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General

1. Little progress has been made by government forces against the Karen insurgents and it appears that they are for the present content with having cleared the insurgents from the main road. Small scale operations are being actively pursued to clear up minor Communist concentrations on either side of the road, in particular between Pegu and Toungoo, and these appear to have met with some success. Further north however Communist attempts to sabotage bridges etc., continue and road traffic, which must travel in convoys, is liable to ambush.

2. The Government announcement of an amnesty for all insurgents (it had previously been confined to Karen and Mon insurgents only) with the exception of those guilty of murder, dacoity and rape, and of leaders responsible for the insurrection who were liable to be tried under the High Treason Act, is expected by the authorities to meet with considerable success. According to the police, surrenders throughout Burma over the last few days have numbered between 100 and 150 per day. These have mostly been in groups of two to ten persons, the largest group so far being one of 71 White Band PVO's. But the future of the larger groups of White Band PVO's on the river axis is still undecided, though it appears that active negotiations with the Government are in progress; to a certain extent they are cooperating with the forces now advancing up the road towards Prome, in denying adjoining areas to the Communists and thus securing freedom of advance for the government troops.

3. Government forces have now retaken Paungde, about 30 miles south of Prome, and are advancing northwards. There are indications that the forces of the People's Democratic Front (PDF) are preparing to withdraw to the north and east where the jungle and hilly terrain will be in their favor. No major engagement has yet taken place.

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The Burma Communist Party (BCP)

4. Having publicly declared in March that the insurrection in Burma was part of the World Revolutionary Movement, it was a logical sequel that they should interpret the party's position in Burma in a strictly orthodox manner. This was effected in a broadcast on 19 April of a statement purporting to be made by Bo LA YAUNG of the White Band PVO (which is dealt with in more detail below) which emphasized the principle of BCP leadership in the Democratic Front. The illusion of a coalition with joint leadership was finally thrown overboard.

5. The party is now very much on the defensive. On 6 April, according to press reports, a conference of its principal leaders and representatives from Arakan considered the possibility of withdrawing to Arakan via the Taungup Pass when the Government attack materialized. It seems now, however, that this plan has been abandoned, probably because of the concentrations of hostile PVO's to the west of the Irrawaddy, and it is probable that they will withdraw their forces into the hilly jungle to the north and east of Prome.

6. In Rangoon the party has had little success in the attempts at reorganization which have been going on for several months and there are reports of disagreement between sub-headquarters of the Rangoon District BCP, which the police consider may well result in a split in the party.

The All-Burma Peasants' Union (ABPU)

7. From a broadcast given over the People's Broadcasting Service on 28 April it seems probable that Thakin PE TINT has now taken over the post of General-Secretary of the ABPU; he has held it in an acting capacity for some time. This post had previously been held by Thakin THAN PE who is believed to have been in China for some months.

8. The People's Democracy Journal, issued by the Lower Burma HQ of the BCP, for January 1950 gave membership figures for the ABPU branches in 15 districts. On the basis of these figures the BCP claims a total ABPU membership of some 750,000 as compared with some 285,000 claimed in June 1947. There is no independent information against which the reliability of these figures can be assessed but it must be assumed, if only because the BCP has controlled large areas of agricultural country for some two years, that the nominal membership of the ABPU will have considerably increased. It remains to be seen, however, to what extent the BCP will be able to rely on the continued loyalty of the peasants now that the Government is beginning to reassert its influence in the districts. There is an indication that the taxes which Communist-controlled People's Administrative Committees have recently started to impose are proving unpopular.

All-Burma Women's Congress (ABWC)

9. Reports indicate that the BCP women's organization, the ABWC of which nothing was heard after the outbreak of the insurrection in 1948, was revived in April 1949; recent references to the organization in BCP propaganda publications suggest a membership of many thousands. A report just received states that women are now being recruited into the BCP Armed Forces.

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Burma Workers' Union (aka All-Burma Trades Union Congress)

10. Last month's survey referred to a conference of the Burma Workers' Union (BWU) held at Thayetmyo from 24 to 26 February 1950. A copy of their manifesto, which appeared in March in a People's Liberation News Sheet, has now been seen. The manifesto emphasizes the role of the working class as the vanguard of the People's Democratic Revolution and its determination to strive for world peace alongside the workers of the world in the WFTU; the tasks of the workers within the Democratic Front and an economic system incorporating nationalist enterprises, cooperative enterprises, and individual private enterprises, are analysed in some detail, as are also the rights and duties of the working class; emphasis is placed on the responsibility of the working class in the administration of the PDF and in the organization of workers towards the establishment of a "People's Democratic New State".

11. It is a reflection of the general defensive policy of the party and that on 4 April instructions were issued to labor organizers in Rangoon that no labor agitation was to be instituted in the capital without the permission of the Central headquarters of the BCP; activities were to be limited to maintaining contact with party sympathizers among labor in Rangoon.

Burma Communist Party (BCP) and the People's Democratic Front (PDF)

12. It appears that the Army Mutineers, or at least their leading members, have now been absorbed into the BCP. An interesting report which has still to be confirmed but which [redacted] states that on 1 May the formation of a new "Governing body" of the BCP was announced. Its officials were listed as follows:

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Chairman	Thakin THAN TUN
Secretary (Central Political Affairs)	Bo MEYA (Army Mutineers)
Members	BA TIN (aka H. N. GHOSHAL) BA THEIN TIN Bo THEIN (aka PE THEIN)* Thakin THAN PE Thakin TIN TUN

At the same time a Military Affairs Council subordinate to this governing body was elected, its members being:

Generalissimo	Bo YAN AUNG
Chiefs of Staff	Bo AUNG DIN Bo YE MYINT
Chief Commanders	Bo YE HTUT (Army Mutineers) Bo SEIN TIN (Army Mutineers)
Chief Political Commissar	Bo MYO MYINT
Commander Southern Area Forces	Bo THET TUN (Army Mutineers)
Deputy Chief of Staff	MAUNG SHIN Thakin MYA MAUNG

All are required to swear allegiance to the BCP and its program.

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13. It seems, however, that there is a separate committee to control the affairs of the PDF, for a broadcast on 30 April notified the reorganization of the "PDF Committee"--presumably referring to the Central Organization Committee--with the following as its members.

BCP Members	Thakin THAN TUN Thakin BA THEIN TIN Thakin TIN TUN Thakin THAN MYAING
Army Mutineers	Bo SEIN TIN Bo SOE MAUNG

The announcement continued that Army Mutineer Bo THEIN, who acted as Secretary of the PDF conference in March, had broken away from the PDF and formed his own militant group. This admission gives substance to rumors which have suggested that several of the leading Army Mutineers have now broken away from the PDF, and thus casts some doubt on the reliability of the report referred to in paragraph 12 above.

14. The composition of the Military Affairs council referred to in the same report is however, to a certain extent confirmed by PDF broadcasts naming Bo YAN AUNG as Commander-in-Chief of the unified army which, it is claimed, has now been successfully formed; Bo YE MYINT is named as his second in command and in charge of political affairs. The title adopted by this unified army is the "People's Army" and a recent PDF announcement warns that this new force should not be confused with the now anti-BCP PVO armed forces which also used the same title.

15. The hand of the Cental Organization Committee (COC) of the PDF was strengthened in an announcement published on 21 March reporting the decisions reached at the main conference of the PDF. The COC was empowered to act as the Central People's Administrative Board and to exercise authority until such time as the formation of a People's Democratic Republic could be announced; it was also given a supervisory function over the implementation of the land redistribution program.

Details of the PDF May Day celebrations are included in attachment A to this report.

BCP and the White Band PVO

16. It will be remembered that various BCP pronouncements at the time of the split in the PDF in March roundly condemned the White Band PVO and in particular its leaders, but at the same time occasionally claimed that there were some PVO who still supported the BCP. One report suggests that in discussions confined to BCP leaders and reliable Army Mutineers, the PVO as a whole are identified as enemies, but party propaganda through the medium of the People's Broadcasting Service continues to claim support among the PVO's (there is independent evidence that such support still exists in Pegu District) and to call for the return to the Democratic Front of all PVO's who recognize the villainy of Bo PO KUN and his friends, and who are prepared to accept the principle of the leadership of the BCP in the Democratic Front. As a magnet to attract the waverers, announcements have been broadcast of the formation of a "Revolutionary People's Yebaw Organization" of which Bo LA YAUNG is alleged to be president; Bo NYUNT MAUNG and Bo SAW MAUNG have been named as members of the Provisional

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Central Executive Committee. This announcement tends to confirm an independent report that there is still a group of PVO's which is prepared to cooperate with the Democratic Front and to support its program, but that they are only prepared to do so on terms which guarantee them equal representation with the BCP on People's Administrative Committees and independent administration of their own organization through a headquarters separate from the main headquarters of the PDF. It is unlikely, however, that the BCP will allow such a state of affairs to continue for long or that they will permit any such PVO headquarters to follow an independent line. The aim of this propaganda may well be more to break up the opposition than to secure any effective recruitment.

17. The remaineder of the PVO's who now appear firmly opposed to the BCP and who are said to be led by Bo PO KUN, Bo AUNG SEIN, Bo HTEIN WIN GALE and Bo HLA PE, are reported to have reformed their organization under the new title of the "People's Volunteer Party". The BCP has recently claimed to have obtained documentary evidence that this group over a considerable period has been intriguing with NE WIN and U KO KO GYI, the one-time president of the Burma Socialist Party who broke away to form the Union of Burma Communist Party, through Bo HTEIN WIN GALE and Ko MYA HAN, of the Union of Burma Communist Party.

BCP Links with the China Communist Party (CCP)

25X1X 18. An extremely interesting report [redacted] appears to have valuable contacts among the insurgents throws further light on the question of aid from the CCP to the Burmese Communists. This report suggests that Thakin AUNG GYI first went to China in November 1949 at which time there was already a BCP representative in Peiping; his purpose was to seek aid from the CCP. The CCP's reply is alleged to have been that they were not prepared to provide physical assistance but they were willing to make arms and ammunition available; the risks of introducing these arms into Burma however, were to be borne entirely by the BCP who would be responsible for smuggling them across the frontier from China. Thakin AUNG GYI is said to have returned from China to Burma and to have attended the PDF conference in March and to have left again at the end of March accompanied by Thakin PE TINT and three BCP subordinates; this party was to travel to China via the Shan States reconnoitering a suitable route for smuggling arms into Burma. This report provides further confirmation that such negotiations are in progress but there remains a certain confusion as to the identity of the Burmese representatives who have been or are still in China in this connection.

BCP Propaganda

19. It is now clear that the BCP's propaganda effort was stepped up to a remarkable extent at the beginning of 1950 as the result of decisions taken in late 1949. Their earlier technique of pamphleteering has been largely abandoned in favor of the production of newspapers and magazines and it has become the responsibility not only of the Central Headquarters, but also of Regional Headquarters and below them District Headquarters to produce a Journal at monthly intervals and more frequently if possible. Those that have been seen have all been well produced and include publications by the Central Headquarters of the PDF (the "Alin Yaung" journal) the Western Zone of the BCP (with headquarters at Prome) the Lower Burma headquarters of the BCP, the Pegu District BCP and the Rangoon District BCP, and it seems probable that other district party headquarters were expected to take similar action. All appear to have started publication

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in January 1950. The emphasis on the international aspects of Communism, a fairly recent development, is marked in all these publications, doubtless with a view to preparing the party rank and file for Thakin THAN TUN's announcement in March of the international nature of the Burmese insurrection. The current international Party Line is competently interpreted.

20. The PDF Broadcasting Station, which was damaged in an attack on Prome by the PVO at the end of March, resumed transmission on 13 April and it has since been possible to examine in some detail the material put out. This falls under three main headings.

a. Local and international Communists news.

b. Propaganda talks and news commentaries essentially for Burmese consumption.

c. Announcements by various bodies of the PDF (such as the Central Organization Committee or the People's Army) and in one case specific instructions to an individual in Arakan for the reorganization of the unit under his command.

21. The main themes running through the broadcast propaganda are:

a. The usual attacks on the Government.

b. The build up of the Democratic Front, claims of military successes, announcements by consituent organizations proclaiming loyalty, etc.

c. A specific attack on the Government alleging that Thakin NU has all along been acting in collusion with Saw BA U GYI under Anglo-American orders and that the Karen retreat was prearranged. This is designed to discredit the Government in the eyes of the PVO leaders at present negotiating with them.

d. A virulent attack on the "traitorous" PVO leaders coupled with a call to the PVO rank and file to return to the PDF.

22. The principal announcement in the campaign for the return of the PVO's was one attributed to Bo LA YAUNG, which is believed to have been made under duress, but it is of particular importance in that the BCP thus announced, through the mouth of one of the two main PVO leaders, the terms which PVO's would have to accept; great emphasis was placed on recognition of the BCP leadership in the PDF.

Communist Party (Burma) (Red Flags) (CP(B))

23. The recent formation is reported of a "Control Commission" of the CP(B) and of a "Political and Military Affairs Council" for the Delta area. There are indications, however, that some groups at least are realizing the futility of attempting to fight on on their own. Press reports refer to a peace conference which is said to have taken place on 6 April at Twante, not far from Rangoon, attended by government officials and representatives of the CP(B). At this meeting it was proposed by the CP(B) that the Government should lift the ban on the party and allow it to take part in the general elections (which are as remote as ever) under the auspices of the AFPFL. Similar ideas, it will be remembered, were voiced by the party in January this year.

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Burma Socialist Party (BSP)

24. During April there was an intensification in the anti-capitalist, anti-western propaganda in BSP-controlled publications. The Voice of the Union which is generally recognized as the organ of the BSP, though not publicly admitted as such, was revived on 27 March and has played a leading part in this campaign. Support for the Soviet-led democracies has become more pronounced and there have been persistent calls for Burma to swing over into the Soviet camp.

25. On 18 April a leading article in The Voice of the Union called for a clear cut foreign policy, for "the existing world situation is such that a neutral policy is meaningless". On 21 April, after an attack on the Atlantic Pact and "the plans and programs of the war maniacs" the paper concluded "we take this opportunity to warn the masses that they should align themselves with the world people's peace camp, yearned for by all but those who are against peace." Again on 25 April the same paper urges the country to "achieve an understanding with the world people's democratic forces by openly opposing the imperialists who are fomenting another war . . . let us make the people's struggle an integral part of the world peace struggle."

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26. It is not surprising, therefore, that the same paper welcomed the resolutions passed by the TUC(B) on May Day. The Taing-lone-kyaw, commenting on the same celebrations, considered that the masses were now pledged to establish a socialist world after destroying imperialism; that the Burmese labor movement was now closely linked with the world labor movement; and that the new Burma was now an added strength in the World movement; and in its editorial the paper asserted that Burma must prepare on all sides to "give a decisive blow to the militarists and the colonial fascists--the enemies of world peace."

27. A very similar line was adopted in Thakin LWIN's speech at the May Day celebrations, though it was to a certain extent camouflaged in a mass of verbiage, and it becomes of important to know how far the attitude adopted by the TUC(B) and the line taken by newspapers hitherto under BSP control in fact represent the policy of the BSP leaders. The TUC(B) appears to have determined on announcing this policy without the approval of the Central Committee of the BSP and against the instructions of the party leaders, who are now said to be considerably embarrassed. But this embarrassment may well have arisen from the fact that the TUC(B) announcement was particularly ill-timed in view of the materialization of the Commonwealth loan and the possibility of American financial aid; although KYAW NYEIN and some others recently appear to be inclined to more moderate views, there are no adequate grounds for assuming the party leadership which has such influence in the affairs of the Government has abandoned the extreme views to which it is hitherto believed to have subscribed, or that the BSP will be prepared to disown the TUC(B).

28. Details of the TUC(B) May Day celebrations, including the text of a message of greetings from the WFTU are included in Attachment A to this report.

Chinese Activities

29. The Peiping Broadcasting Station is now broadcasting programs daily in Burmese. So far these broadcasts have been confined to newsitems of a general nature and there has been nothing specifically applying to Burma.

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30. Propaganda from the Burma Branch of the China Democratic League (CDL(BB)), through its official organ, the Zin Min Pao, has been becoming increasingly outspoken. On 25 and 26 April the paper contained particularly virulent attacks on "MacDonald, the mass killer from Malaya", who was at that time paying a short visit to Burma. In general the Peiping line is followed.

31. It is becoming increasingly clear that the CDL(BB) has a dual role. In a report to the CDL headquarters in Peiping, prepared in January 1950, the CDL(BB) defined its aims and objects as follows:

> "As China and Burma have now agreed to establish diplomatic relations, our work and aim are now to cooperate with the democratic parties of Burma to set up a democratic government in this country, and to free her from the tie of the Anglo-American imperialists. Besides we are struggling hard to bring about the unity among all the Overseas Chinese in Burma to give whole-hearted support to China for national reconstruction and rehabilitation, which, we firmly believe we will achieve in the end."

32. Their attempt to control the Chinese community in Burma and to secure its support for the Communist regime in China has long been evident and to this end the branch has been extremely active and has sponsored or inspired the formation of a large number of organizations among the various groups in the community. In addition to a number of trade and workers organizations there is a women's organization (The Burma Chinese Women's Federation), a student union (the Burma Chinese Students' Union), and now there is a proposal to form a New Democratic Youth Corps. Cultural organizations include the I-Chiang Singing Party (Irrawaddy Choir), the Chu Po Poetic Society, Burma Chinese Cultural Union and the Burma Chinese Teachers' Union, and the CDL(BB) controls at least two of the principal Chinese schools in Rangoon. The curricula of these schools are now to follow the lines laid down in instructions from Peiping.

33. The development of links with Burmese organizations follows an interesting course. Until the end of 1949 it appeared that the branch was taking great care to avoid giving offence to the Burmese authorities but there had been indications of links between the CDL(BB) and the BCP, and B. F. CHEN, Secretary of the branch, had been instrumental in putting BCP-penetrated youth organizations in Burma in touch with the Communist-controlled National Students Federation of China. There was only one indication in 1949 of any dealings with the Burma Socialist Party and that was at a low level. It should be noted that in the definition of policy quoted above, the CDL (BB) does not tie itself to any particular Burmese party, and this may be an indication that the CDL(BB) had recognized that the BSP was also worth exploiting.

34. Links still appear to be maintained with the BCP for Thakin AUNG GYI referred to in paragraph 18 above, is reported to have claimed that the BCP has been assisted in maintaining overland communications with the CCP by such CDL organizations as the Burma Chinese Students' Union and the Burma Chinese Teachers' Union. On the other hand the CDL(BB)'s May Day celebrations Committee resolved to send, and did send, representatives to the TUC(B)'s May Day celebrations, and the general tone of the CDL(BB)'s own celebrations are sufficient indication of the increasing sympathy between the two groups.

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35. It seems probable that the policy defined above represents the branch's own ideas, for a recent report indicates that the CDL(BB) is seeking guidance from Peiping regarding the policy of the China People's Government towards neighboring countries. But in view of its recognition of and practical approach to the complicated political situation in Burma, the CDL(BB)'s policy of encouraging any anti-Western party is likely to find favor with Peiping and may well be adopted by the CCP until Burma's internal situation becomes clearer. The first objective, of course, would be to break Burma's links with the Western Powers.

25X1X [redacted] Comment. Bo THEIN (aka PE THEIN) is probably Thakin PE THEIN of the BCP and not the Army Mutineer referred to below.

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