Sanitized - Approved For Release : CIA-RDP82-00457R007400100005-8

25X1A

INFORMATION REPORT

CD NO. 107

COUNTRY Philippines

CONFIDENTIAL

DATE DISTR. 29 MAY 51

SUBJECT Communist Party Document Urging Coordination of Urban Revolutionary Activities with Armed Struggle in the Field

NO. OF PAGES 11

PLACE ACQUIRED [redacted] 25X1A

NO. OF ENCLS. (LISTED BELOW)

DATE OF INFO. 25X1X

SUPPLEMENT TO REPORT NO.

[redacted]

The following document, issued by the Secretariat of the Communist Party of the Philippines, urges coordination of revolutionary activities in cities and towns with the armed struggle in the field. It was among the Communist documents confiscated in the Manila raids of October 1950. The document was dated 9 May 1950; however, handwritten marginal notations indicate that an effort was made to bring the document up to date following the outbreak of hostilities in Korea. The document is exceptionally well conceived and written.

COORDINATE REVOLUTIONARY ACTIVITIES IN THE CITIES AND TOWNS WITH THE ARMED STRUGGLE IN THE FIELD

I. The New Situation in the Cities and Towns:

1. In our latest Political Resolution we declared the existence of a revolutionary situation and adopted concrete assignments to prepare the Party to cope with the rapidly developing situation which we anticipated would be caused by sharpening the anti-imperialist struggle in the Philippines, in conjunction with the sharpening anti-imperialist struggle outside our country.

2. In line with our policy of sharpening the anti-imperialist struggle, we launched a simultaneous and coordinated attack on the puppets of the imperialist army on all sectors, by celebrating the eighth anniversary of the HMB. Although there is still some weakness in the implementation of such simultaneous attacks, we accomplished our basic aim of projecting the armed struggle to the millions of discontented people who are presently looking for decisive leadership and seeking solutions to their most basic and pressing needs. When we first launched our coordinated attacks, these discontented masses began asking themselves if such attacks signified the beginning of an HMB counter-offensive, which would finally bring about the overthrow of the Liberal Party government in which the majority of the people had already lost confidence. Although they realized that such attacks do not yet constitute the beginning of the HMB counter-offensive for which they are waiting, these skillfully executed attacks greatly enhanced the prestige of the HMB to a point where the HMB now enjoys a quantitative edge over the Nationalista Party and other non-Communist groups, so far as the basic sympathy of the masses is concerned. This quantitative edge necessitates pursuing our political offensive by continuously harassing the enemy without rest, and more frequently launching coordinated and simultaneous attacks

CONFIDENTIAL

CLASSIFICATION SECRET/CONTROL - U.S. OFFICIALS ONLY

STATE	X	NAVY	X	NSRB		DISTRIBUTION							
ARMY	X	AIR	X	FBI									

Document No. 05
No Change in Class. ☐
☐ Declassified
Class. Changed To: TS S C
Auth.: HR 70-2
Date: 01/08/78 By: [illegible]

Sanitized - Approved For Release : CIA-RDP82-00457R007400100005-8

Sanitized - Approved For Release : CIA-RDP82-00457R007400100005-8

against the enemy on all sectors, not only to sway the reserves of the revolution from the leadership of all non-Communist parties and groups, but also to bring to the active revolutionary front those masses who are already looking to us for leadership, but who, up to the present are still taking a passive and awaitist attitude.

3. Needless to say, with the implementation of this new policy, there is bound to arise (as is already arising), a new situation, not only in the field of actual armed struggle, but also in the cities and towns where the enemy is most entrenched. Our party and its mass organizations have already been prepared to meet the new situation in the field of actual armed struggle. The same cannot yet be said of the Party and our mass organizations in the cities and towns.

4. What is the present situation in the cities and towns and what further developments can we expect?

5. Immediately after our celebration of the eighth anniversary of the HMB, the enemy displayed increased vigilance in all cities and large towns, particularly in Manila and adjoining cities. The armed forces of the national government, as well as those of Manila and adjoining cities, were placed on a 24-hour alert. Checkpoints were established at all entrances from the provinces to Manila and people were searched indiscriminately at these checkpoints. Permits for mass demonstrations were refused, and a permit granted to the Congress of Labor Organizations (CLO) to hold a parade last 1 May 1950 cancelled. The CLO decision to hold the parade without a permit forced the Supreme Court to order that the permit be granted. Plans are being formulated for reestablishing the notorious Japanese-sponsored neighborhood associations, with the same objectives as previously set forth. Under consideration are plans for fingerprinting and photographing all residents of Manila for the purpose of checking on dissidents and suspected dissidents. Raids were conducted on places suspected of disaffection against the government in the hope that people would be terrorized into submission. The intelligence force of the enemy was increased and became extremely active. The mayor of Manila openly boasted that he will not respect constitutional guarantees in his drive against dissidents and suspected dissidents. This threat explains the relatively poor attendance at the celebrations of the CLO on 1 May 1950, as compared with celebrations held previously.

6. This is just the beginning of more intensified suppressions which are forthcoming. As we intensify and sharpen our struggle against the enemy, the enemy will also intensify and sharpen its suppression of the peoples' movement and its organizations. This raises the practical question of how to carry on revolutionary activities in cities and towns where the enemy is still strongly entrenched, where Fascist terror already prevails, and where we are not in a position to conduct guerrilla warfare similar to that conducted in the barrios, fields, and mountains.

II. Correct Orientation on Revolutionary Activities in the Cities and Towns under the Present Situation:

1. As in China, the development of our armed struggle for national liberation will naturally start from mountain bases, from where it will expand its areas of influence and control. Under such a pattern of development, revolutionary work and activities within cities and towns should be coordinated with the development of the armed struggle originating in the mountain bases, and no overt military struggle of the type conducted in the barrios and fields, should take place until the Peoples' Liberation Army begins to knock at the city's door. Then the armed revolutionary workers and other elements within the towns and cities should begin to seize strategic

Sanitized - Approved For Release : CIA-RDP82-00457R007400100005-8

Sanitized - Approved For Release : CIA-RDP82-00457R007400100005-8

25X1A

[redacted]

industries and plants, government and other public buildings, enemy garrisons and other enemy installations. Under the plan, while revolutionary activities go on in the cities and towns, the methods of struggle and forms of organization are being adjusted to the situation that exists within the cities and towns, and to the tempo of the development of the armed struggle outside the areas in question.

2. To avoid confusion, it must immediately be stated that revolutionary activity can take various forms, and that while armed struggle alone can bring about the overthrow of the rule of imperialism and its puppets, the conduct of such armed struggle involves activity other than the most obvious carrying of guns and shooting the enemy. Again it should be clearly understood that, when strategically considered, the workers and the poor peasantry form the main force of the revolution and furnish it leadership, this does not mean that the workers should be thrown headlong against the forces of the enemy under unequal conditions. To do so would be sheer adventurism, not scientific revolutionary action.

3. In our past analysis of the weaknesses of our trade union movement, we have repeatedly stressed the theme that our workers are not adequately schooled in the class struggle, and that trade union workers are basically motivated by economic considerations. Such analysis is correct as far as it goes, but it does not present the entire picture of the trade union movement. The analysis fails to take into account the basic Fascist character of the regime under which the trade union movement is operating which molds the thinking and actions of the rank and file workers. Before the war, when bourgoise democratic freedom was still enjoyed by the people, the Party did not encounter difficulty in persuading workers to clash with the forces of the State. Then, when a worker fought a policeman, at most he was instantly shot and killed, or else he was merely clubbed by the policeman. Now the situation is different. The worker who defies the State is immediately branded a dissident, and if he is not killed instantly during the headlong clash between the workers and the government forces, he is further tortured in Fascist fashion. This fear of Fascist torture is preventing otherwise militant workers from clashing headlong with the forces of the State. The phenomena of Party members who are afraid to work actively in Manila, yet are ready to go into the field of armed struggle, shows that our Party members are ready to struggle only they are afraid to struggle under conditions of unequal strength because they lack the resourcefulness to struggle under such conditions. It was our failure to encourage workers to clash headlong with the forces of the State which drove us to the conclusion that the workers are not militant, and that they are not performing their role as a main force and leaders of the revolution.

4. Now, by way of self-criticism, we must admit that our basic orientation on how to encourage workers to perform their historic role as a main force and leaders of the revolution is incorrect, and even adventurist. This does not mean that all our notions concerning the trade union movement are wrong. Neither does this admission of error mean that the appeasers were correct when they led the workers to support the Liberal Party candidates for senators. Our error was in measuring the revolutionary tempo and character of the workers by their willingness to clash headlong with the forces of the State, especially when the fact that they would fight under conditions of unequal strength was only too clear to the workers themselves. To some extent,

Sanitized - Approved For Release : CIA-RDP82-00457R007400100005-8

Sanitized - Approved For Release : CIA-RDP82-00457R007400100005-8

it can be said that our adventurist orientation was the reflex action or attitude produced by the extreme attitude of appeasement advanced by persons within our ranks. Because of our political immaturity and lack of skill in evolving various forms of revolutionary activity, we were driven by the extreme appeasement of the enemy and by the appeasers within the Party into the adventurist position of encouraging the workers to clash headlong with the forces of the State, to make them perform their historic role as a main force and leaders of the revolution. Thanks to the workers, who did not follow us in this adventurist policy, we are forced to admit our errors honestly, and to reconsider and change our tactics accordingly.

5. A further reflection of our adventurist policy is our implementation of the armed struggle in Manila. Prodded by the armed struggle of the peasants in the field and provoked by continuous criticisms that workers in the cities have not performed their historic role by coordinating their struggles with the armed struggle of the peasants, we finally gave way to the adventurist policy of taking military actions in the cities. This policy was implemented despite the fact that we had not yet succeeded in preparing our mass organizations for such actions. For some time we maintained the correct position of initiating military action only when we had taken the necessary minimum steps to prepare both our Party and our mass organizations in the city for such action. However, we gave in to our own impatience, especially when we were under constant criticism by the adventurists who believed that the best way to prepare our Party and mass organizations for military actions in the cities, was to launch such military actions. This policy of launching military actions in places where the masses were unprepared for such armed struggle was successful in the barrios of the provinces where the masses, although not yet adequately prepared, could at least seek protection and cover among our armed forces who were there to protect them. The situation is different in the cities. In cities, the masses who become involved in overt military actions cannot seek the protection of our armed forces. This causes even the most militant masses in the cities, and even Party members, to be reluctant to house our armed forces who are being sought by the enemy for participation in military actions. Because we gave way to the adventurist policy of launching military actions without adequately preparing both the Party and its mass organizations, our armed forces were dispersed and we were faced with the problem of housing the remaining armed forces. The problem has come to the question of what to do with Party members who refuse to house members of our armed forces, since there is a general reluctance among Party members to furnish such housing.

6. This is not the first time that Party leadership was not followed by its rank and file and by the masses. During the Japanese occupation, at the height of Japanese-puppet suppression, because of our overestimation of our strength in Central Luzon, we instructed our rank and file to lead the masses in refusing to form neighborhood associations which the Japanese puppets were forcing on the people, and instead to stand by our Barrio United Defense Corps (BUDC) organizations. The refusal of our own rank and file in following the instructions, which arose from the refusal of the masses to follow them, forced the Party to change the instructions. Quick to realize our mistake, we permitted the organization of neighborhood associations, and utilized them as a legal screen to carry on our revolutionary BUDC activities. When we implemented the tactics of "retreat for defense" after the March 1942 Japanese-puppet pacification campaign, the masses, our own rank and file, and even some ranking and middle cadres were reluctant to follow the directive, because they felt the situation did not warrant the proposed retreat. There was an overestimation of the enemy's strength, resulting from a previous overestimation of our own strength. After a long, drawn-out struggle, we finally realized the tactics of "retreat for defense" were incorrect. Immediately after the victory of Roxas and

Sanitized - Approved For Release : CIA-RDP82-00457R007400100005-8

Sanitized - Approved For Release : CIA-RDP82-00457R007400100005-8

the Liberal Party in April 1946 our Party leadership instructed our lower organizations and the rank and file to stand their guard, stick to their posts, and not to retreat underground. Here again the instructions of the Party leaders were completely ignored, and our lower organizations and the rank and file retreated underground, formed armed groups and refused to be arrested and tortured by the Fascist agents of the imperialist puppets. This adventurist policy actually was merely a cover for the developing appeasement policy of the enemy, by Party leaders. The situation caused a decisive rupture in the leadership of the Party and led to the rejection of the majority leadership by the lower organizations, the rank and file, and by the masses. It finally culminated in the suspension and later expulsion from the Party of the leaders responsible for such an adventurist-covering-appeasement policy. This historical background is given to show that the masses and party members who have had revolutionary background and experience, and who have to bear the brunt of enemy suppression, know instinctively when to advance and when to retreat in the face of enemy fire. Party leaders should learn from the masses in analyzing weaknesses in our mass movements, in order to formulate concrete action and assignments which would neither constitute appeasing the enemy or evading struggle, nor mean adventurist sacrifice of revolutionary cadres and masses in a contest of unequal strength.

7. To complete our self-criticism, the question which remains to be answered is, when should we have adopted this new, corrected orientation on revolutionary activities in cities and towns? Our answer is that immediately after the imperialist reoccupation of the Philippines, Party leaders should have realized that American soldiers, under the direction of imperialist-military leaders, came here not to liberate, but to exploit and dominate our country and people anew. It is not the nature of imperialism to liberate its colonies, and evidences to show that the American imperialists came back to stay at all costs, are not wanting. With such realization, we should never have disbanded our armed forces as we did, but should have immediately oriented the entire Party and the revolutionary mass movements it is leading, including the trade union movement, towards the eventual armed overthrow of the rule of imperialism and its puppets. This does not mean that we should have allowed the advantage of the limited democratic liberation, which the existing situation still permitted us to enjoy, slip by. We should utilize such limited democratic liberties to sharpen the struggle against imperialism and its puppets, to force their hand in their sham and pretense of democracy. This the Party actually did. However, the error of the Party leaders then was their failure to orient the Party at that early date to the immediate necessity of preparing our organizations for the resumption of the armed struggle. Insofar as the trade union movement is concerned, it was correct to organize it on a legal basis. Our error was in not orienting the trade union leaders at that early date, at least to the inevitability of the armed struggle and consequently to the necessity of preparing the trade union movement to coordinate its activities in the inevitable armed struggle. Because of the failure of such orientation, the trade union movement, under our leadership, engaged in many activities which, while useful to individual and particular unions, did not contribute to the heightening of the revolutionary struggle. Thus, instead of concentrating on organizing workers in strategic industries where seizure of power at decisive moments would hasten the revolutionary struggle, our trade union leadership dissipated their time and energies by catering to the economic demands of workers of trades and industries which are not useful in the over-all revolutionary struggle.

III. Broad Implementation of Our Correct Orientation:

1. A. Trade Union Movements: The trade union movement should continue its legal reformist front and activities in order to screen our revolutionary

Sanitized - Approved For Release : CIA-RDP82-00457R007400100005-8

Sanitized - Approved For Release : CIA-RDP82-00457R007400100005-8

activities and to coordinate the revolutionary trade union struggle with the armed struggle for national liberation. It should continue its legal struggle for the economic demands of the workers, and in this struggle, we should drive the workers to the highest militance of which they are capable, even to the point of inviting enemy suppression. This suppression will drive home to them the fact that there is really no democracy, and that the HMB, under Communist leadership, is correct in the declaration that there is no way out for the exploited toilers, but the armed overthrow of the rule of the exploiters. The workers should be made to struggle for political demands directly and in a manner clearly related to their basic economic demands, for example, staging political demonstrations to demand jobs for the jobless, the abolition of the Court of Industrial Relations for its partiality towards employers, for price control and action against profiteers and black-marketeers. By such political demonstrations the workers will finally reach the realization that demonstrations alone are not adequate to achieve their aims. Realization of this inadequacy will lead them to seek better and more adequate methods of struggle in order to achieve such demands. Political action which will serve to link them with the armed struggle should be avoided for the time being. It is fundamental to human behavior to avoid being involved in struggle, unless it is to one's self-interest. We should not appear to be merely involving workers in the armed struggle. Such appearances would be given by prematurely leading them in political actions linking them with the armed peasant movement. Let active participation in the armed struggle for national liberation by the workers be a dialectical outcome of their natural quest for economic security through their struggle for economic demands.

2. Call a halt to the present planlessness and subservience of the trade union leadership to economic demands of workers in non-strategic trades and industries. Our plan of organizing workers in strategic industries should be aggressively implemented, and this implementation should not be waylayed by the demands on the time of our trade union leaders by workers in non-strategic industries. Concentrate the building of Party cells among the workers in strategic industries. Conduct underground propaganda and organizational work among advanced workers who are ready, or can be made to accept the armed struggle. Build underground HMB units within the legal trade union mass organizations, aside from Party cells, giving them concrete duties of information-gathering, finance-collecting, industrial sabotage, liquidation of trade union spies, saboteurs and racketeers, and eventual armed seizure of strategic industries.

3. Care should be taken that legal cadres being utilized prominently in the legal trade union movement should not be involved in the HMB underground recruiting drives among the workers. The duty of HMB and Party recruiting should be assigned to underground Party workers who are not prominently identified with the legal trade union movement.

4. B. Armed Forces: Until the decisive moment arrives, military operations in cities and large towns far from our bases shall be limited to political liquidation, confiscation of enemy properties, and sabotage of enemy installations. For these assignments it is necessary to organize small, compact, highly-disciplined and mobile armed units who are especially trained for the work.

5. To provide a mass base for these armed units, a reserve for recruiting new men for these armed units, and a source of mass recruiting for large-scale combat when the decisive moment arrives, the Party should organize people who already believe in the armed struggle and who look to the HMB for leadership. This organization should be undertaken on a territorial basis in small units not exceeding five members in each unit. The organizational structure of such units, including the relationship between lower and higher organs, should guarantee the minimum disclosure of members.

Sanitized - Approved For Release : CIA-RDP82-00457R007400100005-8

Sanitized - Approved For Release : CIA-RDP82-00457R007400100005-8

These units will not be given active military assignments until the decisive moment arrives. However, they will undergo regular organizational and political life, to make them more conscious of what they are fighting for, and to make them a part of the HMB and the armed struggle for national liberation under Communist leadership. They shall be given assignments such as information-gathering, finance collecting, housing of cadres and members of the active armed forces, and even actual struggle for the collection of arms and ammunition.

6. The leaders of these units shall be sent to the field and given an intensive and extensive political and military preparation for leadership of their units when the decisive moment arrives. Before the arrival of the decisive moment, each unit, or group of units shall be given their respective sectors or assignments in the over-all plan for seizing power in the cities.

7. Learn the dangers of giving way to impatience, leading to adventurism, from our recent experiences. Consider the degree of enemy suppression in cities, in relation to the present strength of our mass organizations in the area. It is necessary to concentrate on developing the necessary mass base of organized and politically-minded masses, who will be ready to support, hide, house and otherwise help our armed forces. Without this mass base, all military action is sheer adventurism. Reject the "left" infantile theory of organizing the necessary mass base in the cities by launching military actions.

8. C. Youth and Student Movements: Youth and student movements in the cities and towns should continue their legal existance and their legal struggle on both student and national issues, to any degree short of linking the youth movement with the armed struggle. Activities of youth groups should be utilized as a screen to cover underground propaganda and organizational work among the advanced students and youths who are ready to participate in the armed struggle for national liberation under Communist leadership and who are willing to expose the bankruptcy of the legal struggle.

9. All youth cadres who had Huk records during the Japanese occupation should have already been sent into the field of armed struggle. Only those who had no such records should be utilized in the legal youth and student movements. Youth and student cadres who are now studying should already have been forced to leave their studies if they had Huk records during the Japanese occupation, and sent to the field. Only those taking technical courses useful to the revolution and to the future New Democracy, shall be allowed to continue their studies.

10. Our drive is to send to the field of actual armed struggle students and youths who can now be prevailed upon to participate in the armed struggle. Youths, particularly students with patriotic aspirations, absence of distracting family responsibilities, and who have advantageous educational backgrounds, can be a valuable addition to the HMB organization, which is basically of peasant composition, with only a few members representing the working class.

11. There will always be sufficient unexposed youth and student cadres in the cities and towns to continue both the legal struggle of the youth and student movements, and the underground work of the Party, including HMB recruiting within the legal student and youth movements. Precautions should be taken that cadres being utilized prominently in the legal movement should not be involved in recruiting for the Party and for the HMB.

Sanitized - Approved For Release : CIA-RDP82-00457R007400100005-8

Sanitized - Approved For Release : CIA-RDP82-00457R007400100005-8

12. Youth cadres who are assigned to Party and IEB recruiting need not be over-cautious in such recruiting because they fear disclosure. Our policy is aggressive Party and IEB recruiting combined with sending to the field the cadres who will be exposed by such aggressive recruiting policy, since they will be replaced by those whom they have recruited.

13. D. Women's Movement: The women's movement should also continue its legal existence and legal struggle in towns and cities, showing interest in issues concerning women, as well as in some national issues. Activities of the women's groups should be used as a screen to cover underground propaganda and organizational activities which are designed to help the armed struggle for national liberation.

14. The most important underground activities which our women's movement can carry on in the armed struggle are recruiting and training young women to serve as first aid assistants, and solicitors for contributions of money, office supplies, medicines, clothing, shoes, and other supplies for the armed forces. They also can be utilized as intelligence agents and as couriers. Because of the increased mobility which our armed forces will have to adopt as the result of the increased and intensified suppression by the enemy, we cannot expect many women to endure the physical hardships incident to the life of rank and file guerrilla soldiers.

15. The most important legal activity of our womens' movement should be issuing neutralizing propaganda to counteract antagonism towards the IEB and the Communists. Such propaganda should stress the increasing difficulties of living by the common people, the burden of which is borne by the housewives. It should stress investigations of living conditions of women and children from the poorer classes, in order to expose the anomalies of the existing situation, even to members of our womens' organization. In this manner, the more intelligent and honest women will be encouraged to seek more adequate solutions to the problems which they encounter. They will reach no other conclusion than the Communist solution of armed overthrow of the rule of imperialism and its puppets.

16. Women workers and peasants, and wives of workers and peasants, who are in a better position to understand exploitation as a result of their own experiences, should be involved either in the legal trade union or peasant movement, or in auxiliaries of such movements. These women should not only engage in legal struggles for womens' economic and political demands, but should also engage in underground Party and IEB recruiting among the womens' legal organizations.

17. There should be contacts between our working women and our middle class women, so that the latter will become involved in the struggle of the former. However, considering the relatively low ideological level of middle class women, care should be taken not to alienate them immediately. Patience, tact, and correct techniques should be used so that middle class women become voluntarily involved in the struggle of the working women, which ultimately will lead to their involvement in the over-all struggle for national liberation.

18. E. Movement of Government Employees: The government employees' movement should also continue its legal existence and legal struggles for strictly government employees' demands, as well as on mild national issues, to any degree short of linking the organization with the armed struggle. Activities of government employees should be designed to screen underground propaganda and organizational work

Sanitized - Approved For Release : CIA-RDP82-00457R007400100005-8

Sanitized - Approved For Release : CIA-RDP82-00457R007400100005-8

of Party and HMB recruiting among the more advanced government workers, and especially among elements which would be most useful in paralyzing government functions, and which the New Democracy will need most in its future program of reconstruction.

19. Government employees should be oriented not only to work under the New Democracy, but also to contribute their utmost to the establishment of an early overthrow of the present government. They should be made to understand that the final test of their loyalty in the new regime would be to engage in underground activities so that a decisive change in the present society and its government will be achieved.

20. Government employees, second only to the armed forces of the government, can contribute greatly to the decisive weakening of the enemy's rule. Aside from soliciting various forms of contributions which are necessary in the conduct of the armed struggle, they can be a valuable source of information which is useful to the revolution. Most important, they can sabotage important government functions, and this activity would greatly add to the government's present instability.

21. Because the government will demand a higher standard of loyalty from its employees as compared to private citizens, care should be exercised to prevent unnecessary disclosure of our workers in government agencies. Ordinary government employees should be grouped in underground units, not exceeding three in each unit. The unit must be composed of employees who not only believe in the same cause, but who also have bonds of personal loyalty. Government employees occupying particularly strategic positions need not be placed in units. They should be contacted individually to receive instructions and guidance in their work.

22. F. Work Among Religious Organizations: Among Catholic mass organizations, our aim is to isolate the hierarchy from the Catholic masses. In other denominations, however, our main drive is to win the masses to our side, but we should not neglect to win over some of their leaders who show signs of progressive thinking and actions.

23. Since in general religious masses are the most backward and are even idealist to a point of passivity in their outlook, we should consider our work among them as a neutralization of elements which might otherwise be made antagonistic towards the HMB and the Communists. The most important aspect of our work among religious organizations is propaganda. Without destroying their belief in heaven, we should make them bring heaven down to earth. Appealing to their humanitarian sentiments, we have to portray the sad plight of the masses, and dare them to suggest practical religious solutions for alleviating human suffering. We should project in their minds the struggle of the HMB as a protection against the continued existance of human misery and degradation. Few if any religious groups can be encouraged to participate actively in the armed struggle, but they can at least be influenced so they view the struggle of the HMB with sympathy and understanding, and thereby prevented from joining the enemy camp. They may even be utilized in conducting propaganda in our favor.

24. Of all religious organizations, only the Catholic Church and the Iglesia ni Cristo can rally their followers to a degree that they will fight the HMB and the Communists. Thus the masses of these two religious denominations are our special targets for neutralization. The Catholic Church, because of its record and experience in organizing counter-revolutions, is the most dangerous of the two religious groups.

25. The Aglipay Church has a glorious record of fighting against domination by the Vatican on religious matters. This church is the religious expression of our struggle for national liberation. Unlike the Catholic Church, but like the Iglesia ni Cristo, it draws its flock from the exploited peasants and workers. Compared with the Catholic Church the various Protestant churches also have some progressive tendencies. Born

Sanitized - Approved For Release : CIA-RDP82-00457R007400100005-8

Sanitized - Approved For Release : CIA-RDP82-00457R007400100005-8

out of religious intolerance and bigotry, the Protestant Church and its followers can be made to fight for democratic liberties and encouraged to view with understanding the struggle of the MB for democracy, which is being so ruthlessly oppressed by the imperialist puppets.

26. Our task is to win over progressive elements among the less reactionary religious organizations so that they will work among reactionary followers to prevent them from being utilized by their religious leaders in counter-revolutionary activities.

27. G. Work Among Technologists, Artists and other Professionals: The ideological struggle going on outside and inside our country, and the frustrations being experienced by intelligent and honest technologists, artists and other professionals, is causing them to think of the basic cause for such frustrations. The most honest and progressive members of professional groups already realize that their frustrations are the result of the imperialist-feudal domination of our country. They are prepared to accept and even implement the Communist solution of armed overthrow of imperialist-feudal-puppet rule and the establishment of a New Democracy.

28. Because of their relatively comfortable mode of living, such persons do not feel the urgency of the armed struggle, and they have a tendency to be awaitists. They are carefully weighing the advantages of their present comforts which they are reluctant to forego, with the future role they will assume in the New Democracy. This explains their awaitism.

29. Our aim is to change their sense of values and thereby struggle against their opportunism, so that the most honest, intelligent and decisive members of professional groups will be recruited into the Party. At the same time we should engage in one form of activity or another, those persons who are not prepared to forego their present comforts, so as to utilize them indirectly in the conduct of our armed struggle for national liberation.

30. H. Work Among Potentially Anti-Imperialist National Bourgeoisie: Our national bourgeoisie as a group, is weak. This is the result of the relatively low development of capitalism in our country. So long as American imperialism is still very strong and capable of maintaining the rule of its puppets in our country, our national bourgeoisie will tend to be pro-imperialist and to accommodate themselves as well as possible under imperialist-feudal domination of our economy. Under such conditions the national bourgeoisie develops comprador interests, and is willing to accept junior partnership with powerful imperialist interests, in order to develop local industries.

31. However, as the crisis with American imperialism sharpens, resulting in its inability and unwillingness to concede even crumbs to our local national bourgeoisie, some of them can be won over to the anti-imperialist struggle. Those national bourgeoisie are carefully weighing their chances of survival and profit under imperialist-feudal domination of our country, and under the New Democracy led by the Communists.

32. From the very nature of their class interests, we cannot expect the national bourgeoisie to participate actively in the armed struggle for national liberation against imperialist-feudal exploitation and domination of our country. The most we can expect from them is not to be antagonistic towards the national liberation movement. Some of the national bourgeoisie can even be encouraged to take an openly anti-imperialist stand, especially at a time when they already see that imperialism is retreating in our country.

Sanitized - Approved For Release : CIA-RDP82-00457R007400100005-8

Sanitized - Approved For Release : CIA-RDP82-00457R007400100005-8

33. Our aim is to show the national bourgeoisie that they have a place in the New Democracy, and they are fast being eliminated under the present situation of imperialist crisis. We must stress the fact that it is to their interest to help, within the limits of their own class interest, the hastening of the downfall of imperialist domination of our country.

Sanitized - Approved For Release : CIA-RDP82-00457R007400100005-8