staff-planning sections were complete, PWD/SHAEF began the additional task of re-assigning personnel to Army Groups. On the American side there was a further re-assignment from the Army Group to First U.S. Army. This personnel later was to be brought back to 12th Army Group when it became operational.

PWD, with the aid of certain already established British and American agencies, undertook the screening and training of personnel to be offered for assignment to Army Groups.

At the same time, specific operational planning was going forward within the sections of PWD/SHAEF. A plan for taking over information services in Europe under "RANKIN" CASE C conditions was presented to the Chief of Staff. Later the PWD plans for "OVERLORD" and other operations were completed.

Liaison was initiated with representatives of the several exiled Allied governments in London. Stockpiling of radio, press and publications material was coordinated among the several contributing agencies by PWD. The News Section experimented with a special radio news file which later was to form the basis of press activities on the Continent.

The Leaflet Section undertook to coordinate the separate British (PID) and American (OWI) leaflet operations, and a joint PID/OWI printing-production directorate was set up in order to make the most effective use of these facilities in the United Kingdom.

As has been noted previously, the "Voice of SHAEF" broadcasts began on BBC and ABSIE before D-Day. These were to continue throughout the life of SHAEF and represented the radio aspect of the relatively simple basic pattern that all PWD activities assumed in the Western European operation. PWD, as the articulation of the Supreme Commander to the people of enemy and enemy-occupied countries, utilized all its available media for the simple purpose of telling the various audiences what the Supreme Commander wished them to do, why they should do it, and what they might expect if they carried out the Supreme Commander's wishes. Thus, although PWD/SHAEF did not by any means perform all psychological warfare operations in Western Europe, its directive control was sufficient to permit it to coordinate the efforts of the agencies and individuals which contributed toward the total psychological warfare impact and to coordinate these efforts along the simple line of the Supreme Commander's specific expressed wishes. PWD/SHAEF was the channel that extended back to the political policy-making agencies in London and Washington and forward to the extreme front lines where Psychological Warfare Teams were in immediate contact with the enemy.

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C O P Y

1 Feb 44

MEMORANDUM FOR THE DEPUTY CHIEF OF STAFF

Subject: Army Air Forces Psychological Warfare Service

In compliance with the terms of Memorandum for the Commanding General Army Air Forces, WDCSA 321 (5 Jan 44) dated 5 January 1944, the Army Air Forces Psychological Warfare Service has been abolished and necessary action has been taken to rescind outstanding regulations establishing the service.

The two officers engaged in this work have been made available for transfer and assignment to the Psychological Propaganda Branch, G-2.

For the Commanding General, Army Air Forces:

/s/ BYRON E. GATES  
Brigadier General, U. S. Army  
Chief, Management Control

MEMORANDUM FOR RECORD:

On 5 January 1944 Col. O. L. Nelson, GSC, Asst. to the Deputy Chief of Staff sent the following memorandum to the Commanding General, AAF:

"The need for an Army Air Forces Psychological Warfare Service is questioned. The War Department resisted for many months the establishment of a Psychological Warfare Section in G-2 and finally acceded to the proposal in order to provide one point of contact in the War Department with the Office of War Information and other agencies that have primary interest in this field. The principal justification for the establishment of such a section was to eliminate the confusion that had existed by dealing with many different agencies in the War Department."

"In the set up of a Psychological Warfare Section in G-2, it was contemplated that an air officer would be detailed as a Deputy Chief of the section. It is not believed that an Army Air Forces Psychological Warfare Service is needed or is desirable."

"By direction of the Deputy Chief of Staff:"

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Excerpts from  
"Report on Psychological Warfare in the  
Southwest Pacific Area  
1944-1945

II. PWB ESTABLISHED

Shortly after the victory of Hollandia, (April 1944), the Commander-in-Chief directed the establishment of a Psychological Warfare Branch.

Psychological Warfare was new. It had never been taught in our military schools. There was no text. Planning, and the technique of presentation were pioneer fields. Many officers and men both at GHQ and in the field doubted the effectiveness of Psychological Warfare against Japan. Few believed that the Japanese soldier could be made surrender-conscious. Many were convinced that the Japanese would fight until they and their country were destroyed.

The Office of War Information (OWI) already had established an office in Sydney, Australia, staffed by expert writers, broadcasters, artists, and publishers. In June, the OWI staff was moved to Brisbane where it joined key military personnel provided by GHQ. But before this group could hope to operate effectively, patient study, exhaustive research indoctrination, and experimentation would be necessary.

\*\*\*\*\*

The objective of the Basic Military Plan for Psychological Warfare, approved 26 July 1944, was to further the Philippine Campaign. The plan provided a functional organization containing Collation, Planning, and Production sections. With the rapid liberation of the Philippines this plan became outdated and a new one was approved by the Commander-in-Chief, 30 March 1945. It shifted the principal objective from the Philippines to the Japanese homeland.

Possibly the greatest wealth of source material on Japan in existence was readily available. From this material the Collation Section selected, extracted, and compiled separate researches developing each objective. Enemy trends and vulnerabilities slowly began to emerge. The Planning Section, using Collation files, prepared a weekly plan, the objective of which was to further the military effort. Newswriters used this weekly planning directive as a general guide, pouring into the form it suggested significant items from current events, communiques, prisoner of war interrogations, and monitored enemy broadcasts. The information disseminated was shaped so as to exploit known psychological vulnerabilities. A chart was kept showing planned and actual developments of objectives. Frequent letters containing suggestions to Planners from the Military Secretary oriented the programs tactically and strategically.

In April 1945 it had become clear to Psychological Warfare planners that all the elements essential for surrender already existed. Japan had lost her fleet and merchant shipping; her air force was becoming impotent; her troops had been destroyed in the Philippines and key Pacific Islands; her industry was disrupted. The only obstacle preventing surrender was Psychologic.

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As our combined forces were soon to converge upon Japan proper, the Commander-in-Chief called a Psychological Warfare Conference in Manila May 7 and 8, 1945, to discuss and determine common objectives and theater policy. With the end of the war in sight, Psychological Warfare agencies in the U.S.A., Pacific, and Asiatic Mainland converged upon the Japanese homeland seeking to pierce Japan's mental armor and achieve the common objective - decision to surrender.

### III. PRODUCTION AND DISTRIBUTION

Truthful information was disseminated to the enemy by long, medium and short-wave radio, loudspeaker, leaflets, news sheets and magazines. Radio broadcasts to Japan were made in English and Japanese. By the close of the war, three mobile field units, self-contained, equipped to print, monitor, photograph and broadcast, were available to the Sixth, Eighth, and Tenth Armies. A total of 222 million leaflets and news sheets were produced prior to V-J Day and for the month of September 1945 an output of 120 million was contemplated.

The Far Eastern Air Force willingly distributed our leaflets and news sheets. In addition, FEAF made available transport planes to haul leaflets from Manila to forward air bases; at times as many as ten transports per week were required. FEAF personnel had been well-briefed on the objectives of Psychological Warfare and on the purpose of each leaflet dropped. Since the Commanding General, FEAF, supported our entire program, it never became necessary for formal GCR orders to be issued directing these missions.

In tactical areas observation planes did effective spot dropping on enemy units and a small number of leaflets were successfully distributed by shellfire.

### IV. TECHNIQUE OF PRESENTATION

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The Japanese remembers better from sight than from sound, which possibly accounts for unusual faithfulness in keeping a diary picturing innermost thoughts in Japanese characters. Leaflets used were pictorial and normally expressed a single thought. Each was based on a readily acknowledged fact, then advanced a logical idea and finally suggested a way out. Leaflets and news sheets were addressed primarily to the masses and showered by the millions upon them.

Radio stations in SWPA could reach Japan by medium and short wave only. Although short wave radio receivers were forbidden, a few of the wealthy used them clandestinely and the Japanese Government was known to monitor our broadcasts and make limited distribution to senior officials. Consequently, radio programs were shaped to appeal to the highest officials of the government.

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Although taking prisoners in itself might be indecisive, development of a frame of mind in which soldiers toy with the idea of surrender is very important. By interrogation the mental obstacles which prevented surrender were determined. Then leaflets were disseminated which met logically each mental obstacle. Similar appeals by loud speaker were effective.

In Manila a weekly Japanese Newspaper known as the Rakhasan (air drop) News was published. Each week one to two million copies were dropped on enemy troops and the civil population in Japan. Prisoners of war in the Philippines said the Rakhasan News was the only source of truthful information available to the Japanese soldier from the outside world.

\*\*\*\*\*

Most planning was anticipatory. Leaflets announcing the entry of the Soviet Union into the war were prepared four months in advance. Planners reasoned that if the Japanese Government were permitted to make the first announcement, there would be a fantastic claim of victory - from which the people initially might get a lift in morale. If we announced the war first, however, picturing the might of the Red Army, the psychological blow would stun the population. Seven million leaflets "The Red Army Strikes" were dropped on Japan the day the Soviet Union declared war.

The Potsdam Declaration was repeatedly broadcast to Japan. It was translated into Japanese and millions of copies showered over the homeland and troops in the field within some seventy-two hours after it was received by radio in Manila.

The broadcasts from the U.S.A. of Captain Zacharias, USN, were so well-prepared, timely and authoritative that we not only repeated them over the Manila radio but printed and air-dropped them on Japan.

The Imperial Rescript announcing the end of the war was printed, flown to Japan and air-dropped to the masses. Many Japanese first learned of the surrender in this manner.

#### IX. CONCLUSIONS

That Psychological Warfare is potent only when furthering successful military operations.

That effective Psychological Warfare requires comprehensive grasp of the temper and psychological traits of the peoples against whom the program is directed.

That based on performance in the Pacific, Psychological Warfare is a powerful dimension of modern combat which assists in:

Strengthening our morale  
Reducing our battle casualties

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Furthering our deception operations  
Influencing friendly peoples  
Lowering enemy morale  
Inducing enemy soldiers to surrender  
Hastening the enemy decision to sue for peace  
Facilitating military occupation

That in planning military security, it is of paramount importance that the United States exploit the potentialities of Psychological Warfare.

**X. RECOMMENDATION**

That this report be forwarded to the War Department recommending:

That Psychological Warfare Courses be included in our military instruction.

That a Psychological Warfare Section be included permanently in the War Department General Staff.

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**PSYCHOLOGICAL WARFARE BRANCH FUNCTIONAL CHART, SWPA**

**COMMANDER-IN-CHIEF**

**MILITARY SECRETARY**

Prepares basic plans, annexes and Directives to implement policy of Commander-in-Chief. Coordinates PWB with military effort. Effects liaison with other theaters, confers with combat commanders & PWB personnel in the field.

**EXECUTIVE**

Implements policy as directed. Supervises administration; coordinates work among section chiefs and field units.

**COLLATION**

Gathers psychological warfare data produced by existing military intelligence agencies, determines enemy psychological vulnerabilities and presents them in the form of clear cut objectives to Planning Section.

**PLANNING**

Prepares weekly directive to Production Section so that programs will be shaped, timed and localized so as best to further the military effort.

**PRODUCTION**

Using Collation Section data, plans by Planning Section, and suggestions from Military Secretary, produces newscasts, leaflets, news sheets and magazines.

**ADMINISTRATION**

Supply: production materials field unit equipment, packaging and shipment. Technical maintenance; personnel; finance; transportation.

**FAR EAST AIR FORCE**

Provides printed information for dissemination by air drop to enemy.

**SIXTH ARMY**

Assists intelligence and operations sections with psychological warfare activities; prepares psychological warfare indoctrination courses.

**EIGHTH ARMY**

Assists intelligence and operations sections with psychological warfare activities; prepares psychological warfare indoctrination courses.


**MOBILE UNITS**

One each attached to 6th, 8th & 10th Armies. Each was self contained equipped to monitor newscast, print & photograph.

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**PSYCHOLOGICAL WARFARE BRANCH ORGANIZATIONAL CHART, SWPA**



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DISPOSITION FORM

FROM	TO	DATE		FROM	TO	DATE	
			DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE				CHIEF, CENTRAL REPORTS STAFF
			DEPUTY DIRECTOR, C.I.G.				W. Europe-Africa Branch
			ASSISTANT TO THE DIRECTOR				E. Europe-USSR Branch
X		5/27	SECRETARY, N.I.A.				Middle East-India Branch
							Far East-Pacific Branch
			CHIEF OF OPERATIONAL SERVICES				Western Hemisphere Branch
X			CHIEF, CENTRAL PLANNING STAFF				ADMINISTRATIVE OFFICER
			Policy & Review Branch				Personnel Branch
			Information Branch				Budget & Fiscal Branch
			Intelligence Branch				Administrative Services Branch
			Security Branch				Central Records
			Support Branch				Security Branch

REFERENCES:

ENCLOSURES:

Disposition Form  
 From Col. Fortier  
 to the Director,  
 enclosing Report  
 on Psychological  
 Warfare in S. W.  
 Pacific Area,  
 1944-1945.

- ACTION
- RECOMMENDATION
- SIGNATURE
- INFORMATION
- RETURN
- PREPARATION OF REPLY
- DIRECT REPLY
- COMMENT
- FILE
- NOTE
- MAIL

REMARKS:

- The enclosure is transmitted herewith for action as recommended in the 2nd paragraph thereof.

*James S. Lay, Jr.*  
 JAMES S. LAY, JR.  
 Secretary, N.I.A.

(Continue "Remarks" on back, if necessary)

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DISPOSITION FORM

MAY 24 11 43 AM '46

FROM	TO	DATE		FROM	TO	DATE	
X	X	5/24	DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE				CHIEF, CENTRAL REPORTS STAFF
			DEPUTY DIRECTOR, C.I.G.				W. Europe-Africa Branch
			ASSISTANT TO THE DIRECTOR				E. Europe-USSR Branch
			SECRETARY, N.I.A.				Middle East-India Branch
							Far East-Pacific Branch
X		5/23	CHIEF OF OPERATIONAL SERVICES				Western Hemisphere Branch
	X		CHIEF, CENTRAL PLANNING STAFF				ADMINISTRATIVE OFFICER
			Policy & Review Branch				Personnel Branch
			Information Branch				Budget & Fiscal Branch
			Intelligence Branch				Administrative Services Branch
			Security Branch				Central Records
			Support Branch				Security Branch

REFERENCES:

ENCLOSURES:

- ACTION
- RECOMMENDATION
- SIGNATURE
- INFORMATION
- RETURN
- PREPARATION OF REPLY
- DIRECT REPLY
- COMMENT
- FILE
- NOTE
- MAIL

REMARKS:

I am forwarding herewith a letter from Brig. General Bonner Fellers, Headquarters, Army Forces in the Pacific, as well as his report on psychological warfare in the Southwest Pacific Area.

I recommend that this report be forwarded to the Central Planning Staff with a view to investigating the advisability of future planning for psychological warfare.

[Redacted Signature Box]

Colonel, FA  
Assistant Director

2 Enclosures

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(Continue "Remarks" on back, if necessary)

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