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CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
Office of Legislative Counsel
Washington, D. C. 20505

[redacted]

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16 February 1978

TO: Mr. Pat Long
Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence
House of Representatives

Dear Pat:

Attached is that "Perspectives" paper that was prepared in 1975 (for 1976). You already have the "Perspectives" for 1977. As I told you, the paper for 1978 is still in draft. I hope and trust that these will satisfy your needs ...if not, please don't hesitate to let me know.

Sincerely,

SIGNED

[redacted]

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Assistant Legislative Counsel

Attachment

FORM 6-68 1533 OBSOLETE PREVIOUS EDITIONS (40)

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Secret

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DIRECTOR of CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE

Perspectives for Intelligence 1976-1981

Secret

October 1975

USIB/IRAC-D-22.1/44

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DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE

PERSPECTIVES FOR INTELLIGENCE

1976 – 1981

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DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE

PERSPECTIVES FOR INTELLIGENCE

1976 – 1981

Introduction

1. *Perspectives for Intelligence,* looking five years into the future, are issued annually by the Director of Central Intelligence to provide general guidance for all elements of the Intelligence Community. In particular, these statements of perspectives are designed to stimulate early action and planning on programs requiring long developmental lead times prior to their execution—such as complex technical systems, language training, the augmentation of skills, etc. These Perspectives for 1976-1981 are intended to influence Fiscal Year 1976 decisions whose effects will be felt or results fully manifest only after several years. Near term guidance for Fiscal Year 1976 is provided in the Objectives the Director has submitted to the President, which included both Substantive Objectives (further articulated in the Key Intelligence Questions—KIQs) and Resource Management Objectives. The Director's Annual Report to the President on the work of the Intelligence Community will include comments on steps taken during FY 1976 to meet future requirements as outlined in these Perspectives.

2. The Perspectives open with a general overview of the international political, economic and security environment anticipated during the coming five years (Part I). This is followed by a broad statement of the needs the Intelligence Community will be expected to meet during that period (Part II). More specific guidance is given with respect to activities which should be initiated, or on which planning should commence, in order to meet those needs (Part III). Finally, guidance is provided for implementation of "Perspectives" against major national intelligence problems (Part IV).

3. The Perspectives focus on major national intelligence problems. They recognize three important additional categories of problems, but these requirements are not extensively addressed:

a. Continuing national responsibilities of a lower priority which must somehow be satisfied with limited resources;

b. The requirements of civilian and military components of the United States Government for departmental or tactical intelligence support which often parallel national needs and also necessitate continuing attention and resources;

c. Unanticipated situations or crises capable of posing major political, economic or security problems for the United States. Since it may not be possible to meet the demands of such unanticipated problems by a realloca-

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tion of resources from less urgent activities, some reserve capability must be included in our planning to give the Intelligence Community the flexibility necessary to cope with the problems of an unpredictible world.

Part I—Major World Problems

1. *General.* The balance between the US and USSR in the tangible elements of national power, while continuing to be marked by offsetting assymetries, is unlikely to change fundamentally. Perceptions of the less tangible aspects of the balance of power—national attitudes, will, the momentum and direction of international events—may change importantly in either Moscow or Washington or elsewhere. In a situation of rough equality in intercontinental nuclear forces between the US and USSR, other national assets will gain importance as elements of the "strategic" balance of power.

2. While the Soviet-American relationship will still be the most important single factor, it will become less central in world affairs. Power will continue to diffuse, both because of the spread and changes in technology and because of the growth of interdependence, and issues not susceptible to conventional methods of diplomacy or force will grow in importance. The spread of nuclear weapons, the organization of the OPEC cartel and to a lesser extent the growing demand for raw materials have made coercive power available to additional states and non-governmental groups including terrorists. These trends, plus a perception of continuing abatement in post World War II security concerns, will work upon the cohesion of postwar alliances, which in turn will reduce the politically useful power of the US and the USSR. The United States therefore will be faced not only with a persistent threat to its interests from the USSR but also with turbulence and challenge in its relations with other nations.

3. *The USSR.* The United States and the Soviet Union will remain principal adversaries during the next five years. Their relationship will probably continue to be marked by an absence of armed conflict and at least public adherence, by both governments, to the concept of "detente." Disagreements between the two powers will continue to abound, however, in the application of this concept to specific problems. It is not impossible that these disagreements will cumulate to a point where the concept itself losses credibility and public support in the West and hence, political usefulness to the Soviet leadership.

The Soviet leaders seem convinced that in the overall "correlation of forces," world events are moving over the long run in favor of the USSR. They will attempt to further this movement through a variety of political, economic, and subversive activities, backed with growing military capabilities. In doing so, the Soviets will be cautious, trying to avoid confrontation with the US and foreign policies so assertive as to jeopardize what the Soviets see as favorable trends in US-USSR relations and world affairs generally. They will also favor the use of state power in the economic, diplomatic, and conventional military fields over the older revolutionary approach which, however, will continue to be utilized in favorable situations. The USSR will seek to keep "detente" as the leading feature of its foreign policy with the US and Western Europe for at least the next five

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years, largely for pragmatic reasons—i.e., because they think it offers them more advantages than any other alternative to:

— reduce the risk of nuclear confrontation;

— control local crises which could lead to general war;

— minimize China's chances of developing anti-Soviet combinations with other major powers;

— obtain Western economic and technological assistance;

— promote the disintegration of US-Allied power blocs; and

— play a superpower role with the US with respect to world affairs.

The Soviets will have to deal, however, with a number of dilemmas as they attempt to square their long-standing preoccupation with military strength with the minimal requirements of a detente posture. In the field of strategic offensive forces, the modernization program now underway will give the Soviets larger numbers of more accurate missile warheads, improved missile survivability and greater operational flexibility. In their strategic offensive and defensive programs, research and development is aimed at unique applications of existing technologies and applications of advanced technology based on theoretical or technological breakthroughs. Given present and planned US capabilities, we believe that the Soviets could not develop in the next five years a first-strike capability so overwhelming as to prevent substantial retaliation. However, in the conventional field, the Soviets will continue to build and modernize their ground, naval, and air forces for theater warfare along the periphery of the USSR and for distant limited operations. These programs will increase a variety of Soviet capabilities and strain the credibility of Soviet professions of peaceful intent. The Soviets are not likely to be substantially restrained by arms control arrangements, although for political imagery they will espouse a variety of disarmament proposals.

The USSR will continue to see China as a major hostile competitor and will expend considerable foreign policy support in a global struggle with the Chinese for influence and leverage, probing meanwhile for elements in the Chinese leadership succession sympathetic to less hostile, more pragmatic Sino-Soviet relations.

In its economic policy, Moscow will continue to give high priority to the kinds of growth which increase national power and facilitate its projection abroad. Domestically, however, pressures will grow for modernizing reforms of the Soviet economic system, particularly its administrative structure. As has been the case elsewhere in Eastern Europe (e.g., Czechoslovakia), reforms which seek the managerial benefits of some type of demand system could have implications for liberalizing other areas of Soviet life, and will accordingly encounter powerful resistance. Prolonged detente could threaten to erode the pervasive authority of the Communist Party over the Soviet populace. But these are long-standing and chronic problems, and over the next five years the regime is quite capable of resisting unwanted changes in the essentials of the Soviet domestic system.

A key intelligence focus over the next five years will be the Soviet leadership succession, as Brezhnev and the other aging seniors leave the political scene and their replacements consolidate power. Both the new leadership's policy modifica-

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tions and the relative smoothness or turmoil of the succession process will have implications for bilateral relations with the US and the Soviet stance abroad generally, as well as for domestic Soviet priorities and the Party management of the country. While the odds heavily favor continuity, Soviet politics are so centralized—and so secretive—that significant change under a new leadership cannot be wholly excluded.

4. *The People's Republic of China.* China is already in a period of leadership transition, moving toward a post-Mao collegium. The succession could see an initial collegial unity followed by an aggressive, xenophobic leader. Alternatively, the initial period could be followed by the emergence of openly contesting military, Party, and provincial elements. For planning purposes, however, it would seem most appropriate to assume that the follow-on leadership in China will maintain the unity and authoritarian discipline imposed by the Communist Party, that it will be primarily concerned with internal stability and unity in meeting the social and economic problems within Chna, and that it will retain a mistrustful attitude toward the outside world and a particular suspicion of countries on its periphery.

China will continue gradually to develop its strategic forces and will present an increasingly serious retaliatory threat to the Soviet Union. By 1980, it will have the capability of threatening the United States with a demonstration (or desperation) strike by a small number of ICBMs and possibly SLBMs. China will maintain large general purpose forces capable of operations on its periphery, and the gap between Chinese military might and that of its neighbors (other than the USSR) will probably widen. China will be unlikely to commit its forces, however, in the absence of major provocation or concern, but given China's sensitivity regarding its Southern Marches, ambitious North Vietnamese behavior or Taiwan's procurement of nuclear weapons over the next five years could generate what the Chinese might regard as sufficient provocation, particularly if either party appeared to be becoming a Soviet ally.

Internally, China will continue its agriculture-focused economic programs that are essential to keeping food supplies abreast of population. These programs will nevertheless enable industry to expand capacity and output selectively and permit some modest modernization of the defense establishment. Internationally, China will endeavor to become the ideological leader of the developing countries. It will participate in aid programs and similar political gestures and will increase its influence but will not succeed in establishing substantial authority over developing countries. China may become a significant producer and exporter of oil by 1980 and problems could arise in conflicting off-shore oil claims.

The chances of major change in the Sino-Soviet relationship during the next five years are small. Nevertheless, the consequences of the present hostility have been so important to Asia and to the US that even a moderate improvement would alter the foreign policy calculations in numerous capitals; obviously, outright military conflict would be a critical world event. Changes in either direction will almost certainly await the advent of new men, but this is likely to occur within both countries during this period, and it will be important to collect information and reach judgments promptly on the proclivities of the new leaderships.

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5. *Western Europe.* Both the more stable and developed states of North Europe and the more fragile and volatile nations of the Southern Tier are undergoing critical changes. Uncertainties abound and results are not foreordained; some of the determining factors lie within the control of the nations concerned, while others are international in dimension. US policy will be one variable in determining the course of events; in some respects it may be decisive, in others more marginal in impact. In some respects events are working to diminish US influence (measured against past benchmarks) while in other, less obvious spheres—e.g., energy and economic interrelationships—it is being enhanced. But whether US policy is of decisive, important, or very limited impact, Europe's new uncertainties imply greater need for discriminating intelligence collection and analysis.

For the *states of the European Community,* the need is not so much for secret intelligence collection—though this will continue to be useful in certain respects—as for sophisticated analysis and interpretation of massive amounts of information; most of it from open sources. The effort will have to identify and assess new trends or shifts in policies and problems sufficiently in advance to facilitate effective and timely US initiatives or responses. And to be realistic, such coverage must take into account not only domestic directions and moods in these states, but also the interplay between the domestic and international dimensions—including intra-European affairs, the Community's relations with the developing countries and European relations with the East and the US. All these problems combine familiar dimensions with newer, less understood issues such as the social and political repercussions of hyperinflation and vastly increased energy costs.

Both the old and newer pressures will bear on such key European issues as Britain's political and economic health and membership in the Community, whether or not the Italian Communists gain a role in the government, and indeed whether or not moderate government in the classic European liberal tradition can cope with current problems while withstanding assaults from extremists of left and right. The same pressures coupled with other uncertainties in Southern Europe imply serious difficulties for European defense as it has been known for 25 years.

The politically *more fragile states of Southern Europe,* at both ends of the Mediterranean, share the functional problems just mentioned—superimposed on peculiar new political dilemmas of their own. At one end, Portugal is already, and Spain soon will be, passing through an uncertain period of transition from long-established authoritarian regimes of the right to governmental systems which are not yet defined but will be very different. At best, neither in Spain nor Portugal will the new governments be as receptive to US facilities or as amenable to US influence as their predecessors. And it may be that Portugal, and conceivably Spain, will become inhospitable. The USSR did not create this potential in either state, but it has already encouraged it in Portugal and may do so in Spain.

The situation at the eastern end of the Mediterranean is if anything more complex. Neither in Greece nor in Turkey are the odds very high for a durable stabilization of internal politics which would enable both countries to approach realistically the problems of Cyprus and of rights in the Aegean Sea. Over the next five years, these problems will generate recurrent demands for US support,

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with accompanying pressures on US facilities which themselves are almost certain to be cut back to some extent during this period.

6. *Eastern Europe.* While Eastern Europe will continue to be under Soviet control, economic uncertainties and recurrent pressures for some loosening of ties with Moscow will complicate the picture. Poor in natural resources, the region is faced with a slowdown in economic growth rates which could have repercussions at the political level. The five-year period could see an explosion within some East European country against Soviet dominance, but Moscow would quickly reestablish its hegemony, by force if necessary, whatever the price in terms of other policies. Less spectacularly, individual regimes may find themselves able gradually to expand some areas of autonomy, primarily in domestic policy, while adhering to Soviet guidance in foreign policy and security matters. The passing of Tito could open a period of difficulty and contest over the succession and over the external orientation of Yugoslavia, a period that could be risky should the Soviets try to intervene, either to prevent a westward drift or to pull the country eastward.

7. *The Middle East.* This region seems bound to continue to be both volatile and dangerous. Even if significant progress is made over the next five years in resolving the Arab-Israeli conflict, considerable distrust will persist, providing a favorable atmosphere for those Arab elements rejecting a final settlement. A breakdown in the negotiation process is likely to lead to another round of war. As a further source of instability, the policies of important states are strongly dependent on individual leaders—such as Sadat, the Shah, Hussein, and Asad—whose departure could lead to major shifts in national behavior.

The US interests which are threatened by these possibilities are not likely to decline substantially over the period. Arab oil will not become less important to the US economy and will remain vital to our major partners. Meanwhile, the accumulation of oil revenues will magnify the potential for international monetary distortions. While there are important trends which favor an increase in US influence in the region, these trends will remain subject to sudden reversal.

8. *Japan.* Japan will continue to play a major role in international economic affairs generally, expanding its contacts and relations with other countries, including the USSR and China. Although Japan has a high degree of internal stability, it is feeling the social stresses of intense development and rapid economic growth (e.g., population congestion and pollution, among others). Also, Japan is among the advanced powers peculiarly dependent on imported raw materials and energy sources, and hence is both vulnerable and sensitive to changes in price or availability. Over the next five years, Japan will probably continue to strive to maintain cooperative relations with the United States because of the prime importance it places on defense and economic relationships. Differences over economic issues—bilateral or multilateral—could sour US-Japanese relationships, and the Japanese will be highly sensitive to indications of reduced US interest in their security.

9. *New Powers and Blocs.* OPEC's disruption of the non-Communist world's energy situation is likely to inspire further attempts at cooperative efforts by small nations to control other important raw materials, such as bauxite and phosphates. Although most of these attempts will fail, efforts to form various types of pro-

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ducer's associations by these developing countries already have had some political effects within many industrial consuming states as well as on international economic and political relationships. Whatever agreements are negotiated between producing and consuming countries concerning the supply and price factors for raw materials, the political and economic effects for the international system—including the connections of the Communist states to that system—could be significant. Brazil, Venezuela, Nigeria, and Zaire are becoming regional powers and are playing more substantial roles in international forums. Aside from these, several nations whose ties to the US have traditionally been close will display greater independence. This will be particularly prevalent in the economic field but may also affect certain US strategic interests. Examples of such nations are Canada, Mexico, Panama, Australia, and Thailand.

10. *The Developing Countries* will present other major problems to US policymakers. The nature and severity of these problems will hinge in part on foreign, especially developing world, perceptions of America's ability—and willingness—to succor its friends, to protect its interests and those of its allies, and, generally, to play an active role in areas beyond its borders. The developing countries will be especially concerned with US willingness to support transformations, in their favor, in the international economic and political system.

Nevertheless, developing countries will be most interested in US reactions to events in Southeast Asia and Korea because these situations represent potentially dangerous circumstances. Of other similar situations, the Arab-Israeli conflict is the most obvious, but serious stresses could also develop in the Persian Gulf or in the Indian subcontinent. Additional regional disputes—between China and Taiwan, Greece and Turkey, and blacks and whites in southern Africa—could also threaten the tenuous equilibrium between the great powers. The newly rich powers will rapidly expand their military capabilities; some will develop nuclear armaments, however primitive. (Israel already has a nuclear capability and India has exploded one nuclear device; South Africa, Brazil, Taiwan, and South Korea could develop a capability over the next decade, as could other nations such as Iran.) If the developing countries do not consider that the US and other rich industrial states are sufficiently forthcoming in closing the gaps between the developed and less-developed worlds, they will seek outlets for their frustration in assaults on the existing international system. The domination by the developing countries of certain international forums will result in increased confrontation and could eventually incapacitate these forums as useful international organizations for the industrial states. Also, some sufficiently angry developing countries may resort to covert actions in attempts to blackmail selected industrial states through terrorism—of a conventional or nuclear variety—or through covertly sponsored "liberation armies."

11. *Social change* will cause turbulence and possibly create power vacuums in a number of areas stemming from increased expectations and a perception of the growing rather than narrowing economic gaps between developing countries (and classes within developing countries) and the more developed industrial world. Areas particularly susceptible to this process will be the Persian Gulf, certain other Arab states such as Morocco; India, possibly Indonesia, the Philippines, and, in Latin America, Argentina, Peru, Colombia, and possibly even Brazil. Internally this turbulence may be temporarily stilled by some authoritarian

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governments, particularly those benefiting from increased oil revenues, but they will have difficulties in maintaining themselves over the longer term. Such turbulence will also exist within advanced nations, as economic, racial, ideological, or regional minorities turn to violence and terrorism to press their claims against more and more delicately tuned and interdependent societies.

12. *The acceleration of events* will be characteristic of the years ahead. This will come from improved communications and transportation, sharply reducing the time available to reflect on, negotiate, and resolve international problems. It will also raise many local events to international prominence and inflate national or political pride, posing further handicaps to successful negotiations. There will be a resulting tendency towards breakdowns of overloaded institutions, shorter attention spans for individual situations, and a need for simultaneous perception and management of a multiplicity of international relationships. Such change will occur most conspicuously in the fields of science and technology, but the pace there will have substantial effects on the pace of sociological, industrial, and institutional change, with resultant political and economic impacts. Identification and accurate assessments of such changes and their effects will be needed on an increasingly rapid basis.

13. *Interdependence* will be an increasingly important characteristic of the world of the future. Intelligence problems will also be increasingly interdependent, requiring more complex models for analysis to give full weight to the number of disciplines involved. Interdependence will reflect greater national dependence on other nations but will also reflect an increased coincidence of interest among groups, industries, and services in all nations independent of national identification.

Part II—The Role of Intelligence

1. *General.* Intelligence will have to give priority to assessments of an increasing range of problems capable of affecting major American interests and, hence, requiring US decisions. While intelligence on strategic nuclear developments and strategic warning of military attack will continue to receive highest priority, the need will be greater in the next few years for assessments which anticipate and alert decision-makers to other kinds of policy problems. In an era of improved communications and transportation, of a contraction of US forward deployments of forces, and of acceleration in events leading to crises, the demands will be greater for intelligence which is timely, complete, and relevant to policy implications. Meeting those demands will be essential for the use of diplomacy, negotiation, and other benign initiatives to head off military confrontations or international instabilities. The central challenge to the Intelligence Community is in providing material which relates directly to the policy concerns of the highest levels of the US Government. To respond to this challenge, it is clear that the large amounts of information available will have to be submitted to analysis of the interdisciplinary type, so that economic, technological, sociological, and cultural factors can be combined with political and military data to provide US decision-makers with a unified, complete view of the situations which demand their attention—or should demand their attention.

Essential constituents to providing such a unified view include: (1) the description of the perceptions held by foreign decision-makers of the major

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domestic and international issues with which they are concerned; (2) the presentation of these issues in a context which accounts for all significant factors that impinge upon them; and (3) the assessment of the intentions and likely courses of actions of these leaders as well as the capabilities of their countries.

In addition, the Intelligence Community is faced with the requirement to: (1) more effectively identify that which is significant from the large volumes of raw information, and to put it in manageable form; and (2) devise techniques for rapidly and accurately communicating to consumers the essential elements of foreign situations and the reliability of these assessments.

2. *The USSR.* The USSR will remain our major intelligence target. Intelligence will be expected to provide precise data on Soviet military capabilities, economic activity, and efforts to acquire advanced scientific and technological skills to improve military and economic capabilities. It will be expected also to supply reliable assessments of Soviet political dynamics and intentions. While a small percentage of data for these assessments will become available through open exchange and access, the Soviets will try to keep much more of this information secret, and extraordinary efforts will be required to obtain and understand it. One specific priority task will be accurate and demonstrable monitoring of arms limitation agreements made with the Soviet Union. In the military field otherwise, special attention will be focused on Soviet research and development applicable to weapons and supporting systems which could substantially affect the balance of power. These will include antisubmarine warfare, ballistic missiles, satellites, and advanced technology systems. The greater political unity of non-nuclear forces and perhaps an increasing disposition for their use, at least by some of the Soviet client states, will put a greater burden on intelligence to maintain a current baseline of information on such forces. It will also mean maintaining capabilities for tactical intelligence coverage of potential crisis areas and for rapid crisis augmentation of such coverage.

Intelligence will need to keep a running estimate of Soviet calculations of their overall foreign policy balance sheet, and to anticipate shifts in area or emphasis as well as in the general line. Particularly important elements in this larger estimate will be Soviet-US, Sino-Soviet and Sino-Soviet-US relationships, followed by Soviet leverage and intentions in Western Europe and the Middle East. Anticipating the relative smoothness or turmoil of phases of Soviet succession politics, and the implications of this and any new leadership policy consensus will be an important intelligence task, as will the identification of significant reform tendencies or trouble areas in the Soviet economy.

3. *China.* China will continue to be an important intelligence target. The closed nature of Chinese society will make it difficult to assess any turmoil within the country, its leadership perceptions of threats to China's security, or threats China might pose abroad. The latter will become particularly important as Chinese strategic power grows and comes to include capabilities against the United States itself. It will also apply to Chinese political activities and intentions in view of China's influence in the Far East and its ties with and aspirations in the developing countries.

4. *Western Europe.* Next to the USSR and China, Western Europe is the Community's most important continuing intelligence target, in view of US economic and security interests in the region and its importance to the overall rela-

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10. Much of the information that intelligence analysts will need to discharge their responsibilities will have to be collected by techniques and sources—some simple, some awesomely sophisticated—easily jeopardized by public disclosure which compromises them and facilitates the development of countermeasures to frustrate them. Thus an essential aspect of the intelligence mission will be our ability to maintain the necessary secrecy of operations while satisfying legitimate public interest in their legality and propriety.

Part III—Implications for Intelligence Planning

1. *The Planning Environment.* In the early 1970s, the character of substantive problems that had faced the Intelligence Community for more than two decades began to change. The change reflects basically the fragmentation of both sides of the confrontation between the Communist and the non-Communist worlds of the 1950s and 1960s, and the increased interdependence of the United States with the rest of the world on military, political, and economic matters. While Soviet strategic threat capabilities, China's military development, and crisis monitoring continue as our major concerns (consuming about three-fourths of our resources, annually), a broader variety of US foreign policy issues are climbing the priority ladder. Significant among these are international energy problems, the complexity of bi-national and multi-national political relationships, economic instabilities around the globe, the availabilities of important raw materials and the threat of extremist and terrorist forces.

The chief concern for intelligence planning in the present period centers on how we manage our resources to cope with this situation, given:

a. Reduction trends since FY 1969 in our manpower and real dollars available;

b. Increased demands for more timely and better forecasting in intelligence;

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d. A more difficult climate for conducting foreign intelligence created in part by recent public disclosures of intelligence processes and activities.

Intelligence Community resource planning and management is placing increasing emphasis on national plans, i.e., the SIGINT, Imagery and Human Sources plans. They should provide the firm base needed to develop broader operating strategies and clearer resource profiles. A parallel emphasis is being devoted to continually improving our requirements guidance and response to customer's needs through such efforts as the KIQ Evaluation Process (KEP).

2. *Guideline For Planning.* Even assuming an extended period of detente, the larger portion of intelligence resources will continue to be engaged against our major targets; the USSR, China, Western Europe, and crises. Thus, with no lessening of the importance of what our major Communist adversaries are about, events in both the industrialized and lesser developed portions of the *non-Communist* world are taking on new significance for US security and economic well-being. The likelihood is also greater now than in the past that localized economic, social, political and military events will interact with the real or perceived power relationships of the major power blocs in ways which will engage priority US national interests. All this has created a busier substantive arena for the Intelligence

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Community. Not only has there been an increase in the number of problems that require simultaneous handling—and this may increasingly tend to overload some existing mechanisms—there also has been shrinkage in the time available for the Community to recognize and alert policymakers to significant new developments.

Planning for the Community must take on a stronger corporate character. Intelligence program managers need to re-think with a collective mind our intelligence manpower and dollar situation, operational aims, and end-product requirements. It is a time for ideas and stronger management initiatives that encompass both immediate and long-term requirements. Throughout, our objective is to preserve US technical intelligence advantages over foreign adversaries; the USSR in particular. But we need to prevent decisions that could lock us into long-term commitments or investments with limited alternatives.

In the planning process, managers will find it necessary in some instances to modify drastically a balance of resource allocations and applications where simpler adjustments were sufficient in the past. Decision-makers should be ready to cut away sunk-costs in activities which result in marginal value. A key function of managers in building Community strength is to engage willingly and frequently with each other in cross-program tradeoffs to reduce unnecessary resource duplications and functional redundancies. Consolidations, from which lower operational costs and greater functional flexibility can ge derived, should be encouraged. Resource applications must be brought into clearer visibility and linked more coherently to substantive intelligence requirements.

The business of intelligence may well require increases in budgetary terms, if only to maintain today's capabilities at current resource levels. Our first responsibility in this area is to assure that cost increases, where they are deemed necessary, are prudent and defensible. The extensiveness of reviews conducted recently by both Houses of Congress in the FY 1976 appropriations process is ample evidence of what will be expected of intelligence justifications in the years ahead. More oversight can be expected from Presidental and Congressional levels—oversight which will involve a more thorough scrutiny of costs, management, plans, and extent of intelligence activities.

Even though we cannot know with certainty what the future will be, planning mechanisms are needed which will allow us to review each step taken in developing a broader intelligence capability.

4. *Areas to Address.* A thorough review and assessment will be required of each main element in the intelligence process; requirements, collection, processing, production, dissemination, data management, manpower, and research and development.

5. *Intelligence Requirements.* Intelligence resources throughout the Community are driven daily by the intelligence requirements process. Today, there is a confusing variety of methods and vehicles (even language) used to determine and state requirements. Improvements are needed immediately. A better ordering of requirement priorities is needed across-the-board. Better definitions of requirements will be a fundamental step to overall improvement. The process must become more streamlined and interwoven throughout the Community to assure better, quicker, and lower-cost response to the intelligence consumer. The requirements process will be strengthened considerably by developing

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closer ties between producers and consumers. Better feedback is needed from policy officials along with better inputs from these officials; information and materials that are not now being made available to intelligence. Anticipation of consumer needs and the timing of needs are becoming increasingly important in a world that is growing more complex. Greater focus should be placed on shifting ad hoc requirements and how to handle them along with standing requirements. This subject is being given special attention in the DCI's Objectives for FY 1976—but the Community should plan for continued attention and improvement in the out-years.

6. *Collection.* The pace of technological change increases the complexity of the target environment at a rapid rate and poses a risk that our present technical systems may have a shorter useful life. Scientific breakthroughs and improving foreign technologies increase potential by US adversaries to limit the effectiveness of our collection systems. Improvements will be needed just to keep pace with maturation of the foreign technologic environment.

In the SIGINT collection arena, there are both opportunities and problems ahead. Advances in technology are giving us access to additional areas of information (and improving our ability to select the wheat from the chaff therein) formerly beyond our reach. At the same time, changes in the target environment are depriving us of access we have been accustomed to. We must press the development of new techniques and systems and at the same time refine our ability to obtain substantive results from the diminished reporting of older systems. In particular, we must exploit the trend toward voice and data-stream systems, the growth of satellite communications, and continually examine ways to increase the productivity of existing collection platforms despite reductions in their access.

Intelligence from satellite imagery will remain essential in monitoring Soviet compliance to SAL and other agreements, MBFR negotiations, and US negotiations with other nations. Advanced imagery systems will be capable of providing a deluge of intelligence material. Use of this unique capability should be planned carefully to collect only that which is essential to intelligence needs.

Human-source collection capabilities will remain an important part of the collection process. Mechanisms are being devised at the national intelligence level, as well as the diplomatic mission level abroad, to improve the management, coordination, and exploitation of human-source capabilities. This trend must be pursued energetically. There is considerable potential for improved reporting from overt personnel of both intelligence and non-intelligence agencies abroad. Contributions of such agencies as State, Defense, Treasury, USAID, USIA, Agriculture, and Commerce can be enhanced substantially by more effective approaches to information gathering and in the reporting aspects of their activities. We need, particularly, gains in the interrelationships between *overt and clandestine* and *technical and human* sources. We must establish more *direct links between* our human collectors and our technical collectors.

7. *Processing.* This is still one of the most pervasive problems facing the Intelligence Community. Advanced capabilities in technical collection are still challenging intelligence processing techniques. Higher speed processing methods—rapid selection-out of non-essential material and faster ways to disseminate critical matter—are particularly important to SIGINT collection systems.

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8. *Production.* Intelligence improvement will not be complete without a tandem development in analysis, production, and presentation techniques. Accelerated efforts are needed in information science research, automated data handling techniques, improved analytic techniques, and in the development of electronic tools that the analyst can use easily and effectively in the production of intelligence. These must be accompanied by equal stress on deepening the substantive knowledge of their subjects by analysts through training, area study and orientation, and language and cultural familiarity. Improved techniques in writing for the busy policymaker are especially needed and should be given particular emphasis in our training programs. Those officials whom intelligence should seek most to influence are those who have the least time to dwell on tomes. More effective procedures are necessary to evaluate user satisfaction and dissatisfaction with intelligence products.

9. *Dissemination.* The number of customers for intelligence will increase. Some will be customers of new specialties in intelligence, such as economics, science and technology, etc. Increases in the value and timeliness of production will also generate a demand for intelligence service to additional elements of our Government which share responsibility for decision-making on the wide variety of questions to be covered by intelligence in the future. Demands will increase for more immediate (faster than the press) reporting of current developments from the field. Field analysis will remain important but should promptly follow with appropriate detail, spot reporting of a significant event. Lastly, we will have increasing situations in which intelligence must be provided to friendly nations, or even exposed to adversary nations, to serve as a basis for negotiation or monitoring of agreements reached. The dissemination of our intelligence must reflect these new demands and be conducted in a fashion which clearly separates the substantive material circulating from sensitive sources and techniques that are vulnerable to frustration or termination by adversaries. We should also intensify our efforts to downgrade, sanitize, and decontrol where possible, highly compartmented products so that they may be more widely disseminated and used. This will require greater refinement in distinguishing categories of intelligence which can be disseminated to designated audiences from those elements of the intelligence process which must be given greater, rather than less, protection in such a new atmosphere.

10. *Data Management.* Information and data masses should be made more readily available in a more useful form to all quarters of the Community. There will be larger volumes and increased diversity of information to be handled by intelligence in the years ahead. This will call for:

a. A better appreciation and application by managers of the principles of data management;

b. An upgraded data management system of computers, computer techniques, and communications capabilities; and

c. Development of a Community-wide data management system and standards.

Before these improved capabilities can operate as a unitary system, it will be necessary to standardize intelligence language, data, and computer formats.

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11. *Manpower.* Investment in new talent, training and career development, and exposure abroad may well have suffered in our preoccupation with recent reductions in manpower levels. The years ahead will probably call for different organizational mixes of Community manpower, and almost certainly, a greater breadth of expertise in manpower skills. Organization heads and programs managers will be required to formulate plans annually to:

a. Train and familiarize personnel in new and better analytic methodologies—improve the balance of Community skills to meet the demands of a changing intelligence environment;

b. Emphasize and accelerate training in foreign languages and cultures of nations that will be important intelligence targets in the 1976-1981 timeframe;

c. Provide intelligence officers with better familiarity in matters of policy formulation, policy and negotiating issues, how to identify and anticipate issues, and how to relate them to the need for intelligence collection and production;

d. Ensure availability of technical and academic talents and expertise on subjects of importance to intelligence in the 1976-1981 timeframe; and

e. Reassess existing manpower commitments against future rather than past or even present requirements, and place major emphasis on the former.

12. *Research and Development.* R&D continues to grow in importance in the planning and management of US foreign intelligence. Along with R&D initiatives already under way, the IR&D Council should concentrate efforts on:

a. The prevention of surprise in technological progress of other nations—especially by our foreign adversaries;

b. Identification of opportunities and potential problems for intelligence management to address throughout the next decade and beyond; and

c. Surfacing topics and areas of research not included now in the Community R&D effort—topics that should be added to our plans against longer-term problem areas.

13. *National-Military Force Relationships.* Growing substantive intelligence needs call for improved mutual support between national and military operating forces.

In the development of new and improved national intelligence systems and related program decisions, the intelligence requirements of field commanders for reporting timeliness and accuracy should be taken into account. As national interest, mission, and costs permit, national intelligence systems should be supportive to military theater planning and operations.

Similarly, where mission and location permit, intelligence units that are organic to field forces should be supportive to the satisfaction of national and departmental intelligence needs. For example, combat readiness training should include collection and production against actual intelligence targets of interest

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to national-level users as well as to tactical commander needs. Steps should also continue toward improving the capabilities of reserve and National Guard units to take on lower-priority, longer-term intelligence tasks.

14. *Summary Areas of Concern.* Particular attention should be given by planners to the following:

a. Development of procedures, techniques and systems for improving our ability to anticipate and alert policymakers to likely future events which could prove injurious to US interests. New elements and issues on the international scene stress the need for a continuously sensitive, national intelligence nervous system—one that will be immediately responsive to warnings, tipoffs, and conditions of opportunity;

b. Continuing reappraisal of our intelligence products—their styling, utility, and level of comprehensiveness to an increased diversity of intelligence matter and consumer needs;

c. Assurance that substantive consumer needs (rather than momentum of technological achievement and opportunity) is the driving force of investment in our expensive technical collection systems;

d. Development of intelligence operational systems for the future that will be less geographic-dependent or vulnerable to foreign countermeasures;

e. Program planning that is tuned to longer range concerns (5-10 years) and consistent with our developing concept of what the future will demand; and

f. Concentrated efforts to develop a stronger relationship between intelligence producers and intelligence consumers.

Above all, flexibility in allocating collection resources and in applying analytical resources must be enhanced. And, this must be accomplished within the context of greater intra-Community understanding and cooperation so that the total output of the Community is of the greatest possible value to the nation.

Part IV—Implementation

1. *General.* The Perspectives for Intelligence will be utilized and reflected in the following Intelligence Community planning and management documents:

DCI Objectives

Key Intelligence Questions (KIQs)

Key Intelligence Question Evaluation Process (KEP)

National Foreign Intelligence Program Recommendations

National SIGINT Plan

National Imagery Plan

National Human Source Plan

Intelligence Community Annual Report

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2. The following bodies will be consulted and participate in the implementation of the guidance contained in these Perspectives, as well as the documents listed above:

National Security Council Intelligence Committee
United States Intelligence Board
Intelligence Resources Advisory Committee
National Reconnaissance Executive Committee

3. As noted in the introduction, these Perspectives are addressed to major national intelligence problems. The additional categories of problems listed there, which are related to national intelligence but not addressed in these Perspectives, will be implemented by components in the Community following departmental guidance.

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