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Frank - Thought you might like this. It wasn't you only that necessitated the cutting-to-pieces. Your people were great, like Rein Gos. A.

11 April 1979

State Dept., NSC reviews completed

MEMORANDUM FOR: Hamilton Jordan

FROM : Allard Lowenstein

SUBJECT : United States Policy in Zimbabwe

1. Time is about to run out for an electoral resolution of the conflict in Zimbabwe. The best chance left for achieving the Anglo-American principles is to adapt the general approach accepted by everyone for Namibia. If the Transitional Government and the Patriotic Front are ever to be persuaded to accept UN-supervised elections, a number of urgent steps will have to be taken before the opportunity of influencing attitudes toward elections on both sides is further eroded by outside events.

2. Two of these events are about to occur: the United Kingdom election on 3 May, and the votes on the Hill on lifting U.S. sanctions. Until these events change the equation, the possibility of lifting sanctions can influence both sides to negotiate in good faith toward the UN-supervised elections which everyone says they favor in principle. The Transitional Government would also have to be persuaded to make additional concessions, three of which I discussed with Ian Smith and Muzorewa in February: (1) the redefinition of the April elections as transitional (a la December elections in Namibia); (2) an agreement to renegotiate the Constitution, and to submit it for approval to the entire electorate, including black voters; and (3) the resignation of Smith. The Transitional Government viewed these items as bargaining chips, and we seemed headed toward an acceptable quid pro quo when it was decided in Washington that discussions should not go forward.

3. This general approach had gotten off to a hopeful start before this decision was made. Kaunda said it was the most useful proposal in a long time, and urged that I go back to Salisbury at once to "bell the cat." Callaghan was encouraging, and both Bothas were unspecific but encouraging. Hayakawa, McGovern and other significant figures on the Hill were favorable; even Congressmen Bauman and Solarz, who are not natural allies on this or anything else, were both receptive.

4. It is very late, possibly too late, to reverse the course of events, but the stakes, in South Africa and in the United States as well as in Zimbabwe itself, are too high not to make the most effective effort possible. For this approach to have any chance now, very diverse elements would have to cooperate, including the Front Line Presidents, the South African and British governments, and the Congress, especially conservative supporters of the Transitional Government. The first steps to [illegible] delay Congressional action on sanctions, and to check with Nyerere.

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5. Of course no initiative is more viable than the chemistry induced by whoever puts it together: how viable would the Sadat-Begin negotiations have been had they been left to traditional diplomacy? The situation in southern Africa and the nature of this initiative require that the first steps be undertaken at once, and by someone whose commitment to African liberation cannot be questioned, whose concern about the future of whites in southern Africa is trusted by the white leadership there, and whose credentials are respected on the Hill.

6. The proposal outlined above grew out of my long involvement in both Liberation movements in southern Africa and the political pressures of Congress and public life in the United States. I believe it is politically realistic at home and abroad, and still might be successfully launched. I am far less sanguine about its ultimate fate, but one of its strengths is that each step that is taken has value in itself even if something goes wrong further down the road. For instance, had Smith resigned and had the April elections been redefined as transitional, a possibility not pursued in February, the Administration's position both on the Hill and at the UN would now be less difficult -- even if UN-supervised elections and a renegotiated constitution had never materialized.

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INCOMING TELEGRAM

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CONFIDENTIAL NOD379

PAGE 01. CAPE T 00867 112020Z copy 12 OF 15 COPIES
ACTION NODS-00

INFO OCT-01 ADS-00 /001 W
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O 111530Z APR 79 ZFF-4
FM AMCONSUL CAPE TOWN
TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 8363

C O N F I D E N T I A L CAPE TOWN 867

NODIS

FROM EMBASSY CAPE TOWN
DEPT PLEASE PASS WHITE HOUSE

E.O. 12065: XDS-3 4/11/89 (EDMONDSON, W.B.) OR-M
TAGS: PORG, WA, SF
SUBJECT: NAMIBIA: P.W. BOTHA'S REPLY TO PRESIDENT CARTER

1. (CONFIDENTIAL - ENTIRE TEXT)

2. FOLLOWING IN PARAGRAPH 3 BELOW IS TEXT OF LETTER DATED APRIL 11, 1979 FROM PRIME MINISTER P.W. BOTHA TO PRESIDENT CARTER. THE SIGNED ORIGINAL, WHICH WAS HANDED TO EMBASSY POLITICAL COUNSELOR BY DFA LIAISON OFFICER NEIL VAN HEERDEN (ACTING FOR DFA SECRETARY B.G. FOURIE WHO IS ON EASTER VACATION) IS BEING FORWARDED BY POUCH. VAN HEERDEN'S GENERAL COMMENTS ON NAMIBIA ARE REPORTED SEPTEL; HIS ONLY COMMENT ABOUT THE LETTER PER SE WAS THAT P.W. HAD REGARDED PRESIDENT CARTER'S LETTER OF APRIL 6 AS A THREAT, ALTHOUGH AN INQUIRY TO AMBASSADOR SOLE IN WASHINGTON HAD BROUGHT THE REPLY THAT NO THREAT WAS INTENDED. THIS IS MENTIONED IN P.W.'S REPLY, BUT IRONICALLY MY OWN DIRECT ASSERTION OF THIS POINT TO P.W. BOTHA (CAPE TOWN 830) IS NOT MENTIONED. THE SALIENT FEATURE OF THE LETTER IS A CAREFULLY CRAFTED REPETITION OF SOUTH AFRICA'S POSITION

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THAT THE SECRETARY GENERAL'S REPORT OF FEBRUARY 26, 1979 INTRODUCED UNACCEPTABLE DEVIATIONS FROM THE UN PLAN, SPECIFICALLY ON THE ISSUES OF MONITORING SWAPO BASES AND ALLOWING THE ESTABLISHMENT OF SUCH BASES IN NAMIBIA. THE LETTER DISMISSES THE CLARIFICATIONS RESULTING FROM THE RECENT PROXIMITY TALKS AND SAYS THAT THE SAG WILL BE INFLUENCED BY THE CONSULTATIONS IN WHICH NAMIBIA'S "DEMOCRATIC PARTIES" ARE CURRENTLY ENGAGED. IT IS AN UNENCOURAGING, ESSENTIALLY NEGATIVE REPLY.

3. BEGIN TEXT OF LETTER: "DEAR MR PRESIDENT
THANK YOU FOR YOUR LETTER OF 6 APRIL 1979 WHICH WAS HANDED TO ME BY AMBASSADOR EDMONDSON ON 9 APRIL 1979.

I APPRECIATE YOUR CANDOUR AND AM SURE YOU EXPECT THE SAME FRANKNESS FROM ME. I ALSO AGREE WITH YOU THAT WE ARE AT A POINT WHERE UNDERSTANDING EACH OTHER IS OF EXTRAORDINARY IMPORTANCE.

WE STAND BY THE U.N. SETTLEMENT PLAN WHICH CATEGORICALLY PROVIDED FOR THE MONITORING OF SWAPO BASES AND DID NOT PROVIDE FOR THE ESTABLISHMENT AFTER CEASE-FIRE OF SUCH BASES IN THE TERRITORY.

ANY OBJECTIVE ANALYST WOULD AGREE THAT THE SECRETARY-GENERAL'S REPORT OF 26 FEBRUARY 1979, INTRODUCED DEVIATIONS WHICH MATERIALLY ALTER THE PROPOSAL WHICH WE ORIGINALLY ACCEPTED AND INCREASE THE ALREADY CONSIDERABLE RISKS INVOLVED TO A POINT WHERE THE SAFETY OF THE PEOPLE OF SOUTH WEST AFRICA CAN NO LONGER BE GUARANTEED.

THE 16 POINTS WHICH WERE SUBSEQUENTLY SUBMITTED TO US BY THE FIVE FOREIGN MINISTERS, DO NOT AFFECT THESE

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DEVIATIONS.

THE SOUTH AFRICAN GOVERNMENT HAS STATED ALL ALONG THAT IT WOULD BE GUIDED BY THE WISHES OF THE PEOPLE. THE LEADERS OF THE DEMOCRATIC PARTIES ARE CURRENTLY ENGAGED IN CONSULTATIONS ON THESE IMPORTANT MATTERS. THE SOUTH AFRICAN GOVERNMENT WILL BE INFLUENCED BY THEIR VIEWS.

I WAS PERTURBED BY YOUR REFERENCE TO THE IMPLICATIONS FOR OUR RELATIONS WITH THE UNITED STATES AND THE INEVITABILITY OF U.N. ACTION AGAINST SOUTH AFRICA, AS THIS SEEMED TO ME TO BE A DIRECT THREAT. THIS I IMMEDIATELY POINTED OUT TO YOUR AMBASSADOR. SUBSEQUENTLY, OUR AMBASSADOR IN WASHINGTON WAS INFORMED THAT NO THREAT WAS INTENDED. I WOULD BE GRATEFUL TO RECEIVE YOUR CONFIRMATION.

AS IN THE PAST, WE REMAIN READY TO DISCUSS THE IMPLEMENTATION OF THE ORIGINAL SETTLEMENT PROPOSAL AS WELL AS SOUTHERN AFRICAN ISSUES IN GENERAL, WITHOUT ACCEPTING THE RIGHT OF OTHERS TO DICTATE TO US. SINCERELY,
P.W. BOTHA" END TEXT.
EDMUNDSON

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EYES ONLY

SENDER WILL CHECK CLASSIFICATION TOP AND BOTTOM

	UNCLASSIFIED		CONFIDENTIAL		SECRET

OFFICIAL ROUTING SLIP

TO	NAME AND ADDRESS	DATE	INITIALS
1	DCI		
2	BCEvans	9 apr	
3	~~DDCI~~		
4	~~BCEvans~~		
5			
6			

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	ACTION		DIRECT REPLY		PREPARE REPLY
	APPROVAL		DISPATCH		RECOMMENDATION
	COMMENT		FILE		RETURN
	CONCURRENCE		INFORMATION		SIGNATURE

Remarks:

Attached NODIS cable was provided to NFAC where it will be read by selected Agency officers.

FOLD HERE TO RETURN TO SENDER

FROM: NAME, ADDRESS AND PHONE NO.	DATE
BCEvans, Executive Secretary	9 APR 1979

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SECRET NOD031

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~~ACTION NODS-00~~

INFO OCT-01 ADS-00 /001 W

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O 091230Z APR 79
FM AMCONSUL CAPE TOWN
TO SECSTATE WASHDC NIACT IMMEDIATE 8339

S E C R E T CAPE TOWN 830

NODIS FOR THE SECRETARY

FROM EMBASSY CAPE TOWN

DEPT ALSO PASS WHITE HOUSE

E.O. 12065: XDS-3 4/9/89 (EDMONDSON, W.B.) OR-M
TAGS: PORG, WA, SF
SUBJECT: (S) NAMIBIA: DELIVERY OF PRESIDENT CARTER'S LETTER OF APRIL 6, 1979 TO PRIME MINISTER BOTHA

1. (S - ENTIRE TEXT.)

2. I SAW SOUTH AFRICAN PRIME MINISTER P.W. BOTHA AT 1220 P.M. TODAY, APRIL 9, ACCOMPANIED BY SECRETARY FOR FOREIGN AFFAIRS B.G. FOURIE. I HANDED BOTHA THE APRIL 6 LETTER FROM PRESIDENT CARTER WHICH I HAD HANDCARRIED FROM WASHINGTON.

3. THE MEETING WAS SHORT. PRIME MINISTER BOTHA READ THE LETTER THROUGH ONCE AND SAID, "THIS IS A THREAT," AS HE TOSSED THE LETTER ONTO THE COFFEE TABLE. "IT IS NOT INTENDED AS A THREAT, MR. PRIME MINISTER," I REPLIED, BUT HE QUICKLY INTERJECTED, "IT IS A THREAT," AND HANDING IT TO FOURIE SAID, "THERE IS NOTHING TO DISCUSS." I REPEATED THAT IT WAS NOT A THREAT BUT AN EXPRESSION OF CONCERN ABOUT THE SITUATION AND HOPE THAT THE UN PLAN WOULD BE

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PUT INTO EFFECT. P.W. TOOK THE LETTER BACK FROM FOURIE AND READ ALOUD THE PARAGRAPH WHICH READS: "THE RISK IS CLEAR. SHOULD THE U.N. PLAN FAIL TO RECEIVE SOUTH AFRICA'S SUPPORT, I BELIEVE THAT U.N. MEASURES AGAINST YOUR COUNTRY WOULD BE INEVITABLE." I POINTED OUT THAT THIS SIMPLY NOTED A RISK THAT EXISTS, BUT P.W. ASKED RATHER SNIDELY, "WHO SABOTAGED THE UN PLAN?" I SAID I THOUGHT THE PLAN WAS STILL ALIVE AND COULD BE IMPLEMENTED. HE SCOFFED AND, RISING, MADE IT CLEAR THAT THE CONVERSATION WAS OVER. HE EXTENDED HIS HAND, SHOOK MINE, AND QUICKLY SAID GOODBYE. HIS ANGER, IF AROUSED, WAS WELL CONTROLLED.

4. FOURIE ESCORTED ME THE SHORT WAY FROM THE PRIME MINISTER'S OFFICE TO THE OPEN ELEVATOR WITHOUT COMMENT, THEN RETURNED TO THE PRIME MINISTER. I HOPE TO SEE HIM LATER TO SEE IF P.W. HAD MORE TO SAY AFTER I LEFT.
EDMONDSON

NOTE: NOT PASSED WHITE HOUSE BY OC/T - 4/9/79

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