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Translation

THE SEA POWER OF THE STATE

By

S.G. Gorshkov

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THE SEA POWER OF THE STATE

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ABSTRACT

The monograph studies the concept of the sea power of the state and its importance in the policies and defense of a nation. It examines the basic components of sea power among which the main attention is focused on the navy, particularly a modern navy capable of conducting operations and prosecuting strategic missions in various areas of the World Ocean in concert with other branches of the armed forces or independently. The monograph is intended [[primarily for the military reader]] *for admirals, generals, and officers of the Soviet Army and Navy.*

Translator's Note

New material in the 2d Edition is in italics. First Edition material deleted from the 2d Edition is in double brackets: [[ ]]. Data deleted from tables of the 1st Edition are not given. Material in single slantlines indicates there was a change in the Russian wording which may be of interest to the analyst, but which does not alter the translation. Paragraphing was altered somewhat from the 1st Edition, with some combined and some split. These changes are not flagged. The position of paragraphs was rearranged in the section on maritime law.

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FOREWORD

The author received a large number of letters from readers and several reviews appeared in the press after the first edition of the book Morskaya moshch' gosudarstva. These letters and reviews contained valuable wishes and critical remarks on subjects raised in the book, associated by the overall theme of the make-up of the concept "sea power" and its importance for a state whose economic development and defense are linked closely with our planet's sea expanses both by virtue of a long stretch of maritime borders and the maritime geography, which is complex for our country, and by virtue of an increase in military threat from maritime axes. Significantly contributing to the latter is the adherence of a number of western powers to naval ordnance and its unusually rapid development in the nuclear missile era.

The readers' letters and the reviews clearly attest to an ever-growing interest shown by the public at large in our country and abroad in problems involving the development and use of oceans for economic and military purposes. But it was not only a desire to take account of the readers' critical remarks which forced us to turn to a second edition of the book. In the time since the first edition, important events have occurred in our country and abroad with which the problems examined in the work are linked. This relates above all to the extensive discussion held under the aegis of the United Nations; a discussion which assumed the form of an unprecedentedly representative and very lengthy international conference on law of the sea and which attempted to find a solution to the problem of use of the oceans. In addition, exploitation of the seabeds for extraction of valuable resources--and petroleum above all--from the bottom has assumed a completely unheard of scale in recent years. This is linked with numerous attempts by some states to appropriate large sea and ocean expanses, with the simultaneous threat of a considerable and dangerous limitation to freedom of navigation. Finally, many statistics cited in the book have changed significantly as a result of the rapid development of states' economies, which also generated a number of critical remarks from readers.

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Very important events which occurred in our country--the 60th Anniversary of the Great October Socialist Revolution and adoption of the new Constitution--forced a new look at some issues raised in the work.

All this led the author to the idea of the advisability of returning to a favorite topic of his about the sea power of the state as an important factor for ensuring freedom of navigation on the high seas and for protecting sovereignty over the area contiguous with a coast.

Marxism considers the geographical medium, of which the World Ocean is a most important element, to be among the many factors influencing the development of human society. It occupies almost three-fourths of the surface of our planet and possesses colossal biological, energy, and mineral resources.

As man's understanding and the development of technology rose, his use of the World Ocean for many centuries gave rise to transport and fishing fleets which engendered the expansion of trade and the building of numerous bases and ports. With the development of the ocean sciences the research fleet is becoming ever larger. The maritime status of many countries has fostered the appearance in them of specific branches of industry that exert a favorable influence on the economic development of these countries. Moreover, the seas and oceans have long been a specific arena of rivalry and armed combat which has entailed the development of special weapon systems and types of forces incorporated into the concept of "the Navy."

There is a basis for regarding the totality of the *physical* means *for scientific and economic* mastery of the World Ocean and [[the means]] for defending the interests of a State, when rationally combined, as representing the sea power of the State, which determines the capability of one country or another to utilize the military-economic resources of the ocean for its own purposes.

The sea power of the State is rightly regarded as a system which is characterized not only by relationships between its components (naval, transport, fishing, scientific-research fleets, and so forth), but also by an indivisible unity with the environment, the ocean, in an interrelationship through which the system [[expresses]] *functions and manifests* its own unity.

The importance of the individual components comprising the sea power is not constant. It is determined by specific historical conditions; however, *with the existence of antagonistic social systems,* /the importance of the Navy remains dominating./

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In view of this, an examination of the military aspect of sea power is very important, /if one considers/ the significance which is attached to navies by the major imperialist states *in their expansionistic politics, which gives rise to a need for reinforcing attention to our country's defense from ocean axes.*

At the present time, in the era of grandiose scientific discoveries and their utilization for military needs, the technical capabilities of conducting military operations in the ocean medium *and their role in armed conflict* have increased considerably. *Despite the statement by CPSU Central Committee General Secretary, Comrade L. I. Brezhnev, from the rostrum of the 25th Congress of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union that "the Soviet Union is not planning to attack anyone. The Soviet Union does not need a war. . . . Our country is waging a consistent and unflinching struggle for peace..."*[1]*; the imperialist states are not ceasing the arms race, are not rejecting plans for preparing for a new world war, and are continuously unleashing local wars, which have become an inalienable part of their politics.*

[[Both in the preparation by international monopolistic capital for world war and in the local wars which have become an integral part of the policy of imperialist states in the last quarter of a century,]] *In these wars* an important role is being assigned to navies which have been thrust to the forefront of the diverse modern means of combat. For example, Pentagon leaders consider U.S. naval forces to be *not only a primary means of naval warfare, but also* a most important part of the strategic nuclear forces capable of delivering attacks of enormous power in a short time against ground targets situated at a considerable distance from the shore and thereby decisively influencing the situation in any theater of military operations. Moreover, they are counting on drawing nuclear attacks away from their own territory.

Guided by such views on the role of naval forces in a world war, [[the imperialist camp]] *American imperialism* is [[employing]] *proclaiming* oceanic strategy as the primary concept of their military doctrine. This strategy proceeds from the fact that [[practically]] all land targets /can be reached/ by attacks from seaward, and ocean-going nuclear systems themselves are more mobile and difficult to hit owing to their capability to use the great water depth for protection and the vast ocean spaces for concealment. Therefore, even today vast areas of the World Ocean have been converted by the imperialists into launching sites for highly mobile, secretly operating, constantly combat-ready platforms for long-range strategic missiles launched from under water.

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It is well known that the missiles of the U.S. Navy's *strategic* nuclear system are aimed at our country from various directions. Moreover, numerous naval and air bases have been built near the sea frontiers of the Soviet State by the United States and aggressive anti-Soviet blocs -- [[NATO, CENTO, and other countries]]; by using these bases, the member nations of these blocs have the opportunity to place their air forces and land-based aircraft in remote areas from where important targets in the territory of the Soviet union and [[the]] *other* countries of the Socialist Community are completely within range.

All of this poses a constant threat to the security of our country *and other countries of the Socialist Community* and, in the event the imperialists unleash a war, predetermines conditions which are fundamentally different from the conditions arising in the period of the Great Patriotic War.

/The last war was continental./ The struggle in the sea and ocean theaters /was waged/ in secondary sectors whose influence on the course of the war as a whole, although considerable, was not decisive. Today, however, we are threatened by a coalition of sea powers, which, along with land armies, air forces, and missile troops also have powerful [[modern]] naval forces at their disposal.

The role of combat in the ocean sectors within the general efforts of the armed forces has increased greatly, and under certain conditions these sectors could become the main sectors. Today, through [[its]] strikes from the sea, the Navy is capable of altering the course [[and outcome]] of an armed conflict even in the continental theaters of military operations *and of influencing its outcome.*

The equipping of navies with nuclear-missile weaponry introduced much that is new into tactics and the operational art, forced a change in the design of ships, and created new kinds of equipment and weaponry.

Alongside one of the most important [[and comprehensive]] missions of the Navy -- the destruction of enemy ships -- a qualitatively new mission has appeared: the crushing of the military-economic potential of the enemy through direct action from the sea against his vitally important centers. Military operations at sea, as well as on land, are subordinate to general, constantly functioning laws, and they cannot be conducted in isolation from [[the goals of]] that policy of which the war is an extension.

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V. I. Lenin pointed out that "Policy is a thought process, while war is merely a tool, and not the reverse. Consequently, the only recourse is to subordinate the military point of view to the political."[2]

Therefore, it is interesting under present-day conditions to follow from an historical point of view the dialectical relationship between the development of naval forces and [[the goals of]] that policy of the States which they were designed to [[serve]] support. *The importance of this analysis is determined by the possibilities of taking advantage of historical experience in understanding modern times and determining the perspective.*

The sole means of conducting armed combat has always been the army and navy, which in peacetime have also continued to serve as an instrument or weapon of State policy. Many examples from history attest to the fact that under feudalism, as well as under capitalism, problems of foreign policy have always been decided on the basis of the military strength of the "negotiating" sides, and that the potential military strength of one State or another, created in accordance with its economic resources and taking into account its political orientation, frequently made it possible for it to implement an advantageous policy to the detriment of other States not possessing commensurate military strength.

The development of armed forces is very directly tied in with the history of socioeconomic systems and the methods of material production inherent in them. Their rise or fall has been determined by the process of development or disintegration of one social system or another. In the period of change from one socioeconomic system to another, more progressive, system, progress in the military sphere has also been considerably accelerated.

Technical discoveries have always had a revolutionizing influence on the development of armed forces and on the art of employing them. /V. I. Lenin wrote in this regard: "Military tactics depend on the level of military technology..."[3] The pattern of the economic development of a society and of the growth of its productive forces in the military domain is reflected in this./

While not resorting to a detailed examination of the changes in the structure of the armed forces of States from an historical point of view, we shall only note that all maritime countries, without exception, have always had or strived to have both an army and a navy. Peter I spoke about this very graphically: "Every ruler who has only a land army has only one hand, while he who has a fleet has both hands."[4]

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The [[importance]] *role* of an army and navy[[, at a given level of development of technology and economic resources,]] has always been determined by the emerging politico-strategic situation and by the relative position of the States or the nature of the coalition. In some stages of history, the primary role has been played by ground forces, and, in others, by navies. The position and role of each of the branches of the armed forces of a country can vary in peacetime and in wartime, depending on [[technical changes]] *the level of development of technology, capabilities of* the enemy, the geographical conditions, and so forth.

The experience of history attests to the fact that each branch of the armed forces makes its own individual and always weightycontribution to the victory. There have been almost no purely land or purely naval wars. Through all of this, one thesis remains unchanged: Only ground troops are able to consolidate the results of a victory in a campaign or in a war as a whole and are capable of confirming the reality of it through their actual presence.

The conditions for achieving victory are established only when all branches of the armed forces are properly organized, *well* equipped, and trained. Each of them has its own specific operational characteristics, area of employment, and conditions for mutual support. The skillful (or, on the other hand, unskillful) employment of this specific characteristic frequently determines the success (or failure) of an operation, campaign, or even a war as a whole. *Under present-day conditions this proposition is manifested with special force.* It is precisely because of this that [[the basic thesis]] *one of the basic principles* of Soviet military science is the principle of cooperation between all branches of the /Armed Forces./ Victory can be achieved only through the coordinated efforts of these forces. As early as 1921, M.V. Frunze wrote about this in his works devoted to the building up of the Red Army. The idea of the decisive importance of joint operations of the Army and Navy in all areas of armed combat was vividly expressed in his work Yedinaya voyennaya doktrina i krasnaya armiya (A Unified Military Doctrine and the Red Army).[5]

The problems of harmoniously combining rationally balanced branches of the /Armed Forces/ and coordinating their efforts are particularly acute for us at the present time. It is well known that the forces of aggression and militarism, although pressed, are far from rendered harmless. In the postwar years, they have ignited more than 30 wars and armed conflicts of various scales, and are threatening to unleash a new world war. Under these conditions, the defensive might of our State is assuming greater importance for ensuring the peaceful

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development of the Soviet land and [[the]] *other* countries of the Socialist Community. L. I. Brezhnev said *at the 24th CPSU Congress*: "All that has been created by the people must be reliably protected. The Soviet Government must be streng hened and this also means strengthening its armed forces, and improving the defensive capacity of our Motherland in every way. And so long as we live in an unsettled world, this task will remain one of the most basic tasks!"[6]

L. I. Brezhnev reported to the 25th CPSU Congress that "all these years the Party has devoted proper attention to strengthening our country's defenses and improving the Armed Forces. . . .

"No one should have any doubt also that our Party will do everything to ensure that the glorious Armed Forces of the Soviet Union continue to possess all necessary means for accomplishing their responsible mission of being the guardian over the peaceful labor of the Soviet people and the bulwark of universal peace."[7]

It is perfectly clear that our brilliant armed forces must play an important role in performing this task. Therefore, it is very important to examine questions of the employment of the various branches of the armed forces in their historical, present, and future aspects in order to substantiate the trends and conformity to laws in the changes in their roles and positions in wartime and in peacetime. On the basis of this, the author has expressed thoughts on the role and position of navies in various historical eras and at various stages in the development of military material and of the art of war.

Proceeding from the specific characteristics of the Navy as a military factor which has been used in peacetime to show the economic and military might of the State beyond its borders, and the fact that of all the branches of the armed forces, the Navy is to the greatest degree capable of operationally supporting the State interests of the country behond its borders, in our view, it is essential to examine questions relating to its specific characteristics.

The present work portrays navies in past wars, and their role in the growth and development of states. However, it was not the author's goal to present a comprehensive picture of the development of naval forces and of their modes of operation. This was done only to a certain degree in order to show the increase in the importance of navies and to confirm the [[development of]] *some general* patterns *of employment of the armed forces* which have arisen in the past. On the basis of an analysis of

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the current alignment of forces under conditions where the imperialists threaten to unleash an all-out nuclear war, the author strives to show the necessity for the presence of a powerful Navy within the /Armed Forces/ of our State which would be able to repel [[the threat to our country generated]] *an attack against countries of the socialist community* by the imperialist countries from the direction of the seas and oceans.

In the work, particular attention is devoted to the postwar development of navies and to new concepts of employing them, and to refining their roles and missions under present-day conditions and in the near future.

The book shows that the all-round upgrading of submarine forces has held a special place in the development of navies of many countries in the postwar period. The submarine strategic nuclear-missile systems [[are of]] *have acquired* basic importance today in this highly diversified arm of the naval forces. At the same time, the nuclear-powered multipurpose submarines are of [[growing]] *increased* importance as a versatile naval force designed to accomplish a wide range of missions in warfare at sea.

It is natural that the increase in the importance of submarine forces has given rise to the need to intensively develop ASW naval forces, and so the trends in their development are examined.

The work also shows the place of surface ships in the composition of modern navies, [[proceeding from the thesis that]] *since* scientific-technical achievements have had a considerable effect on the view of [[their]] *the* role and combat quality *of the navies*. Together with the improvement of previously existing individual ship types, for example, aircraft carriers and landing ships, there have appeared qualitatively new ASW ships, including helicopter carriers, missile-armed ships, and also surface effect ships -- hydrofoils, [[and]] air cushion vehicles, *and wing-in-ground effect vehicles*.

Considerable attention has been devoted to naval aviation, which is such an important element in the combat power of any modern navy. The trend is shown toward the widespread introduction of aircraft aboard surface ships of various types in connection with the development of V/STOL aircraft.

The ever increasing interest in oceanic problems which is being intensely shown in our day in various public circles throughout the world has also not /been overlooked./ Oceanic problems are examined from various points of view, i.e., the economic, political, and military, examining their dialectical relationship and interdependence.

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The author considers it advisable to have a further expansion in research into the problem of the ocean and the sea power of the state. This would contribute to a deepening of our impressions of the present-day features and patterns in the organizational development of navies and of armed conflict in ocean theaters as an important element in the system of measures for defending our socialist homeland from possible aggression from the direction of the oceans.

For their valuable advice and assistance, the author /expresses/ his sincere [[thanks]] *gratitude* to [[Admiral V. N. Alekseyev]] *Admiral A. I. Sorokin*, Admiral V. S. Sysoyev, [[Rear]] *Vice* Admiral K. A. Stalbo, [[Rear]] *Vice* Admiral /N. V./ Usenko, [[Captain 1st Rank]] *Rear Admiral* N. P. V'yuneko, *Rear Admiral I. K. Khurs, Major General Justice P. D. Barabolya*, and Professor B. G. Bakayev, and also to everyone who cooperated in the preparation of the *second edition of the* book. He welcomes any comments which the readers may have.

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1. *Materialy XXV s"yezda KPSS (Materials of the 25th CPSU Congress). Moscow, Politizdat, 1976, p. 22.*

2. Leninskiy sbornik (Leninist Collection of Articles). XXII, 437.

3. Lenin, V. I. Polnoye sobraniye sochineniy (Complete Collected Works). XIII, 374.

4. Morskoy ustav (Naval Regulations). St. Petersburg, 1720, p. 2.

5. *See:* Frunze, M. V. Izbrannyye proizvedeniya (Selected Works). Moscow, Voyenizdat, *1957, II, 4-22.*

6. *Materialy XXIV s"yezda KPSS (Materials of the 24th CPSU Congress). Moscow, Politizdat, 1971, p. 81.*

7. *Materialy XXV s"yezda KPSS, p. 83.*

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CHAPTER I
THE /OCEAN/ AND THE SEA POWER OF THE STATE

Since ancient times man has been drawn to the ocean by its mystery and terrible power, promising him not only a means for existence, but also a path of unexplored lands. It promised [[him]] *man* countless riches, yet it also harbored great dangers. Therefore, [[one]] *some* of the most remarkable pages in the history of mankind [[is]] *are* linked to the mastery of the ocean and the penetration of its secrets.

The importance of the ocean [[cannot be]] *is difficult to* overestimate in the development of productive forces and the accumulation of the wealth of states. As a rule, civilization, originated and developed on the shores of seas and oceans. Countries whose populations have been associated with navigation became economically strong earlier than others. *Suffice it to refer here if only to Holland, Spain, Portugal, England, Japan, and North America.* At a certain stage in the history of mankind, the acute need arose to utilize the boundless waters of the seas and their riches. The more the capabilities for utilizing these riches grew, the more clearly the prerequisites emerged for originating and shaping that concept known as the sea power of the state, which to a certain degree characterizes the economic and military might of a country, and, consequently, its role in the world arena as well.

VARIOUS VIEWS CONCERNING THE SEA POWER OF THE STATE

The essence of the sea power of the state, it seems to us, lies in the [[degree of]] ability to most effectively utilize the World Ocean, or, as it is sometimes called, the Earth's hydrosphere, in the interests of the state as a whole.

Among the main components which we include in this concept of the sea power of the state are the state's capabilities to

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study (investigate) the ocean and exploit its resources, the condition of the transport and fishing fleet and its ability to support the needs of the state, *the status and capabilities of the country's shipbuilding industry,* and also the presence of a navy adapted to the interests of that state, since antagonistic social systems are present in the world. Of course, the nature of the utilization of the ocean and the degree of development of the above-mentioned components are in the final analysis determined by the achieved level of economic and social development of the state and of its policy.

For the Soviet Union, whose main policy goal is the building of Communism, and a steady improvement in the standard of living of the builders of Communism, sea power is emerging as one of the important factors strengthening [[its]] *the* economy, accelerating its scientific and technical development, and consolidating the economic, political, cultural, and scientific ties between the Soviet people and *friendly* peoples and countries [[friendly to them]].

The material expression of those facets of sea power of the state which are linked to the economy of the country are the transport, fishing, and scientific research fleets, ocean science, which supports the study and exploitation of the ocean's resources, various sectors of industry which *create these fleets and which* extract and process the gifts of the ocean, and also [[cadres of]] scientists, designers, engineers, and technicians, and a glorious army of mariners with diverse, complex, and respected specialties. At the same time, sea power, naturally, together with the other components, also includes the capability of our armed forces to defend the country from threats of attack from the oceans. That facet of sea power is assuming greater importance as the degree of the military threat to our security increases.

The constantly developing and improving Soviet Navy, which within the united ranks of our armed forces is called upon to /support/ the building of Communism and to decisively thwart any attempts by aggressors to encroach on the great gains of the workers, is the material expression of that facet of sea power characterizing the real capability of our country to repel aggression from the oceans.

This in no way means that sea power of the country depends only on the real combat might of the Navy. It should be regarded above all as the capability of the state to place all the ocean resources [[and potentials]] in the service of man and fully utilize them to develop the economy, whose state, in the final analysis, determines all facets of the life of our

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country, including its defense capability. On this plane, the concept of the "sea power" is to a certain degree identified with the concept of the "economic power of the state." In this connection, sea power can be regarded as an integral part of economic power. As economic power determines military power, so does sea power, fostered by the economy of the state and also having an effect on it, have both an economic and a military basis.

The circumstances which force us to include prerequisites of a military character in the concept of the "sea power of the state" were engendered by reasons of an international nature, above all by the existence of imperialism, [[which is also extending its aggressive aspirations to the hydrosphere]] *with its inherent predatory aspirations, within which the hydrosphere holds a significant place both as the medium and as the object of expansion.* Therefore, so long as imperialism exists, there will be a vital need to include the military component in the concept of the "sea power of the state." It is precisely within this context that the Navy should be regarded as one of the most important components of sea power serving as a reliable guarantor of the security of our country and as an important instrument supporting its interests at sea.

The imperialist states are employing their own sea power primarily as a weapon of an aggressive policy for robbing and enslaving countries and peoples and as a means for aggravating the international situation and unleashing wars and military conflicts in various areas of the world. The military theoreticians and imperialist ideologists, for example in the United States, view sea power not only as a most important means of threatening Socialism, but also as a force enabling her to maintain the obedience of her allies in the aggressive military blocs, and to support the dominating position *of the United States* and supreme influence of the American monopolies in those blocs.

Thus, the fundamental difference in the concept of sea power of the Soviet Union and that of the imperialist powers stems from their class essence. It also determines the goals, missions, and methods of employing various components of sea power, above all navies, which in the imperialist states are given the role of one of the primary weapons for gaining world supremacy. This is explained by the fact that in the concept of sea power of the imperialist states, [[its]] *the* military aspects prevail to a greater degree, and all other facets of it are subordinated to and serve these aspects.

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Essentially the concept of the "sea power of the state" is identified *by western military theorists* with that component known as naval power or naval forces. Moreover, they often strive to substitute this concept for the term military power, thereby stressing their intentions to continue to concentrate the main strategic, primarily nuclear-missile, [[capabilities of the armed]] forces in the operational sphere of their navies. Western strategists often attach an unjustifiably over-blown importance to sea power. They strive to explain many events in the world and even the development of the history of whole peoples and countries, as American naval theoreticians did in their day, by the state of their sea power and their relative strength vis a vis the power of other countries. Their current successors, while striving to explain those complex events and processes which are occurring in the world arena from the point of view of "sea power," "maritime power," and "naval power," inevitably arrive at the [[farfetched]] conclusion that it is necessary to further accelerate the naval arms race.

In growth of sea power the imperialists see ways of further enslaving peoples and of filling the so-called power vacuum in certain areas of the world caused by the failure of the entire colonial system and the appearance in its wreckage of an ever greater number of independent states, which have started on the path toward independent development. These states are regarded by the ideologists of imperialist sea power as good [[bait]] *gain* for their aggressive aspirations which can be "acquired," as they cynically assert, primarily with the aid of naval forces. [[Such "ideological" justifications are widely supported by force of arms, and]]

The [[more than 30]] wars and conflicts unleashed by the imperialist circles [[of various countries]] since the end of the Second World War, in which navies participated, are proof of this. They invariably play the role of the "big stick," with which the national-freedom movement is relentlessly suppressed in the countries selected by the imperialists as the victims of their aggression.

The imperialist states also justify the need to increase their sea power /by the fact that/ these [[countries]] *states* have a large number of obligations with respect to "defending democracy and anti-Communist regimes" in various areas of the world. *One cannot help but note here that 41 of the 43 states with which the United States is linked by treaties of cooperation are in areas across the sea.*

By using the old methods of colonial policy -- terror and blackmail, intervention, and economic and political diktat --

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the imperialist powers are more and more frequently resorting to new forms of colonial expansion, under the guise of so-called aid and support. The reader well knows the examples of Korea and Vietnam, Greece and Panama, and many other countries, and how the celebrated "aid" and "support" have been implemented.

The vast scale of American big business participating in the economies of foreign countries, and the rapid growth of American maritime commerce, [[whose annual volume exceeds 400 million tons,]] are also included among the arguments with which they try to justify the growth in the military component of sea power. Here the navy is assigned the role of guarantor of the economic expansion of the American monopolies, the role of an accomplice in the robbery of the peoples of many lands which have proved to be independent of the United States in the economic, political, and military spheres.

Clearly contravening all processes of peaceful, social development, the newly discovered champions of maritime strength agree on the fact that they recognize sea power as the dominant factor in the creation of a new type of "regionalism," i.e., economic groupings of countries in whose economies the use of gigantic ships in maritime commerce will supposedly play a decisive role. Here "conclusions" are advanced to justify the need to defend the shipments in those ships by force of naval weapons. There are many similar justifications for the essence and content of sea power, and even a single enumeration of them would tire the reader.

We have pointed out only a few of the more widespread concepts of sea power that are definitely linked to questions of policy and economics, which are used primarily for propagandistic goals whose purpose is to conceal the essence of the aggressive aspirations of imperialism. The ideologists of imperialism are resorting to deliberately vague phraseology in order to mask the unfavorable facets of their aggressive policy, namely those facets which they believe it would be preferable to conceal from foreign eyes than to display to general view.

Yet, in addition to those facets, there are also openly militaristic concepts which they reveal with a cynical frankness and which others would hide. They express the opinion of the bosses of the military-industrial complex, whose entire reason for existence lies in arousing military hysteria and extorting more and more appropriations in order to intensify the arms race, which constitutes the main source of their income and profits. They assert that sea power is no longer limited by the vast spaces of the oceans, that it is now even

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invading the land masses of continents, reinforcing and even replacing military power, whose level is determined primarily by the capability to destroy with nuclear strikes land targets located deep in enemy territory in any area of the world. In this connection, seapower is emerging to an ever greater degree as the stimulus for repeated "sweeping" reviews of existing strategies of waging war.

In our day, the US Armed Forces are undergoing a new reorientation to the fact that the primary missions in a war must inevitably be accomplished by powerful attacks delivered from the sea by the three main elements of naval forces: nuclear-powered ballistic missile submarines, carrier-based aircraft, and the Marines. In this connection, the destructive power of nuclear strikes is regarded as a new, additional dimension of seapower [[employed]] in naval operations against the shore. A contributing factor is the widespread employment of nuclear-powered submarines, owing to which the traditional dependence of navies on strategic positions located in the ocean and sea theaters and on the "geography" of their bases has been reduced and the opportunity to expand the sphere of their aggressive aspirations to new areas of the World Ocean has appeared.

Yet it is not only this which is causing the ideologists of the military-industrial complex to look toward naval power. "US territory," wrote one of them -- Admiral C. Ricketts -- "would be in a very dangerous position, if it were the only delivery base for modern weaponry. In this event the enemy would direct the entire power of his weaponry against US territory. The naval forces provide an excellent alternative. They permit us to utilize the oceans as a base for weapon systems, while at the same time the enemy territory remains the target in the sights of these systems. These attributes of naval weapon systems can be utilized only by the country which recognizes and learns to exploit the unique characteristics of the sea."[1]

Here, as we see, seapower is /presented/ as a means capable of diverting a retaliatory threat to somewhere farther out in the oceans, away from those who are preparing nuclear aggression against mankind.

Other achievements of scientific-technical progress, particularly such an achievement as artificial earth satellites, which are even being used today by the imperialist militarists for reconnaissance, communications, and navigation, are also included among the factors fostering growth in seapower. Like many other achievements of science and technology which are being used to serve imperialism, they are being considered only /from the point of view/ of their employment for military aims, particularly to increase the striking power of navies.

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A brief [[examination of]] *familiarization with* the concepts of sea power /extant/ abroad enables us to draw a conclusion as to their narrow, utilitarian bent[[, and on their subordination to preparations for war]]. Sea power, /according to/ these concepts, is determined *only* by the new [[dimensions]] *capabilities* of the destructive force of naval weaponry, by the ever greater reduction in the cost of long-range military shipments, by the extension of the effect of naval weaponry to the land masses of the continents, by the broad international obligations and aggressive alliances of the maritime states, and also by control of the seas in certain areas where forces possessing a superiority can actually be put into operation at any moment.

Interest in /exploiting/ the countless riches of the World Ocean has continued to grow in recent times in every country. If the [[very diverse]] resources of the ocean were utilized in the interests of mankind, they would permit the solution of many of the major problems in the areas of energy, food, and the extraction of minerals, and in the development of transport, economic, cultural, and scientific ties between countries in various regions of the world. However, activity in this area is frequently viewed by the leading *imperialist* sea powers [[of the imperialist camp]] from the point of view of military preparations.

US Secretary of the Navy P. Ignatius has asserted: "If all aspects of sea power were related to the United States' self-interest, then it should be noted that a major and modern US flag merchant marine will be necessary in order to provide for support of military operations in order to retain flexibility of unilateral action. Without a strong merchant marine a number of unilateral military options are lost. Being pre-eminent in technological knowledge for exploiting the oceans, the United States must open up new areas for expanding American influence on an international scale. This leadership in ocean exploration may prove of foremost value in the future development of US sea power, which is closely related to our national economy. Similarly, pre-eminence in oceanographic matters will cause the United States to retain its image as a leader in the scientific world, as well as to reap the practical benefits from fall-outs which are only too often unpredictable ahead of time. The international image is important, not only to the foreign buyers of American products, but to US international relations, which are backed by its sea power."[2]

Similar examples showing the aggressive nature of the sea power of imperialist states and its reactionary content could also be cited with regard to other facets of their foreign policy, which is basically oriented toward its celebrated

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"position of strength." However, even the examples cited above are enough to understand the true purpose of the sea power of the imperialist states which is being used by them in peacetime primarily as the main attribute of "gunboat diplomacy," *which has been transformed into "carrier diplomacy" at the present time*, and in wartime as the most important instrument of their grand strategy, whose main feature is to [[an ever greater]] *a growing* degree merging with their oceanic strategy.

[[As indicated above, we regard sea power as an intricate complex of various components linked to the area of the economy of the country and to the policy of the Communist Party, to the area of the country's defense capability, science, and the training of cadres, and to the area of the practical realization of all those possibilities which the exploitation of the seas and oceans will open up for the building of Communism.]]

THE OCEAN AND ITS IMPORTANCE

The ocean, to which the origin of all life on our planet is linked, is of the greatest importance for the life of mankind. The present-day specimens of flora and fauna developed from organisms which formerly lived in the waters of the ocean, which remains an active seat of life even today.

The influence of the ocean environment on the economy of states is vast and multifaceted. The seas and oceans harbor very large reserves of diverse industrial raw materials and [[energy]] *and possess a vast energy potential*. The most important and most economical communications routes between countries pass through the seas and oceans. The amount of living substances synthesized in the ocean is many times greater than anything that [[is created on]] *the* land *can provide*. This makes it possible to view the ocean as one of the main sources of a solution to the food problem for the growing population of the world. Today the annual world catch of fish from an area comprising approximately 10% of the ocean's surface is 60 million tons, yet by 1985 it could reach as much as 100 to 120 million tons. Phytoplankton and animal plankton, enormous quantities of which are present in the ocean, may be widely used as source of protein in the future. Initial steps in this direction have already been taken.

The chemical and mineral resources of the World Ocean are [[practically inexhaustible. It is calculated that if we could precipitate all of the salt in the ocean the seabed would be covered with a layer of salt 57 meters thick. Approximately 90 billion tons of iodine, five billion tons of uranium, and up

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to three billion tons of manganese, vanadium, and nickel, ten million tons of gold, 270 billion tons of heavy water, billions of tons of magnesium, sodium, bromine, and calcium, and millions of tons of silver, thorium, and other rare elements are concentrated in the sea area of our planet. One cubic meter of sea water contains on the average of 30 kg of sodium chloride, 1.3 kg of magnesium, and 66 g of bromine, and 99% of our planet's bromine reserves are found in the ocean.]] *very great,*[3] *but* up to now, only a few substances dissolved in sea water have been available to man for industrial exploitation. The problem of obtaining table salt, magnesium, bromine, sodium, iodine, and several other substances has been successfully resolved from an economic and technical point of view. For example, of the world output of table salt totalling 22 million tons annually, one-third is evaporated from sea water. The annual world output of magnesium from sea water is 300,000 tons, while for bromine it is 100,000 tons. Ways have been found to obtain uranium, gold, and other valuable elements from sea water. The scope and scale of the effort to extract rare and trace elements from water are such that [[major changes in the world economy may be engendered]] *they may influence the world economy* in the near future.

A very rich accumulation of ferromanganese nodules[4] containing up to 30 chemical elements, the main ones being manganese (25%), iron (14%), and also cobalt, nickel, copper, titanium, and vanadium, has been detected on the ocean floor. These formations are incomparably richer in their content of valuable metals than ore found in the depths of the earth.

Although the mining of deepwater ores is a new field, plans are already being proposed for relatively cheap methods of extracting them from the seabed. Thus, the extraction of ferromanganese nodules has already begun in several countries.

Vast energy resources lie in the depths of the seabed. Rich deposits of oil and gas have been found in the Persian Gulf and in the Gulf of Mexico, in the western part of the Caribbean Sea, in the North Sea, off the Pacific Coast of the United States, off the coast of West Africa, in the East and South China Seas, and also in other areas. The geological reserves of oil which have been detected at depths down to 300 meters have been tentatively [[estimated]] *calculated* at 420 billion tons. [[Moreover, it is assumed that the main deposits of oil and gas are not located on land, but in the sea, because two-thirds of the known petroleum-bearing areas on land are located near the sea coast. Yet although mankind will not be able to fully utilize all of these riches until the future, the importance of exploiting them is already growing swiftly.]]

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Prospecting for oil and gas reserves is being conducted in almost all areas of the continental shelf. About one-fourth of the world's petroleum output [[is]] now [[being extracted]] *comes* from the seabed. It is expected that over the next ten years the annual petroleum yield from the sea will [[reach]] *comprise* about one-third of the total world petroleum output. *The following data show the importance of oil production from the seabed. Norway, which never before had oil, now is an exporter of this fuel after beginning exploitation of deposits in this sector of the North Sea. Development of petroleum deposits in the British sector of the North Sea permitted Great Britain to satisfy 70 percent of its needs for this fuel as early as 1977. The British government equates this fact in importance to the Industrial Revolution of the late 18th century.*

The seabed is also rich in other minerals. Coal beds have been found off the West Coast of the United States and off the coasts of Chile and Australia. Iron and copper ores are being mined off of Newfoundland, and the reserves of iron ore in that area have been determined to be more than 3 billion tons. Sulfur is being extracted from the seabed in the Gulf of Mexico from [[metal]] ocean platforms. Extraction from the sea of tin, thorium and titanium ores, [[and also]] diamonds, pearls, sand, gravel, and coquina is also underway.

Interest in the ocean is also being increased in connection with the newly discovered possibilities of utilizing the thermal, mechanical, and chemical energy of the /ocean waters./

According to estimates by scientists, the energy of the ocean tides is more than 2,000 times greater than the annual energy reserves of all the rivers in the world. The exploitation of even a small part of this energy would be an appreciable contribution to the energy resources of mankind. Today engineering thinking is being concentrated on wide-scale experiments to utilize tidal fluctuations of the sea level and differences in the water temperatures of the upper (25-30°C) and deep (5-10°C) layers of the ocean. In 1959 a 9,000-kw unit was put into service in France; it was the first experimental tidal station in the world and has a design power of 320,000 kw. The experimental Kislogubskaya tidal electric-power station /has gone/ into operation in the USSR, and designs are [[also]] being developed for tidal stations in Lumbovskaya Bay and Mezen' Strait. Smaller tidal electric-power stations are in operation in China.

Several countries are already building hydrothermal electric power stations. [[When all technical difficulties are

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overcome and the stations begin to operate, the new, practically inexhaustible source of energy generated by the ocean will be opened up.]] *There also are other projects for utilizing the ocean's energy. For example, the United States is developing a preliminary design of an underwater station which uses the Gulf Stream's heat and current velocity. According to approximate estimates by US specialists, use of the Florida sector of the Gulf Stream alone can cover the energy needs of the United States at the 1980 level.*

The importance of the ocean for transport is very great. The main trade routes of the world connecting the continents, countries, and peoples cross the oceans and seas. If we plotted the navigational routes of ships over the course of the year, [[the World Ocean]] *it* would be covered with a network of these routes, although the network would be of uneven density. This unevenness depends primarily on the level of development of the economies of countries located on the shores of the oceans and seas, on their resources, and on their immediate needs for foreign trade associated with those resources, on the natural conditions for navigation, on the economic feasibility of shipping cargoes by water, and also on the political situations which are emerging in the relations between individual countries in various parts of the world.

The causes relating to the natural or historically established distribution of natural resources and productive powers are particularly revealing and unchanging. For example, we can clearly trace the cargo traffic in world oil shipments from the countries of the Near and Middle East to the West, i.e., to Europe and to the United States, and to the East, i.e., Japan and the countries of Southeast Asia, the shipping of grain from the United States, Canada, and Australia to the countries of the European continent, and also of machinery and industrial goods from the industrially developed countries of Europe and America to the less developed countries of the continents of Africa and Asia.

The economies of the developed capitalist countries to a great degree depend on shipping by seaway, particularly for the import of various types of raw materials and food. This is confirmed by the fact that some 90% of the total volume of foreign commercial shipping consists of raw materials and foodstuffs. In recent years the shipping volume of oil and petroleum products has been growing at a rapid rate (about 10% annually). The volume of shipping for individual types of goods is broken down approximately in the following manner: petroleum and petroleum products, 55%; iron ore, 10%; grain and coal, each 5%; fertilizer, 3%; lumber, sugar, and bauxite, each

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

Figure 1. International Marine Shipments of Oil

Key:
1. USA
2. Venezuela
3. North Africa
4. Western Europe
5. The Near and Middle East
6. Australia
7. Japan



Figure 2. International Marine Shipments of Iron Ore

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

Figure 3. International Marine Shipments of Coal

Key:

1. USSR
2. Australia
3. Canada
4. USA
5. South America
6. England
7. South Africa
8. Poland



Figure 4. International Maritime Shipments of Grain

Key:

(1) Legend
(2) Export Import
(3) Up to 500,000 t
(4) 500,000-1 million t
(5) 1-2 million t
(6) 2-5 million t
(7) More than 5 million t
(8) Types of regions of foreign countries involved in world grain trade
(9) Surplus of own grain - World exporters
(10) Insufficiency of own grain - World importers
(11) Insufficiency of grain - Major importer of grain
(12) Satisfies needs for grain through own production - Secondary importer
(13) Completely satisfies needs for grain through own production
(14) Surplus in growing one particular grain

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1.5-2%; and about 25% is general and other forms of cargo (see Figs. 1-4).

The predominance of raw materials and foodstuffs in the cargo carried determines not only the character of international maritime shipping, but also the entire system of international economic ties, the volume, commodity structure, and direction of international cargo traffic.

The role and position of ocean transport in the economies of many states in their day also determined the importance of oceans, an importance which [[has for a long time remained practically unchanged.]] *is growing continuously.*

The Atlantic Ocean is of primary importance for shipping and international trade. The industrially most developed /regions/, in which some 800 million people live, are located in the Atlantic basin. The ocean exceeds 93 million square kilometers, which is almost 26% of the entire area of the World Ocean. The distance, for example, from Copenhagen to New York is more than 7,000 kilometers, and the distance to the Panama Canal is 10,000 km. Three-fourths of the seaports of the world, which handle more than 70% of the cargo carried on the World Ocean, are located on the shores of the Atlantic Ocean.

The communications routes /running/ through the northern part of the Atlantic ocean are distinguished by their importance and shipping intensity. On the average, some 4,000 merchant ships[[, the majority of them] in transit between ports are found here each day. More than 100 regular lines of the USSR, the United States, /Great Britain/, France, Italy, the Netherlands, the German Federal Republic, and other countries, cross the North Atlantic.

The main transoceanic cargo traffic in the North Atlantic runs between Western European ports and the ports of North America (more than 21% of the cargo traffic); between the ports of North America and the ports of Southwest Europe, North Africa, and the Near East through the Strait of Gibraltar (about 12% of the cargo traffic); between the ports of Western Europe and the ports of Central and South America and the countries of the Pacific Ocean via the Panama Canal (more than 10% of the cargo traffic). The importance of the routes running from the ports of Europe and North and South America around Africa increased after the closure of the Suez Canal in 1967 as a result of the Israeli aggression. The significance of these lines of communications will clearly also continue to grow in the future, despite the opening of the Canal, since large-tonnage ships, the so-called supertankers and other ships

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with a large displacement, *and which cannot use this canal,* have recently begun to play an ever greater role in world shipping.

The role of the Atlantic lines of communications is /increasing/ due to the [[exceptional]] military importance of this theater. The armed forces of NATO, the main aggressive bloc of imperialism, are deployed there, and powerful nuclear-missile attacks by submarines and carrier aircraft of the imperialist navies on targets in the countries of the Socialist Community are possible from there. The main naval forces of the chief imperialist powers are concentrated in the Atlantic (including the Mediterranean Sea). About 70-80% of the combatants of the United States and Great Britain are constantly located there, including five of the six squadrons of nuclear-powered missile-armed submarines and four of the six US attack carrier forces. *Continental theaters of military operations in which the primary groupings of NATO ground forces and aviation are deployed, are adjacent to the Atlantic zone.*

The main NATO communications routes connecting the group of European countries belonging to this bloc with its main arsenal, the United States of America, run across the Atlantic. These communications routes are of enormous military importance. For example, in the Second World War some 2,200 major convoys consisting of more than 75,000 ships reached Europe via the Atlantic. In the same period, some 7,700 convoys, including more than [[170,000]] *173,000* transports, steamed over coastal communications routes.[5] *The main tonnage losses in the war took place in the Atlantic (85.5%), including 8.2% in the Mediterranean.*

Of the seas of the Atlantic basin, the Mediterranean Sea is of greatest importance; 18 European, Asian, and African states, with various political leanings, are located on its shores. More than 300 million people live in these countries. Some of these states belong to the aggressive NATO and CENTO blocs, others belong to the group of so-called nonaligned states or are waging an intense struggle for their own independence.

The economies of many Mediterranean states are tied to the exploitation of such strategic minerals as oil and chrome. The struggle for a predominating influence in the area of extracting those *and others* raw materials is an important part of the policy of many capitalist countries. The most important communications routes by which fuel is shipped to the countries of Europe and United States pass through the Mediterranean Sea. In the Second World War more than 154 million register tons of

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shipping plied between the countries of Africa and Southern Europe and England through the Mediterranean Sea. In the year 1940 alone, ships of the Axis powers carried more than five million tons of cargo to North Africa.[6]

Thus, the main transport arteries of the Western countries run across the Atlantic Ocean, and their economies depend greatly on the uninterrupted functioning of those arteries. [[Therefore,]] *By virtue of the aforementioned factors*, NATO military ideologists consider the Atlantic Ocean to be the main oceanic theater of military operations and are concentrating their main naval forces here.

The Pacific Ocean is the largest ocean in the world and is of great importance to shipping and international trade. More than one billion people live in the countries of the Pacific Ocean basin. The area of the Pacific Ocean is almost 180 million square kilometers, which is one-half of the entire surface of the World Ocean or one-third of the surface of the globe. The states situated on the opposite shores of the ocean are vast distances apart from one another. Thus, it is more than 8,400 km from Vladivostok to San Francisco, 14,800 km from Petropavlovsk-Kamchatskiy to the Panama Canal, and 11,500 km from San Francisco to Manila.

About 20% of the *volume of* the world's shipping is on the Pacific Ocean, with the American-Asian, American-Australian, and Asian-Australian sectors having the most intensive shipping.

Recently the communications routes via which oil is delivered from the ports of the Persian Gulf to Japan have assumed great importance. The heaviest ship traffic is in the American-Asian sector, connecting the ports of North America and the Panama Canal and the ports of Japan, the Chinese People's Republic, the Philippines, and the Gulf of Singapore. The economic significance of the Pacific Ocean theater is to a great degree determined by the dependence of the countries contiguous to it on oceanic communications supporting the needs of their economies and armed forces.

There are many nuclear, missile, and aircraft industry centers, shipbuilding centers, and centers for the production of synthetic rubber, aluminum, etc., located on the Pacific Coast of the United States. Today the Pacific Coast represents a major base of American imperialism, which supplies military equipment not only for the armed forces of the United States, but also for other capitalist states in America and Asia and also Australia.

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The imperialist states in the Pacific theater are united under the aegis of the United States in military blocs. A series of bilateral agreements have been concluded between the United States and Japan, South Korea, Thailand, the Taiwan regime, and the governments of other countries. The military bases set up in foreign states by the United States contain their advisers and major contingents of ground, air and naval forces. American nuclear-powered missile-armed submarines are on constant patrol in the waters of the Pacific Ocean. The US Seventh Fleet is the main American striking force in the Far East.

Military shipments supporting the needs of the armed forces are of great importance to the United States in the Pacific Ocean. In this connection, merchant shipping predominates *here as in other theaters*, although air transport has been developed considerably. [[Thus,]] *For example*, in the three years of military operations in Korea more than one million men and 370,000 tons of cargo were shipped by air between the United States and Korea and Japan and back again. In that same period, about five million men and 74 million tons of various cargoes were shipped by merchant ships and combatants of the United States and her allies. Thus, for each ton of cargo delivered to Asia by air, more than 200 tons of cargo were delivered by sea, and five out of six of the occupation troops arrived by sea. In 1967, the United States shipped [[2.4]] *2.5* million tons of cargo by ocean to Southeast Asia in connection with the war in Vietnam.[7]

The Indian Ocean is [[playing]] *exerting* an ever greater [[role in]] *influence on* the economies of the developing countries of South Asia and East Africa. About one billion people live in the countries of that basin. It is the third largest ocean, with an area of almost 75 million square kilometers (more than 20% of the area of the World Ocean). The greatest distances are: 10,750 km between the southern extremities of Africa and Australia (Cape Agulhas and South Sea Cape); 6,300 km along the equator; and about 10,600 km along the meridian 60° east longitude.

About one-tenth of the world's shipping is in the Indian Ocean. The economic importance of the Indian Ocean lies primarily in the fact that the world trade routes connecting Europe and America with South Asia, East Africa, and Australia and with the oil-producing areas of the Near and Middle East pass through it. The routes from the Black Sea and Baltic ports of the Far East and also India, Pakistan, Bangladesh, Indonesia, Burma, and other countries pass through the Indian Ocean. The situation in many countries of the Indian Ocean

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basin is determined, on one hand, by the aspirations of imperialism to retain its former supremacy in new forms, and, on the other, by the persistent struggle of the peoples of those states for complete political and economic independence, against foreign bases in their territories, and against neocolonialism in all of its manifestations.

The Arctic Ocean is the smallest of all the oceans, occupying an area of only a little more than 13 million square kilometers. A large part of that water area, about eight million square kilometers, consists of the Barents, Kara, East Siberian, Chuckchee, and Laptev Seas, and others. Only a hundredth of the world's shipping is in that ocean. The shortest air routes between Eurasia and the American continent pass over the Arctic Ocean and Arctic seas washing the northern coast of the Soviet Union, Norway, the United States, Canada, and Greenland. The great economic significance of the territory of the USSR contiguous to the shores of the Arctic Ocean gives rise to its importance *for us*. The Northern Sea route, passing along the Soviet shore, is of enormous economic importance to our country, despite the extreme complexity of ship navigation along it. The navigational period in the Arctic [[runs from late June to September and is 90 to 120 days in duration]] *is limited*.

Communications by sea with the islands and the northern coast of Canada is [[also]] possible only [[eight]] *three or four* months a year due to the difficult ice situation.

The Study of the Ocean. In spite of the fact that the seas and oceans have played a considerable role in the history of the development of mankind and man in his quest for new areas to apply his /abilities/ has first turned to the ocean and only later to terrestrial space, and finally also to outer space, there is still much that remains unknown in the area of conquering the hydrosphere of the earth. [[There are many such "blank spots" in it which men have not touched even once throughout history.]] Therefore, even today the [[sea is]] *oceans are* perhaps the least studied areas of the planet.

It is essential to have detailed and comprehensive knowledge of the hydrosphere of the earth to understand the processes occurring in it, its effect on the land and the atmosphere and on the formation of the weather, and reliable information is needed on the resources existing in the hydrosphere and ways of exploiting them in order to exploit the World Ocean and utilize its resources. Knowledge assuring navigational safety on the oceans and seas and flights over them is also essential. Man is studying the ocean more and more thoroughly,

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seriously exploiting it, and unveiling its secrets. The World Ocean is the property of all mankind, and only the coordinated efforts of all peoples and countries can make it serve man to the fullest degree and with complete efficiency.

It is well known that the processes occurring at the surface and in the water layers have a great effect on the entire environment of the earth, yet much of what is observed there is still unclear and unexplained. The main difficulty in solving the riddles of the deep lies in the specific nature of the ocean environment itself and its relative inaccessibility to study using modern equipment.

Scientific study of the oceans actually began about 200 years ago. However, it did not emerge as a comprehensive ocean science until the mid-*20th* century.

The basic goal of oceanographic research today is the accumulation of general scientific knowledge about the World Ocean and the compilation of reliable charts showing currents, waves, temperature, salinity, underwater relief, and magnetic, and other geophysical fields. The research results [[form]] *are* the basis for the development of reliable methods of predicting processes occurring in the water layers of the oceans and seas and in the *contiguous* atmospheric layers [[at the sea-air interface]]. All of this is being utilized to prepare recommendations for the design of ships and measures supporting the safe navigation of ships and aircraft flights.

Prospecting for organic and mineral resources in the oceans and the development of [[measures]] *methods* for rationally exploiting them, and also the preparation of recommendations for the preservation and protection of the oceans against pollution is an important independent research trend.

The developed capitalist countries (primarily the United States, Great Britain, France, Japan, the Federal German Republic, and Canada) attach the greatest signficance to the question of studying and exploiting the World Ocean and are taking a number of measures aimed at expanding work in this area. The most important measures are the development of future plans for studying and exploiting the ocean, [[which includes a drastic increase in appropriations to conduct this work,] and also the creation of special agencies coordinating the activity of various organizations, scientific centers, private firms and companies, and scientific institutions.

In the United States, the President's National Council on Marine Resources and Engineering Development, /headed by the

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vice president/, [[which coordinates]] *coordinated* work in this area [[has been in operation]] since 1966. *In mid-1971 the functions of governmental planning and coordinating agencies for ocean research were transferred to the Federal Council on Science and Technology in the person of the Interdepartmental Council on Marine Science and Technology. The head of the National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration is in charge of this Council.*

Other capitalist countries are also devoting serious attention to questions of coordinating oceanographic research. In particular, Japan has created the Interdepartmental Committee on Marine Science and Engineering, France has created the National Oceanographic Research Center, and the German Federal Republic has the Technical Committee.

The steady increase in budgetary appropriations for these purposes in many major capitalist states attests to the growing attention being given to oceanographic research. However, as can be seen in Table 1, the main part of these appropriations goes for military purposes.

Thus, [[of]] *based on* the total for the US National Oceanographic Program for fiscal year [[1972/1973 (667]] *1976/1977 (956.6* million dollars), the highest expenditures were those directly or indirectly tied to military preparations (more than [[409]] *580* million dollars).

A Congressional Committee report entitled Our Nation and the Sea has been published in the United States *in January 1969*. The report contained recommendations for considerably expanding activities of the federal government in the area of ocean research and the exploitation of its resources, and for a gradual increase in appropriations for these purposes of approximately 7% to 10% annually over the next 10 years (1971-1980). *The Committee's recommendations were adopted and appropriations for ocean research rose an average of 10% during the period from 1971 through 1977.*

At the recommendation of Congress, this report carried data on the approximate cost of carrying out a broad program for studying the ocean and exploiting its resources for the period 1971 to 1980. According to these data, some ten billion dollars would be needed to pay for the accomplishment of the entire program for the ten-year period. It is intended to gradually increase appropriations for these purposes until they reach two billion dollars annually by 1980.

The data in Table 2 show the increase in budgetary appropriations for the study and exploitation of the ocean in several other capitalist countries.

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Table 1 Total U.S. Appropriations for Ocean Research by Department (in millions of dollars)

Department	1973/74	1974/75	1975/76	1976/77
1. Defense Department	257.4	244.3	256.6	274.0
2. Commerce Department	190.3	213.2	231.1	250.9
3. Interior Department	46.5	106.8	143.6	157.2
4. National Science Foundation	62.9	69.2	66.7	75.9
5. Transportation Department	47.6	75.6	82.1	93.5
6. /HEW/	8.1	11.2	12.2	12.2
7. State Department	12.0	11.6	13.2	15.3
8. NASA	5.3	12.5	20.0	28.3
9. EPA	26.5	22.4	24.3	25.1
10. Other agencies	10.3	15.7	22.7	24.2
TOTAL	667.0	782.5	872.5	956.6

Table 2 Increase in Budgeting Appropriations for Ocean Research and Exploration (in millions of dollars)

Country	1973	1974	1975	1976
France	23.6	46.2	48.0	53.4
FRG	52.6	77.3	88.8	443.8[1]
Japan	33.8	36.1	45.8	67.2
Japan (additionally for exhibition on Okinawa)	55.7	65.2	35.8	--

[1] *These appropriations covered by national program for oceanic research and engineering development for these purposes for the period 1976-1979.*

The leading countries of the world are conducting a study of the World Ocean with the aid of surface oceanographic ships, research submarines and deep-diving submersibles, specially equipped aircraft and helicopters, artificial earth satellites, stationary platforms and systems mounted on the seabed, and also moored and drifting buoy stations. In the future it will be possible to employ self-contained systems which move freely along the seabed for such purposes. In the current stage, surface oceanographic ships remain the primary means of conducting various oceanographic research over broad areas of the World Ocean.

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A methodology for studying the oceans and seas is currently being developed. This methodology represents a combination of such methods as synchronized oceanographic and meteorological surveying, determining parameters in standard hydrological sections, surveying bottom relief, and the determination of the elements of the earth's magnetic and gravitational fields.

In recent years the oceanographic research zone method has become standard; this makes it possible to establish patterns of space-time variations for large areas of the oceans over long time intervals. Soviet oceanographers took the initiative in developing this method.

In the future the best research method evidently will be a method based on the deployment of a global system of self-contained moored or drifting oceanographic stations, supplemented by studies from ships and artificial satellites, which will, in addition, receive data from the oceanographic stations and retransmit them to ground centers for collection and processing.

Oceanographic expeditions, which have been conducted for more than 150 years, have a special place in ocean research. The first scientific oceanographic work on the high seas was carried out in the early 19th century by the Russian navymen I. F. Kruzenshtern and Yu. F. Lisyanskiy during circumnavigation of the globe by the ships NADEZHDA and NEVA.

In 1820, the Russian expedition of T. Bellingshausen and M. P. Lazarev aboard the ships VOSTOK and MIRNYY discovered a new continent -- Antarctica.

Extensive oceanographic research was conducted by the Russian mariners F. P. Vrangel in the Arctic Ocean (1820-1824) and in the Pacific Ocean (1825-1827), and by F. P. Litke in the Pacific Ocean (1826-1829).

From 1872 to 1876 the English expedition around the world aboard the ship CHALLENGER studied the relief of the ocean bottom and also the physical and chemical properties of surface and deep-ocean water.

The turn of the 20th century was characterized by a considerable expansion in geographic research. The severe, difficult-to-reach polar areas of the ocean evoked the greatest interest from researchers of various countries. Thus, in 1878 and 1879, the sealing ship VEGA under the command of the well-known Swedish polar explorer N. Nordenskjöld made the first passage over the Northern Sea Route.

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The famous Norwegian polar explorers F. Nansen (1893-1896) and R. Amundsen (1918-1924) occupy a special place in the study of the Arctic.

From time immemorial Russian explorers have studied the Arctic. In the 18th century this activity assumed nationwide importance. At that time almost the entire northern coast of Asia was /put/ on the map by major expeditions under the leadership of Bering, Chirikov, the Laptev brothers, and other prominent mariners. In 1898, the YERMAK, the [[strongest]] *most powerful* icebreaker in the world *for that time*, was built according to the ideas of the prominent Russian naval leader and scientist S. O. Makarov, and it *permitted a* /considerable advancement of/ the study, and especially the exploration, of the Arctic.

At the beginning of the 20th century [[was marked by]] a series of Arctic expeditions *was conducted,* the most important of which with respect to scientific results were the expeditions conducted from 1911 to 1915 under the leadership of B. A. Vil'kitskiy aboard the icebreakers TAYMYR and VAYGACH.

After the victory of the Great October Socialist Revolution, the young Socialist state proceeded with a systematic study of the Arctic Basin. In March 1921 the Floating Marine Scientific Institute (PLAVMORNIN) was founded by decree of the Soviet Government.

In 1932 and 1933, extensive international Arctic research was conducted under the Second International Polar Year. In that period the Soviet Union equipped 15 oceanographic expeditions to make a detailed study of the geophysics of the Arctic regions and of the navigational conditions along the Northern Sea Route. In 1937 studies of the Arctic were begun from "North Pole" drifting scientific stations. Two such stations have been continuously in operation in the Arctic Ocean since 1954. They conduct oceanographic, meteorological, aerological, actinometric, magnetic, ionospheric, ice, astronomical, and hydrographic research which is of great practical importance for the operational servicing of [[voyages]] *navigation* over the Northern Sea Route.

The unprecedented assault on the ices of the Arctic Ocean by the nuclear-powered icebreaker ARKTIKA was a major event in Arctic study and development. On 17 August 1977 a Soviet expedition was the first in the world to reach the North Pole aboard a surface ship in active navigation. It is difficult to overestimate the importance of this achievement, which opened new opportunities for using the forbidding Polar basin in the interests of the socialist economy and for understanding physical processes on our planet.

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[[Moreover,]] Since 1948 the Arctic has been studied by unattended automatic radio meteorological stations. Today up to 25 to 30 of those stations are set up annually on the ice of the Arctic Ocean. They radio data to shore posts on wind direction and velocity, air temperature, atmospheric pressure, and also ice drift.

Although the study of the southern polar areas was begun almost simultaneously with the study of the Arctic waters, up until the mid-1950's they were sporadic in nature, and only since then have multidiscipline international studies of the Antarctic been initiated both by regular expeditions from various countries and by scientific bases and observatories which were built there.

The first Soviet observatories in Antarctica were /set up/ in the period of the International Geophysical Year program and the year of the International Geophysical Cooperation (1957-1959). At the present time, a joint study of Antarctica is being conducted by 12 countries whose work is coordinated by the International Scientific Committee on Antarctic Research.

Up until the 1930's, the temperate zones and low latitudes of the World Ocean were studied by sporadic expeditions which covered small areas. The most significant of these were the study in the Pacific and Atlantic Oceans conducted by S. O. Makarov aboard the corvette VITYAZ' from 1886 to 1889, as a result of which the regime of the waters of the Pacific Ocean was described in detail; the multidiscipline research carried out by the German expedition aboard the ship METEOR from 1925 to 1938 which embraced practically the entire area of the Atlantic Ocean; and the oceanographic and geophysical research by U.S. scientists in the Pacific Ocean aboard the GANNET in 1928 and 1929. It is difficult to overestimate the importance of these initial multidiscipline studies.

Interest in oceanographic research increased particularly after the Second World War, as shown *by data* in Table 3.

Ocean research was most intensive in the period from 1957 through [[1972]] *1976*. In those [[15]] *20* years, [[75.5]] *up to 80%* of all the expeditions organized since 1849 were conducted. /The diagram in Figure 5 illustrates that our Motherland made the main contribution./

The increasing demands of the national economy have led to the need for a more extensive study of the World Ocean. At the present time, the solution of regional problems is gradually being relegated to the background, giving way to global studies

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Table 3 Number of Oceanographic Expeditions by Individual Basin[1]

Periods	Atlantic Ocean	Pacific Ocean	Indian Ocean	Arctic Ocean	World Ocean
1849-1956	1485	1193	81	905	3664
1957-1960	1218	699	64	405	2386
1961-1964	1831	947	180	435	3393
1965-1972	2589	2065	263	640	5557
1973-1976	*323*	*1474*	*145*	*364*	*2306*
Total *as of 1977*	*7446*	*6378*	*733*	*2749*	*17,306*

[1]According to card file data on the extent of Oceanographic studies of the Scientific-Research Oceanographic Center of the Ministry of Defense.

of three interacting media: the ocean, the atmosphere, and the lithosphere. In this connection, we note the tendency of various countries to contribute manpower and equipment for the study and exploitation of the ocean. Thus, from 1957 to 1959, the aforementioned International Geophysical Cooperation was conducted with more than 70 expeditionary ships from 17 countries participating. During the period of those investigations, voluminous data of the greatest value were obtained on the seas and oceans, in particular on the physics of the sea, the history of the earth, phenomena affecting the weather and climate, and life in the World Ocean. The Indian Ocean international expedition took place from 1959 through 1965. Its basic research tasks were the study of the physical processes in the atmosphere and ocean, ascertaining the zones of oceánological fronts, determining the heat balance and water exchange of the ocean, the study of the geological structure of the seabed, and the discovery of new fishing regions.

Of great significance in the development of international cooperation in the area of oceanographic research was the creation in 1961 under UNESCO of the Intergovernmental Oceanographic Commission under whose leadership international expeditions were conducted for studying the tropical area of the Atlantic Ocean (1963-1964), the Study of the Kuroshio Current (the CSK, [[since]] 1969-*1976*), the Combined Study of the Mediterranean Sea (the CSM, since 1969), and the Caribbean Sea and Adjacent Regions (the CSCAR, [[since]] 1970-*1975*).

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

Figure 5. [[Average]] *Total* Number of *Soviet and Foreign* [[Ocean]] Expeditions [[Annually for Various Periods]]

KEY: 1. Number of expeditions 3. Foreign expeditions
2. Soviet expeditions 4. Years

The [[research]] programs of these expeditions have included research on the geophysical and dynamic fields of the ocean, and also work on the problem of the interaction of the ocean and atmosphere.

In developing the "Long-Term Expanded Program for Oceanic Research" (LEPOR), adopted in 1969, the Intergovernmental Oceanographic Commission worked out a ten-year program for the period 1971-1980, under which many international oceanographic research projects presently are being carried out. For example, in conformity with [[In order to prepare for the international work under]] the Program for Investigating the Global Atmospheric Processes (PIGAP) [[planned for 1974, in 1972 the USSR conducted research under the national Tropics Experiment Program in the Atlantic Ocean. In the course of this experiment a broad series of aerometeorological and oceanographic observations were conducted simultaneously from scientific-research

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ships for the first time in the history of the studies on the ocean and the atmosphere]] *the Atlantic Tropics Experiment Program (ATEP) was conducted from June through September 1974 with the participation of the USSR, United States, France, FRG, Great Britian, and Brazil (a total of 39 vessels, 12 aircraft, 2 Earth satellites and a network of fixed stations). The purpose of this experiment was to obtain material on the spatial and time changeability of atmospheric processes of varying scale over a large area of the ocean simultaneously. In 1974-1975, the USSR, United States, Australia, Canada, and Japan conducted experiments to determine the transformation of air masses in the equatorial part of the Pacific Ocean.*

Even greater coordination of the efforts of many countries in ocean research is planned for the future. These studies will provide valuable material needed by mankind for the extensive exploitation of the vast riches which are contained in the hydrosphere.

The Atlantic is the ocean which has been most studied.

From Table 4 it is seen that the Soviet Union, the United States, *Japan,* and Great Britain have made the greatest contribution to the study of the [[Atlantic]] *World* Ocean. [[There is no doubt that the Soviet Union does not intend to give up her position as the leading oceanographic power of the world. The successful resolution of the problem of studying the World Ocean in our country is linked]].

It is planned to expand integrated research of the World Ocean in the primary directions of development of the national economy for 1976-1980, approved by the 25th CPSU Congress. This research is supported primarily [[to]] *by* qualitative changes and quantitative growth in ships and research equipment.

Surface ships, built according to specially developed designs and fitted with appropriate gear and equipment, are [[the main and most economic means]] *used* for conducting research and other work involving the exploitation of the World Ocean.

At the present time, our country has [[about 150]] *over 160* research ships displacing more than 500 tons [[(Table 5)]].

The majority of our scientific-research ships are fully modern in their design and performance characteristics and equipment.

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Table 4 Contribution of Various Countries to the *Oceanographic* Study of the [[Atlantic]] *World* Ocean for the period 1849 to [[1972]] *1976*[1]

Country	No. of Expeditions [[to Atlantic]]	Percentage of Total Expeditions
[[Russia &]] USSR	*7077*	*41*
USA	*2976*	*17*
Japan	*2176*	*12*
Great Britain	*1135*	*6*
France	*503*	*3*
Canada	*496*	*3*
Others	*2943*	*18*
Total	*17,306*	*100*

[1]*The number of foreign expeditions is from material presented for international exchange through World Data Centers.*

The development and improvement of Soviet scientific-research ships is continuing at the present time. The goal is to develop ocean-going systems of various types with the maximum possible integration of equipment which ensures conducting research in all areas using the greatest possible number of parameters, which, naturally, also foreordains an increase in the displacement of such ships.

The scientific-research and expeditionary ships of our country are equipped with modern navigational and research equipment to conduct basic and applied research in all areas of the oceans and seas. Shipboard computers make it possible, while conducting the research, to analyze and process all of the obtained data on the submarine relief and the sea bottom, the earth's physical fields in the ocean, and hydrological and meteorological processes in the water and in the atmosphere above it. Using modern equipment we can measure with high accuracy depths to 11,000 meters on any slope on the seabed, and study the hydrophysical fields throughout the depth of the ocean. Self-contained deepwater buoy stations moored by the research ships are widely used in research practice. A large number of studies of the upper layers of the atmosphere above the ocean are being conducted aboard certain research ships using meteorological rockets.

A whole series of ocean studies can be carried out only by means of research submarines and deep submersibles. Moreover,

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Table 5 Main Characteristics of Several Classes of Research Ships of the Soviet Union

Name of Ship Class	Ship Mission	Displacement, tons	Economic speed, knots	Cruising range, miles	Complement	Scientific party	No. of laboratories
AKADEMIC KRYLOV	*Multidiscipline Ocean Research*	*9100*	*15.0*	*24,000*	*148*	*36*	*18*
ABKHAZIYA	*Multidiscipline Ocean Research*	*7500*	*16.0*	*19,000*	*107*	*51*	*28*
AKADEMIK KURCHATOV	Multidiscipline Ocean Research	6700	16.0	20,000	86	81	28
NIKOLAY ZUBOV	Multidiscipline Ocean Research	3000	14.0	11,000	68	40	14
PROFESSOR BOGOROV	*Multidiscipline Ocean Research*	*1600*	*11.5*	*10,000*	*20*	*40*	*11*
PASSAT	Weather ship	3700	13.0	15,000	60	52	5
VALERIAN URYVAYEV	*Weather ship*	*1100*	*12.0*	*10,000*	*24*	*16*	*7*
TAYGA	*Hydrographic Research*	*2500*	*13.0*	*9,000*	*46*	*20*	*7*
ARKTIKA	Hydrographic research	1500	14.0	8,000	41	14	3
IKHTIANDR	*Multidiscipline Fisheries Research*	*2800*	*12.5*	*11,000*	*75*	*39*	*7*
AELITA	Fishing research	900	11	7,000	28	4	3

experience in the employment of deep submersibles has shown that they have several significant advantages over probes, trawls, buoys, and other equipment used [[in research]] from surface ships. Deep submersibles enable scientists to conduct broad-spectrum, prolonged studies of objects and sea life in situ.

Deep submersibles vary greatly in performance characteristics. Depending on their purpose and mission, submersibles

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can have a displacement of from 2 to 3 up to several hundred tons, an endurance of from 10 to 15 hours up to several days, a range of from 30 to 40 up to several thousand miles at speeds of from 2 to 3 up to 25 knots.

While the Soviet Union is among the leaders in the world in oceanographic research in the field of building surface research ships and in the area of building deep submersibles we are somewhat behind leading Western countries where bathyscaphs, bathyspheres, and other deep-diving systems are widely utilized. This poses the problem of overcoming the lag in research in the deepwater ocean area for Soviet scientists and industrial organizations.

Soviet scientists have achieved considerable success in solving present-day problems in the area of oceanography. The research of Soviet expeditions in the oceans in recent years has been marked by a series of fundamental discoveries. For example, the expeditions aboard the scientific ships M. LOMONOSOV (1959) and AKADEMIK KURCHATOV (1969) discovered and studied powerful countercurrents in the equatorial and northwestern portions of the Atlantic Ocean at depths of from 100 to 500 meters which were named the Lomonosov Current and the Antilles-Guyana Countercurrent. Our scientists discovered and studied the Lomonosov, Mendeleyev, and Gakkel ridges in the Arctic Ocean and also several trenches in the Pacific Ocean.

The considerable contribution of Soviet oceanography in the area of experimental and theoretical research has been directed toward the study of the physical "Ocean-Atmospheric" system, and the space-time variation in hydrophysical fields, and toward the development of methods of hydrometeorological and ice forecasting in the ocean.

Step by step, Soviet oceanographers are obtaining the necessary scientific data to further progress in science and to increase the efficiency of the national economy of our Motherland. All major international expeditions, as a rule, are conducted with a considerable number of participants from the Soviet Union. In the future we must [[not reduce the share of]] *reinforce* our participation *with other countries* [[in world efforts involving]] *in* the study of the ocean environment, and we must continue to develop research ships [[, develop]] *and* an industry for building modern instruments for oceanographic research, improve coordination of the activities of all departments engaged in this important field of studying our planet, and improve the training of cadres of scientists -- oceanologists, hydrographers, and other professionals needed for this science.

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Here it is appropriate to note that we need an improvement in our oceanographic research instrumentation. Requirements for obtaining increasingly more diverse data on the water environment and seabed, the need to follow variations in currents occurring in this environment, and also the immediate and uninterrupted processing of the whole mass of data on currents are giving rise to the widespread introduction of modern electronic-measuring and computer systems. The scientific and industrial organizations of our country must step up their efforts considerably in organizing oceanographic research so that we do not lose first place in the world oceanographic science, which the Soviet Union now rightly holds.

Problems of Combating Ocean Pollution. The rapid development of industry and agriculture and also the intensive exploitation of the wealth of the sea have brought about widespread water pollution and have created a threat to the life of living organisms both in inland fresh-water reservoirs and in the seas and oceans.

It is quite natural that as mankind begins to understand the enormous importance of the ocean as a source of vital resources and as the need for the comprehensive study of it increases, problems are arising both with respect to preserving and developing these resources and, consequently, also to combating pollution of the ocean environment, which directly threaten its resources to a very dangerous degree. Recently the campaign against ocean pollution has gone beyond the framework of a purely scientific problem and now is at the center of attention of both the governments of many countries and of international organizations. The October 1973 London Conference adopted the International Convention on the Prevention of Marine Pollution by Ships, which replaces the International Convention on the Prevention of Petroleum Pollution of the Sea which is currently in force. The new convention establishes more rigid requirements for measures concerned with preventing such pollution.

In the Soviet Union the protection of waters from pollution is regarded as a national problem. The law "The Protection of Nature in the RSFSR" was adopted by the Third Session of the Supreme Soviet of the RSFSR in the Fifth Convocation [[as early as]] *in* 1960. In December 1972 the decree of the CPSU Central Committee and of the USSR Council of Ministers entitled "Strengthening the Protection of Nature and Improving the Utilization of Natural Resources" was adopted. *This was reflected in the new USSR Constitution as well.*

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[[The January 1973 issue of Courier, the journal of the United Nations Educational, Scientific, and Cultural Organization, cited the ten main pollutants of our planet:

1. Radiation, which comes from the testing of nuclear weaponry and the operation of warships and merchantmen using nuclear fuel, and from the production of nuclear fuel and the fabrication of weaponry. Exceeding permissible doses could lead to malignant tumors and genetic mutations.

2. Oil pollution, which occurs during the transport of oil by sea, results from marine accidents and from drilling for and refining it, leading to ruinous ecological effects: the shore is polluted, and plankton, fish, seabirds, and shellfish perish.

3. DDT and other pesticides which are very toxic to crustaceans even in very low concentrations. When these substances get into reservoirs fish die, and organisms serving as food for fish as well as for man are poisoned.

4. Mercury, which is contained in the combustion products of fossil fuel and in the wastes from paint and varnish production which are given off when mercury is added. Mercury is one of the most dangerous pollutants in food products, especially those originating in the sea, and can accumulate in the body and exert a harmful effect on the nervous system.

5. Phosphates, which are contained in sewage. The main sources are chemical detergents, fertilizers washed from the soil, and waste from farms intensively engaged in livestock breeding. It is the main pollutant of river and lake waters.

6. Lead, which is contained in exhaust gases. Other sources are: lead ore processing enterprises, the chemical industry, and pesticides. A toxic element with cumulative effects acts on the enzyme system and on the metabolism in living cells, and accumulates in sea sediment and fresh water.

7. Carbon dioxide gas, which is formed during the combustion of various carbon compounds (power engineering, industry, heating). An increase in the percentage of this gas in the atmosphere could cause a dangerous increase in temperature on the earth's surface, which would be fraught with ruinous geochemical and ecological effects.

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8. Carbon monoxide, which is a highly toxic gas which could disrupt the thermal balance of the upper atmosphere. The main sources are internal combusion engines, the metallurgical industry, and petroleum refining plants.

9. Sulfur dioxide, which is contained in exhaust gases and in the smoke from power and industrial enterprises and home furnaces. Air pollution aggravates respiratory ailments, is harmful to plants, and attacks limestone structures and several synthetic fabrics and materials.

10. Nitric oxides, which create smog, promote excessive growth of water vegetation, which leads to the depletion of the oxygen reserves in the water, the death of fish, and the deterioration of the quality of the water. Its main sources are internal combusion engines, aircraft jet engines, blast furnaces, chemical industrial enterprises, forest fires, and the excessive use of chemical fertilizers.]]

According to a finding by UNESCO, the ten main pollutants of our planet are radiation, oil, DDT and other pesticides, mercury, phosphates, lead, carbon dioxide, carbon monoxide, sulfur dioxide, and nitric oxides.

On the whole, marine pollution by radioactive substances and petroleum products represents the greatest danger to the resources of the World Ocean and mankind. The natural radioactivity of the ocean is created mainly by potassium-40 and artificial radioactivity, primarily by strontium-90 and cesium-137.

All marine organisms possess a selective capacity to accumulate radioactive substances, concentrating them in great quantities [[within themselves]]. /Seaweed and phytoplankton concentrate tens of thousands of times more radioactive isotopes in themselves than are contained in the water./ Animals living in the water also very actively collect radioactive isotopes. Thus, when making long migrations, fish contaminated with radioactive substances are carriers of these substances. Cerium, cesium, and yttrium are the most dangerous to marine organisms, whereas strontium-90 is more dangerous to man.

Nuclear explosions which are accompanied by the formation of radioactive substances are the main sources of radioactive pollution of the environment. In this connection, a large part

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of the long-lived radioactive products of explosions fall into the waters of the World Ocean under the influence of climatic and meteorological factors.

In spite of the 1963 Moscow Agreement, which prohibits nuclear explosions in the water, atmosphere, and in outer space, France and China, who did not sign that international document, continued to conduct nuclear weapons tests. In the period 1960 to [[1937]] *1978*, France set off [[51]] *80* explosions. In the period 1964 through [[1973]] *1978*, China set off [[15]] *25* explosions. All of those explosions considerably added to the overall amount of radionuclides discharged into the biogenetic zone.

With the development of nuclear-power engineering the acute problem of the burying of radioactive wastes arose, since the amount of such wastes is increasing annually. The practice of burying radioactive waste in high seas areas has become widespread. In 1969 alone, Euratom buried some 11,000 tons of radioactive wastes in the coastal waters of Spain in the Atlantic Ocean.

Despite controlling measures, the dumping of radioactive wastes is leading to the pollution of flora and fauna in the oceans and seas. Considering the officially sanctioned system of dumping radioactive wastes from nuclear-powered submarines in the United States, we can expect that large amounts of radioactive isotopes will be introduced not only into coastal waters, but also into open areas of the World Ocean.

The pollution of sea water and the shores by petroleum products has become a worldwide calamity. Oil layers on the surface of the oceans and seas have had an adverse effect on the aeration of sea water, which leads to the formation of stagnant hydrogen-sulfide zones, secondary pollution of the seabed, and the destruction of benthos.[8] It is well known that oil pollution ruins beaches and leads to fires.

Today, 25% of the world tonnage of merchant shipping is made up of tankers, and about 50% are motorships. About 1.5 million tons of petroleum products are annually discharged into the seas and oceans in pumping out ballast water and washing tanks. [[Discharged into the sea,]] They are carried away by currents and deposited on the shore. Oil refining plants and the oil industry play a major role in marine pollution.

The ever growing amount of oil obtained from the ocean has already been mentioned. If we assume that less than 5% of the oil leaks away in sea drilling, then *even* in this case tens of

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of tons of oil will wind up in the open ocean. Hence [[it is clear what]] /the campaign against pollution of the World Ocean by petroleum and petroleum products has become an acute problem/.

Several international conferences, including those in 1954 and 1962, have been devoted to questions of the danger of polluting the oceans and seas by oil *and measures for countering this*.

Waste waters from industrial and commercial enterprises located on the seacoast and also on the banks of rivers flowing into the sea are also sources of marine pollution. The volume of waste water annually dumped into the rivers and seas [[has assumed]] *is* vast [[proportions]]. At the same time, the construction of various types of /purification/ facilities has received little attention. Many countries have not established the necessary /controls/ over industrial enterprises which are polluting the water environment with their production wastes.

The dumping of wastes by the chemical industry is of particularly great danger to the resources of the World Ocean. Waste waters polluting coastal waters with toxic substances have a ruinous effect on the flora and the fauna of the seas. The dumping of untreated sewage into the sea pollutes not only the water but also the beaches with disease-producing bacteria, creating the threat of illness for the population.

In light of the foregoing we can assert that the World Ocean is in danger despite its /vast/ dimensions. The efforts of all of mankind are needed in order to eliminate this danger.

Here it is appropriate to note the words of the great Karl Marx: "Even an entire society, a nation, or even all societies existing at the same time taken together, are not the proprietors of the earth. They are merely its custodians, utilizing it, like boni patres familias, they must leave it improved for later generations."[9]

THE TRANSPORT AND FISHING FLEETS -- COMPONENTS OF THE SEA POWER OF THE STATE

Sea transport, which since ancient times has held one of the leading roles among modes of transportation, is an important component of the sea power of the state. In our time international shipping accounts for 75 to 80% of the total transport freight traffic. It is the most economical mode of transportation, owing to the great carrying capacity of ships,

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relatively small capital investment in equipment for shipping routes, and the lowest specific cost of power for moving freight [[at the same speed]] (as compared with other transportation modes). For these reasons the cost of marine shipping is 40 to 45 percent lower than rail traasport and more than 20 times less than motor transport.[10]

As world production grows, the need to move goods within the borders on one's own state territory as well as between countries is also growing. The desire of each state to accomplish those transfers with its own equipment is quite natural. Hence the need is arising to possess the necessary transport fleet which would ensure the economic and political independence of foreign trade and would not only permit a saving in foreign exchange [[expenditures]] for chartering ships but under certain conditions would also make it possible to gain considerable foreign exchange revenue for one's own treasury. For many so-called maritime countries of the world with a well developed transport fleet, foreign exchange receipts from merchant shipping are an important source for covering their foreign exchange deficit. As V. G. Bakayev, who for a long time headed the Soviet Merchant Marine, wrote in his work "The USSR on the World Sea Routes" (SSSR Na Mirovykh Morskikh Putyakh), "Such a major capitalist country as Great Britain, which regularly has a negative trade balance, to a significant degree covers the deficit through income from assigning about half of her own fleet to carry cargo for foreign charterers.

"Income from shipping plays just as significant a role in the foreign exchange balances of Norway, Denmark, Greece, Sweden, and several other countries. For example, the net annual income of the Norwegian Merchant Marine exceeds $700 million. Income from shipping constitutes from 17 to 19 percent of Sweden's foreign exchange balance."[11]

The volume of world maritime shipping is growing steadily *and has more than quadrupled over the last two decades, comprising around 3.2 billion tons in 1978. International maritime shipping developed at high rates, increasing by approximately 8.0% in volume annually.* [[Whereas in the early 1950's the merchant ships of the world carried some 600 million tons of cargo annually between countries and continents, in 1970 they were already carrying 2.4 billion tons.]]

If we also consider that the Merchant Marine is practically the only mode of transportation capable of mass shipments of cargo between continents and that the income from shipping plays a large part in the balance of payments of many states, then its enormous economic and political importance becomes understandable.

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Moreover, the transport fleet is considered by many countries to be not only an important instrument of the economy, but also an important reserve of the navy in the event of war. For example, the American naval command regards the transport fleet in wartime to be an integral part of the armed forces. In this connection, the construction of the Merchant Marine in the United States and its development are subordinated not only to economic factors, but also to the needs of accomplishing purely military missions which will inevitably be assigned to the transport fleet in wartime. This mission is to keep the country's military-economic potential at the necessary level by providing uninterrupted shipments of strategic raw materials and finished goods, assuring all forms of supplies to military bases located in other countries and also the sea and ocean transport of troops and military cargo.

British journalist David Fairhall in his book "Russia Looks to the Sea" (Rossiya Stremitsya v More), [[quite]] frankly writes that, in building new transport ships "... The American Government pays the cost of fulfilling 'special military requirements' which would permit the rapid outfitting of ships to carry out military missions as auxiliary ships of the US Navy.

"In the postwar years the US Government was paying shipowners an annual average of nearly 80 million dollars in subsidies. By 1960, half of the 500 or so US flag vessels in foreign trade were subsidized." He further writes: "If a merchant vessel is built with government aid, the Secretary of the Navy has the right to require inclusion of those military features, under the 1936 Act, which guarantees that a ship 'shall be capable of serving as a naval auxiliary.'" "American commentators on Soviet sea power," the British journalist states, "are fond of pointing out ways in which new Russian ships could be adapted for military use in wartime. However, these same commentators forget to remind their readers of the explicit nature of their own government's provisions in this respect."

[[He]] *Fairhall* further reveals the essence of those measures. "... Military features required of a merchant ship indicate that they must have: heavy lift gear; roll-on and roll-off facilities to load military vehicles; extra evaporator capacity to provide extra water for troops; and duplicated controls which would be less vulnerable to damage. If the Federal Maritime Board judges that such equipment is not commercially necessary it is paid for by the government. For example, a freighter costing about 13 million US dollars might include 90 thousand dollars' worth of defense features."

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The press has reported, for example, that the liner UNITED STATES, with a 2,000-passenger capacity, can be rapidly equipped to carry a division numbering 14,000 men.

American military experts assess that 4 displacement tons are required for each soldier from today's mechanized forces with full combat gear and, in addition, 2 displacement tons of shipping are required monthly to supply him.

As is well known, transport ships are widely utilized for logistical support of combatants at sea. In this connection, many countries of the world are devoting a great deal of attention to their navies and merchant marines with regard to developing equipment and organizing the transfer of cargo at sea, and also to the refueling of combatants and auxiliaries at sea while underway. The press has reported that the 31,400-ton displacement tankers (with nuclear propulsion) designed in the United States are supposed to provide for the transfer of 2,380 cubic meters of fuel per hour to another ship at sea at a speed of 15 knots.

Thus, the merchant transport fleet of the capitalist countries is being developed in consideration of wartime requirements, as an important means of naval support, and also to carry large contingents of troops and their armament and supplies.

In light of this, the transport fleet should be regarded as a versatile component of the sea power of a country which has an important role in wartime and in peacetime.

In that connection, the development and employment of the transport fleets of various countries in peacetime always occur within the sphere of the economic and political struggle in the international arena, which continues to be identified with the antagonistic social systems. Moreover, the struggle in this area today, which can be characterized as a struggle for influence on the world maritime communication routes, is steadily intensifying as world production and international trade and economic ties are developed. The problems of national and international maritime shipping are becoming increasingly acute and universal.

All the foregoing has generated a rapid growth in the [[civil]] *world transport* fleet.[[7]] [[Whereas in 1950 the world civil fleet numbered 30,852 ships, on 1 July 1973 59,606 ships were registered. In 20 years the total growth in the displacement of the fleet was almost threefold, reaching 289,927 register tons.]] *The entire world maritime transport*

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fleet as of 1 January 1978 consisted of 32,239 ships with an overall deadweight of 625,811,000 tons, including for the ten capitalist countries with the largest fleets (Table 6).[12]

[[Today according to Lloyd's figures, 110 states have a civil fleet. On 1 July 1973 the total displacement of the ships of the fleet of the capitalist states was 264.2 million register tons as compared with 224 million tons on 1 July 1971, i.e., it had increased almost 18% in two years.]]

Table 6

Country	Total as of 1 January 1978		
	No. of ships	Gross register tons, thousands	Deadweight, thousands of tons
World total	*32,239*	*364,774*	*625,811*
Including:			
Liberia	*2,432*	*74,216*	*145,587*
Japan	*4,036*	*37,242*	*62,863*
Great Britain	*1,812*	*30,309*	*50,612*
Greece	*2,807*	*29,895*	*50,108*
Norway	*1,103*	*26,738*	*48,615*
Panama	*2,430*	*18,741*	*31,098*
USA	*1,052*	*13,765*	*20,924*
France	*469*	*11,169*	*19,768*
Italy	*957*	*10,317*	*17,368*
FRG	*1,202*	*8,936*	*14,961*

The world transport fleet recently has been developing at high tempos. The mean annual rate of growth of the world transport fleet for 1970-1975 was 9.1%. Major changes occurred in the structure of the world transport fleet during the period 1966-1976: 1. Total deadweight of the tanker fleet increased by almost 3.4 times (from 84 million tons to 286 million tons);

2. The total deadweight of combination ships (for transporting liquid and bulk cargoes) increased 13 times and comprised 44 million tons by 1976;

3. The total deadweight of bulk carriers (ships for transporting bulk cargoes) increased almost 5.3 times and reached 103 million tons;

4. Ships for transporting oil and bulk cargoes make up around 80% of the overall tonnage in the contemporary transport fleet, while they comprised 56% in 1966.

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Table 6 attests to the concentration of tonnage in a small number of countries. For example, [[about 55]] *over 70%* of the [[growth in ship]] tonnage *of all ships in the world* is owned by [[six]] *ten* capitalist seapowers (Liberia *and Panama*, whose fleets belong largely to American and Greek shipowners, Japan, Great Britain, Greece, Norway, the United States, *Italy, France, and the FRG*).

The trend of development of the world's transport fleet after the Second World War and particularly in the last 10 to 15 years has been toward greater ship speed, size, cargo capacity, and specialization. The size and gross tonnage of merchant ships are steadily increasing. Thus, whereas in 1968 there were 12 large-tonnage ships, primarily tankers with a [[gross]] tonnage of 100,000 register tons or greater, in 1973 there were 293 such ships. It should also be noted that, although the group of ships with a [[gross]] tonnage of up to 4,000 register tons, designed basically for navigation in limited areas, comprises more than 65% of the total composition of the merchant fleet, the total [[gross]] tonnage of those ships is only 13% of the total tonnage of the world merchant fleet.

Along with the increase in the average size of ships, a rapid rejuvenation of the fleet is also taking place which is leading to a considerable qualitative improvement. The process of the rejuvenation of the fleet is traced very well in Table 7.

Table 7 Variation in Distribution of Gross Tonnage of the World Civilian[1] Fleet By Ship Age

Ship Age	1951		1957		1963		1971		1973	
	1,000 GRT	%	1,000 GRT	%	1,000 GRT	%	1,000 GRT	%	1,000 GRT	%
Less than 5 yr.	12427	15.3	23080	22.1	60806	31.3	91750	37.1	111628	38.2
5-9 yr.	40667	49.4	16130	15.4	44035	22.7	55074	22.3	70280	24.3
10-14 yr.	6141	7.5	36668	35.1	33949	17.7	43292	17.5	43997	15.3
15-19 yr.	2569	3.2	10380	10.0	17952	9.2	24653	10.0	32600	11.2
20-24 yr.	5446	6.7	3124	3.0	19096	9.8	11120	4.5	13660	4.7
More than 25 yr.	14500	17.9	15075	14.4	18314	9.3	21313	8.6	17762	6.3
Total	81750	100.0	104457	100.0	194152	100.0	247202	100.0	289927	100.0

[1] *The term "Civilian Fleet" is understood to mean the transport and fishing fleets simultaneously.*

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Thus, in 1973 ships [[less than]] *with an operating period of* ten years [[old]] comprised more than 62% of the gross tonnage. At the present time, ships which have been in operation no longer than four years rank first in number and gross tonnage.

The most important qualitative changes in ships of the merchant marine also include the increase in *their* speed ([[see]] Table 8). Whereas during the Second World War the speed of the majority of the merchant ships did not exceed 8 to 10 knots, today it has increased up to 14 to 16 knots, and many containerships steam at speeds up to 22 to 24 knots.

Table 8 Ship Speed of Different Classes, in Knots

Ship	Prewar Years	1950's	1960's
General Purpose	10-11	12-15	18-20
Containerships	13-15	14-20	20-26
Tankers	10-11	14-15	15-17
Fishing	8-10	12-14	15-17

On the average, over the last 30 to 35 years the speed of the statistically "average" ship of the world merchant fleet has increased 60 to 70%, but the trend in the increase in speed is not the same for ships of different types. The speed of tankers is increasing relatively slowly. In the prewar years the transport of oil and petroleum products by sea was carried out at an average speed of 11 knots. Today's tankers transport cargo at an average speed of 16 knots, and only individual high-speed tankers, of which there are very few, have a speed of some 19 knots.

A more distinct trend in the increase in speed is observed in liners. Until recently the speed of these ships did not exceed 16 to 18 knots. However, already by 1970 the world merchant fleet had some 230 dry-cargo ships with a speed of more than 20 knots. Today, orders are being placed for cargo liners with a speed of 20 to 24 knots and containerships with a speed of 22 to 27 knots. In this connection, the average speed of the containerships under construction is 35% higher than conventional ships intended for the transport of general cargo which are under construction. [[Eight containerships which will have a speed of 33 knots have been ordered by an American container company.]]

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Diesel ships are most widely employed in sea transport. The power of marine diesel engines is steadily growing. Only 15 years ago 10,000 hp was the limit for a single unit. Today this limit already exceeds 40,000 hp, while in the same period specific fuel consumption has been reduced by approximately 20% and diesel efficiency has reached 42%. In the near future all marine propulsion plants up to 25,000 hp will, it seems, be diesels.

Gas turbine propulsion plants are a relatively new type of main engine in the transport fleet. The few gas turbine ships existing at the present time are essentially experimental in nature. However, this type of engine has hopeful prospects for widespread introduction into the transport fleet due to its high degree of economy and capability of obtaining high power from compact units.

The increase in the size of ships and in their speed necessitates the building of more powerful marine propulsion plants. Nuclear-powered propulsion plants apparently will be used in the 60,000 to 150,000 hp range. At the present time, nuclear-powered ships [[are]] already [[in operation]] *have been built* in the USSR, the United States, [[and]] the FRG, *and Japan*. The United States is the leader among the capitalist countries in building nuclear propulsion plants. However, work on building nuclear-powered ships has still not gone beyond the experimental stage.

[[As we see,]] In the field of merchant ship construction the influence of scientific-technical progress is being displayed to an ever-greater degree and [[is]] *its achievements are* being utilized *only* by the developed countries with a powerful shipbuilding base and a high industrial potential. New types of merchant transport ships which are very interesting from a military-economic point of view have appeared in the world transport shipbuilding as a result of this influence and due to the ever growing requirements of many countries for large-scale shipping. These are primarily ships which are fully or partially equipped to carry cargo in containers. Containerships or cellular container carriers in which all the cargo spaces consist of cells for transporting and securing containers; semi-containerships, in which part of the holds or only a single hold is of cellular construction (when necessary they can be used both as container carriers and as conventional general-purpose ships); and, finally, combination ships -- Ro-Ro ships and LASH ships.

[[In 1970, container shipments were 14.3 million tons in the United States; 9.7 million tons in Great Britain;

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4.8 million tons in Japan; 3.2 million tons in Holland; 2.9 million tons in Belgium; and 2.1 million tons in FRG.]]

[[On 1 July 1973 there were 394 modern containerships totalling 5,899,000 gross register tons in operation in the world. The largest number of container ships were owned by the United States (104), Great Britain (92), Japan (37), and the FRG (48).]]

Containerization proved to be a most effective means for raising the productivity of cargo operations and the intensity of processing ships when general cargoes are shipped. Labor productivity rises 10-15 times and the throughput capacity of docks quadruples in transloading containers compared with the processing of conventional general cargoes.

By mid-1975 the number of containerships reached 419 with an overall gross tonnage of 6.2 million register tons. Over 75% of containership tonnage is registered in four countries: 1.8 million register tons in the United States, 1.3 million in Great Britain, 1.1 million in Japan, and 0.6 million register tons in the FRG.

The containership is one of the most technically sophisticated types of ships, with a high speed (16-26 knots) and a 60,000 to 120,000 hp propulsion plant. The average container capacity of such ships is approximately 1,200 standard 20-foot containers with a maximum cargo weight of around 20 tons.

Some 60% of the containerships are employed in two primary shipping areas: Europe to North America, and the United States to the Far East and Southeast Asia. The remaining ships are active between Europe and Australia, North America and the Mediterranean Sea, the United States and Australia and several other countries.

It should be noted that the bulk of military cargo can also be transported in containers, as confirmed by the experience of the US logistics forces in Vietnam.

Ships employing the horizontal /loading/ method [[(Ro-Ro type)]] have undergone considerable development. *When using these ships it is possible to attain the same high labor productivity during loading and unloading operations as when using containerships, as well as great flexibility in performing operations, as when using general-purpose dry-cargo ships. These ships are capable of transporting a large quantity of wheeled equipment and large-size cargoes unsuitable for containerization.*

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By 1975 the number of ships with the horizontal loading method totalled 142 with an overall gross tonnage of 510,000 register tons. Approximately 60% of such ships (small tonnage) are used for coastal shipping, and the remainder for shipping between the United States and Europe and between Europe and the Far East and Australia. [[In early 1971 there were more than 130 such ships in the world fleet, and about 80% of them had been built in a four-year period.]] They have a deadweight of 14,000 to 23,000 tons and a speed of 20 to 25 knots. These ships are normally fitted with stern ports. In addition, in some cases bow and side ports are also provided to speed loading operations. The special features of these ships are (for large-tonnage ships) their bow and stern thrusters, hinged automobile decks (car decks), the absence of cargo hoising equipment characteristic of conventional transport ships, and the widespread introduction of automation.

/Ro-Ro ships/ are especially effective as military transports, since they are capable of transporting military equipment and containers. The rate of cargo operations aboard them is faster than aboard containerships, since at the same time the unloading of equipment is proceeding at its own pace, they can ship containers aboard which are placed on deck. [[A major disadvantage of Ro-Ro ships, which lies in the need to moor them only by the stern, has been eliminated with the PARALLA-class Ro-Ro ships. The ramp aboard them is positioned at an angle to the diametral plane of the ship, permitting mooring alongside a conventional wharf. The role of such ships in military shipping has grown still further as a result.]]

Such specialized ships as LASH ships, which can also be widely used for military purposes, have also become widespread. The first lighter carriers began to appear in the United States in the late-1960's with the construction of LASH-type ships. They are designed to transport shallow-draft lighters weighing from 500 to 1,000 tons. [[On 1 July 1973]] *By mid-1975* there were [[20]] *27* LASH-type ships [[of various classes]] with a total of [[565,000]] *795,000* gross register tons in operation *in the world;* the United States had [[16]] *over 85% of them.* [[Norway had two, and Holland and the FRG each had one.]] Every LASH ship is a general-purpose dry-cargo ship. It can transport not only lighters, but also containers, wheeled vehicles, helicopters, package and palletized freight, and bulk /cargo/.

The modern American LASH-class ship SEA BEE is capable of transporting a motorized infantry brigade (previously this required five C-3 class transports) *and landing* troops [[can be landed]] on slightly improved beaches.

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The loading and unloading of from 43 to 89 dumb lighters is done using the ship's own facilities on water areas protected from wave action, with the activity taking less than a day.

LASH ships are used primarily for mixed sea-river shipping. Loaded lighters with shallow draft can be towed along rivers and canals for hundreds of kilometers into the interior and then returned after loading for departure with the next LASH ship.

LASH class ships are equipped with a portal crane of 500-ton load-lifting capacity. Lighters are hoisted by this crane from the stern and are unloaded there. SEA BEE class lighter carriers have cargo gear in the form of a platform accommodated in the ship's stern on which two lighters are placed simultaneously and the platform can be lowered to the water. The platform has a cargo carrying capacity of 2,000 tons.

Special basins and shore facilities for unloading LASH ships are being constructed to accommodate them in several world ports (Los Angeles, San Francisco, Houston, and Galveston in the United States, and Rotterdam, Bremerhaven, and Barcelona in Europe).

Experts believe that the use of LASH ships *in place of cargo ships* will make it possible to increase cargo handling productivity by a factor of five to ten [[over conventional cargo ships]], reduce the berthing time of ships and the /amount/ of cargo handling equipment, and also reduce capital investment for the construction of port facilities [[and expenditures for cargo operations as a whole]].

The changes occurring in the tanker fleet are [[very]] interesting. /Tankers/ play a very important role in supplying countries with raw materials and [[energy resources]] *fuel*, and [[also]] *are widely used* in /supplying/ fuel for armed forces. The average annual rate of growth of the world tanker fleet [[from 1965 through 1971]] *in recent years* was 10.4 percent. In [[1970]] *1976* international shipments of liquid fuel increased to [[1.37]] *1.39* million tons.

[[In 197[illegible] the gross tonnage of the ships of the world tanker fleet was 115,365,000 register tons, i.e., 39.8% of the gross tonnage of the entire merchant fleet.]] *According to the Lloyds Register, the entire liquid-cargo fleet of the capitalist world as of 1 January 1978 consisted of 7,121 ships with a total deadweight of around 333 million tons.* The largest [[number of tankers]] *tanker fleets* are owned by Liberia

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([[29.4 million register tons]] *92 million tons*), Japan ([[14.2 million register tons]] *32 million tons*), Great Britain ([[14.1 million register tons]] *29 million tons*), and Norway ([[11.2 million register tons]] *29 million tons*).

[[More than 60% of the cargo capacity of the world tanker fleet is comprised of tankers of from 50,000 to 372,000 deadweight tons.]] The growth in the role of major tanker ships of from 100,000 to 300,000 deadweight tons is a clear trend in the development of the tanker fleet.

Over the last 20 years the maximum [[size]] *tonnage* of tankers has increased by a factor of 17. This is linked to the fact that the operation of large-tonnage ships is more economical. *For example, the cost of shipping oil in a tanker with a cargo capacity of 100,000 tons a distance of 10,000 nautical miles is only 31% of the cost of shipping over the same distance in a tanker with a cargo capacity of 10,000 tons.* Therefore, it is not accidental that the number of orders for tankers with a cargo capacity of 250,000 to 300,000 tons has increased sharply, although the relative number of these tankers out of the total in operation is small, only 1.3 percent.

But there are *also* important considerations which are holding back the construction of large tankers. These include primarily the inability of ports to accommodate [[them]] *such ships* due to their shallow depths and the danger of major pollution of water areas in the event a supertanker has an accident or sinks. Being heavy and having a high degree of inertia, [[they]] *supertankers* are difficult to maneuver even [[at speeds of 14 to 16 knots and]] with bow thrusters. In order to reduce their speed, Japan has [[even]] developed special parachutes to /reduce/ the distance of the travel after the main engine is stopped.

Gas carriers designed to transport liquefied petroleum and natural gas [[have become of great]] *are acquiring increasing* importance to the transport fleet. [[On 1 July 1973, 374 gas carriers totalling 2,276,000 gross register tons were in operation.]]

The largest ships of that class have a carrying capacity of up to 71,000 cubic meters; their average capacity is about 6,500 cubic meters. At the present time, ships with a carrying capacity of 95,000 cubic meters of petroleum gas and 125,000 cubic meters of natural gas are under construction. The basic

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sectors for the transportation of liquefied gases are from Algeria to France, Great Britain, the United States, Italy, and Spain; Libya to Ital and Spain; and Alaska to Japan and the United States.

Let us briefly examine the basic data characterizing the transport fleet of several maritime capitalist powers.

Japan's Merchant Marine is 2d in the world in gross tonnage, and 86% of its total carrying capacity is made up of ships which have been in service less than ten years. The rapid growth of the Japanese transport fleet in recent years was achieved through the support of the state shipbuilding and shipping companies.

Since 1956 Japan's shipbuilding industry has been first in the world in gross tonnage of merchant ships constructed. If Japan's construction capabilities were fully utilized, according to rough calculations she could build more than 9 million gross register tons of shipping annually.

Japanese experts assert that in the event of a sharp increase in the country's demand for naval ships, this kind of industrial shipbuilding base could support the construction of warships of all types with a total displacement of up to 300,000 tons annually, while simultaneously building merchant ships with a total gross tonnage of 4 to 4.5 million register tons.

Despite the fact that Great Britain was formerly one of the leading seapowers, her share of the [[field]] *sphere* of merchant shipping is constantly decreasing. In the period of 1968 to 1972 the gross tonnage of the ships of the transport fleet increased by more than five million register tons, yet her relative share of the world transport fleet decreased from 11.6 to 10.6%. Great Britain's transport fleet presently is third in the world in gross tonnage behind the transport fleets of Liberia and Japan. The age of the ships in Great Britain's transport fleet corresponds to the average world level, i.e., 60% are ships with an age of less than 10 years.

Recently Great Britain's tanker fleet, which comprises [[40]] *over 50%* of the gross tonnage of the British transport fleet, has undergone considerable growth. [[The tanker fleet totals 600 ships, 50 of which are supertankers. The largest British tanker, UNIVERSE IRELAND, has a deadweight of 326,000 tons.]]

Great Britain has a developed shipbuilding industry with an annual capacity to turn out up to three million register tons of merchant ships and is also capable of building large numbers of naval ships of all types.

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On 1 [[July 1971]] *January 1978* the transport fleet of Greece numbered [[2,241]] *2,807* ships with a total of [[15,329,000]] *29,895,000* gross register tons [[(5.8% of the world tonnage)]], including [[304]] *370* tankers ([[5,205,000]] *9,324,000* register tons). In addition, Greek shipowners own [[about 1,250]] *over 1,200* ships (*around* 18 million register tons) registered under other flags.

[[On 1 July 1973]] *By 1978* Greece's Merchant Marine occupied [[fifth]] *fourth* place among the transport fleets of the world [[, having increased by 4,166,000 register tons in two years]].

Greece's shipbuilding industry is poorly developed, and foreign shipyards are the basic source of the new ships expanding its fleet.

The Norwegian transport fleet is [[fourth]] *fifth* in the world. It is of primary importance to the country's economy: 90% of the capacity of its ships is utilized for shipments between the ports of different countries, 8% is employed between the ports of Norway and other states, and 2% between its own ports. About 80% of the gross tonnage of Norway's fleet is made up of the ships less than ten years old. Basically the fleet is composed of large-tonnage ships [[, and]]. There is no doubt that the capacity of the ships will increase in the future due to the fact that Norway is a country with a highly developed shipbuilding industry[[. The shipbuilding industry of Norway numbers]] *numbering* about 150 enterprises building ships with a total capacity of up to 500,000 register tons annually.

The United States of America has a transport fleet which is in seventh place among the world transport fleets. According to the Merchant Marine Act passed by the US Congress in 1936, the United States must not depend on foreign shipowners and shipyards and must have a transport fleet consisting of ships built in the United States, belonging to US citizens, and manned by US citizens. These ships must carry all coastal shipments and a considerable part of the foreign trade shipments. In wartime they can be used by the armed forces as auxiliary ships.

During the Second World War the United States built a very large transport fleet. In 1945 its gross tonnage was about 59% of the tonnage of the transport fleet of all the capitalist countries, but this fleet was poorly balanced and was distinguished by its poor operational characteristics. Therefore, in 1946 they began to sell some ships, to put ships into the reserve, and to scrap some.

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The new law on the marine transport fleet and the shipbuilding program adopted in 1970 are aimed at increasing the former sea might of the United States in the world charter market. On 1 [[July 1973]] *January 1978*, the US transport fleet had ships with a gross tonnage of [[14,312,000]] *20,924,000* register tons[[, of which five million register tons were in the reserve fleet]]. It must be noted that the main part of the transport fleet of Liberia and Panama belongs to American shipowners. They use the flags of convenience of these countries to gain excessive profits by /paying/ minimal wages and hiring lowly paid crews whose wage scales are outside the control of US unions.

About 60% of the gross tonnage of the US transport fleet is made up of ships which have been in service more than 20 years. The US government has adopted a ten-year program to rejuvenate the fleet calling for the construction of 300 ships. The new ships will be designed with a view to their use for military purposes based on the experience in waging the war in Vietnam, where ships of the transport fleet carried a large volume of military shipments. The construction of tankers, LASH ships, and general-purpose ships primarily is envisioned.

The United States has a developed shipbuilding industry whose production capacity permits it during mobilization to build naval ships of all types with a total standard displacement of about 1.7 million tons annually and merchant ships with a total cargo capacity of about *16* million tons annually.

The transport fleet of the Federal Republic of Germany is in [[11th]] *10th* place in the *capitalist* world. The majority of the ships (80%) are less than ten years old, and a small percentage is made up of ships which have been operating more than 25 years. The FRG rebuilt her own shipbuilding industry rather rapidly in the postwar period. At the present time, the country has more than 50 shipbuilding yards. There are about 80 thousand workers in shipbuilding enterprises. Construction of containerships and large-tonnage tankers is underway, and a nuclear-powered transport ship has been built. The shipbuilding industry of the FRG is distinguished by the concentration of its enterprises, 88% of the production capacity being concentrated in Hamburg, Bremen-Bremerhaven, Kiel, and Emden alone.

The largest containerships are built at the Howaldtswerke-Deutsche Werft AG. High-speed (up to 33 knots) containerships are built at the AG Wester and the Rheinstahl-Nordseewerke shipyards.

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An analysis of the data published in the foreign press [[makes it possible to discern]] *attests to* the following trends in the development of the world transport fleet in the near future.

The dry-cargo fleet will continue to be rapidly expanded with large, high-speed containerships without their own cargo handling equipment for operation on lines with stable cargo traffic, and also with smaller and slower containerships with cargo cranes for delivering containers to unequipped ports. Third-generation containerships with a cargo capacity of up to 40,000 tons carrying 2,000 or more 20-foot containers will be widely used. The further increase in *size of* containerships will be limited not so much by technical capabilities as by market considerations and the size of canals and locks.

Ro-Ro ships will be built for operation on short lines connecting areas with a developed highway network.

LASH ships will be built to provide through shipment of cargo between sea and river ports. They will evidently be widely used in *purely* merchant shipping [[as a means]] to reduce berth time. The "maximum" variant in that type of ships may turn out to be composite ships with a completely detachable, replaceable cargo section.

The construction of general-purpose dry-cargo ships will be reduced while construction of specialized ships equipped to transport certain kinds of cargo will be increased. The number of transport ships equipped for ice navigation and icebreakers being built will increase. Construction of high-speed passenger ships and also of relatively quiet-running ships for long cruises will increase.

It can be assumed that the new transport ships will possess the following characteristics.

The speed of ships of several categories will be considerably increased. The speed of major containerships and Ro-Ro ships, LASH ships, and other ships which reduce the time for loading operations will be increased and will probably exceed 30 knots in the near future. It is planned to achieve this increase in speed mainly by increasing the power of the engines.

The [[use of the]] principle of navigation on hydrofoils at speeds of 40 to 50 knots [[is limited to]] *will be used in constructing* passenger ships with a displacement of not more than 1,000 tons, since a further increase in the displacement of such ships is economically unprofitable and technically difficult.

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More promising for the construction of major high-speed transport ships is the principle of navigating on an air cushion, whose efficiency increases as the dimensions of the ship increase. The displacement of air-cushion ships will [[be determined by]] *depend on* capabilities for building high-power propulsion plants.

The size of ships for transporting bulk cargo will be increased, and the carrying capacity of ships for transporting bulk cargo will exceed 250,000 register tons.

Gas-turbine and steam-turbine propulsion plants, and later also cost-effective nuclear-powered propulsion plants, will be more widely used [[in connection with the need to]] *with the* increase *in* speed and size of ships and consequently also the power *of main engines*. Light diesels and geared-diesel propulsion plants will be widely employed *as main engines* aboard ships with less [[powerful main engines]] *power*. Integrated automated shipboard engineering systems will be widely used which will permit a sharp reduction in crew size and an increase in the economy of the equipment.

The world tanker fleet will grow with the steady increase in the volume of shipments of oil and petroleum production [[(in 1976 it may exceed 2.4 billion tons)]]. The increase in the size of tankers is one of the most important trends in the development of the tanker fleet. The cargo capacity of the larger tankers has already reached 500,000 register tons (the question of building a tanker with a deadweight of one million tons is being studied). According to the predictions of the Japan Steel and Tube Company, in 1981 the average carrying capacity of tankers on order will be 190,000 tons, and a third of the operating tankers will have a cargo capacity of more than 100,000 tons.

A further increase in tanker tonnage is being held back by the depth of, and navigational conditions in, canals and straits. Moreover, the number of ports capable of accommodating large-tonnage tankers is increasing from year to year.

The ports, *especially major ports*, [[which represent the terminal points of marine communications routes have always been]] *are* an important part of the transport fleet. At present there are about 420 major seaports in the capitalist countries whose *annual* freight traffic exceeds one million tons each. It is natural that their development has been influenced by such major events as the appearance of various types of giant ships, including ships which are capable of transporting bulk cargo in containers "portal-to-portal." The requirements for operating

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the latest ships, whose main characteristics are shown below in Table 9, are determined by the dimensions of the approach channels to the ports, and of channels [[and]] *in* narrows, the size of the berths and their depth, and also other characteristics of ports and harbors.

Table 9 Basic Characteristics of the Latest Types of Ships

Ship Type	Full Load Capacity, Ton	Length	Beam	Draft
Tanker	500	380	67	26.5
Tanker	200	340	50	17.5
OBO	150	305	48	16.5
OBO	80	260	35	14.5
Dry Cargo Ships	30	210	26	11.5
Dry Cargo Ships	20	175	23	10.5

At the present time mainly roadstead berths of various designs and oil transshipment bases are being built and dredging work at existing wharfs is being done in order to handle large-tonnage tankers. One of the first petroleum transshipment bases was the Bantry Base built in Southern Ireland in Bantry Bay. It can service giant tankers with a draft of up to 25 meters. The Bantry transshipment base is a roadstead berth with a depth of 30 meters. This berth is connected with the shore by a viaduct which carries two crude-oil pipelines. The shore facilities consist of 12 tanks with a capacity of *95,400* cubic meters of crude oil, two ballast tanks, and bunkering and auxiliary facilities. The giant tankers deliver oil here from the ports of the Persian Gulf, and later oil is carried aboard tankers with a capacity of up to 100,000 tons to ports on the European continent.

The oil refining plants located on the European continent receive crude oil by pipeline from six major ports: Rotterdam (the Netherlands), Fos and Le Havre (France), Trieste and Genoa (Italy), and Wilhelmshaven (FRG).

The ports of Rotterdam, Fos, and Le Havre can accommodate very large tankers with a cargo capacity of up to 250,000 tons, Genoa can handle tankers up to 220,000 tons, Wilhelmshaven, up to 210,000 tons (not fully loaded), and Trieste, up to 200,000 tons. Japan has ports (Yokohama, Chiba, and several others) capable of accommodating very large tankers with a carrying capacity of 200,000 to 300,000 tons.

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However, the total number of ports in the world which can accommodate ships drawing 15 meters or more does not exceed 20. Even the United States, which intends by 1985 to import half of the oil and natural gas consumed in the country, has no such port. The daily import of oil and petroleum products into the United States has reached two million tons, and 2,600 tankers with a carrying capacity of 47,000 tons or 500 tankers with a carrying capacity of 250,000 tons are required to transport that amount. They intend to construct three deep-water ports to accommodate and process cargoes of supertankers -- one on the US East Coast, another on the US West Coast, and a third on the Gulf of Mexico.

In connection with the development of container shipping, the traditional functions of a port as a storage and distribution center and as a terminus for various modes of transportation have been pushed into the background. At the same time, the port's role is growing as a transshipment center within a unified transport system. A port must devote considerably greater attention than ever to reducing the lay days of containerships operating on a firm schedule not only by reducing their cargo handling time but also by reducing the number of auxiliary operations. Cargo must also remain in port for a minimum amount of time. Therefore, great importance is being attached to improving the *condition of* water approaches, the piloting service and harbor service craft, raillines and roads clearing the port, parking areas, and so forth.

Special container areas and wharves have been built in all major ports of the highly developed capitalist states. In recent years Rotterdam has become the major center of the European ports for transshipping containers. In 1971, some 320,000 containers were handled. Rotterdam is also the largest port in the world with respect to freight traffic; in 1971 the turnover was 231.7 million tons, including 169.8 million tons in imports and *61.9* million tons in exports.

In the near future the nature of port construction will also reflect the appearance of air-cushion ships and hydrofoils, whose importance for shipping cargoes and passengers over short hauls will obviously increase.

Thus, the development of the main ports of the world will proceed along a path toward greater dredging work, the construction of new deep-water berthing facilities, the equipping of special container areas and wharves capable of handling containerships, and port specialization.

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The Soviet merchant transport fleet, like the fleet of any state, is a component part of the sea power of the USSR. The transformation of our country during the years of Soviet power into a highly developed industrial power, the stable growth of the economic might of the USSR, and the steady expansion of its foreign trade ties have brought about the vigorous development of sea transport in the USSR.

The Soviet Union's sea transport has been transformed into a leading, technically well equipped, and highly profitable sector of the national economy which fully meets the economic needs of the country.

The Merchant Marine of the USSR currently occupies second place in freight traffic among the modes of transportation in the country. The role of marine shipping is especially great in the Far East and North, where the Merchant Marine is practically the sole mode of transportation assuring the shipment of the most varied cargo to numerous coastal points.

The sea transport needed to support foreign trade is of particularly great importance to the Soviet Union. Fleet operations in this area comprise about 90% of the total volume of its freight traffic.

Cooperation by the Soviet Merchant Marine is successfully being developed within the framework of Socialist economic integration, embracing many spheres of its operations. The significance of [[this]] *the fleet* has begun to be more widely felt in connection with the transport requirements of the countries fighting for their freedom and independence, and also of the developing countries which are striving for economic independence, yet, as a rule, have no transport fleet of their own.

The Soviet Union is free of the capitalist charter market in its foreign trade. She can maintain and develop trade relations with any maritime country using her own transport fleet.

The successful accomplishment of the postwar development plans by the merchant transport fleet has made it possible to fully support the needs of the economy and to guarantee the immunity of the country's foreign economic ties against unforeseen circumstances, such as the blockade of Cuba or the closure of the Suez Canal.

The Soviet merchant transport fleet is acquiring ever greater weight in the world shipping [[by expanding]] *thanks to an expansion of* shipments for foreign charterers. It is

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thereby carrying out an important state mission with respect to the export of transport services, and is making a considerable annual contribution to the state's balance of trade.

The Great Patriotic War [[from 1941 to 1945]] was a very important stage in the history of the development of the merchant transport fleet of our country as well as for the national economy as a whole. In the course of the war the merchant transport fleet[[, hand in hand with the Navy, accomplished work of vast importance, supplying]] *supplied* the needs of the fronts and the economy of the nation with national economic and military shipments. In many cases sea communications routes were the main and frequently the only way of delivering military cargo. Soviet transport ships sailing on almost every sea and ocean supported transport communications with allied countries and were frequently subjected to attacks by enemy aircraft and submarines.

[[In the course of its heroic work]] In the period of the Great Patriotic War, the Soviet transport fleet, which by 1941 had 800 ships with a total carrying capacity of more than two million tons in its inventory, lost [[363]] *380* ships with a total carrying capacity of about [[700,000]] *one million* tons.[13]

The great, concerted work by the Soviet people in reviving the national economy made it possible by 1950 to bring the *volume of sea* cargo shipments by the Merchant Marine up to the 1940 level, and by 1965 the cargo capacity of the Soviet transport fleet exceeded 8.5 million tons.

In [[recent]] *subsequent* years the sea transport fleet of the USSR [[has]] continued to develop at a fast pace. Whereas in 12 years (from 1946 through 1958) the freight traffic of the Soviet Merchant Marine increased from 15.9 to 57.4 billion ton-miles, i.e., by a factor of 3.6, subsequently only seven years were needed to achieve the same growth.

In 1973 the gross tonnage of our fleet (including ships of the transport fleet, fishing fleet, and scientific-research fleet) reached 17.4 million register tons[[. The Soviet Union has moved from 12th place in the world, which it occupied with respect to the tonnage of the civil fleet until 1960, up to sixth place.]] with a total carrying capacity of about 14 million tons. This has fully supported the needs of the foreign commerce of the USSR, whose turnover increased from 2.9 billion rubles in 1950 to 31.3 billion rubles in 1973. [[In 1973 the Soviet transport fleet numbered 1,602 ships]] [[Each year its inventory is being expanded with large numbers of new ships of the most varied classes and categories. In 1973 the fleet

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received more than 80 ships with a total carrying capacity of more than 700,000 tons, and in 1974 its inventory was increased by almost 90 ships with a cargo capacity of about 900,000 tons.]] *By 1978 the Soviet Merchant Marine had a total of over 20.8 million register tons.*[14]

[[As a result, the Soviet merchant transport fleet has become younger in the age of its inventory than the world fleet as a whole. Thus, 64.4% of the total gross tonnage of the USSR has been in service less than ten years, as compared with 62.7% for the world fleet.]]

The Merchant Marine of the USSR has ships of various designs, beginning with ships for coastal navigation and ending with the largest ships, such as the tanker KRYM with a cargo carrying capacity of 150,000 tons, which makes it possible for her to carry shipments to all areas of the World Ocean. [[Its]] *The Soviet Merchant Marine* inventory includes dry-cargo ships and tankers, ships for transporting wood chips, and coal and ore, icebreakers and icebreaker-transport ships, container-ships, *Ro-Ro ships,* and river-sea ships, and other classes of ships. In [[1973]] *1978* the [[carrying capacity]] *gross tonnage* of the Soviet tanker fleet [[reached almost five]] *exceeded 4.3* million *register* tons.

The Soviet Union also has a major fleet of passenger ships sailing on 17 international and many coastal lines.

In the 10th Five-Year Plan the Merchant Marine will be augmented by highly productive dry-cargo ships, liquid-cargo ships and combination ships with a total tonnage of around five million tons. Construction of a series of containerships accommodating up to 730 containers will be completed. The Merchant Marine also began to be augmented by large Ro-Ro ships which can accommodate up to 14,500 tons of cargo in larger-size packets or over 1,300 20-foot containers. It is envisaged that LASH-type ships will be delivered for the route from the Danube to the sea, which accommodate the shipping of 26 lighters with a full-load displacement of 1,300 tons each, as well as LASH-type ships for the Far Eastern Basin carrying 42-44 lighters with a loaded displacement of 500 tons each.

Construction will continue of specialized ships with a deadweight of 6,000 and 11,000 tons for transporting timber cargoes, and of barge and tug units for carrying these cargoes in the Far Eastern Basin. The construction of bulk carriers of varying load capacities, refrigerator ships, and ships for transporting heavy cargoes up to 700 tons is planned.

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The Merchant Marine of our country is not only ships. The Soviet Union has more than 70 ports each handling an annual volume of not less than one million tons. A majority of these ports have deep-water mechanized wharves, good warehousing, and well planned areas with spur tracks.

New major ports are under construction on the Far East coast and in the Black Sea which will considerably surpass most major ports in our country in level of equipment and handling capacity. The level of coordinated mechanization of on-loading and off-loading operations is increasing each year. This has permitted a sharp increase in the handling capacity of the /sea gates/ of the USSR. The Soviet Merchant Marine is serviced by more than 30 repair yards which, together with the ship crews, assure that the fleet is in good technical condition.

All productive activity of the Soviet merchant transport fleet is conducted by 17 merchant shipping lines organized into three associations: the Northwest Fleet, the Southern Fleet, and the Far Eastern Fleet. Registered ships, ports, ship repair yards, and salvage-rescue and other organizations directly associated with the work of the fleet and with supporting and servicing it are subordinate to them. The fleet is doing a great deal of work on improving control at all levels, beginning with the ships and ending with the sector as a whole. Automated planning and control systems are being built and introduced for that purpose.

The [[Party and government]] *25th CPSU Congress decreed to* envision that [[the Merchant Marine of the USSR]] *marine transportation* will be further developed, *and that the growing needs of the national economy for foreign trade and coastal shipping will be satisfied more fully. In this connection there is an* [[It is planned to]] increase *in* freight volume, [[expand]] the fleet *is being expanded* with new, highly economical general-purpose and specialized ships, *and* [[increase]] the capacity of the seaports, and [[increase]] the capacity of ship repair enterprises *are being increased*.

[[Thus,]] The future development of all components comprising the unified whole of this sector of the national economy of the country and of its sea might, known as the merchant transport fleet, is envisioned.

The fishing fleet is an integral part of the civil fleet and is an important component of the sea power of the state. The role of this fleet has increased sharply as a result of progress in man's exploitation of the World Ocean and as a result of the increase in the scale of utilization of various

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animal and plant products from the sea for food and industrial purposes. Its most important task is to provide an answer to the acute food problem confronting mankind.

According to official figures from the Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations, the food situation of the world's population is poor mainly due to an animal protein deficiency in its diet which afflicts some two billion persons, i.e., half of the entire population. Such an abnormal situation affecting the growth in the world's population is aggravated by the capitalist attitude in a majority of the countries. Therefore, mankind is increasingly turning its gaze toward the potential biological resources of the World Ocean.

Men have been engaged in fishing and catching of sea animals since time immemorial; however, the development of the fishing fleet on an industrial basis began in the latter half of the 19th century in connection with the sharp increase in demand for protein and the improvement in navigation equipment.

At first that process proceeded slowly. Thus, during the period 1850 to 1900 the average annual increase in the world catch was very modest by modern standards -- about 40,000 tons. In the period between the two world wars solid increases were already being achieved -- 1.3 million tons -- and in the postwar period the average increase has reached 2.3 million tons.

At the present time fish (89%) are of the greatest importance in sea and ocean fishing, followed by mollusks, (5%), crustaceans (2.3%), sea animals (1.8%), water vegetation (1%), and others.[15]

In the period 1948 through 1967, the world catch of fish and the yield of other products of the sea increased almost threefold, from 22 million tons to 62 million tons. However, after 1967, despite a considerable improvement in the technical level of equipping the fishing fleet, the rate of growth in the catch markedly decreased. One reason for this is the exhaustion of the fishing stock due to the unforeseen increase in the catch in the important, well exploited fishing grounds. Therefore, the [[question of the]] *acute* need *has arisen* to set fishing quotas for several types of fish and for the catching of sea animals and to establish an entirely scientifically based system for conducting marine fishing [[is becoming the order of the day]].

At the present time, the exploitation of marine biological resources yields about three-quarters of all revenue [[that mankind derives]] *derived* from the World Ocean. Commercial fishing

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employs more than seven million people in the world. The world catch of fish and other marine products has reached 70 million tons a year. This figure is relatively close to the optimal permissible figure which is determined by taking into account the actual annual natural reproduction of the biological volume of marine products and the conditions for their propagation in the oceans.

Many hundreds of thousands of rowboats, and sailing and motorships are engaged in fishing and in catching marine animals in the world. However, the modern fishing fleet is based on large powered ships designed to catch fish and capture sea animals in remote areas of the seas and oceans, process the product, and store and transport it to shore bases.

Lloyd's /Register/ classifies modern fishing ships into two main groups according to their design: trawlers and other fishing ships with a gross tonnage of from 100 to 4,000 register tons or more; fishing transports and fish factory ships (according to our terminology, transport refrigerator ships and floating fishing bases) with a gross tonnage of from 100 to 10,000 register tons or more.

Modern fishing ships possess considerable seaworthiness, and great range and endurance. As a rule, they are equipped with the latest navigational, sonar, and electronic gear, and the latest fishing and technical equipment.

Scientific research in the field of fish biology conducted in many countries, but primarily in the Soviet Union, the forecasting of areas and routes of fish movements, the development on that basis of new methods of surveying fish resources and the necessary equipment for detecting them, and also new, more advanced methods for catching, processing, storing, and delivering products to the consumer have played a major role in the development of the world fishing fleet in the postwar period.

The growth in the output of marine products by the fishing fleet is playing a considerable role in the production of food products and raw materials for the operation of many sectors of industry. Therefore, at the present time almost 80 countries are engaged in commercial fishing. [[The Soviet Union is in third place after Peru and Japan in size of catch.]]

In [[1974]] *1976* the large-tonnage fishing fleet of the world numbered [[17,955]] *19,651* ships (of 100 register tons or larger) with a total gross tonnage of [[about 10.7]] *over 11.8* million register tons.[16] Included are [[17,262]] *18,923*

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fishing vessels (trawlers, seiners, sealing schooners, and others) with a total tonnage of [[7.33]] *8.24* million register tons, and [[693]] *728* processing and transport ships with a total of [[about 3.45]] *over 3.6* million register tons.

Japan is first in the world among the capitalist countries in number and gross tonnage of ships in the fishing fleet[[; however, Peru exceeds it]] *and* in size of catch.

In [[1974]] *1976* Japan's fishing fleet numbered [[3,198]] *3,076* ships with a total of about [[1.26]] *1.19* million register tons. In that country fishing employs about three million people, and the annual catch [[is]] *in 1974 was* [[is more than 8.6]] *10* million tons of fish and other marine products. Fish is one of her staples and an important export product.

The Republic of Peru, whose fishing fleet in number and total tonnage is only 11th in the world ([[604]] *608* ships of about [[125,000]] *126,000* register tons), [[has the highest catch in the world,]] *catches* more than nine million tons annually, owing to her direct proximity (30 to 50 miles) to the richest Pacific Ocean fishing grounds.

The largest fishing countries are the United States ([[1,577]] *1,886* large-tonnage ships with a total tonnage of about [[358,000]] *425,000* register tons), Norway ([[606]] *689* ships with a total tonnage of [[204,000]] *218,000* register tons), and the Republic of South Africa (143 ships with a total tonnage of 75,000 register tons). Each of these countries annually catches from two to three million tons of fish and other sea products. Great Britain, Canada, Iceland, Denmark, Chile, and others with an annual catch of more than one million tons occupy an important position among the other capitalist fishing countries.

[[Characteristically, Peru and Japan have about one-third of the world fishing catch, while the share of the leading 15 fishing countries is about four-fifths of the catch (these countries include Peru, Japan, the USSR, the PRC, Norway, the United States, the Republic of South Africa, India, Spain, Canada, Denmark, Chile, Indonesia, Thailand, and Great Britain.)]]

Up until 1957, the Atlantic Ocean[[, and especially its northern part,]] provided the main part of world marine fish yield. Later the center of operations was shifted to the Pacific Ocean, whose share by 1970 amounted to about 55% of the world catch[[, more than half of which was taken in the northern part of the ocean. At the same time, 41% of the world catch

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was taken in the Atlantic Ocean, with two-thirds of it taken in the northern part of the Ocean]]. The Indian Ocean's share of the world catch of marine products [[has fallen]] *is* only [[to]] about five percent.

Experience in two world wars has shown that fishing ships were widely used within the Navy to carry out auxiliary and combat missions, primarily in the area of defense and protection of ports and naval base areas.

Our country has a major fishing fleet which constitutes the foundation of its fishing industry. The basis for the building of the Soviet fishing fleet was laid on 9 December 1918, when by decree of the Supreme Council of the National Economy the Main Administration of Fishing and the Fishing Industry (Glavryba) in Russia was established. In the following years the government contributed a great deal of money to expanding the technical capabilities of the sea fishing fleet, above all for acquiring and building ships.

The war considerably slowed the development of Soviet fishing and its fleet. It suffered great losses in the Azov-Black Sea, Baltic, and North Sea basins. Shore enterprises of the fishing industry, ports, and shipbuilding yards were put out of service, and about 5,000 ships were lost. The country's fishing /catch/ dropped sharply.

Work on building and developing the Soviet fishing fleet was expanded with new intensity after the end of the war, and today one can meet fishing ships flying the flag of our Motherland in the most distant regions of the World Ocean.

In the Ninth Five-Year Plan our fishing fleet entered a phase of fundamental technical transition [[which will permit a considerable expansion of the fishing zone]] *and achieved great results in this area.* At the present time 87% of the total fish catch in the USSR is taken from ocean fishing grounds. Fishing intensity has increased threefold, despite the fact that many capitalist states have expanded the zone of their territorial sea and have established special fishing zones with a breadth of up to 200 miles as a result of which up to 40% of the area of the commercial fishing shelf with a possible fish catch of ten million tons annuallly has become closed to fleets of other countries.

The reduction in fishing bases owing to the increase in the radius of operations of the fleet on the World Ocean has also stimulated the development of fishing at great depths. Whereas up to the Second World War trawling was done at depths

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to 200 to 400 meters, trawling at depths to 1,000 meters has now been mastered. The Soviet Union is ahead of the other countries of the world in exploiting deep-water fishing grounds. Appropriate research in deep-water trawling is also being conducted in the FRG, Spain, France, and Great Britain. In those countries ships of certain types are capable of trawling at depths of 600 to 1,000 meters.

Today the Soviet fishing fleet is first among the major fishing fleets of the world in number of ships of different types. It has fishing, processing, and transport ships and also the necessary means of support.

The ships of the Soviet fishing fleet are distinguished by their versatility, i.e., they have various types of fishing equipment. Consequently, they are not tied to seasonal catching of certain types of fish, and are capable of completely processing the catch. They are characterized by high economic efficiency.

Further development of the fishing fleet has been conditioned by the fact that the fishing grounds will continue to be far from the shore bases. The nature of the work of the fishing ships will change as the structure of the fishing fleet changes. Supertrawlers designed for independent operations in distant areas under difficult weather conditions will appear in the inventory of the fishing [[ships]]*fleet*. There will be an increase in the number of medium, general-purpose fishing ships designed to operate within expeditions and also independently on fishing grounds in offshore waters, where the use of large fishing ships is uneconomical. The number of specialized fishing ships and also support ships will increase.

Considering the development of shipbuilding technology, we can assume that new fishing ships in the near future will possess considerably more powerful propulsion plants which will permit them not only to sharply increase their productivity by utilizing larger trawls and by fishing at higher trawling speeds and in deeper water, but also by increasing the mobility of the fleet as a whole. Moreover, the new propulsion capabilities will pave the way for a further improvement in the technology of processing catches, will permit a considerable improvement in living and working conditions for the crew, and will improve navigational safety.

The further development of the fishing fleet will make a considerable contribution to providing the Soviet people with food products. At the same time, the expansion of the areas of navigation of the fishing fleet will expand our knowledge

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of the World Ocean as a result of extensive oceanographic, meteorological, and other research of the ocean environment, conducted along with the fishing work.

Through their voyages lasting many months, thousands of sailors of the transport and fishing fleets are demonstrating to the entire world the devotion of our people to seafaring and a love for this difficult but glorious profession which our forefathers practiced many centuries ago, and they are debunking the myth of the "landlubber traits of the [[Russian nation and of all]] Soviet people.

The seapower of the Soviet state is based primarily on remarkable cadres of professional mariners who devote their entire lives to a fascinating and very difficult maritime profession.

Problems of International Maritime Law

[[The World Ocean is vast, yet no matter how broad its expanses, the level of interest of every country in the world in utilizing its hydrosphere and its resources is just as great, so that international regulation, which is an integral part of the peaceful cooperation of all countries, has been needed to assure freedom of navigation, fishing, and scientific research.]]

[[This regulation has found expression in international maritime law, which defines the legal regime of the expanses of the World Ocean and the activity of states in the sphere of navigation and use of the hydrosphere in peacetime and in wartime.]]

The World Ocean has been used by mankind since time immemorial. As the first class society in history -- the slave-owning society -- became entrenched, navigation also developed and at that time served as one of the important means of developing slave trade and commerce. This was marked by the development of several unwritten maritime customs, the observance of which was considered obligatory and which somewhat later were codified in written documents in the nature of a treaty, and which assumed the importance of international standards. Thus, in the third and second centuries B.C. there appeared the Rhodian Code, which was recognized by the Greeks and Romans. The provisions of this code were later given the name Rhodian Sea Law. In the seventh century a maritime code of Byzantine law, the "Basilica," emerged with regulated trade in countries of the Levant. Later other codes of maritime laws and customs also became known. They were all aimed at protecting the trade interests of the more powerful slave-owning states of that day and were based on the concept that "*might* makes right." However, even at that time ideas were being voiced about freedom of the high seas. For example, according to classical Roman Law it was considered that the air, running water, and the sea are a natural right intended for common use of all peoples.

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With the transition to the feudal method of production, the huge slave-owning states were broken up into many small independent kingdoms. The feudalists considered themselves to be not only the absolute owners of their own lands, but also the owners of rivers crossing their possessions and even of the seas and oceans.

The aspiration of the suzerains for personal enrichment fostered numerous intenstine wars which served as the sole means of territorial acquisition. This was aided to a great extent by the high level of development of productive forces and equipment in comparison with the slave-owning society. The possibility arose of breaking away from the shore with the aid of a rather advanced sailing fleet and of seeking new lands in order to seize their riches.

The era of great geographical discoveries gave impetus to the development of navigation and, along with this, to piracy, the slave trade, and aggressive campaigns. In this period, "*might* makes right" assumed even greater importance, which also found expression in maritime law.

The seizure by the sea powers of newly discovered lands led at the same time to the appropriation of certain maritime areas. Thus, in 1494 and 1529, Spain and Portugal set the boundaries of their spheres of influence in the World Ocean in a treaty: Spain declared her exclusive right to shipping in the Western Atlantic, the Gulf of Mexico, and in the Pacific Ocean, while Portugal declared her exclusive right to shipping in the Eastern Atlantic and Indian Ocean. These sea powers conferred upon themselves the right to pursue and seize as prizes all foreign ships appearing in the waters which they controlled, to levy customs duties upon them, and also to try the crews under their own laws.

In the Middle Ages other states also aspired to control the seas: Denmark, the Northern Seas located between Norway, Iceland, and Greenland; Genoa, the Ligurian Sea and the Gulf of Lion; and England, all seas and oceans washing her territory, while Venice declared the Adriatic Sea to be her property.[17]

Coming out against such claims to the high seas, the developing bourgeoisie and its ideologists put forth a demand for freedom of navigation and freedom of economic regulations. Thus, in 1609 in his book Mare Liberum the Dutch jurist Hugo Grotius presented convincing justification for the protection of freedom of the high seas against England's supremacy on the seas.

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Thus, the active battle against the reactionary principle of the feudal right to ownership of the seas and the battle for recognition of freedom of the seas began in the period of the establishment of capitalist relations. This important progressive step in the area of international maritime law also gave rise to other positive standards. The role of the principle of freedom of the high seas has been constantly expanded and has assumed special significance in the modern era as society become economically and socially developed.

The need for equal freedom of navigation for all on every sea and ocean was brought about primarily by the economic requirements of states, since the development of productive forces led to the formation of a world market, and hence also to a world shipping market. International trade could not exist without transportation, and it could only be maritime transportation.[18]

The main revolutionary class, the proletariat, which was shaping its sense of justice and its ideology, also came out for freedom of the seas. In 1861, Karl Marx wrote: "The sea, as a common spacious road for all nations, cannot be under the sovereignty of any . . . power."[19]

International congresses held in Vienna (1815) and in Paris (1856) played a definite role in the development of maritime law. Such progressive declarations as the declaration of freedom of navigation on certain international rivers, on the condemnation of slave trading, the abolition of privateering and limitations on the right of seizure were specifically adopted at these congresses in spite of all their reactionary essence.

Although the principle of freedom of the high seas has been generally recognized since the last half of the 18th century, feudal and bourgeois states, in battling for supremacy of the seas and the seizure of foreign lands, constantly violated it.

In the 19th and 20th centuries the United States, Great Britain, Germany, France, and other capitalist states strove to continue a policy of sea supremacy and flagrantly violated the bases of the principle of the high seas. Thus, for example, right after the end of the Second World War under the pretext of "protecting" freedom of navigation, the United States tried to resurrect the old policy of diktat on the high seas, in particular by putting into practice overflights of transport ships by their military aircraft, which were illegal and clearly calculated to intimidate.

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[[Thus,]] In order to hinder the activity of the [[Soviet]] *USSR* Navy on the World Ocean, their warships daily create navigational difficulty for [[our]] *Soviet* warships [[on the high seas]], close on them to short ranges, and maneuver in direct proximity to them, simulating the employment of weaponry, and so forth. [[Their]] Aircraft *of the United States and other imperialist states* not only constantly accompany Soviet ships on the high seas, but also overfly them at impermissibly low and dangerous altitudes and distances. However, this practice has not had the desired results, since brute force has been countered by the outstanding schooling of the Soviet commanding officers, their daring and persistence, the high degree of military discipline and knowledge of the sea of the crews of the Soviet warships, and also by the solid knowledge and strict execution of the rules of international maritime law.

The Soviet Union always has been against various encroachments on freedom of navigation on the high sea committed by naval and air forces of the United States and other member nations of the North Atlantic Alliance. Thus, in the period 1948-1971, the Soviet government came out resolutely and consistently against flights by US warplanes over Soviet and other foreign merchant ships and against the illegal practice employed by US warships and warplanes of "identifying" ships by dangerously closing with them and cutting across their bows, by simulating weapons employment, and by other unauthorized techniques.

Having encountered appropriate counteraction by the Soviet Navy vigorously supported by diplomatic activities of the Soviet government, the ruling circles of the United States were forced to turn to negotiations on preventing incidents on the high seas.

As a result of a series of meetings of military delegations of the two countries, the Treaty between the Government of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and the Government of the United States of America on the Prevention of Incidents on the High Sea and in the Air Space Over It was prepared and signed in May 1972.

This document is known to play a positive role in ensuring the security of navigation on international sea lanes and strengthening international legality on the seas. The Treaty, *by defining mutual obligations of the parties* , confirmed the principles acknowledged by international law. [[, specifically by the 1958 Geneva Convention on the High Seas.]] Practice

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in employing this agreement has noticeably improved the situation on the high seas. In spite of the fact that [[the Treaty]] *it* is a bilateral agreement, it apparently /may be open for other interested countries to join/. [[However, the attacks by the imperialist powers on the principle of international maritime law have continued. These attacks have to a certain extent been aided by the impractical draft of the Treaty on the Sea, put forth by Malta in August 1971, which proposed a fundamental change in all modern principles of international maritime law, including the principle of freedom of the high seas.]]

[[The draft specifically proposed dividing the entire World Ocean into sea areas of two legal categories: national sea areas with a breadth of 200 nautical miles and a regime which in practice does not differ from the territorial sea regime, and international sea areas, which would be the so-called common legacy of mankind. In this connection, whereas it was proposed to invest the coastal state with complete sovereignty in the national sea area, according to the authors' concept, the international sea area should be governed on behalf of the international community by a special international organization possessing broad supranational powers.]]

[[The desire of certain coastal developing countries to seek new sources of income for their own economic development fostered the Maltese draft. In their opinion, one such source could be the World Ocean and its seabed, particularly those sectors of it which are more promising from the point of view of economic exploitation. It is they who are striving to exercise their own jurisdiction in those sectors in order to later utilize them as a source of profit not requiring any expenditures.]]

[[As grounds for the review of international maritime law references were also made to the imperfection of the 1958 Geneva Conventions, which were supposedly developed by the sea powers only from a position of "might makes right" and without considering the interests of the developing countries, and to the absence in those conventions of exact norms defining the limits of the territorial sea and the continental shelf. However, from the materials published in the foreign press, we can reach the definite conclusion that the Maltese draft has been agreed upon in advance by certain circles in the imperialist states. This is confirmed in particular by the statement by American Congressman B. Gilman on 10 April 1974, in which he demanded that the United States establish a 200-mile coastal zone instead of the current 12-mile zone recognized by the United States. "In a period when world food reserves are

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rapidly running out," he stressed, "we need to be certain that the fishing areas surrounding the continental United States will not be subjected to plundering.]]

[[In trying to substantiate their claims to vast areas of the high seas, a certain group of states has advocated their version, according to which the absence of formally fixed norms supposedly gives every state the right to determine the breadth of its own territorial sea according to its own discretion regardless of the point of view and interests of other states.]]

[[In opposing this, other states quite justifiably believe that unilateral and unlimited expansion of the territorial sea is not permitted by modern international law. The solution of this question cannot depend on the will of the coastal states, since it will always be of an international nature, despite the fact that the expansion of the territorial sea is in all cases a unilateral act.]]

[[Thus, one of the most important reasons for the attempts by certain countries to foist a fundamental review of existing international maritime law on the world community, and a review of the principle of the freedom of the high seas in particular, lies primarily in the clash of economic and political interests of various groups of countries.]]

[[The overwhelming majority of states, taking as their basis standards of international maritime law and generally recognized practice, believe with good reason that it is essential to introduce a single limit not exceeding 12 nautical miles for everyone in order to guarantee those interests for which a territorial sea is established. However, even among those states there is a certain group which, while agreeing with the establishment of such a standard norm, believes it is essential to establish a broader zone of economic interest in addition to the territorial sea, which would extend the jurisdiction of coastal states to the resources of the zone.]]

Thus, in the various stages of the development of society international law in general, and maritime law in particular, have not remained unchanged[[, each period of history having had its own international law.]]

In the period of capitalism, as in all previous socioeconomic systems based on private ownership and exploitation of man by man, international law has been utilized primarily in the interests of the ruling classes, and its sphere of influence has been limited to the so-called civilized states. The *so-called* noncivilized peoples, i.e., the colonial peoples, have not enjoyed the protection of international law.

Present-day international law, which is typical of the era of the transition from capitalism to socialism, was shaped after

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the Great October Socialist Revolution under the mighty influence of new principles in international relations which had not been known in any of the preceding eras. This law recognized the regulation of relations between states with different socioeconomic systems based on the principles of the sovereign equality of all states, mutual respect, and peaceful coexistence. It includes progressive standards created in our day with the most active and direct participation of the Soviet Union and other Socialist *and developing* states, and positive norms and principles from past eras have been retained.

Being [[an integral]] *a* part of *general* international law, international maritime law [[is guided by]] *develops under the influence of* all of its *fundamental* principles, such as the principle of respect for state sovereignty, *the principle of equal rights of states,* the principle of peaceful coexistence, *the principle of nonaggression,* the principle of peaceful resolution of international disputes, and so forth. At the same time, as the area of international law directly tied to the use of the seas and the oceans, it [[has]] *contains a system of* its own characteristic princip es *and norms. They can include,* for example, the principle of the freedom of the high seas, *the principle of freedom of navigation and the conduct of marine fisheries,* the principle of the immunity of naval ships *and state vessels,* and others.

International maritime law establishes the legal bases for the [[actions]] *relations* of independent states and rules for mutual relations between them and their agencies on the seas and oceans.

The work of the International Law Commission and the I (Geneva) UN Conference on Law of the Sea in 1958 was a significant step forward in the development of maritime law. The Conference examined and adopted four conventions which are presently effective: the convention on the high seas; on the territorial sea and contiguous zone; on fishing and protection of living resources of the high seas; and on the continental shelf. These conventions codified such generally recognized principles and norms of international maritime law as the principle of freedom of the high seas, the principle of a state's sovereignty over the territorial sea, the sovereign rights of states over the continental shelf for exploring and developing its natural resources, and so forth.

The I UN Conference on Law of the Sea played an important role in strengthening international law and order and in developing the cooperation of states.

A peculiarity of present-day international maritime law is the development of its norms based on mutual agreements and treaties between independent sovereign states, including states with different socioeconomic systems.

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The regulations of international maritime law now in effect were codified in numerous conventions and treaties, [specifically]] *including* in the [[1958]] Geneva /Conventions/ which /represent/ [[a]] *the first* code of standards and principles of international maritime law which has been validated by many years of practice.

/Present-day/ international maritime law [[embraces a wide range of problems. The include, for example,]] *contains norms determining* the legal regime [[of the areas]] of the high seas [[, of]] *and* the territorial seas, [[and]] inland waters and [[in the]] contiguous zones, of the continental shelf and the bed of the seas [[and oceans]] *beyond its limits, of international* straits and canals, of demilitarized and neutralized maritime [[zones]] *regions* and territories, [[the freedom to conduct]] *of* scientific research in the World Ocean, [[and freedom to]] /of fishing/ *and catching other marine animals. It reflects issues on* the campaign against pollution, the legal status of warships and [[military navigation]] *merchant ships*, and other, no less important *international legal* [[problems]] *concepts.* [[International maritime law]] *It* also /includes/ [[laws]] *norms* developed as a result of many centuries of [[efforts]] *experience* by maritime states directed toward *assuring* navigational safety and rendering aid to those in distress at sea. On the basis of widespread [[international]] cooperation, a series of international legal acts were adopted and are in force in this area.

[[So long as imperialism exists, the danger of an outbreak of new wars remains. In this connection, the international rules for waging war, including the rules for waging warfare at sea, retain their significance. The relationship between belligerent and neutral states, the legal definition of belligerent persons and ships, questions associated with the armament of merchantmen, the legal basis for the legality of a naval blockade and the definition of the blockade zone, and other questions are included in international maritime law.]]

[[Thus, international maritime law is an important instrument guaranteeing the rights and obligations of sovereign states, whose interests impinge in various areas of mankind's use of the seas and oceans. It is an integral part of the practical activity of navies, which need an international legal basis for their daily activities, i.e., the establishment of more favorable conditions for carrying out their assigned missions on the basis of a strict observance of the standards and principles of international maritime law.]]

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However, present-day international maritime law is not a code of rigid canons. Individual regulations continue to be developed and improved. *After the Geneva Conventions on Law of the Sea, improvement proceeded along the path of partial codification of individual norms and institutions of maritime law performed by various international organizations in the UN system. Since the end of the sixties,* this process *has acquired a character unprecedented in breadth and* is determined primarily by such political factors as the [[steadily growing]] *immeasurably increased* influence of the Socialist states on the development of friendly international relations, *the decay of the colonial system,* the increasing political activity in the international arena by the developing countries, including those which were recently freed from colonial dependence, and also the further worsening of the overall crisis of capitalism. Moreover, the possibilities of exploiting the vast natural resources of the World Ocean which have been expanding as a result of scientific-technical progress are having a significant effect on the development of present-day international law.

[[Under the present conditions, the legal regulation of the activities of states on the World Ocean is difficult due to a series of circumstances. The most important of these include: profound differences in political and economic interests of states with different socioeconomic systems causing them to have different approaches to the imperialistic powers of mercenary aspirations of monopolistic capital to seize vast sectors of the seabed beyond the continental shelf for prospecting and industrial development, which is to the detriment of the other states of the world; and certain parasitic tendencies by the ruling classes of some states accompanied by the desire to derive material gain without expending any money on the development of their own economy by dictating to other states the conditions for use of the World Ocean.]]

[[The circumstances listed, along with others, have given rise to the tendency to review the basic principles and practices of all regulations of modern international maritime law codified by the system of the 1958 Geneva Convention and by other international legal acts.]]

[[One such principle is the principle of freedom of the high seas. In speeches the imperialist states are constantly calling for the observance of this principle; however, it is precisely they, in conducting a policy of "rolling back Communism," aggression, and suppression of national-freedom struggle, who are trying to utilize the freedom of the high seas for their own military-political and economic purposes.]]

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Through the efforts of a number of capitalist states, the seas and oceans and their underwater expanses now have become the object of disputes and economic rivalry among individual states and world social systems. International relations often have become complicated of late because of this. At the same time, the existing international maritime law still is in no position to resolve many pressing international legal problems, which are a factor having a serious effect on the development of international relations and on the domestic and foreign policies of many states.

Along with the creation of a uniform system of principles and norms of contemporary maritime law, the resolution of these problems has become one of the most important problems of international relations in our time.

Questions of using the ocean and the political, economic, and legal problems which arise in this regard are being discussed widely at international conferences, science symposia, and talks.

The III UN Conference on Law of the Sea was set up by decision of the UN General Assembly in 1973 for examining the complex of legal issues of the states' activities in the ocean, and it continues its work. The Conference has to establish the status of various maritime areas and decide on the rights and duties of states involving exploitation of resources and other kinds of activity within the expanses of the Ocean.

The struggle which has unfolded at the present time for elaborating a system of juridical norms and principles which define the legal regime of oceans and seas actually is a campaign to determine the paths their subsequent use will follow.

Two basic trends clash at the Conference: the line for mutually acceptable regulation of all issues of maritime law, to which the socialist countries and many developing countries adhere, and the opposing tendency of a number of capitalist countries, which are attempting to seize vast marine expanses and impose an arbitrary regime of their use through unilateral acts.

The Soviet Union attaches great significance to the work of the III UN Conference on Law of the Sea and is for elaborating and adopting a just regime in the ocean which would secure the interests of all states, including the USSR and the other socialist countries, to an equal extent.

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A. N. Kosygin remarked that "the ocean, occupying over two-thirds of our planet's surface, always has been a major factor in international politics.

". . . Of course, the present process of collective elaboration of a new order on the seas and oceans is not simple. We proceed from the assumption that a future legal regime has to contribute to strengthening the peace and increasing the welfare of nations, and that practical issues of using the ocean have to consider the reasonable interests of all states. But attempts to resolve these issues unilaterally, without due consideration of other countries' needs and legal rights, may turn the seas and oceans into yet another source of tension and conflicts. We on our part wish to avoid this.

"In our view, the UN Conference on Law of the Sea made certain advances in drawing up a draft of a new international convention. Further joint efforts have to be made to overcome the remaining differences and to bring this important matter to a successful conclusion."[20]

At the same time, recent sessions of the Conference have reflected a different approach and are being held in an atmosphere of ever increasing pressure on the part of the most developed capitalist states, particularly the United States, and in the presence of their attempt to establish such law and order in the World Ocean which would meet the interest of monopolies thirsting to seize more and more expanses of the ocean.

Under these conditions the Soviet Union consistently advocates the establishment of those norms of international law which would contribute to a strengthening of universal peace and security and would meet the interests of strengthening the independence of developing states, the just interests of all countries, and an increase in their welfare through marine resources.

The question concerns a complex of international legal problems touching on important political, economic, and defense interests of a majority of the states. Among them are the establishment of a uniform 12-mile limit to the width of territorial waters; assurance of innocent passage and flights through and over international straits; recognition of rights to 200-mile economic zones and rights for foreign fishing within them on mutually acceptable conditions; establishment of a fixed limit to the continental shelf and regime of the seabed beyond its limits; a campaign against pollution of the marine environment; scientific ocean research and so forth.

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The general fundamental line in conducting a peaceloving foreign policy was reflected in the Soviet Union's approach to resolving specific problems of maritime law. The USSR's proposals on questions of the legal regime of the territorial sea, made jointly with Bulgaria, the GDR, and Poland, take account of historical experience and the states' objective needs in developing international navigation and trade. They also take account of the substantiated economic interests and security interests of coastal states. These proposals are aimed at establishing the sovereignty of coastal states in territorial waters contiguous to their shores with their respect for the right of innocent passage of foreign ships.

An overwhelming majority of states share the proposal formulated by the USSR on the 12-mile limit to the width of the territorial sea and do not adhere to the claims of certain countries to expand it to 200 nautical miles.

The problem of freedom of transit through international straits and of flight in the airspace above them is closely related to the problem of the breadth of the territorial sea. All straits can be divided into several categories according to their importance for navigation.

One category includes the straits connecting individual seas and oceans which are intensively utilized for international shipping ([[for example,]] the English Channel, the Strait of Dover, the Strait of Gibraltar, the Singapore Strait, [[Kithira]] Strait *of Malacca*, and many others). By virtue of the historically developed standards of conventional maritime law, freedom of transit of ships and of overflight by aircraft based on the equality of all flags has always existed and should exist in such straits, because every state on earth has an interest in the normal functioning of international sea routes. However, several countries whose shores are washed by international straits, under the pretext of protecting their own sovereignty and ensuring their security, are coming out against this freedom, trying to place all international shipping under their own control, and in certain cases to encroach on the legal, *vitally* important interests of individual states.

The Soviet Union is in favor of freedom of transit for ships and overflight for aircraft of all countries in straits being used for international shipping, with guarantees of the security of the coastal states being maintained. Without guaranteeing this freedom, it is unthinkable and practically impossible to implement the generally recognized principle of the freedom of the high seas fostering the normal development of mutual relations between states.

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A completely different category includes the straits off the international maritime routes. Such straits are [[mainly]] of importance only to the states adjacent to them, and therefore the regulation of shipping in such straits has always been and should remain the prerogative of national governments.

Another group of problems in international maritime law is closely associated with the expansion of capabilities for the industrial exploitation (which is practically just beginning) of the resources of the seabed beyond the limits of the territorial sea. [[Although the general principles of the legal regulation of such activity on the continental shelf are fixed by the 1958 Geneva Conventions on the Continental Shelf, the question of its outer limit has remained open, since in the Conventions this boundary is referred to as that point where the depth of the water above permits exploitation of natural resources.]]

In connection with the fact that the outer limit to which the sovereign rights of a coastal state extend to the continental shelf was not defined sufficiently clearly in 1958, some highly developed countries possessing the equipment needed to extract seabed mineral resources are seeking to receive at the Conference the right of setting the outer limit of the continental shelf practically in an uncontrolled manner, guided by the constantly changing geomorphological data on the shelf and not by juridical criteria. Consideration is given to the military importance of using the continental shelf, which permits the accommodation of diverse military facilities thereon. In this connection this approach to resolving the problem of the continental shelf assumes a special, aggressive character in the actions of these states.

The problem of defining the boundaries of the international region of the seabed, the regime of which must be determined at the Conference, is closely linked with the problem of defining the outer limit of the continental shelf.

[[The unsettled question of the outer limit of the continental shelf and the reality of the industrial exploitation of its resources at considerable depth have given rise to the desire to divide the entire World Ocean into two sections: one falling under the national jurisdiction of the coastal states and another comprising a so-called international region.]] The idea is to implement control of the exploitation of the resources in this region through a specially created international agency given broad powers in the area of regulating the activity of states conducting prospecting for and exploitation of [[its]] *the region's* living and mineral resources, of levying of licensing or leasing fees for exploitation of sectors of the

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seabed, and of distributing the income among the participants in the agreement taking into account the special interests of the developing countries.

[[The tendency toward the division of the seabed is closely linked with the tendency toward establishing 200-mile economic zones or patrimonial (hereditary) sea zones, because it is precisely in the 200-mile zone bordering the mainland in which the bulk of the biological species of commercial value live. Moreover, this zone covers practically the entire geological continental shelf, where so far the only profitable exploitation of mineral resources is possible.]]

[[As for the question of the regime of the economic zone or patrimonial (hereditary) sea, a majority of the developing countries and certain developed capitalist countries are proceeding from the position that coastal states must enjoy exclusive rights to the living and nonliving resources in them. Moreover, they must implement control over the scientific research of other states and the pollution of the sea waters in them. One of the reasons for advancing and supporting this concept is the desire of a certain number of states to substitute it for the concept of the 200-mile territorial sea, which has not found wide support.]]

[[With regard to scientific research in the World Ocean, mankind has always had an interest in the detailed study of the entire water area which has an influence not only on economic and other activity but also on the very conditions of the existence of man.]]

[[The abundance of unresolved problems, the vast capital investment necessary to resolve them, and also the level of interest of a large number of countries have all created the conditions for expanding international cooperation in the study of the World Ocean.]]

[[It would seem that such activity should be encouraged in every way by all members of the world community, and, strictly speaking, many resolutions of various United Nations agencies and nongovernmental organizations call for it. Nevertheless, some developing countries, by distortedly interpreting these resolutions and citing the formal absence of agreed standards increasing freedom of scientific research on the World Ocean, are striving in every possible way to limit them and put them under their control. In this connection, some states are achieving control in the waters of the 200-mile zone adjacent to their coast, and others are attempting to extend their control to the entire World Ocean with the aid of the aforementioned

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international mechanism. And this despite the fact that freedom of scientific research on the high seas was long ago transformed into a standard of international maritime law. Therefore, any sort of limitations on scientific research in such vast areas which would be included in the regions of the so-called economic zones are, in our view, inadmissible.]]

The Soviet Union advocates that the international agency to be established for regulating and exploiting mineral resources of the international seabed region carry out its work by taking account of the need to provide equal opportunities for all states in developing the region's resources and preventing monopolization of such activity.

The unresolved nature of a number of key problems of the regime of the World Ocean, as well as the politics of certain states aimed at seizure and division of marine expanses and resources, contributed to an increase in recent years in the number of unilateral and arbitrary acts by individual coastal states.

Such a policy also is linked closely with unilateral establishment of 200-mile economic zones without awaiting decisions by the Conference on Law of the Sea. By mid-1979 several tens of states already had established economic and fishing zones up to 200 nautical miles wide. Coastal states exercise sovereign rights to living and mineral resources in the economic zones and exclusive jurisdiction to perform scientific research and to erect manmade platforms and facilities, and jurisdiction in preventing and combating pollution of the marine environment. Moreover, some states are passing national laws with provisions which essentially go beyond the bounds of the draft Convention being discussed at the Conference and which thus do not contribute to solutions mutually acceptable for all states.

The United States of America and Common Market countries have not remained aloof from such unilateral actions. On 26 November 1976 the United States passed a law on preservation of fish resources and control of fishing in a 200-mile zone, the law becoming effective on 1 March 1977. An agreement on a 200-mile fishing zone by Common Market countries went into effect on 1 January 1977. These actions by the United States and the Common Market caused a sort of chain reaction on the adoption of similar national laws by many developing countries.

Under these conditions the Soviet Union had no choice but to take retaliatory steps to protect fish resources in seas contiguous to USSR shores. On 10 December 1976 an Ukase of the USSR Presidium of the Supreme Soviet was adopted, entitled

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"On Temporary Steps to Preserve Living Resources and to Regulate Fishing in Sea Regions Contiguous to the USSR Coast," and becoming effective on 24 February 1977 for regions of the Pacific and Arctic oceans and on 17 May 1977 for regions of the Barents Sea.

The Soviet Union and other Socialist countries have come out for the securing by convention of the *performance of scientific research in economic zones on a permissive basis and preservation of the* freedom of scientific research [[on the World Ocean]] beyond the limits of the [[12-mile territorial sea]] *economic zones* as a standard of international law, as well as for the maximum retention of other freedoms of the high seas already codified in international conventions.

The problem of preventing the pollution of the environment by man, including pollution of the World Ocean, [[with harmful substances]] under present-day conditions involving the further development of industry, shipping, and the extraction of oil and gas from the seabed, and the expansion of scientific research on the seabed and its subsoil, is also of very real importance. The resolution of this problem is possible through an intelligent mix of international agreements and national legislation. However, in this connection, the maximum preservation of the generally recognized freedom of navigation on the high seas, which cannot be subjected to foreign control *under the pretext of combating pollution,* is assuming great importance.

This problem is being given a great deal of attention in the Soviet Union, as specifically attested to by the [[decree]] *decrees* of the CPSU Central Committee and of the USSR Council of Ministers [[published on 10 January 1973]] entitled "Improving the Protection of Nature and Improving the Utilization of Natural Resources" *and "On Steps to Prevent Pollution of the Black Sea and Sea of Azov Basins,"* and also by the participation of the Soviet Union in many international agreements concerning the prevention of pollution of the sea [[by oil and other harmful substances]].

The current level of scientific-technical progress and the further development of diverse activity of states on the World Ocean have given rise to the need to erect various manmade commercial and scientific structures in its waters and on the seabed. The scale of this activity is attested to by the fact that many hundreds of [[drilling rigs]] *platforms* have already been located in various areas of the continental shelf merely for the extraction of oil. In this connection, the erection of manmade structures is practical today not only on the continental shelf and the waters covering it, but also far beyond its limits.

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However, the question of legal standards regulating the activity of states involved in the construction and operation of manmade structures and safeguarding the safety of both shipping and the structures themselves, as well as protecting the environment from pollution, has not been resolved *to a sufficient extent* by present-day international law. Until now there have been only general standards regulating the construction of manmade structures only on the continental shelf which are designed only for commercial prospecting and the mining of natural resources of the seabed and its subsoil. With regard to the location and legal status of manmade structures performing other tasks or set up beyond the limits of the continental shelf, up to the present time there are no international legal acts regulating this form of activity. Even in the coming decade this situation could create obstacles both for the construction of such facilities and for shipping and other legal activities carried out on the basis of the principle of freedom of the high seas which is fixed by international agreements.

The Soviet Union stands for a reasoned resolution of this problem taking into account the interests of the entire international community, including these states not having access to the sea, and is in favor of quickly putting an end to this gap in present-day international law.

The problem of the status of manmade structures on the seabed beyond the 12-mile territorial sea is closely linked to the question of the prohibition of utilizing the seabed beyond the above limits for military purposes, which is part of the problem of curtailing the arms race, the subsequent reduction of arms, and also later of disarmament. Today certain progress has already been achieved in this area. Through the efforts of the Soviet Union and other peaceloving countries, an international agreement was signed and has gone into force prohibiting the placing of nuclear weaponry and other forms of weapons of mass destruction on the bottoms of oceans and seas and in their subsoil beyond the limits of the 12-mile zone of coastal states. Efforts are being made to completely demilitarize the seabed beyond the indicated limits.

Certain states incorrectly tie the question of the demilitarization of the seabed to the question of preventing navigation of nuclear-powered submarines beyond the limits of their own territorial sea, i.e., practically throughout the World Ocean, thereby ignoring the principle of guaranteeing equal security for states with different socioeconomic systems. This question cannot be resolved in isolation from such questions as, for example, [[prohibiting the setting up of]] *eliminating*

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military bases in foreign lands, the prohibition of flights by aircraft with nuclear weaponry aboard beyond national territorial borders, and other such questions.

The Soviet Union has always stood and continues to stand for positions curtailing the arms race and reducing the sphere of military activity of states, not unilaterally, but on the basis of the principle of guaranteeing equal security for the states concerned.

[[Ways of further developing international legal regulation of the exploitation of the World Ocean and its beds are of great importance to the Soviet Union, a great seapower. At the present time, the states of the whole world are faced with a choice: either a radical reform and complete revision of existing standards of present-day maritime law, or the further development and perfection of those standards on the basis of existing international conventions and agreements, in which the principles and standards of maritime law, that have become crystallized over a course of centuries and have proven themselves in practice, have been consolidated in treaty form.]]

[[In view of the emerging situation, it is extremely important for the USSR, and, objectively speaking, also for all of the states in the world, to uphold the freedom of the high seas as the main condition for further progressive development of international maritime law. In this connection, it is important to uphold the freedom to conduct scientific research, since, if this is not done, the efforts of many states with regard to the further study of the World Ocean will meet insurmountable obstacles. Attempts to put the conduct of scientific research in the World Ocean under control of the coastal states or an international agency can do unjustifiable damage to future activities of mankind in this little studied environment.]]

[[The outcome of the effort to establish a standard 12-mile limit for the breadth of the territorial sea while retaining freedom of navigation through international straits is of great importance to the Soviet Union. A positive solution to this question on the international level with certain guarantees to ensure the security of coastal states and the protection of the environment from pollution will permit the elimination of existing impediments to international navigation in straits and will foster the establishment of mutually profitable commercial relationships between states. The proposal of the USSR with regard to the complete prohibition of utilizing the bed of seas and oceans and their subsoil for military purposes is of great importance for the removal of the threat of

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extending the arms race to this area. A positive resolution of this problem will have a beneficial effect on international security and will promote further matching efforts with regard to prospecting for and exploiting the resources of the World Ocean.]]

[[The Second Session of the Third United Nations Conference on the Law of the Sea was held in Caracas, the capital of Venezuela, from 20 June through 29 August 1974. Representatives from 138 states were present at the conference. The agenda included more than 100 points embracing practically all the international problems previously discussed by the UN Seabed Committee. Among the more important problems were those fixing a 12-mile limit for the breadth of the territorial sea, the establishment of 200-mile economic zones and defining their regimes, freedom of transit through straits used for international shipping, the regime of the high seas, freedom of scientific research not associated with prospecting for and the exploitation of ocean resources, the outer limit of the continental shelf, the regime of the seabed beyond the limits of the continental shelf, prevention of the pollution of the sea environment, and others.]]

[[Very intensive discussions took place on all the issues enumerated. In order to bring the positions of various states closer together and accelerate the resolution of the main questions, the Soviet delegation, taking the position that all questions of the law of the sea are interrelated and must be resolved "in a package," declared its readiness to proceed to the establishment of a 200-mile economic zone on the condition that there would also be a positive resolution of other basic questions of maritime law (the establishment of a 12-mile-wide territorial sea, freedom of passage through international straits, freedom of navigation, freedom of scientific research, a definition of the outer boundary of the continental shelf, a definition of the regime of the seabed, prevention of pollution of the ocean environment, and permission for fishermen of other states to fish for part of the catch in the economic zone if the coastal state does not catch 100% of the annual permissible catch). This proposal by the Soviet Union received the support of a considerable number of delegates of other states.]]

[[The Second Session of the Third UN Conference on the Law of the Sea managed to take only the initial steps on the path to developing a new convention: a procedure for making decisions at the Conference was established, the essence of the issues was somewhat refined, the positions of states on these issues were brought closer together, and also practical principles were developed for making certain decisions on a series of important sea law problems in the latter stages of its work.]]

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[[The Third Session of this Conference, which was held from 17 March through 9 May 1975 in Geneva, also did not make any decisions with respect to the substance of the above questions, since it could not overcome serious disagreements on basic questions of maritime law. However, at the Geneva session an unofficial draft was prepared of a single text of a new convention which was proposed for adoption as a basis for further discussion at the next session of the Conference which is scheduled to be held from 29 March through 21 May 1976 in New York..]]

The consistent and active position of the delegations of the Soviet Union and other Socialist countries at past sessions of the III UN Conference on the Law of the Sea significantly contributed to progress in working out a new Convention on Law of the Sea. The Socialist countries showed interest in most rapid adoption of this Convention and took a number of important steps to consider the interests of different groups of states at the Conference.

Thus, the present-day development of society's productive forces is to a considerable degree linked to the exploitation of ocean resources and the utilization of its energy resources. All mankind is devoting its attention to this problem at the present time. It has been transformed from a national problem, which has existed for years, into an international problem, and has emerged beyond the realm of politics of individual countries and has assumed an international nature. Today, joint efforts by many states are [[required]] *necessary* to resolve it, and this will find expression in the conclusion of a series of international agreements and the assumption of certain obligations by many countries. Among these we may include the mutual obligation of the COMECON countries and also the agreement between the governments of the USSR and the United States on cooperation in the field of research signed in Washington on 19 June 1973.

Our Motherland, possessing powerful transport, fishing, and research fleets, is establishing close international contacts for the exploitation of the riches of the ocean and for its study. These contacts, and also the growing prestige of the Soviet Union, have made it possible for it to become an indispensable participant in all basic agreements and conventions defining the present-day relationships between states regulated by the standards of international maritime law.

The peaceloving policy of the CPSU and the Soviet government, the deep respect for the national traits, traditions, and interests of other states, and the undeviating adherence

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to Leninist principles of internationalism, have determined the Soviet Union's contribution to the resolution of the problem of international maritime law, which serves the interests of the mutual regulation of relationships between sovereign states with regard to use of the oceans. In this connection, the Soviet Union's contribution to the overall practice of international maritime law is being rationally combined with the effort to protect the interests of the Soviet Union and the countries of the Socialist Community.

The situation presently taking shape in the World Ocean reflects objective processes of social development. To an ever increasing extent, the seas and oceans are being used by states not only for purposes of transportation, marine fisheries, and the extraction of minerals, but also for needs of military navigation.

The growth of operational-strategic capabilities of present-day navies, their widespread employment by states to achieve their own political goals, and great successes in naval shipbuilding have fostered the establishment of such conditions that sizeable naval forces are constantly at sea far from their home ports. One of the specific features of naval operations in the latter half of the 20th century as compared with those of the recent past is the sharp increase in the development of forces and individual warships in various areas of the World Ocean. This circumstance combined with the colossal growth of the transport and fishing fleets contributes to the increase in the number of contacts occurring while underway between warships of various states, between warships and merchantmen, and also between local authorities and warships during calls at foreign ports. Such contacts in peacetime are characteristic primarily of only one branch of the armed forces of all states -- the navy.

While underway a warship may be on the high seas, in *archipelago or* territorial seas, or inland waters, and may be transiting a strait or other parts of the World Ocean whose legal regime has its own peculiarities and which exerts a definite influence on navigation. On the other hand, the legal status of the warship herself also governs her operations in areas where there is the possibility of coming in contact with foreign warships, civilian ships, and authorities.

The legal status of a warship on the high seas, in territorial waters, or in ports [[of foreign states]] is at the present time distinguished by her immunity, [[based on the principle of state sovereignty]] which is founded on the generally recognized principle of *the sovereign* equality of states in international relations.

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By virtue of their inherent immunity, the warships of one state regardless of their ranks have no authority over warships or vessels of other countries, no matter where they are in the World Ocean.

Any warship is regarded as a specific agency of a state and acts on behalf of her government, while at the same time being a representative of the armed forces. [[Therefore]] *In this connection*, missions of a diplomatic nature can arise during the activity of any warship while underway.

Both general principles of international law and specific norms and rules concerning only warships are applied in relationships among warships. Norms of intrastate law as well as various technical norms and rules which, being fixed in international documents, acquire juridical force, are used widely for this purpose in addition to international legal norms.

The commanding officer of a warship located outside her own internal and territorial waters and carrying out an assigned mission must observe and strictly comply with all international agreements concluded by the state whose flag she is flying and must also consider *and respect* the special features of the national legislation of foreign maritime states. Therefore, *in the USSR* international maritime law is studied at all institutions for training naval officers. Knowledge of its basic regulations and the skillful use of them in his own work is not only a clear service obligation of every /Soviet naval officer/, but also serves as an indication of his general knowledge of the sea.

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From the review of the basic aspects of the sea power of the Soviet state the conclusion should be evident that, by having maritime strength and as it steadily grows, our country is acquiring more and more capabilities for the further development of its economy and science, for improving the living standard of the Soviet people, and for strengthening its defense capability. The constantly growing sea power of [[our country]] *the USSR* supports the ever expanding exploitation of the vast resources of the World Ocean in various sectors of the national economy. It is opening up new prospects for the further development of science and the rapid and effective utilization of theoretical results of oceanographic studies for the development of the country, and it is making it possible [[for our country]] to retain [[its]] *a* leading position in the world in ocean science. The use of the resources of the World Ocean combined with the further development of science in this area

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is opening up new sectors for the economic and political integration of the Socialist countries, is expanding their sphere of international cooperation, and is increasing [[the]] *their* prestige [[of the Soviet state]] in the international arena.

The growing sea might of [[our country]] *the Soviet state* is supporting the successful conduct of its foreign policy, permits it to constantly expand trade, transport, scientific and cultural ties with other countries and to strengthen constructive cooperation between states with different social systems, and puts an important instrument in the hands of our people for carrying out its historical mission, the expansion of economic aid to all countries which are on the path to independent development.

Having covered only in general terms those aspects of the sea power of the country which are linked to policy, the economy, international law, and science, and believing that sea power is an important factor for strengthening the defense capability of our country which imparts through its armed forces the quality of being able to repel aggression from seaward, which in the postwar years has become a more dangerous direction than in the past for the Soviet Union and the *other* countries of the Socialist Community, we intend in the following chapters to look into its military aspect in more detail and to show the need for our country to have a strong and appropriately organized Navy.

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1. USNIP, No. 1, 1963, pp. 33-39.

2. USNIP, No. 4, 1970, pp. 26-31.

3. *Iodine, uranium, manganese, vanadium, nickel, gold, magnesium, potassium, bromine, calcium, silver, thorium, and so forth.*

4. Deposits of sedimentary rock.

5. Cf: Belli, V. A., et al. Blokada i Kontrblokada (Blockade and Counterblockade), Nauka Publishing House, Moscow, 1967, p. 398.

6. Ibid., pp. 669-670.

7. Cf: Istoriya Voyenno-Morskogo Iskusstva (The History of the Art of Naval Warfare), Voyenizdat, Moscow, 1969, pp. 551-558.

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8. *The benthos is the totality of organisms living on and in the soil of marine and continental waters.*

9. Marx, K., and Engels, F. Sochineniya (Works). 2d edition, Vol. 25, Part. II, p. 337.

10. Cf: Vodnyy Transport, 28 January 1971.

11. Bakayev, V. G. SSSR Na Mirovykh Morskikh Putyakh (The USSR on the World Sea Routes). Znaniye Publishing House, Moscow, 1969, pp. 7-8.

[[7. Here and henceforth statistical data on the world fleet are cited from Lloyd's Handbook in which the terms "civilian fleet" means both the transport (merchant) and fishing fleets.]]

12. *Cf: MORSKOY FLOT, No. 8, 1978, p. 59.*

13. *Cf: KOMMUNIST, No. 11, 1978.*

14. *Cf: MORSKOY FLOT, No. 10, 1978, p. 19.*

15. Cf: Promyslovyy Flot Kapitalisticheskikh Stran (The Fishing Fleet of the Capitalist Countries). Sudostroyeniye Publishing House, Moscow, 1971, pp. 10-11.

16. Lloyd's Register of Shipping. London,[[1974, p. 12]] *1977.*

[[10. Cf: Osokin, C. D. Mirovoy Okean (The World Ocean). Prosveshcheniye Publishing House, Moscow, 1972, pp. 75-76.]]

17. Cf: Molodtsov, S. V. Mezhdunarodno-Pravovoy Rezhim Otkrytogo Morya i Kontinental'nogo Shel'fa (The International Legal Regime of the High Seas and the Continental Shelf). USSR Academy of Sciences Publishing House, Moscow, 1960, p. 11.

18. Cf: Khlestov, O. Mezhdunarodno-Pravovyye Problemy Mirovogo Okeana (International Legal Problems Concerning the World Ocean). Mezhdunarodnaya Zhizn', No. 2, 1973, p. 48.

19. Marx, K., and F. Engels. Sochineniya (Works). 2d edition, Vol. 15, p. 439.

20. *PRAVDA, 22 September 1977.*

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CHAPTER II

PAGES FROM THE HISTORY OF NAVIES

As we have already indicated, basic among the many components of a state's sea power is the naval fleet with its varied and ramified organization consisting of ships, aircraft, and other forces; command, control, and communications agencies; a system of logistical supply and bases; and scientific and research agencies, along with thir vessels and testing centers.

Each state develops its complex naval force in accordance with its own peculiar viewpoint and experiences based on the missions assigned to the navy by the political leaders and the economic capabilities of the nation.

It is impossible to build a navy blindly copying some model for its manning and organization, even though this model be the navy of the most powerful state. However, there is much that is common, and this enables us to compare the strengths of various navies, and evaluate their tactical and strategic capabilities as well as their degree of technical perfection.

This similarity stems, primarily, from the uniqueness of the environment in which the navy is required to operate, i.e., the ocean, as well as the similarity of the principles of shipbuilding and other sciences on the basis of which one evaluates the seagoing, *strength*, *maneuver*, tactical, and other characteristics of a ship, and from the aggregate of things which determine the vast possibilities of utilizing the seas as developed routes of communication [[and commerce]] between continents.

In solving the problems of trade, dependable routes of communication, intercourse between nations, and fishing and marine industries, people have since time immemorial seized and developed individual coastal regions along the seas and oceans.

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The maritime location of many nations favored the development in them of specific branches of industry which naturally left their imprint also on the development of the armed forces of nations which concerned themselves, in greater or lesser measure, with the building of navies and utilizing them in wars.

Navies have always played a great role in strengthening the independence of countries whose territories are washed by seas and oceans, as well as in their economic and cultural development. Naval power has been one of the factors which contributed to making some nations into great powers. Furthermore, history shows that nations without naval forces have never been able to hold the position of a great power for long.

And it could not be otherwise, because seas and oceans are the operating areas of navies. Continents are essentially gigantic islands, whose total area is under 150 million square kilometers. The World Ocean, with a surface area of 350 million square kilometers, surrounds them, binds them together, and holds them, in many respects, in a state of constant dependence (specifically, in the climatic respect).

As was previously demonstrated, seas and oceans represent an inexhaustible source of a variety of foodstuffs, industrial raw materials, and energy. The seas and oceans serve as a means for the cheapest and most important routes of communication [[between nations]] through which commercial and other ties between nations are established and maintained. All this determines the special role of seas and oceans in the economy of nations.

Contributing to the overall growth of the economy of maritime nations *and the rates of its development* was the creation in them of many branches of industry and economy dependent on the sea[[, and this led to the higher industrial development of these countries]]. It is not through happenstance, therefore, that nations whose populaces were associated with seafaring became economically and militarily powerful before the others. Included among these throughout the various periods of history were Spain, England, Holland, France, Portugal, Turkey, and the United States. All present-day great powers are maritime nations.

Therefore, military necessity, the development of an economy tied in with the sea, and political struggles have always impelled nations to build and maintain navies in keeping with the times on an ever-increasing scale.

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As man got to know the ocean and became its master, the scale of utilization of water environment for military purposes was expanded [[-- it was used for defending his own country and for seizing foreign possessions]]. Today, in this epoch of great scientific discoveries [[and the application of such discoveries to military ends]], the possibilities for conducting military operations on the seas have increased incredibly. In view of this fact, the former importance of oceans as areas for naval engagements between warring nations [[on the sea lines of communication or by seaborne assault landings]] has changed -- the seas have been transformed into vast spaces for launching naval ballistic missiles from submarines and for operations by [[naval]] aircraft launched from the decks of [[attack]] carriers.

In order to better understand the capabilities of modern navies and to have some idea about their development in the future, it is useful to direct our attention to the [[processes involved in their development in the]] past [[and to the]] part played by navies within the system of a nation's armed forces in lending support to their position of independence.

Whereas formerly the oceans harbored the threat of invasion, the probability of which was determined by the relative strengths of navies and land armies, now, given the existence of a system of strategic naval weapons, they have become, additionally, the source of devastating attacks upon the territories of the opposing sides. In light of this fact, military operations in the oceanic theater presently constitute an important part of the overall armed struggle. Finally, the oceans have lost their former importance as protective barriers. During the last two world wars they reliably separated the nations of the Western Hemisphere from the devastating firestorm and the destruction which occurred in the European countries.

Accordingly, the role and importance of the oceanic theater under present-day conditions has also changed. The tremendously increased strike capabilities of naval forces and the strivings of the military leaders of imperialist nations to achieve through this means [[a dominating]] *an advantageous* position in the accomplishment of strategic missions are the main criteria governing the role and significance of oceanic theaters from the military point of view. Here it is also necessary to note that the vast spaces of the oceans and seas adjacent to them are not only extensive strategic zones for the deployment of large-scale naval forces and launch sites of missile-armed submarines, but also water areas where there are numerous islands in different sectors and in regions that are

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very convenient to the Western nations for setting up strongpoints, barriers, and naval and air bases. This enabled the imperialist governments -- members of aggressive blocs -- to encircle the Soviet Union and the countries of the Socialist Community with powerful groupings of land, sea, and air forces, and missile launching sites on land and sea. The tactical use of all these forces is associated with the use of powerful fleets earmarked for conducting military operations or for providing all-around security for other groupings. Because of the very wide front and the great depth of the oceanic base areas, the imperialists are able at minimum expense to deploy their naval forces and maneuver them by sectors, creating in a relatively short time powerful groupings at selected areas of the World Ocean from which to launch nuclear attacks upon Soviet territory.

But against the background of the global strategic situation it is impossible to ignore the following very important circumstance, which may have a very substantial importance in evaluating that situation.

The United States, separated from Europe by the vastness of the Atlantic Ocean, has been safe for centuries and has not experienced the horrors of war. It has become accustomed, under the protection of its powerful Navy, to this fact of security and to operating with impunity. The situation has changed now, and the oceans are the least secure in the system of American defenses. Now, in the event the American imperialists unleash a war against the nations of the Socialist Community, the territory of the United States, in contrast to past wars, may become a theater of military operations, and the ocean spaces will be converted into an arena for maximum use of sea power to accomplish its important strategic missions.

NAVIES OF THE WESTERN NATIONS FROM THE SIXTEENTH THROUGH THE NINETEENTH CENTURIES

Every social and economic system has produced a navy in accordance with its economic and technical capabilities. For example, in a slave-holding society, flat-bottomed, not very seaworthy ships propelled by oars constituted the basis of the fleet. At that time there was no such thing as a compass, and for that reason the ships sailed close to the shores. Light weapons, such as bows and arrows, spears, and rock catapults were used in warfare at sea, and for that reason the tactics of a naval action boiled down to ramming and, as a rule, boarding with hand-to-hand combat.

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During the era of feudalism ships of the navy were equipped with sails, built with keels and made more stable, but continued to remain small. [[At this time]] They began to use artillery pieces on ships, and this introduced a marked change in the tactics of naval warfare, although ramming and boarding continued to be used for a long time.

The entry of capitalism into the world arena led to radical changes in the equipment and technology of armed warfare. It witnessed the development of steam-powered fleets, powerful guns, and heavy armor plating. The contest between guns and armor for a long time determined the new trends in the development of naval shipbuilding and in the art of naval warfare. It was necessary to develop methods for the employment of navies adequate to the new means for conducting war at sea. The creation of submarines and naval aircraft led to marked changes in the development of navies. Still more profound and revolutionary changes in the development of navies have taken place in recent times in connection with the construction of nuclear-powered ships carrying nuclear-missile weaponry.

These stages in the development of navies were not merely phases in the technological improvement of ships. Simultaneously with the development of the material and technical equipment of navies there were changes in their basic missions. Their role in the peacetime policies of nations was enhanced; the place of the navy within the system of armed forces changed; and the role of military operations at sea was enhanced.

In a slave-holding society and under feudalism, navies in concert with ground forces took part in many wars and then served as the most important, and, oftentimes, the only means of transporting troops and invading enemy territory. [[They]] *Navies also* were used for protecting friendly commercial sea lanes and for destroying enemy commercial shipping.

One of the great turning points in the history of the human race occurred during the 16th and 17th centuries -- the epoch of great geographic discoveries; it was the period of initial accumulation of capital and the development of capitalism.

"The era of colonial undertakings, which now opened up to all maritime nations, was likewise the period of construction of huge navies for protecting newly founded colonies and the trade carried on with them. This marked the beginning of the period that included more naval engagements and provided greater stimulus to naval weapons developments than any preceding period."[1]

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During this period many Western European nations converted their navies into one of the instruments for accumulating capital, seizing colonies, enslaving peoples of entire continents, and plundering them. Navies became the means for vicious struggles between competitors for colonial pillaging and for dominance in the colonies and on the sea lanes.

Since the principal territories of possible colonial properties of European countries were overseas, the most important role in the struggle for colonies and dividing the world that was associated with it devolved upon the navies, which were an instrument of this division.

"The discovery of gold and silver deposits in America, and the eradication, enslavement and the burial alive of the indigenous population in mines, the first steps in conquering and plundering the East Indies, and the conversion of Africa into a private preserve for hunting blacks -- all these were the dawn of the capitalistic era of production."[2]

This "dawn" began with a vicious struggle to seize colonies and sea trade routes with their key positions, such as Gibraltar, Singapore, Malta, and many others. The main force in this struggle was the navies of the European nations.

The first in the search for new lands and colonizing them were Spain and Portugal. The sea expeditions of Columbus, /Vespucci, Magellan, Vasco da Gama/, and other navigators not only resulted in the discovery of the American continent, in laying out a sea route around Africa to India and China and the exploration of many Pacific islands; they also laid the foundation for colonizing these regions and countries. The actions of navies in discovering and colonizing new lands were so successful and the prospects so alluring of promise as to prompt two of the first plunderers -- Spain and Portugal -- to draw up an agreement to divide the world between them; the purpose was to keep for themselves the riches that had been captured and to deny any "third power" an opportunity to join in colonial brigandage. Such a demarcation line was established in [[1494]] *1949 [sic]* in the Atlantic Ocean; another was drawn in *1529* in the Pacific.

Immediately following the Spanish and Portuguese in the search for new lands were the English, French, and Dutch. Russia, at that time, still had no outlet to the sea nor a fleet and, therefore, was unable to take part in the division of the world.

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Spain, in the 16th century, having solidly entrenched herself as a great power and being the possessor of vast colonial holdings, failed, however, to utilize the wealth amassed from the colonies to develop industries and build a navy. The Spanish navy and shipbuilding in that country did not progress or flourish. After the destruction of the "invincible armada" by a more modern British fleet, Spain lost her position among the great world powers, and, being incapable of defending her overseas possessions, gradually lost them and eventually became a third-rate nation. This occurred very largely as a result of her weakened naval strength.

In the middle of the 17th century Holland had the most powerful navy in the world. That nation developed its colonial system to the fullest and reached the zenith of its national power. Her chief competitor was rapidly developing England with an economic power greater than that of Holland. The struggle between these countries reached its peak in what has been referred to historically as the Anglo-Dutch wars. The North Sea was the main arena for the principal contests. [[Following several naval victories by the British,]] *The Anglo-Dutch wars resulted in Holland's military and economic might being undermined. The struggle for the colonies and for sea supremacy ended in a victory by England.* Holland was forced to admit her defeat. Ever since, the Dutch have been a second-rate colonial power. Their fate was sealed by the victory of British industrial capitalism over the trade and commercial capitalism of Holland, the military manifestation of which is seen in the superiority of the British Navy (or British naval power, in the final analysis).

Karl Marx spoke of this as follows: "Trade dominance was now associated with the greater or lesser degree of predominance of conditions for the existence of major industries. By way of example, one has only to compare England with Holland. The history of the decline of Holland as the dominant commercial nation is the history of the subordination of commercial capitalism to industrial capitalism."[3]

England often used her Navy for the direct enrichment of the nation. It is enough to remind one that many English warships and merchantmen in the service of the crown operated as pirates. They robbed the merchantmen of other nations, seized them as prizes, and towed them to British ports[[, thereby undermining the economy of her competitors]]. Thus, the Navy was converted from a commercial customer into a source of enrichment for the state. *Other states also resorted to the practice of using the Navy for sea robbery. For example, in the latter half of the 18th century America had a fleet of*

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privateers during her struggle for independence. This fleet contributed to a certain extent to filling the coffers of the American states, which were maintaining Washington's Continental Army.

The core of British national policy has been exemplified by her aspiration to hold the position of "mistress of the seas," which was personified in world political power. To achieve this objective she selected the course of reducing her competitors on the seas, by all possible measures, to the /status/ of nations incapable of withstanding the might of her Navy.

At the beginning of the 18th century France embarked on the path of capitalist development. Through the enslavement of overseas countries by means of her fleet, France also developed into a vast colonial empire through her control over Canada, large territorial possessions in the Mississippi Valley, a number of West Indies islands, a portion of India, and vast regions of Africa.

At this time, the struggle in the international arena for economic hegemony, colonial proprietorship, and world dominance shifted to the English-French sphere of competition. This struggle culminated in the Seven-Years War of 1756-1763, which involved practically all the nations of Europe, including Russia. "England and France fought in this war for colonies, i.e., they were waging an imperialist war."[4]

The principal events of this war unfolded on the sea; consequently, navies played the important role in the contests between the main opposing forces. The political aims of this war were attained in contests between the British and French fleets in consequence of which France, having lost any hopes she might have had for achieving dominance or a position of naval prominence, was forced to relinquish her possessions in North American and India to the British.

In the middle of the 18th century England firmly entrenched herself as the greatest seapower, based on the most powerful navy in the world. She held a position of dominance in the capitalist world for almost two centuries.

Actions on the part of the English colonizers to discourage, by all possible means, the development of industries in the colonies and to keep them merely as sources of raw materials and as consumers of British manufactured goods resulted in a war for independence among the more developed of the North American colonies. Siding with the Americans were the navies

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of England's former rivals -- France, Holland, and Spain. Russia, which announced a position of so-called armed neutrality that was supported by the Russian Navy, did not permit England to blockade America; in this way she played a positive role vis-a-vis the Americans. England had to wage the war under conditions in which her Navy was greatly inferior to the combined enemy navy. The unfavorable ratio of naval forces and the inability to freely send reinforcements to the land forces from the mother country compelled England, after several defeats on land, to recognize the independence of the United States of America.

This war once again confirmed the growing influence of naval forces on the course and outcome of an armed conflict. [[In that war]] Naval operations were transferred from European waters to distant oceanic regions in consequence of which sea communications took on added significance.

The new conditions for combat operations by navies imposed higher demands for the seaworthiness of ships and their combat stability. In this connection, the ships were built larger, their design changed, armaments were strengthened, and the use of armor plating was introduced. The marked increase in the capabilities of the developing capitalistic industries contributed to the rapid development of the navy and its weapons.

Navies took on especially greater importance in the political struggle during the wars in the period of the French bourgeois revolution at the end of the 18th and early 19th centuries. The chief organizer of these wars was the British bourgeoisie, which was striving to seize in their entirety the remaining French colonial possessions. Here, the British transferred the brunt of the wars on the continent to their European allies, limiting her participation in the war mainly to naval operations. At that time, the counterrevolutionary grand bourgeoisie, which came into power in France following the Thermidorian Revolution, had as its first and foremost task the total destruction of British colonial might. To that end, Bonaparte headed an expedition to Egypt with the ultimate objective of conquering India. French forces, in a secret maneuver by sea unbeknownst to the British fleet, commenced their successful military operations in Egypt.

It should be noted that Bonaparte's expedition by sea was exposed to great danger in the event of discovery by the British fleet, which was commanded by Nelson. A chain of errors committed by Nelson and circumstances themselves saved the French expedition. It was not until two and one-half months later that the British fleet overtook the French ships in Abukir Bay and destroyed them.

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Defeat of the French fleet primarily affected the combat capability, mainly of that portion of the army which was in Egypt. Napoleon was forced to abandon his march to India and restrict himself to operations in Egyptian territory.

Therefore, although France had powerful ground forces, the weakness of her fleet was one of the main reasons for the failure of French plans for a large-scale political action by the French government -- destruction of England's colonial might by conquering Egypt and India.

Continuing the struggle, Napoleon resolved to invade the British Isles themselves with a large force, for which about 2,600 various kinds of transport vessels were prepared. The threat of mortal danger hung over England. And again the weakness of the French Navy proved fatal for France. Preparations for invasion were delayed. At that time, the offensive by Russian forces under the command of Kutuzov forced Napoleon to call off the invasion of England.

On 21 October 1805, the famous Battle of Trafalgar took place in the Atlantic off the coast of Spain, with the British fleet, under the command of Nelson, inflicting a disastrous defeat upon the combined French-Spanish fleet. The significance of that battle, like the role of the British Navy in the struggle with Napoleonic France, has been greatly exaggerated by the Anglo-American ideologists. For example, in Fyffe's History of Moern Europe it was emphasized that "not only was Trafalgar the greatest naval victory, but it was also the greatest and most famous of all victories achieved on land or on the sea during the entire revolutionary war. No single victory or series of victories by Napoleon had such an influence on Europe . . ."[5]

We cannot agree with this. As we all know, the war against Napoleon was continued for many years, and Russia played the main role through her destruction of the French Army in the Patriotic War of 1812. It was this Russian victory which had a decisive influence on the political situation in Europe. As far as the Battle of Trafalgar is concerned, it was not, insofar as its political consequences were concerned, an ordinary fleet naval engagement. After a series of defeats suffered by the French Navy, its final destruction at Trafalgar demonstrated the total inability of the French to fight on the seas against the better British Navy, consisting of better quality ships, manned by better trained personnel, and using tactics that were novel at the time. England and her colonies were practically invulnerable against attack from the sea. This freed the hands of the British bourgeoisie to organize and finance new alliances

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for a continuation of the struggle with Napoleonic France. France was forced to abandon any plans for war at sea and to seek out other methods of conducting war not associated with the sea against her chief rival.

THE RUSSIAN NAVY IN THE SEVENTEENTH-NINETEENTH CENTURIES

Owing to a variety of political conditions and the historical situation, the Navy of Russia, the greatest continental *and at the same time naval* state in the world, developed in an unusual manner. The Russian Navy sailed out onto the high seas at a time when they were dominated by the navies of strong naval powers of the West. [[In all fairness]] It should be mentioned that the expansionist tendencies that characterized the big powers of that period were not entirely foreign to the policies of Russian Czarism.

History has shown very clearly that Russia could not become one of the great powers without a strong Navy. This was well understood by Peter I, who can rightfully be considered the founder of the Russian regular Navy. It was with the aid of this Navy that the age-long war of the Russian people for the return of outlets to the Baltic Sea was brilliantly concluded. However, *at a later time* the lessons of this struggle with foreign invaders were not always properly understood by the Russian autocrats, who frequently underestimated the capabilities inherent in the power of the Navy, in consequence of which Russia suffered defeats in many instances. Also contributing to this was the continuous, age-long propaganda by those inimical to Russian interests, primarily England, to the effect that it was pointless for a great continental power to have an interest in the sea. To lend conviction to such propaganda, wide use was made of the fiction alleging that Russia was not a seagoing but rather a land nation, that the sea was foreign to her people, and that they were not capable of navigating.

[[This]] *The* psychological, and at times physical, pressure was intensified after Peter the First's Navy /matched strength with/ the British Navy. The English bourgeoisie perceived in this action an encroachment upon its self-styled claim as "mistress of the seas."

As a matter of fact our ancestors, beginning with the third century, waged war in the Black, Mediterranean, and Caspian seas. History tells us that even then the ancient Slavic tribes were making extended sea voyages, which gives us reason to believe that navigation by our Slavic forebears in

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the northern part of the Black Sea, in the Dneiper River areas, and in other parts of eastern Europe had been developed in much earlier times. The fact that in the year 269 A.D. these tribes sailed a large fleet and defeated Athens, Corinth, Sparta and had reached the shores of Crete and Cyprus[6] clearly demonstrates that navigation and a knowledge of sea routes in the Black, Aegean, Marmora, and Mediterranean seas was anything but a new experience for the ancient Slavic tribes who populated the southern regions of our country.

Navigation by the ancient Slavs was unique in nature and developed as a consequence of the requirements for their economic development. Our rivers, which are generally slow-flowing, have served since very early times not only as the more important of our routes of communication and outlets to the sea but also the points of departure for ocean voyages. This peculiarity of Slavic navigation was manifested in the uniqueness of their shipbuilding methods and in the tactics they used in naval warfare.

The military campaigns of the Slavs and their incursions into slave-holding Byzantium had an important effect on changes in the political map of the Balkan peninsula and those regions of Europe adjacent to it at that time. The Slavic conquests accelerated the downfall of slave-holding Byzantium, which was internally weakened through wars, and contributed to the establishment of feudalism there.

In addition to the above-mentioned Slavic naval campaigns of the 3d century, history tells us of invasions by Slavs into the Balkan peninsula, repeated attacks on Constantinople, fighting in Thrace and Greece, a military campaign of eastern Slavs in Italy and on the Island of Crete -- all carried out in the sixth and seventh centuries. Seafarers of the States of Kiev and Novgorod were experts in the art of navigation. This is clearly demonstrated by the many sea voyages they undertook between the ninth and twelfth centuries, the best known of which were the voyages by Prince Oleg of Kiev, especially the campaign of 907 which led to the capitulation of Constantinople and the conclusion of the first written trade agreement (911 A.D.) which guaranteed unimpeded navigation to Russian ships on the Black and Mediterranean seas.

In commenting on the growth of the Kievan state between the ninth and eleventh centuries, Karl Marx wrote in his "Secret Diplomacy of the 18th Century": "The ancient maps of Russia opened up before us indicate that this country at one time had a larger area in Europe than it does now. Its growth from the ninth through the eleventh centuries is noted with

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alarm. We have already mentioned something about Oleg, who committed 88,000 troops against Byzantium and who dictated peace terms which were a disgrace to the dignity of the Eastern Roman Empire. We have also referred to Igor, who had made a vassal state of Byzantium, Svyatoslav, and finally Vladimir, who captured the Crimea."

Russian overseas campaigns have been adequately portrayed in our national historical and artistic literature. Many foreign students have written about the Russian seafarers of that period. By way of example, the English research worker, F. Jane, wrote about the Russian Navy, stating that it can lay claim to greater antiquity than the British Navy. A century before British ships were built, the Russians were fighting desperately in naval battles, and no less than a thousand years ago they had been considered the best seafarers of that era. In the 12th century the Russians were already engaged in maritime trade and industry on the White Sea, had penetrated into the Pechora region, and had traveled to Novaya Zemlya and to the Kara Sea. Beginning with the 12th century Russian maritime activities extended to the Baltic Sea as well. In the 13th century Novgorod gained an important place in trade on the Baltic Sea following an extended, difficult struggle with the Swedes and the Livonian Order, the landmarks of which were Alexander Nevskiy's victory over the Swedes on the Neva in 1240 and defeat of the German knights on Lake Peipus in 1242; as a consequence, Novgorod became a member of the Hanseatic League of maritime trading cities.

The Tatar invasion destroyed Russian naval might on the southern seas and separated Russia from the Black and Caspian seas. The Russians retained only the coastal area of the White Sea and a small portion of the Gulf of Finland at the mouths of the Neva and Narva Rivers where the men of Novgorod opposed their enemies who tried to cut them off from the Baltic Sea.

The Tatar yoke and the subsequent Polish and Swedish interventions suppressed the development of Russia for a long time. This period, which was very difficult for the country, covered a span of about five centuries and had its effect on the development of the Navy. During this time, Russia completely lost her maritime trade. The western nations, which had not been subjected to such difficult ordeals and had been protected against the invasions of the Tatar hordes by the Slavs, developed in very rapid fashion and built powerful navies which were extensively used to establish colonies and to develop maritime trade.

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As a result of a prolonged but unsuccessful centuries-long war for an outlet to the Baltic Sea, Russia was driven back from the former Baltic shores by the Stolbovo Peace Treaty in 1616. King Gustavus Adolphus of Sweden termed this treaty one of the "greatest boons of the Almighty" and stated that the Russian people will find it difficult to surmount the obstacles imposed.

However, Russia's aspirations to reach the sea, halted on the southern and Baltic seas, was directed toward the north *and east,* where she had explored the entire seacoast from Pechora to the Sea of Okhotsk; there she obtained the first information about Sakhalin and the Shantarskiye Islands. In the south the Don and Zaporozhe Cossacks reached the sea via the Dnieper and Don rivers in spite of the opposition by powerful enemy forces, and they made daring raids upon Black Sea coastal areas.

It must be admitted that the prolonged campaign of propaganda inimical to Russia found support among the influential satraps of Russian Czarism who tried in every possible way to impede efforts to build a Navy; they strived to curtail appropriations necessary for maintaining the Navy in the necessary state of readiness.

The narrowness of thinking by Czarist servants in high places was not without results. Their reactionary ideas of opposing a Navy with an army, and their failure to understand that the power of the armed forces of a nation depends on the coordinated development of both components of a single organism did great harm to the defensive capabilities of the nation for a long period of time. One example in support of this is the administration of Kuropatkin, the Minister of War. Just before the Russo-Japanese War he made the following entry in his diary: "Yesterday with Witte, . . . *We* persuaded the sovereign in a friendly manner as to the need to curtail expenditures for the Navy and for the Far East."[7] If this does not constitute perfidy, it is certainly testimony of a gross misunderstanding of the national interest.

Enemy propaganda continuously repeated that Russia was not a maritime nation, that she was merely a continental power and for that reason needed only enough of a Navy to accomplish certain modest missions dealing with coastal defenses.

Possessing one-sixth of the total land surface of the globe, Russia was unquestionably the greatest land power in the world. But at the same time she had always been a great sea power. The coastal boundaries of Russia were almost twice as long as those of the United States, and about 15 times as long

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as the coastline of France. The ratio of sea boundaries of Russia, the United States, and France is approximately the same: about two-thirds of their state boundaries consist of ocean coastlines. The sea boundaries of Germany (before World War II) accounted for only one-third of her total boundaries. Nevertheless, no one rebuked Germany for her desire to have a powerful navy given the fact that she was a continental nation.

No less widely used by the enemies of Russia were methods of falsifying her military history, demonstrating that all of our nation's victories were alleged to have been gained by ground forces, [[that armies should be developed at the expense of the navies,]] that the Russian Army could be most powerful only by getting rid of the Navy. Thus, Kuropatkin in 1900 reported to the Czar: "History has taught us to follow the paths of our forebears and that land armies should be regarded as Russia's main strength."[8]

As a matter of fact, the Navy failed to participate in only two of the 33 wars that Russia fought over a period of 200 years prior to World War I (the Hungarian campaign in 1849 and the Akhaltekinsk Expeditions of 1877-1879).[9]

In this connection, one cannot fail to mention that in the Russo-Japanese War, according to Lenin, the important element was the matter of dominance at sea. In his article "The Fall of Port Arthur," Lenin wrote: "The military blow is irreparable. The question of dominance on the seas -- the key and most important problem in this war -- has been resolved. . . . The Japanese have always reinforced and replaced their military forces more quickly and more effectively following each great encounter than the Russians. And now, having attained complete dominance at sea and having completely destroyed one of the Russian armies, they will be able to send in twice as many reinforcements as the Russians."[10]

And even today bourgeois propaganda headed by the ideologists of the United States and directed against the need of the Soviet state to have a powerful naval force is being disseminated on a large scale.

Comparatively recently, specifically on 4 August 1970, then President of the United States Richard Nixon made the statement: "What the Soviet Union needs in the way of military preparations is different from what we require. The USSR is a land power, and we are primarily a naval power; therefore, our needs are different."[11] Need it be said that Nixon's statement, which is a modern version of earlier attempts by British politicians and officials of the British Admiralty to prove the

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absence of any need for Russia to have a powerful navy, has no connection with the real state of affairs and contradicts the history of development of [[our]] *the Russian* Navy in the past and is at variance with the interests of [[our country]] *the Soviet state* today?

And even today the Soviet Union is reproached for the fact that it is developing a powerful Navy. But nothing is said about the build-up of naval forces of the United States and other NATO countries. Meanwhile, quite recently, on 11 April 1978, US Secretary of Defense Brown declared before a subcommittee of the House of Representatives: "We wish to have our naval presence everywhere in the world in peacetime" -- and he announced a five-year program for building up the US Navy at a cost of $32 billion.[12]

For a number of reasons, the Russian Navy developed in anything but a uniform manner. Individual upsurges in Russian naval power alternated with prolonged periods of decline and weakness, and each time Russian naval power decreased, it produced new difficulties that led to serious consequences which could not readily be corrected, regardless of the considerable efforts invested. Such was the case in the Crimean War of 1853-1856, whose outcome was decided beforehand by the superiority of the Anglo-French fleet. [[Failure by the Czarist government to properly estimate the role of the fleet resulted in a situation wherein Russia was forbidden to have a fleet on the Black Sea, according to the Peace Treaty of 1856.]]

[[The lessons of that war were not taken into account by the autocracy even in the Turkish War of 1877-1878, when the appearance of the British fleet in the straits forced the Russian Army standing before the walls of Constantinople to withdraw without having gained the principal objective of the war -- gaining a free exit to the Mediterranean Sea.]] The same thing held true in the Russo-Japanese War of 1904-1905. Inactivity of the Russian fleet at the beginning, due to inefficiency and outright treachery by the military command followed by the complete destruction of the fleet could not but have had a decisive influence, according to Lenin, on the outcome of that war, which proved so difficult for Russia.

During periods of decline the Navy lost its aggressive characteristics and merely served as a defensive force: It lost the quality of being a very important instrument of state policy. Furthermore, after the industrial revolution in the leading capitalistic nations, when the general backwardness of Russia became apparent, the Russian Navy became relatively weaker. This was [[testimony]] *one of the manifestations* of

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the /loss/ by Czarist Russia of her position as a great world power with an independent policy, and *evidence* of having become a supplier of cannon fodder to the imperialist predators to fight for their interests -- interests that were foreign to the Russian people.

Russia also had great difficulties resulting from her geographic position, which called for a fleet in each of the separate naval theaters with the capability of performing assigned missions.

Nevertheless, despite all these difficulties, the Navy contributed many remarkable pages of heroism in the nation's history and played an important role in the history of the development of Russia.

The history of Russia's regular Navy is usually begun with the era of Peter the Great. In describing this period, Karl Marx stated that it was impossible to conceive of a great nation so isolated from the ocean as Russia before Peter's time. "No great nation had even existed nor was it possible for a nation to exist in such an intra-continental position like Peter the Great's original realm. No nation would submit to seeing its shores and the mouths of its rivers wrested away from it. Russia could not leave the mouth of the Neva, the sole outlet for the sale of products of the Russian north, in the hands of the Swedes."[13]

Russia could not resign herself to being isolated from the sea, and waged constant warfare to gain access to the coast. [[Russia's]] *This* struggle [[to gain an outlet to the sea]] called for a naval fleet without which such an objective could not have been achieved. The building of a Navy at the time of Peter I was a logical sequel to the development of the Russian state and factually indicated the rebirth, under new conditions, of the qualities of a seafaring people which were inherent in the Russians. To cope with this problem in a backward nation and do it in a short time, the Russian people had to surmount exceptional difficulties.

It was resolved to make the breakthrough to the sea by capturing Azov; this would *contribute to protecting* [[protect]] Russia against threats from the Turks and Tatars. The international situation and the system of military and political alliances that existed at that time (Russia, Poland, Austria and Hungary against Turkey) confirmed the correctness of selecting this direction.

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However, the first Azov campaign of 1695 demonstrated that the Army alone could not take Azov, which was receiving support by sea. An intensified shipbuilding program made it possible in the spring of 1696 to use ships in the siege and to capture Azov through the combined efforts of land and sea forces. This successful experience in precision cooperation between the Army and Navy in the capture of a maritime fortress stands out favorably in comparison with similar, though unsuccessful, operations by the British in attempts to capture Quebec (1691) and St. Pierre (1693).

To be sure, the capture of Azov by no means resolved the problem of the return of the outlets to the sea for free maritime trading. It was still necessary to resolve the problem of occupying the coast of the Kerch Peninsula which was under Turkish control. In addition, there was the difficulty and persistent struggle to be settled with one of the most powerful states of that day, Sweden. That nation had dominated northern Europe for about a century and a half and stubbornly resisted attempts by the Russians to reach the Baltic coast and sail the Baltic Sea. Russia had to [[rebuild her economy on a new basis,]] create a modern army and simultaneously build a navy with the greatest possible speed; without such a navy military operations in the Baltic Sea area would have been impossible.

The Russian Navy appeared on the Baltic and immediately gave a good account of itself during the operations for access through the mouth of the Neva, in the invasion of Kotlin Island, and in the defense of the new capital on the Neva -- St. Petersburg. In 1708, when the Swedes mounted [[a]] *the next* joint offensive of large land and naval forces against St. Petersburg, the Russian Navy already represented an impressive force. It had 12 [[sailing ships-of-the-line]] *frigates* and several hundred smaller vessels, mainly oar-propelled craft. This offensive failed ignominiously under attacks by the Russian Army and Navy.

On 27 June 1709 the victorious Battle of Poltava was fought -- a most important event in history -- which signified the end of Sweden as a great power. But the objectives of the war had not been attained here; 12 more long years of stubborn fighting were necessary to do so.

To /clear/ the Gulf of Finland of enemy naval units it was necessary, first and foremost, to seize Vyborg. This removed the direct threat to St. Petersburg and opened a way for the Navy to the Finnish skerries. Attempts to accomplish the task with ground forces alone did not result in the capture of the fortress. Vyborg was later taken through a closely coordinated

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action of ground and naval forces. This was followed by the fall of Riga, Pernov, Arensburg, the Moon Sound Islands, and Reval. In all of these actions the Navy played an increasingly greater role. Gradually, it became a most important factor in the continuing stubborn action. As a result of joint operations involving galleys and troops which they set ashore, we occupied Helsingfors and Abo in the summer of 1713, and this brought the Swedish coast and its capital under direct attack. Despite all of this, the Swedes by no means felt they had been defeated, and they were convinced that their ships-of-the-line would destroy the Russian fleet and thereby prevent a march maneuver by its landing force across the Gulf of Bothnia.

England and France, and subsequently other states which feared an increasingly stronger Russia and the total defeat of Sweden, used all manner of intrigue against the Russians and applied pressure against them. However, Peter I firmly insisted on completely and totally consolidating the shores of the Baltic Sea [[he]] *she* had occupied. He gained this confidence through the new Russian fleet which won a brilliant victory over the Swedish fleet at Gangut in 1714 and thereby became a respectable force which ensured an independent Russian policy in the Baltic Sea area.

The situation was not limited merely to intrigue and diplomatic pressure applied by foreign governments. In the summer of 1719 England resolved to put her own armed forces into action. Her fleet entered the Baltic Sea. Inspired by this demarche of the British, the Swedes put their ships out to sea. In the Battle of Oesel Island the Russian ships-of-the-line under the command of N. A. Senyavin [[completely]] destroyed *and completely captured* the Swedish Squadron. [[and captured some of its ships.]] Following that, the Russian galleys made a seaborne assault landing in the area of Stockholm under cover of the fleet.

At the end of 1719 England concluded a military alliance with Sweden that was directed against Russia, and this inspired the Swedes to continue the war. The Russian Baltic Fleet, in the meantime, continued to grow. Generally speaking, at that time there were only two powerful navies -- the British and the Russian navies. Fleets of other seafaring nations were considerably weaker.

In 1720 sizeable British naval forces again entered the Baltic. However, the Russian fleet continued with the landing operations on the Swedish coastline and won a victory over the enemy [[line forces]] in the Battle of Grengam Island. In 1721, despite the presence in the Baltic of the British,

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the Russian armed forces forced the Swedes to capitulate, and on 30 August 1721 to sign a peace treaty whereby Sweden permanently ceded the coastal areas of the Baltic *except Finland* occupied by the Russian forces. This treaty was clear evidence of the importance of the Navy*'s actions* [[and its capacity to support troops]] in the attainment of military objectives.

In spite of the intervention of England and other nations, the Navy made it possible to retain the fruits of the victory at Poltava, and it elevated Russia to one of the most powerful naval forces in the world.

The medal struck in honor of the victory over the Swedes reads: "Termination of hostilities by this peace treaty was due to the Navy alone; it would not have been possible by a land action." This is one of the clearest examples of the influence of the Navy in enabling Russia to attain large-scale successes in the international sphere.

Simultaneously with conducting war for the return of outlets to the Baltic Sea, there was the parallel [[expansion]] *development of lands* of the Russian nation [[eastward toward]] *in the east right up to* the Pacific Ocean.

In the 17th century the Russians explored in very rapid fashion the vast areas of Siberia and the Far East. The results of these explorations are included among the great geographic discoveries of the world.

Yakutsk, the point of departure for the Pacific Ocean, was founded in 1632. This was followed by expeditions led by Moskvitin, Stadukhin, Dezhnev, Khabarov, and other explorers who traveled in the territories of the Far East and its coastal zone. In 1649 Okhotsk, the first Russian port on the Pacific, was founded. In the early part of the 18th century Atlasov explored Kamchatka where the port of Petropavlovsk-Kamchatskiy was founded in 1740.

In the middle of the 18th century Russian industrialists headed by G. Shelekhov, who had already formed the Russian-American Company, began to develop the American Northwest and the Aleutian *and Kurile* islands.

By 1800 Russia had already secured Alaska, the Aleutian Islands, Sakhalin, as well as numerous islands in the Pacific. Russia reached the Pacific coast, but her position here was not strong enough due to the weakness of the Russian Navy in these waters, as well as the aggressiveness of other nations which were attempting to seize Russian possessions in the northern Pacific area.

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Following the death of Peter the Great in 1725, signs of decline and demoralization began to appear in the Russian Navy. Ships became dilapidated and were not immediately replaced, ship maintenance was progressively worse, and shipbuilding reduced in scope.

The new Russo-Swedish War of 1741-1743, though temporarily reviving naval activity, nevertheless revealed some serious superficial defects due to lessened attention by the ruling circles of Russia to ship construction and development. However, in this war the Russian Navy played a most important part in defending the shoreline of the Baltic Sea and the city of St. Petersburg. Nevertheless, the process of deterioration of the Russian Navy continued after the war, and our nation steadily lost its importance as a great seapower. At the same time it was still /confronted/ with the ever growing problem of the return of outlets to the southern seas. This should inevitably have called for the revival of the Navy and the strengthening of its role within the system of armed forces, but that occurred later on.

In 1769 shipbuilding was resumed in the old shipyards built by Peter. In the Russo-Turkish War of 1768-1774 the Danube Flotilla was of tremendous assistance to the forces fighting the Turks on the western shores of the Black Sea by destroying powerful Turkish naval forces. The Azov-Black Sea Fleet, commanded by A. N. Senyavin, opened a route from the Sea of Azov to the Black Sea for the Russians; this was the solution to a problem which arose as far back as 1696 with the capture of Azov. The new Black Sea Fleet won a number of glorious victories over the superior forces of the Turkish Fleet and broke up enemy assault landings in the Crimea, thereby consolidating Russia's position on the shores of the Black Sea.

During the course of the prolonged struggle for outlets to the seas Russia succeeded in building a powerful Navy and a great shipbuilding industry which had great potential capabilities. The talents of Russian officers and admirals were crystallized in advanced naval arts and shipbuilding science. The illustrious traditions of the Russian naval school, which gave to the world and the native land such outstanding naval commanders as Spiridov, Ushakov, Senyavin, Lazarev, Nakhimov, Makarov, and such famous ship designers and builders as Yershov, Titov, Bubnov, and Krylov are being preserved and augmented by Soviet navymen.

Russians in the Mediterranean. The Mediterranean Sea is termed the cradle of power of great navies. This sea has also been the scene of illustrious achievements by Russian sailors.

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Recent historical research has revealed that even in ancient times the people of the Black Sea area, the Balkan Peninsula, the Aegean Archipelago, and Asia Minor had contact by sea with one another for many centuries. Navigation of that epoch in pursuit of trade had a favorable influence on the economic development of the peoples of these regions. The tribes which populated the vast [[steppes and wooded steppes]] *expanses* of eastern Europe and the Black Sea littoral engaged in trade and had cultural, political, and military ties to the most developed of the old Mediterranean nations, thanks to the system of water routes. These ties played a not inconsiderable role in developing the economy of the people in the Black Sea area, their trades and professions, and in exerting a positive effect on the development of their social and political lives.

The Russian state exerted a favorable influence on commercial navigation in the Mediterranean basin and the Baltic Sea. The military successes of old Russia ensured the safety of the famous water route from the "Varangians to the Greeks," which was developed in the ninth century, and thereby contributed to the development of trade in many countries of Europe, Asia, and Africa.

As early as the 11th century the merchants of Novgorod followed trade routes on trips to Mediterranean countries not only along rivers but also by sea around Europe to Constantinople. The Russian state undertook a number of measures to ensure the safety of the ocean trade routes, including combined operations with Byzantium in battling the pirates of the Aegean.

Beginning with the second half of the 11th century and up until the [[Tatar-Mongol]] *Mongol-Tatar* invasion, the Russian Mediterranean trade contributed to the development of feudalism in old Russia. As the Russian state became broken into small segments the sea voyages were undertaken by individual princes. Convoys of Russian trading vessels sailed to foreign lands until the Mongol-Tatar invasion cut Russia off from contact with the southern seas.

However, the [[Mongol]] conquerors could not deny the Russian people their inherent love for the sea. The seafarers of Russia, more often sailing the ships of foreign merchants, continued to navigate the Mediterranean on trade and diplomatic missions and often on pilgrimages. In those difficult days even the Russian freebooters in the lower reaches of the Dnieper and the Don continued the traditions of our nation's sailors. The Cossacks made many ocean voyages in the 16th century and received assistance from a unified Russian centralized state, which not only supported the Cossack cause but often served to organize its operations.

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The war with Turkey and the Crimean khanates subordinated to it was long and difficult. The Ottoman Empire, insofar as population, area, and military-economic resources were concerned, was among the most powerful nations of that time. The Turkish Army and Navy were considered the most powerful in the world. Hence, the military successes of the poorly armed Cossacks in that struggle were of no mean importance in protecting the southern regions of the Russian state, and they served as an inspiring example to the Mediterranean nations which rose to oppose their Turkish oppressors. Being powerful, excellent fighters, the Don and Zaporozhe Cossacks made the water expanses and coastal areas of the Black and Azov seas in the 16th and 17th centuries an arena of savage military clashes with the Turkish Army and Navy. One of the episodes of that struggle worthy of mention is the seizure by the Cossacks of the Turkish-held fortress of Azov in 1637 and holding it for a period of five years. In 1641 the Turks sent an expedition of 200,000 men and about 300 ships against the Cossack-held fortress. After a three and a half month siege, during which they suffered heavy losses and failed to break down Cossack resistance, the Turks were forced to raise the siege and evacuate with their remaining troops. A year later (1642) the Cossacks voluntarily withdrew from the fortress and blew up the various installations. They made this decision by agreement with the Russian government, which sought to avoid a large-scale war with Turkey.

The victory of the Russian regular Army and Navy in the capture of Azov by Peter I in 1696 was a brilliant conclusion to a two-century struggle by the Russians for the right to navigate the southern seas freely. *In addition, as a* [[The]] result of that [[Russian]] victory, [[apart from the fact that our nation]] *Russia again* reached the shores of the Sea of Azov.[[, was]] The treaty [[we drew up]] with Turkey[[, which]] allowed unrestricted navigation for the Russians in the Mediterranean Sea.

A brilliant contribution to the pages of history was made by the Russian Baltic Fleet in the First Archipelagan Expedition to the Mediterranean Sea (1770-1774) under the command of Admiral G. A. Spiridov, which was undertaken for the purpose of conducting major military and political actions against Turkey, including providing support to the Balkan peoples who revolted against their Turkish enslavers. The Baltic Squadron, consisting of ten ships-of-the-line and a number of other combatants, was concentrated in the Mediterranean after overcoming tremendous difficulties. It was assigned a mission that was seemingly impossible to accomplish, but the Squadron proceeded to carry out the task in brilliant fashion. In a

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decisive battle at Chesma (24-26 June 1770)[14] that Squadron destroyed the Turkish Fleet. Concerning this event the commanding officer of the Squadron, Admiral Spiridov reported: "Honor to the All-Russian Fleet! We have attacked the enemy . . . fleet and have smashed, burned, and sent it skyward, we have converted it into ashes and have sunk the remainder . . . and we control the entire archipelago."[15]

For a period of several years the Russian Squadron was engaged in military operations far from its own shores. It destroyed the Turkish Fleet in actions at Chios and Chesma, blockaded the Dardanelles, disrupted sea lines of communication, made numerous seaborne assault landings, and thereby diverted the enemy from the main, northern Black Sea areas. The Squadron captured 20 islands in the archipelago and a number of coastal cities, including some along the coast of Syria. The Turks were always aware of the threat of a Russian attack from the south against Constantinople.

The Mediterranean operations of the Russian Squadron, which maintained its fighting capacity for several years through its own resources, and the brilliant victory it scored over a larger enemy fleet were a remarkable example of prolonged operations by a large naval unit completely separated from domestic bases. This detachment of the Russian Navy enhanced the prestige of the Russians internationally and won the ardent sympathies of all Mediterranean peoples.

The successful actions of the Russian Army and Navy compelled the Turks to sue for peace and to sign a treaty whereby Russia acquired the lands between the Bug and the Dnieper, secured, once and for all, the Sea of Azov with access to the Black Sea, and established the right of unrestricted commercial navigation in the Black Sea and passage into the Mediterranean Sea. The Crimea was declared independent of Turkish rule.

Having used the power of her Navy, Russia finally annexed the Crimea in 1783 without a war and proceeded to build her main base for the Black Sea Fleet at Sevastopol. However, this did not bring about an end to the fighting on the southern seas.

The rapid rise of Russia served as the reason for the countries inimical to her to support Turkey in the latter's attempts to militarily force the Russians to relinquish her gains on the Black Sea coast. In the war against Russia, Sweden was also involved; her rulers were still nursing hopes for the restoration of the Baltic regions to their control.

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In August of 1787 Turkey began military operations, thereby drawing Russian forces to the southern borders of the country. Taking advantage of the fact that apart from the Baltic Fleet there were practically no armed forces in the vicinity of St. Petersburg, Sweden declared war on Russia in the summer of 1788. Her fleet was dispatched to the eastern part of the Gulf of Finland, thereby placing the capital of Russia in a critical situation. The main effort in the war against Sweden devolved upon the Baltic Fleet, which protected its shores successfully. After several victories it defeated and drove off the Swedish Fleet, thereby exerting a decisive influence on the outcome of battles being fought on Finnish territory. Obviously, if there had been no Russian Navy the ground forces alone could not, due to their insufficient strength, have coped with the Swedes in such rapid fashion.

Foreign powers supporting Turkey and Sweden in this war shifted from diplomatic pressure to direct threats. England moved her fleet into the Black and Baltic seas, and Prussia concentrated her ground forces along the Russian Frontier. However, military operations in the south were developing favorably for Russia. A powerful detachment of the Turkish Flotilla which reached Ochakov to support the army was defeated by the Liman Flotilla, and this enabled the Russian forces to take possession of Ochakov. The Turkish battle fleet was defeated by the Black Sea Fleet at Kerch and decisively destroyed at Capt Kaliakra. Due to the daring actions of the Black Sea Fleet, commanded by its outstanding leader Admiral F. F. Ushakov, the Turkish Fleet was driven out of the Black Sea, and the Turkish Army, deprived of support from the sea, ceased all resistance in late 1791. A peace treaty was signed in *Jassy* in 1792 whereby the coastal area of the Black Sea extending from the Dniester to *the present* Novorossiysk was ceded to Russia.

The international situation at the end of the 18th and early 19th centuries was extremely complex. After the bourgeois revolution, France was involved in a bitter struggle with capitalist England, which had captured the most important colonial areas of the world. The political struggle between France and Russia was being waged for the legacy of the German empire, which had disintegrated by this time. At [[that]] *this* time it was a question of whether the small German states would draw up a French or Russian type Confederation of the Rhine. Such a complex situation resulted in continuous, marked turns in the policies of the larger European nations and in the trends of their basic military objectives.

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Between 1798 and 1800 Russia, allied with England, Austria, and Turkey, was conducting military operations against France. Portions of the Russian Army under the command of the outstanding military leader A. V. Suvorov performed miracles of heroism in distant Switzerland and northern Italy. The Russian naval squadron in the Mediterranean commanded by Ushakov freed the Ionian Islands from French control. Using them as a base, it participated actively in driving the French out of Italy. One of the most brilliant naval achievements was the capture, after a three-month siege, of the powerful fortress of Corfu. History is acquainted with the rapturous words of Suvorov who, upon hearing this report, announced: "Our Great Peter still lives! This is what he said in 1714 following the defeat of the Swedish Fleet: Nature made only one Russia, she has no competitors -- and we can see that again now. Hurrah for the Russian Fleet! . . . I say to myself at this time, why was I not at Corfu, even as a warrant officer?"[16]

By way of comparison, we wish to point out that during this same period the British Fleet under the command of Admiral Nelson was in the second year of his siege against the weaker LaValletta fortress on Malta and failed to capture it.

The political consequences of the victories by the Russian Fleet in the Mediterranean were of great significance. Napoleon attributed great importance to the Ionian Islands. He regarded them as a very important departure point for military operations against Egypt, the Balkans, Constantinople, and southern Russia. Therefore, the expulsion of the French from the Ionian archipelago by Ushakov's squadron radically changed the situation in the Mediterranean Sea. The Russian Fleet proved itself to be a very important instrument of foreign policy. Through its operations in Italy, Sardinia and even Tunis were drawn into Russia's sphere of influence. Cooperating with the Army, the Navy played a decisive role in the liberation of Naples and Rome.

The flourishing of the art of naval warfare in Russia during the second half of the 18th century coincided with the rapid development of all aspects of the military art. Thanks to Suvorov, the Russian Army added greatly to its illustrious military traditions. F. F. Ushakov performed the same service for the Navy.

However, it was only during the period of our Soviet rule that the name of Admiral F. F. Ushakov was properly evaluated and given its lofty due. Western European and American historians even today, following the example of the American Mahan, continue in every possible way to ignore Ushakov, believing

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that he was merely a conscientious student of Nelson and achieved his successes that way. However, a simple comparison of the data pertaining to the greatest battles conducted under the direction of these two famous admirals demonstrates that Ushakov won his naval victories considerably before Nelson was able to demonstrate his talent as a naval leader.[17]

After the main forces of Ushakov's flotilla departed, some of the naval and the naval infantry forces were retained in the Mediterranean to secure the Ionian Islands. Several years later, in order to counter new attempts by the French to seize areas in the Balkans and also to protect the Ionian Islands as a base for the Russian Fleet in the Mediterranean, Russia again began to concentrate her naval units here under the command of Admiral D. N. Senyavin (the Second Archipelagan Expedition), who encountered a very difficult, rapidly changing military and political situation.

In late 1806 Turkey, incited by Napoleon, declared war on Russia. This changed the mission of the Russian Mediterranean Squadron completely; its function now was to capture Constantinople by an attack from the south. This task was to have been accomplished jointly with the allied English Fleet. However, the real intentions of the English boiled down to the matter of preventing the Russians from seizing the Black Sea straits and strengthening their supremacy in the Mediterranean. Senyavin was forced to limit himself to blockading the Dardanelles under the provocative actions of the English. Nevertheless, in the course of his naval operations in the Dardanelles and Afon he defeated the Turkish Fleet.

While the Russian Fleet was winning brilliant victories in the Aegean Sea, peace negotiations were being conducted on the Nieman River between Napoleon and Alexander I. A week after the Battle of the Afon, the Treaty of Tilsit was signed (25 June 1807), which suddenly changed the foreign policy of the Czarist government in view of the alliance that was made with Napoleon. As a result, Russia gained a breathing spell before the French invasion, but it was bought at an exceptionally high price. Napoleon's territorial gains in Western Europe were recognized. Russia promised to participate in the continental blockade of England and go to war against her. Russia was to relinquish to France and Turkey all the strategic positions held in the Mediterranean that had been won by the Russian Fleet. All Russian forces were to be removed from the Mediterranean[[, and the squadron was to be placed under the full command of the French]].

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This abrupt change in the foreign policy of Russia was especially difficult for the Russian Mediterranean Squadron. It was not until August 1809 that a portion of the Squadron's personnel returned to their homes.

It was only twenty years later, in 1827, *that* the Russian Squadron [[again returned to]] *reappeared in* the Mediterranean, *and again* with the noble mission of rendering aid, but this time it was to the Greek people. Together with the British and French squadrons the Russian Squadron under Admiral Gayden was supposed to force the Turkish occupational forces in Greece to refrain from exterminating the Greek population who were fighting for national independence. Combined operations by the allied fleets were concluded by the famous Battle of Navarino (Pylos) in October 1827 in which a superior Turkish Fleet was completely destroyed.

Following that battle, the Russian Squadron remained in the Mediterranean under the command of Admiral Rikord. This was the Squadron which conducted a very tight blockade of the Dardanelles and the Turkish coast during the Russo-Turkish War of 1828-1829. Subsequently, [[although]] the Russian Fleet did not conduct military operations in the Mediterranean, *but* individual ships and entire squadrons continued to visit the region.

Thus, since very early times the Mediterranean Sea has been of tremendous economic and strategic importance to Russia. Commercial and cultural ties with Mediterranean countries and other [[nations]] *regions* of the world were maintained by means of this sea. Over a long period of time Russia's most important line of defense against enemy attack from the south ran through here.

The Mediterranean Sea has assumed still greater defensive significance for our country under present-day conditions in which the possibilities for an aggressive imperialist attack upon the Soviet Union directly from this region have increased tremendously. This is due to the fact that the United States Sixth Fleet is based here regularly with its aircraft carriers and nuclear-powered missile-armed submarines.

The Russian Navy During the Industrial Revolution. The Russian Navy entered a difficult period following the termination of the Napoleonic wars. It was the darkest period of its history and was due to the failure of the Czarist rulers to understand the significance of the Navy insofar as the destiny of Russia was concerned. Talentless individuals were appointed to head the Navy, such as Admiral Chichagov, who considered the Navy

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burdensome and unnecessary. His successors included the French immigrant, reactionary Marquis de Traverse and the German Von Moller, who continued with the ruination of the Navy. The Decembrist Steingel' described the condition of the Navy at that time as follows: "Marquis de Traverse completely destroyed the most beautiful creation of Peter the Great."[18]

Ships practically never put out to sea. Naval personnel were employed to perform auxiliary duties. Russian admirals were replaced by foreigners. Embezzlement of government property was universal. The well-known Russian Admiral V. M. Golovnin wrote: "If rotten, poorly armed vessels, aged, ailing fleet commanders without naval skills or spirit, and inexperienced captains, officers, and plowmen called sailors -- all formed up into ship's crews -- can make a navy, then we have got a navy."[19]

Standing out brilliantly against the general decline of Russia's naval might are such positive occurrences in the Navy's activities as an expedition which circumnavigated the globe, undertaken through the initiative of the best naval officers, including a group of Decembrist sailors. The crews of the ships in the expedition preserved the best traditions of the Russian Navy. Emerging from this group were such illustrious naval commanders as M. P. Lazarev, P. S. Nakhimov, V. A. Kornilov, and others.

The activities of our seafarers and merchants in the Aleutian Islands, Kurile Islands, and the west coast of North America played no small role in preserving the traditions of the Navy. Naval vessels under the direction of traders Shelekhov, Baranov, and others persistently explored the North American coastline and islands from Alaska to Capt St. Elias. However, the subsequent fate of these lands was predetermined: The Czarist government did not assign proper importance to these newly acquired regions which could not be held without strong naval forces in the northern Pacific.

The day of atonement was approaching for the failure of the Czarist government to understand the importance of the Navy in the development of the nation, its importance as an instrument of national policy, and as an armed force. The Crimean War of 1853-1856 was approaching. England and France persisted in their policy of pressing Russia back from the Mediterranean, and they were striving to take into their hands Turkey's economy and her finances. Turkey cherished the hope of re-establishing her dominance on the northern shores of the Black Sea.

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In this war an important part was to be played by the navies, since the principal opponents (England, France and Russia) were widely separated and the distances could only be negotiated by ships.

This war took place during the period of the industrial revolution which began primarily in the capitalist countries of Western Europe where heavy industry experienced a tremendous development, and this brought about a technical revolution in military affairs. As far as navies were concerned, this was the period of transition from sail to steamships with armor-plated hulls and propeller engines, and powerful gun armament.

The [[British and French]] *Anglo-French naval forces* had [[an overall]] *a more than* twofold superiority over the Russian Navy in ships-of-the-line and frigates, and a more than tenfold superiority in steamships. In addition, all the Russian steamships were paddle-wheel types. The technical backwardness of the Russian Fleet gave rise to defensive rather than offensive tactics which contradicted the most mobile form of force, one designed to seek out and destroy an enemy at sea.

The main theater of war was the Black Sea, and the central event of the entire war was the heroic eleven-month defense of Sevastopol. The war commenced with the Battle of Sinop in which the Turkish Fleet was destroyed. This event has been entered in golden letters into the book of glory of the Russian Fleet. However, after the Anglo-French fleet entered the Black Sea, the technically backward, weaker Russian Black Sea Fleet was unable to continue the battle at sea. The Russian high command decided to use the guns and men from the Fleet for the direct defense of Sevastopol on land.

Having a superior naval force, the enemy strove to expand the war geographically. Combined Anglo-French squadrons were sent to the Gulf of Finland where they encountered stiff resistance from much weaker Russian naval forces, which thwarted the attack on St. Petersburg.

In the White Sea the British and French were engaged in "disorderly attacks upon Russian and Lapp villages and destroying the paltry equipment of the poor fishermen,"[20] and, of course, attained no useful objectives. In August of 1854 an Anglo-French squadron appeared before Petropavlovsk-Kamchatskiy, which was defended by only two ships and a small garrison of troops. However, in the unequal battle, the Russians put up strong resistance and won a victory, causing the allied squadron to withdraw ignominiously.

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Despite the heroism manifested by the Russians in this war, our backward Czarist nation suffered a great defeat. The Crimean War, which cost the belligerents "incalculable funds and over a million dead,"[21] ended with the treaty of peace that was signed in Paris on 30 March 1856. Russia was forced to give up her control over the Danubian estuary and a portion of Southern Bessarabia and relinquish her protectorate over the Danubian principalities. The Russians were forbidden to have a naval fleet on the Black Sea -- this was one of the most difficult terms of the treaty. This circumstance once again emphasized the special importance ascribed to the Navy in international relations. Russia was thrust back still farther from the attainment of her cherished objective of an unrestrictive egress to the Mediterranean.

The Crimean War was an episode of exceptional importance, which was followed by great changes in the social and economic life of the country. Russia embarked on a course of capitalistic development, and proceeded to bind the wounds sustained in the war.

In 1871 Russia succeeded in revoking the treaty clause that prohibited her from having a fleet on the Black Sea. Having received this authorization, the Czarist government experienced no change in its attitude toward the Navy, and it failed to appreciate the necessity for a strong Navy and undertook no measures to restore Russia's naval might. Meanwhile, as a result of the Franco-Prussian War of 1870-1871, favorable conditions arose in 1877 for the military solution of some vexing problems with Turkey.

When the war began the Black Sea Fleet was dismal to contemplate. Apart from two weak, clumsy ironclads, so-called "Popovki" [Translator's Note: rounded armored ships built after the design of Vice Admiral Popov], there were only a few obsolete, small-sized vessels. Necessity forced us to arm and utilize for naval operations some comparatively fast steamships from the merchant fleet, as well as steam cutters and other boats. Using these vessels, the Russian navymen under the leadership of youthful, energetic commanders conducted successful actions at sea, paralyzing the movement of the Turkish ironclads.

The Russian Army was sorely tested in this war. However, as a result of several heroic victories it reached the gates of Constantinople. With a little more effort the prolonged struggle for an outlet to the Mediterranean Sea could have been terminated successfully. When the Russian troops stood before the walls of Constantinople, however, a British squadron made

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an appearance in the straits. The effect it produced was nothing short of magical. The independent policy of Russian Czarism disappeared because of the threat posed by England and Austria and embodied in this squadron. Actually, since Russia had no fleet to defend the Black Sea coast and regions adjacent to it, she had to withdraw. She again had to reckon with the fact that Czarist officials, who continued to underestimate the importance of the Navy in international relations and in war, stubbornly resisted all attempts to strengthen Russia's naval might.

The peace treaty was turned over for the consideration of the international Congress of Berlin in 1878. The treaty that was adopted by the Congress again moved Russia away from outlets to the Mediterranean and adversely affected the condition of the Slavic people on the Balkan Peninsula. The territorial area of Bulgaria was reduced by more than one-half, and that of Montenegro also greatly reduced. In turn, however, Austria-Hungary, which was not involved in the war, received Bosnia and Herzegovina, while England got Cyprus.

Although Russia's strategic position was somewhat improved as a result of the war, [[nevertheless]] the gains she derived from this peace agreement were hardly in line with the effort invested. And this was due not only to the fact that she lacked a strong Navy.

Along with this, the Congress of Berlin became the starting point for a new arrangement of forces in Europe. It laid the beginning for dividing the great powers into two enemy groupings: Russia and France versus Germany and Austria-Hungary. The English and the Americans played the role of arbiters. The question of Russia's right to unrestricted passage to the Mediterranean became considerably more complex, was put off indefinitely, and could now be resolved only by a world war.

For over a hundred years Russia's policy in the south revolved around the unrelenting desire to obtain free exit into the Mediterranean. This promised not only tremendous commercial and economic advantages, but also a stronger influence in the Balkans and Asia Minor. And despite the fact that the straits were in the hands of a greatly weakened Turkey, Russia could readily have coped with the problem provided other powers did not involve themselves in the struggle. Therefore, each time the principal European nations were distracted by other affairs, Russia again returned to the main objective in her southern policy, striving to achieve freedom of trade and navigation in the Mediterranean Sea.

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The wars which were fought here covered a span of over 30 years and cost millions of lives, but Russia succeeded in establishing herself solidly along the northern and eastern shores of the Black Sea. She was incapable of moving forward toward her objective, regardless of the victories gained by her ground forces.

In the struggle for outlets to the southern seas, the Russian Czarist government frequently found itself insolvent in the final periods of a war when it was especially important to have a naval force on which an independent policy could be based in order to compel an enemy and the government that supported it to agree to peace terms convenient to Russia. Being one of the most powerful [[land]] powers in the world, Russia had a fleet in the south strong enough only to take on Turkey in single combat. But as soon as other states intervened and posed threats mainly by means of their naval forces, Russia was forced to pull back and was sometimes defeated; as a result, she lost her independence of policy and submitted to the dictates of the Western European powers.

In this connection it should be emphasized that Peter I clearly could not have conducted his policy of consolidating Russia's position on the Baltic so persistently without submitting to the demands and threats of other powers, which were supported by demonstrations of naval force, had he not *created by* [[at]] that time [[had the second strongest]] *a powerful* navy [[in the world]].

Therefore, during a struggle lasting over a hundred years for outlets to the southern seas, the weakness of the Russian Navy was one of the most important reasons that this objective was not attained.

A brief examination of the role of the Navy in the history of Russia, and in her growth and economic development, leads to the following basic conclusion: During all stages of the nation's history her armed forces had to have a powerful Navy consistent with the interests of a world power.

NAVIES IN THE WARS OF THE LATE NINETEENTH AND EARLY TWENTIETH CENTURIES

Capitalism made the transition to the imperialist stage during the late 19th and early 20th centuries. "Imperialism, as a higher stage of capitalism in Europe and America, and later in Asia, was fully formed during the period 1898 to 1914. The Spanish-American War (1898), the Boer War (1899-1902), the

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Russo-Japanese War (1904-1905), and the economic crisis of 1900 in Europe -- these are the principal historic milestones of the new epoch of world history."[22]

By this time, the principal capitalist powers had divided practically all of the earth's territories, mainly with the aid of their fleets. Moreover, those nations which were the first to embark on the path of capitalist development and had strong navies succeeded in capturing the lion's share of those territories. For example, England, who had begun her conquest of colonies as far back as 1583 (Newfoundland), [[succeeded]] by the end of the 19th century through skillful use during peacetime and in war of the power of her Navy *over a period of 300 years, conquered* [[in conquering]] *by various means and methods* colonies whose territorial area was 90 times that of the mother country.

The center of the struggle for the partition and redistribution of the world shifted to the Pacific Ocean, where weak and still undivided China lay. Naval squadrons sailed to this area to implement the expansionist aspirations of the major imperialist powers. The first to begin plundering the Chinese people were the British and French imperialists, and they were followed by the more recent predators -- the United States, Germany, and Japan. Russian Czarism was a military-feudal form of imperialism with all of the qualities inherent in that system, such as barbarism, despotism, violence, unbridled exploitation of the multinational population of the nation, and an expansionist policy with respect to neighboring countries; it also joined the fray.

Uncompromising contradictions between colonizers gave rise to many conflicts and wars in the Far East in which the naval fleets continued to be the principal instruments for attaining the political objectives of the imperial powers.

The Sino-Japanese War. The industrial development of Japan following the bourgeois revolution of [[1863]] *1867-1868* made it possible for that nation to build a navy relatively quickly. Through its use Japanese imperialism now had the capability to direct its aggressive aspirations for the seizure of Chinese territory, China being an economically backward nation with a very weak Navy.

In 1894 Japan, supported by the United States and England, launched a surprise attack on China, and, since the opponents were separated by a body of water, that fact very largely determined the very important role of the navies in that war.

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Having the ability, by virtue of her Navy, to anticipate the Chinese in establishing a seaborne land force in Korea, Japan pushed into southern Manchuria. Following this, a seaborne army -- also transported with the aid of the Navy -- was landed on the Yellow Sea coast in the region of Bitsyvo and Taliyenwan and seized the Liaotung Peninsula with the main Chinese naval base, Port Arthur.

Japan left the islands, invaded the Asian mainland, and in this the great powers of the world saw the potential threat of her expansion. The Sino-Japanese peace treaty of 1895 was protested by Russia, Germany, and France, nations which had impressive naval forces capable of posing a threat to the Japanese island nation. Japan was forced to relinquish the Liaotung Peninsula and Port Arthur.



Key:
(1) Legend
(2) Battle of the Yalu Tsian River 9-17-1894
(3) Bases of fleets participating in the military operations (China: Weihaiwei and Port Arthur; Japan: Sasebo, Shimonoseki, and Takasaki)
(4) Territory of warring states
(5) Composition of fleets at beginning of war
(6) Sides
(7) Armorclad ships
(8) Armored cruisers
(9) Cruisers
(10) Gunboats
(11) Destroyers
(12) Japan
(13) China
(14) Indicated for China is the northern squadron inasmuch as the Shanghai, Canton, and Fuchow fleets did not participate in the war.

Figure 6. The Sino-Japanese War 1894-1895

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The problems of the new Far Eastern center of imperialist contradictions were moved to the forefront of world politics. Along with this, the Sino-Japanese War demonstrated the especially important part played by navies in attaining the political objectives of states under conditions of a more complex struggle to reshape the world.

The Spanish-American War. By the end of the 19th century the policy of the United States had all the characteristics peculiar to an imperial power. America was searching for her first big victim. The closest and most convenient targets of her aggressive aspirations were the Spanish colonies in the Caribbean Sea, the Philippine Islands, and Guam. These islands were supposed to ensure America's further expansion in Asia. The United States used the first convenient excuse to declare war in 1898. The main role in this war was played by a Navy whose power was to be used primarily against the Spanish Navy in order, thereby, to deny the enemy an opportunity to receive reinforcements by sea from the mother country. Hence, in preparing for the war she built a Navy that was superior to that of backward, monarchical Spain. The Caribbean Sea and the western Pacific were the main theaters in this war.

Utilizing superior sea power, the Americans landed an assault force on the Island of Cuba. When the Spanish West Indian squadron attempted to break out of Santiago, the technically superior American ships destroyed it. The Spanish garrison at Santiago, denied support by the Navy, soon capitulated. The war in the Caribbean, for all intents and purposes, was over.

And the American victory in the Philippines was also cheaply obtained. Spain's weak Asian Squadron was destroyed in the Bay of Manila. The United States Marines entered Manila, the capital of the Philippines, unchallenged, denying entry to the real victors, the Philippine insurrectionists, through whose actions the islands in that archipelago had been cleared of Spaniards.

Through the peace agreement Cuba, Puerto Rico, Guam, and the Philippines became American colonies. The United States assumed a dominating position in the Caribbean, became consolidated in the Western Hemisphere, and acquired convenient positions in the Pacific which served as approaches to China.

The victory of the United States over backward Spain was a direct result of American superiority at sea. The Navy played the most important and decisive role in that war. The Spanish-American War was followed by a period of unrestrained naval

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

Figure 7. The Spanish-American War of 1898

Key:

1. Legend
2. Areas in which the better known naval battles took place
3. Bases of navies involved in the naval operations (Spain: Canary Islands, Santiago, and Cavite; USA: Key West, San Francisco, and Hong Kong)
4. Territory of the belligerents
5. Composition of the armed forces at beginning of war
6. Armorclads
7. New
8. Old
9. Armored cruisers
10. Spain
11. USA
12. San Francisco
13. Key West
14. Santiago
15. Canary Islands
16. Hong Kong
17. Cavite

development. The Navy and Marines had been moved up to the leading position in the armed forces of the United States.

The Role of Navies in the Russo-Japanese War. The contradictions in the Far East were fraught with new wars. War between Japan and Russia was growing imminent. The position taken by Russia together with France and Germany against the Sino-Japanese Treaty formed the basis for an open political struggle between Russia and Japan. The seizure of the Kwangtung area in 1897 by the Russian Fleet and ground forces and the erection of a base for the Russian Pacific Squadron in Port Arthur exacerbated the situation still more.

The troops of all the leading imperialistic competitors, England, Japan, the United States, Germany, France, and Russia,

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were brought in during the Boxer Rebellion, which broke out in 1900. The contradictions between these imperialist powers became still more intensified following this period.

Following Russia's occupation of Manchuria the basic problem in the Far Eastern policies of England, Japan, and the United States was how to oust Russia from the regions which she had taken over and bring them under their own control. Incited by England and the United States, Japan openly indicated that she was proceeding on a course that would lead to war with Russia and she was making intensive preparations for it.

In 1902 Japan and England signed a pact against Russia. One of the special terms of this agreement was the obligation of the allies to maintain in Far Eastern waters a fleet more powerful than that of the Russians. This was clear testimony that Russia's enemies intended to assign a role of paramount importance to the navy in the impending armed clash.

The United States also tried to kindle a war between Japan and Russia in the hope both, especially their navies, would become weakened, and this would give the Americans an opportunity to take over key positions in the Pacific and in China. The President of the United States warned the governments of France and Germany that America would take the side of Japan if they extended any kind of support to Russia. And so Russia found herself isolated in her stand against the powerful island empire whose main strategic strength lay in its Navy and which relied on its alliance with and support of at least two of the largest seapowers in the world -- England and the United States -- whose principles regarding the use of their navies for the solution of military and political missions were well known. These circumstances should have determined the trend of preparations by the conflicting sides for the possible war. Clearly manifested in the different approaches to the matter of preparing the armed forces of the two sides were the long-range views of the Japanese politicians and the lack of this quality on the part of the national leaders of Czarist Russia.

The Japanese paid special attention to the construction of a powerful navy, to which end most of the nation's appropriations and the indemnity received from China following the Sino-Japanese war were directed. The United States and England broadly subsidized Japan and served as her arsenal. Practically all of the Japanese armorclads were built in British shipyards, and for that period they had the best operational performance characteristics and the best weapons. Under the direction of German instructors Japan raised a huge army as well for an invasion of the mainland. Japanese Army and Navy officers had

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wartime experience in China and were thoroughly acquainted with the peculiarities of that theater of operations.

The preparations of Czarist Russia for the impending war were quite different. Although the ruling circles of Russia understood that their Far Eastern aspirations could be realized only militarily, they [[nevertheless]] failed to take the necessary and provident measures. The impact of this inactivity in preparation for war was further aggravated by the fact that the strategic situation in the Far East was developing unfavorably for Russia. The Siberia-Eastern Chinese Railway had not yet reached full capacity to ensure uninterrupted and rapid concentration and supplying of Russian troops in the eastern military area, and this particularly affected the [[Pacific Fleet]] *fleet in the Pacific*, which was greatly inferior to the Japanese Fleet, as can be seen from Table 10.

The shortsighted Russian command group and the Czar failed to correctly evaluate the seriousness of the situation in the Far East and to understand the role of the Navy in the approaching war. In this connection, timely measures to reinforce the Pacific Fleet with elements of the Baltic and Black Sea Fleets were not undertaken. In addition, the Russian [[Pacific]] Fleet was dispersed in the various seas. In the Yellow Sea, which was the main naval theater, the Fleet had a mere eight ironclad ships.

Construction of naval bases on the Pacific Ocean was far from completed, and Port Arthur was neither an adequate fortress nor an equipped naval base to withstand enemy attacks and support the basing of ships.

Table 10 Composition of Russian and Japanese Fleets in the Far East at the Beginning of the Russo-Japanese War [23]

Types of ships	Russia	Japan
Fleet Ironclads	7	6
Armored cruisers	4	8
Cruisers	7	12
Destroyers and torpedo boats	37	47

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Thus, in the beginning of 1904 Russia found herself isolated, unprepared for war, with a weak fleet in the Far East, and facing the combined might of international monopolistic capital, which used Japan as its striking force.

The immediate strategic aim of the war, according to the Japanese plans, was to gain control of the sea, which they proposed to achieve by a surprise attack upon the Russian [[Pacific]] Fleet and the destruction of the Port Arthur squadron, as well as Russian ships and facilities in Korea and China. It was then planned to land the Army on Liaotung Peninsula, capture Port Arthur, and then destroy the main grouping of Russian troops in Southern Manchuria, subsequently occupying all of Manchuria and the Maritime and Ussuri territories.

Taking advantage of the favorable international situation and the general military unpreparedness of Czarist Russia, Japan unleashed the war on 9 February 1904 with qualitative and quantitative superiority over the Russian Navy. The base facilities of the Japanese Navy ensured their control of the troop transportation routes to the continent. The Japanese Army was likewise numerically superior to the Russian land forces, and Russia was unable to change this unfavorable ratio very quickly owing to inadequate land transportation facilities.

The war began with a surprise attack by the Japanese Fleet on Russian naval forces in Port Arthur and Chemulpo which, though weakening the Russian Squadron, still did not result in the enemy's controlling the sea.

But was this a real surprise attack? Was there sufficient information about Japanese preparations for war?

Repeated reports by a Russian naval intelligence agent in Japan gave every reason to expect an attack. In early January he reported that reservists had been called up, steamships with a capability of transporting two divisions of troops had been chartered, steamship voyages to distant ports had been cancelled, and the Japanese Fleet was departing for Korea. On 18 January the agent reported that minefields were being laid and that the scope of preparations pointed to Japanese military plans of extensive dimensions. On 24 January he telegraphed the news of the general mobilization in Japan. But the Czarist government disregarded all these warnings, and the war hit the Russian ships like an avalanche.

When the war was fully underway, the Czar appointed Vice Admiral S. O. Makarov Commander in Chief of the Pacific Fleet. He knew the enemy well and was well acquainted with the theater

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of operations, while also being an authority in naval tactics. However, the Czar's deputy in the Far East and the Fleet CinC had opposing views regarding the role of the Fleet in the war and its employment in the developing situations. Makarov's proposals for active operations by the Fleet and for increasing its combat readiness met with obstacles. The ships were kept at the bases most of the time and [[no]] *hardly any* reconnaissance operations, much less active operations, were conducted against the seaborne transport of Japanese forces. Following the loss of the Fleet Commander in Chief on 14 April 1904 when the flagship PETROPAVLOVSK was blown up by a mine, all active operations by the Port Arthur Squadron ceased.

In the meantime, the Russian Army, though greatly reinforced, was retreating northward under Japanese attack. Effective measures were necessary to lessen Japanese pressure. The only effective force to this end could be the Fleet, which was capable of stopping or restricting the flow of reinforcements arriving by sea to the Japanese Army and creating a threat to the Japanese islands. An understanding of the situation came too late.

On 24 August 1904 the belated decision was made to dispatch the Second Pacific Squadron from the Baltic Sea. The timely union of this Squadron with the Port Arthur Squadron could have radically changed the situation in Russia's favor in the theater of operations, but the opportunity had been lost.

As a matter of fact, if such measures had been undertaken earlier, the relative strength of forces in the Far East would have been quite different (Table 11).

Taking advantage of the favorable situation on the seas, the Japanese concentrated their main efforts against Port Arthur. They tried to break the resistance of its defenders and to destroy the squadron that was based there before arrival of reinforcements from Europe. The Japanese siege grouping was reinforced, and launched a savage assault against the Port Arthur fortifications.

Having decided against using the still adequate power of the Fleet for its *immediate* mission of fighting at sea where it could provide the greatest support both for the besieged Port Arthur and all the Russian forces in Manchuria, untalented Russian military leaders decided to disarm the vessels and utilize their armament and personnel directly in the land defense of the fortress, not realizing that the existing situation differed radically from the conditions [[that prevailed in]] *of the defense of* Sevastopol in 1854-1855, where such a

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Table 11 Fleet Strengths if the Second Pacific Squadron Had Arrived on Time in the Far East

Types of Ships	Russia			Japan
	Port Arthur Squadron and Vladivostok Detachment	Second Pacific Squadron	Total	
Fleet armorclads . . .	7	8	15	8
Armored cruisers . . .	4	1	5	8
Coastal defense armorclads	–	3	3	–
Total armorclad ships	11	12	23	16
Cruisers	7	8	15	15
Destroyers and torpedo boats	37	9	46	63

Note: Japan achieved an increase in number of warships in comparison with prewar times chiefly by taking advantage of England's shipbuilding industry and Anglo-American credits.

decision was fully justified. The Port Arthur garrison fought heroically for eight months. Despite the fact that the possibilities of defending the fort were not completely exhausted, the structure was surrendered [[unconquered]] to the Japanese on 2 January 1905. Although the fall of Port Arthur is considered the turning point of the war and to a considerable degree decided its outcome, actually, however, the turning point began with the cessation of active operations by the Russian Fleet, i.e., after the first phase of the battle for supremacy at sea ended in the defeat of the Russians.

The Second Pacific Squadron under the command of Rozhestvenskiy did not begin the voyage from the Baltic Sea to the Far East until 15 October 1904. The history of the Russian Navy, or any other navy, for that matter, had never recorded such a long, protracted voyage by a vast fleet, consisting of so many different types of vessels, many of them not very

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seaworthy, without any past experience in joint, long-distance ocean voyages. Along that extended course the Squadron did not have a single base to provide rest for the personnel, make repairs to the ships, or take on supplies. Most of the shores along which the armada sailed were under the control of England, an unfriendly nation. The farther the Russian Squadron sailed away from its western bases, the greater the danger of a surprise encounter with the enemy navy, a fact that complicated the voyage greatly. However, the heroism and high morale and skill of the Russian sailors made it possible to overcome all difficulties.

News of the fall of Port Arthur and the loss of the Port Arthur Squadron was received in St. Petersburg while the Squadron was at anchor off the coast of Madagascar. But the Czar and his associates saw in the Second Pacific Squadron their last hopes for a victory in the war, and they did not change the mission assigned to it.

On completion of the almost eight-month, unprecedented voyage without the loss of a single ship, the Russian Squadron sailed into the Strait of Korea on 14 May 1905. Here, waiting for it, was the more modern Japanese Fleet, which had been making preparations for action for some time and was supported by a system of closely disposed bases. The outcome of the Battle of Tsushima Straits was predetermined. Despite the heroism of the officers and men who fought courageously in this action, the Second Pacific Squadron suffered a disastrous defeat at the hands of an enemy that had superiority, primarily in weapons and combat equipment. Most of the Russian ships were lost in the battle while an insignificant number were interned in foreign ports.

The question of control on the sea was finally resolved in favor of the Japanese. Lenin wrote the following: "The Russian naval fleet was completely destroyed. The war was irrevocably lost. . . . We were faced not only with a military defeat but a total military disaster of the autocracy."[24]

The Russo-Japanese War ended with this destruction of the Czarist Navy. The government was convinced that it was pointless to continue the war. It decided against waging the war under conditions in which a revolution had been started, an event which presaged the total downfall of the autocracy. Japan had also become totally exhausted and was forced to call on the President of the United States to use his good offices as a mediator.

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

Key:

1. Legend
2. Points of better known naval engagements
3. Bases of fleets participating in military operations
4. Course taken by Vice Admiral Rozhdestvenskiy's squadron
5. Course of Rear Admiral Fel'kerzam's detachment
6. Course of Captain 1st Rank Dobrotvorskiy's detachment
7. Course of Rear Admiral Nebogatov's detachment (3rd Pacific Squadron)
8. Sea line of communications operations by Vladivostok Detachment
9. Area of operations of auxiliary cruisers and cruisers on sea lines of communication (July-September 1904)
10. Territory of warring countries

Figure 8. Russo-Japanese War 1904-1905

The national economic, political, and military backwardness and the total lack of understanding by the Czarist government of the significance of sea power for Russia were the principal reasons for the weakness of her Navy, and these things brought about military defeat. The real winners in this war were the imperialists of the United States, England, and Germany. Their competitors in the Far East and the Pacific were greatly weakened and mired in debt.

According to the terms of the Portsmouth Peace Treaty, Japan was allowed to lease the Kwangtung region with Port Arthur and Dal'nyy, she got control of the southern [[part]] *branch line of the* [[Manchurian]] *Chinese Eastern* Railroad, was ceded the southern part of Sakhalin, and was granted preferential rights in Korea.

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As a result of the grievous lessons taught by the war, influential Russians began to get a better understanding of the significance of the Navy in modern warfare and induced the Czarist government to rebuild the Navy as quickly as possible. The most outstanding national ship designers called on to build a Navy included: A. N. Krylov, V. V. Konstantinov, N. I. Kuteynikov, I. G. Bubnov, and others. But as later events proved, the Czarist rulers remained true to themselves and did not change their attitudes toward the Navy. The process of construction was conducted in the usual earlier manner, principally out of consideration for national prestige, without taking into account the need for Russia to become a naval power. Hence, the construction of the Navy proceeded in random fashion with[[out]] adherence *only* to [[specifically projected missions, merely]] adjusting our own forces to those of foreign fleets and *blindly* imitating[[, in servile fashion,]] the various foreigners as to types of ships, some of which were inadequate to our needs and even obsolete. They absolutely failed to take into account the conditions under which ships were supposed to operate, as well as the special requirements peculiar to Russia only, in the construction of a navy governed by our country's geographic situation. The most important of these was the potential necessity of intertheater maneuver of forces due to the remoteness of the naval theaters. Here, it was necessary to take into account the absence of suitably equipped sea routes between the individual theaters and of bases upon them, a situation resulting, to a considerable extent, from indifference by the Czars to laying claim to the many islands and overseas territories which had been discovered by the Russians. It will again be recalled that the principal reason for the loss of these territories was the ingrained failure to understand the importance of sea power to Russia.

Russia was forced to build separate fleets on each sea, each of which was weaker, as a rule, than the fleets of our potential enemies in a particular theater. Manifestly, the solution of the problem of intertheater maneuver of naval forces called for the construction of ships with long-range navigation capability and for leaders with exceptional strategic foresight to ensure timely concentration of forces in the required theater. Unquestionably, if Rozhestvenskiy's squadron had been transferred to the Far East before the outbreak of hostilities or even before the fall of Port Arthur, the war would have been postponed to a later date or its outcome greatly changed.

The history of the wars waged by Russia convincingly demonstrates that each time the Czarist rulers failed to devote sufficient attention to the development of the Navy and to maintain it in accordance with current requirements, Russia either suffered military defeats or her peacetime policy failed to attain the desired aims and objectives.

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NAVIES IN WORLD WAR I

Differences in the rate of economic and political development among the imperialist governments intensified the drive to remake the world, thereby creating conditions for a new and more difficult war.

Political preparations for the forthcoming war had been in the making for some time. The imperialist nations were divided into two opposing groups: the alliance of central European powers, headed by Germany, and the Triple Entente, headed by Britain. The impending war could only be global and imperialistic in scope. Proceeding in parallel with this was the process of accelerated training of the armed forces personnel. Special attention was devoted to careful analysis of the experiences in the Russo-Japanese War, in which the greatest naval engagements took place and in which the most modern means of naval combat were involved. That war demonstrated that the importance of navies in military operations had grown markedly. This basic inference was perceived by practically all the main imperialist powers, which immediately proceeded with the construction of ships, taking into account the experiences in the Russo-Japanese War.

Another conclusion reached was that the dominating role in naval battles would be played by heavily armored gunnery ships. Accordingly, the efforts of all naval powers in their preparations for the First World War were directed toward the construction of surface fleets and developing tactics for use in gunnery duels between armored squadrons. These views were reflected in the construction of powerful battleships known as dreadnoughts.

Recognized as the second most important weapon of the fleet was the torpedo, which was [[first]] *widely* used in the Russo-Japanese War and fired from surface ships. This led to perfection and mass production of destroyers and light cruisers with torpedo and gun armament.

All other questions pertaining to the building of navies, especially developing submarines, were relegated to a secondary position based on the experiences of the past war, even though the advances in science and technology of that time made it possible for industry to proceed with the construction of rather advanced submarines. *The art of naval warfare had not recognized the capabilities of submarine forces which objectively already were in existence at that time.*

Having a considerable and quite negative influence on the one-sided trend in the development of navies, also, was Mahan's

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theory of "sea control," generally regarded as incontestable, according to which only battles between large battleships or the blockading of enemy ships in their bases could lead to victory at sea.

Russia's preparation for World War I took place in a period of difficult political problems. The results of the Russo-Japanese War revealed the inability [[precariousness]] of the Russian Czarist system [[and its]] to successfully cope with the principal problems of national policy. Revolutionary actions and armed uprisings initiated by the heroic [[men of the]] *armoralad* POTEMKIN continued until the very beginning of the war, and they shook the foundations of the autocracy.

After the Russo-Japanese War the /Russian/ Navy was quite ineffective and incapable of meeting the German Navy in battle on the open sea. *But* despite the urgent need to build up a navy quickly, the Czarist government was not at all concerned. For a long time, therefore, it was not clear what kind of navy Russia needed and what problems she would have to cope with in the impending war. In 1911, finally, a law was promulgated which served as the basis for determining the composition of the operational forces of the Baltic Fleet.[25] As far as the Black Sea Fleet and the Siberian Flotilla were concerned, their composition was to be determined more precisely in the future, depending on changes in the strategic situation in these theaters.

The Baltic Fleet, which was held to be of especially great importance in securing the strategic right flank of the fighting front and in defending the capital city against attacks by a powerful German Fleet, was assigned the mission of preventing enemy amphibious assault landings in the eastern part of the Gulf of Finland. It should be admitted that the Baltic Fleet accomplished this task brilliantly, using as a basis in its battle plan the concept of a defensive action in the Nargen-Porkkala-Udd position with minefields and gun support.

The Black Sea Fleet was to ensure control of the Black Sea and be in a state of readiness to commence operations for the seizure of the exits to the Mediterranean. It was also supposed to be prepared to destroy the enemy fleet at the mine and gun position at Sevastopol.

The approaching war was becoming more and more perceptible, yet the belatedly begun program of shipbuilding was progressing poorly. Thus, the construction of the first battleships for the Baltic Fleet was begun in 1909, of battleships for the Black Sea Fleet, 1911, and of battle cruisers for the Baltic

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Fleet, in late 1912, yet it had not been completed when the war broke out. The destroyer program, however, was progressing more successfully. Therefore, the Baltic and Black Sea fleets entered the war with obsolete ships.

At the same time, practically all kinds of weapons and combat means were quickly and successfully improved upon and therefore had better tactical characteristics than was true of the foreign models. Good results were also attained in fleet combat training.

Status of Navies at the Outbreak of World War I. Because the experience in the Russo-Japanese War had been examined from only one standpoint, tremendous battleship fleets were built by the outbreak of World War I by the main warring nations.

Most powerful was the British Navy, which, it seemed, could completely ensure the safety of the vast colonial empire and lines of communications with all the nations of the world.

The German Navy, supported by a rapidly growing industrial base, developed most rapidly, and this contributed to the technical improvement of its ships. As we can see from Table 12, at the beginning of the war the Entente had a total of 99 battleships, whereas the Central Powers had only 53. Thus, the Entente had almost a twofold superiority over the Central Powers in number of battleships. The overall relative strength of the forces of the German group deteriorated following the entry into the war of the United States and Italy on the side of the Entente. This is shown in Table 13.

In addition, the British Navy had an extensive system of bases in the mother country and in the colonies. The geographic position of Great Britain relative to the German Navy bases created favorable conditions for a sea blockade of Germany and offered advantages to the British Navy in its operations against enemy surface ships.

The plan of the British Admiralty called for the suppression of Germany's economy through the suppression of sea transportation and establishing sea control through a blockade of German coastal ports. Provision was made to have available at the home country's bases a superiority in battle strength capable, under favorable conditions, of dealing the German Fleet a decisive blow in the event it ventured out to sea.

The French Navy, by agreement with the British, and later the Italian Navy, were deployed in the Mediterranean where they could make use of a developed system of bases in the western section.

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Table 12 Composition of Navies at the Beginning of World War I [26]

Types of Ships	Entente				Central Powers		
	England	France	Russia	Total	Germany	Austria-Hungary	Total
Battleships – Dreadnoughts and Battle Cruisers	29	4	-	33	19	3	22
Battleships – Dreadnoughts	40	17	9	66	22	9	31
Cruisers	82	24	12	118	44	10	54
Destroyers	225	81	62	368	144	16	160
Submarines	76	38	15	129	28	6	34

Table 13 Composition of Navies Following the Entry of the United States and Italy in WWI [27]

Types of Ships	England	France	Russia	Italy	US	Total	Germany	Austria-Hungary	Turkey	Total
Battleships – Dreadnoughts and Battle Cruisers	42	7	5	5	15	74	24	4	1	29
Battleships – Pre-Dreadnoughts	31	14	9	6	25	85	21	9	1	31
Cruisers (including armored cruisers)	88	22	12	18	26	166	26	12	2	40
Destroyers	339	83	76	34	75	607	195	17	9	221
Submarines	131	40	34	36	54	295	138	13	-	151

The Austro-Hungarian Navy was bottled up in the Adriatic Sea at the very beginning of the war.

The German Navy relied on bases convenient for defense against sea attack, but Germany lacked bases that would ensure direct outlets to the ocean. Her system of bases permitted quick concentration of naval strength only in the North and Baltic seas.

The German command planned on weakening the British Navy, destroying it part by part as the British maintained a blockade of the German coast. They hoped to equalize the strengths of

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

Figure 9. World War I – 1914–1918

Key:

1. Legend
2. Sites of most famous naval battles
3. Naval bases
4. Areas of prolonged action by German sea raiders
5. Areas of operation of German cruisers
6. German U-boat operating areas
7. Areas of sea operations
8. German surface craft operating areas
9. Territorial areas of the opposing sides

the navies in that manner and later, in a general battle, to deliver the decisive blow against the British. This would permit Germany to operate freely on the seas, and later, through a naval blockade, to strangle England and thereby attain the ultimate objectives of the war -- redivide the world in its own favor and build a powerful colonial empire. Provision was made for extensive raiding operations against British merchant shipping. There were no plans for naval participation in military operations in ground force theaters of action. In the initial period of the war the Baltic theater was considered to be of secondary importance for the German Navy.

The following observations are not without interest: In planning especially intensive offensive land operations on the order of blitzkrieg tactics, the Germans were not particularly concerned with losses, but they planned naval actions with special care because of their fear of losing their large ships.

In 1914 the two sides were headed toward war in earnest. All they needed was an excuse to unleash it, and, naturally, a pretext was found.

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The chief culprit for starting World War I -- this was engendered by the contradictions between the imperialistic states -- was German imperialism, which was characterized by its extreme aggressiveness. It openly proposed a forceful redivision of the world which would ensure Germany's commanding position on the planet forever.

It should be explained that other imperialistic countries were also guilty in starting the war; they also got into it with predatory objectives in mind. The Entente and the German alliance deserved each other.

This was a "war between two groups of great robber-powers for the distribution of colonies, for the enslavement of other nations, for conveniences and privileges in the world market."[28]

As we all know, the German plan for the quick destruction of the French Army and capture of Paris failed. Both sides on the Western Front shifted to prolonged positional warfare. The German strategy in the West became deadlocked.

Operations involving individual cruisers and cruiser squadrons were widely used by the Germans to harass Allied shipping, but proved to be ineffective, and they did not achieve the expected results. American neutrality, which was favorable to the Entente, and Japan's entry into the war on the Allied side also helped to remove the threats to ocean shipping; Japan sought to acquire the German colonies and ensure convenient positions for herself in order to expand her position in China and eventually fight for control of the Pacific Ocean. By the end of 1914, most of the German cruiser strength, which had exerted a certain amount of pressure on the shipping situation, was destroyed. The strong points in the German colonies used as bases for the cruisers were captured.

German naval operations likewise failed to achieve perceptible results insofar as weakening of the British naval forces was concerned. Despite all this, Germany still hoped to alter in its favor the outcome of the battle at sea with a victory over the British Navy in a decisive naval battle, and thereby influence the outcome of the whole war. And the British Navy was making preparations for such a battle. The opportunity to match forces finally arrived in the famous Battle of Jutland in May 1916.

The Battle of Jutland ([[30]] *31* May -- 1 June 1916) was the greatest naval engagement in the entire war. The main battle elements of the British and German fleets were involved in this action.

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In evaluating the battle, many students noted a certain indecisiveness manifested by the fleet commanders, especially the British, and they noted the absence of any desire to take risks for fear of losing large ships; it was referred to as a "cat and mouse" game. They wrote that when the admirals were in the line of fire they manifested a lesser degree of decisiveness than was true of generals, who were usually behind their troops during a battle. For these reasons many athorities felt that the Battle of Jutland did not yield any results whatever.

To our way of thinking, however, this opinion is entirely wrong. An evaluation of any battle, as we all know, is based not on a comparison of losses sustained by the individual sides but by the extent the battling forces attained their assigned objectives.

From this standpoint let us consider the results of the battle between the fleets at Jutland.

Germany's objective in this action was to bring about a marked turn in the course of the war in her own favor, destroy the British Fleet, and ensure for herself the necessary freedom of operation in order to choke England with an all out sea blockade. Along with this, if the Germans were victorious, the sea blockade applied against the Central Powers would have been lifted; the serious effect of this blockade on the economy was already painfully perceptible. But the German Fleet proved incapable of accomplishing these missions.

England was striving to maintain the situation that prevailed on the seas and to intensify the blockade against Germany. She essentially achieved these aims in the battle.

Therefore, the Battle of Jutland determined there would be no change in the overall course of the protracted war and that it would be continued as a battle of potentials which held no promise of success for Germany.

The *outcome of the* Battle of Jutland meant the loss of any hope by the German High Command that the blockade of Germany would be lifted, the exhaustion of her military might, and the loss of the war, *since it aggravated Germany's serious need to carry on a lengthy struggle of potentials.* In addition, the Battle of Jutland demonstrated that the transfer to new conditions of the experiences of the Russo-Japanese War relative to the employment of major, type commands of capital ships as the main and only elements to gain victory at sea is erroneous. The battle served as a dividing line; the time had come to recognize the importance of cooperation in a naval action between the various naval elements and forces.

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Exhaustion of military and economic resources and the growth of the revolutionary movement in the countries of the warring coalitions, especially the German grouping, forced their governments to seek ways to hasten the end of the war. The economies of England and France, which were supplied by sea with the resources of virtually the whole world, were in a position which offered every possibility of waging a long war with every chance of success. Because of the sea blockade, Germany suffered from an acute shortage of industrial raw materials, foodstuffs, and manpower, and for that reason a long war meant a defeat. Austria-Hungary was held only by means of German bayonets and was seeking a separate withdrawal from the war. In Russia the revolutionary movement was spreading, and the Czar was unable to contain it.

In January 1917 Lenin wrote: "In 29 months of war the resources of both imperialist coalitions were pretty well determined; all, or nearly all, possible allies were drawn into the carnage, and the strengths of armies and navies were tested and retested, measured and remeasured."[29] This marked "the turning point from an imperialist war to an imperialist peace."[30]

Having lost hopes for a quick end to the war by means of her ground forces and having failed to achieve her objectives in the Battle of Jutland with her battle fleet, Germany feverishly sought other means to gain a victory as quickly as possible. And it seemed that a way out was found: waging all-out submarine warfare to destroy English shipping and to force her to capitulate before the arrival of American troops in Europe.

The leaders of Germany, including the army command element, viewed all-out submarine warfare as the one and only final possibility of winning a victory or gaining an honorable peace.

Germany had initiated her submarine blockade of the British Isles at the beginning of the war but did not conduct it decisively, fearing she would antagonize relationships with neutral governments, especially the United States. However, unrestricted submarine operations commenced in February 1917 at the insistence of Hindenburg and Ludendorf. Originally, some 26 or 27 submarines were assigned to operate against the British sea lanes. In the months that followed, the number was increased. Enemy merchant shipping losses were increasing. Only about 10% of the losses were replaced. The all-out submarine blockade almost brought England to her knees. The fact of the matter is that the front-line troops were running short of the necessary supplies, while England herself was on the verge of economic collapse.

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The vast antisubmarine resources of the Allied fleets, including large numbers of ships, planes, and dirigibles, were enlisted to fight the U-boats, which were now operating without observing any of the limitations of international law. The convoy system was used more and more. Other measures for combating the U-boats were also used, especially at the approaches to their bases and at the bases themselves. Apart from increasing the area of the minefields along the German coast, vast minefields were planted between the Shetland Islands and Norway, which were supposed to prevent the U-boats from reaching the Atlantic from the North Sea. However, in spite of the tremendous effort and expense involved, this minefield did not justify the hopes that had been placed on it. The losses in merchant shipping continued to be high.

Nevertheless, in the final period of the war the effectiveness of the submarine blockade was reduced because the German command, after charging the U-boats with accomplishing the main mission, had failed to employ other naval forces to ensure their successful operation. The German fleets and air units did not materially even engage the enemy antisubmarine forces. The U-boats were left to their own resources. To the thousands of ships and other means of waging antisubmarine warfare, Germany merely responded with a few new submarines. Imperialist Germany, whose military machine was approaching a catastrophic end, delayed too long before beginning to employ her submarine forces on a broad scale, and she did not draw upon her total naval strength to support their operations. Hence, she was incapable, in the final analysis, of accomplishing the task of an effective submarine blockade of England. In the meantime, having received a considerable amount of aid and replacements from the United States, the Allies continued to gain strength in the battle with the undersea enemy. In 1918 they used for this purpose about 9,000 ships of various types, 2,500 aircraft, a large number of dirigibles and balloons, as well as over 700,000 men. Also affecting the reduced effectiveness of the submarine blockade was the increasing rate of replacement of merchant ships, although they did not exceed the losses until 1918.

But in spite of the fact that the main goals of the war had not been attained by means of the submarine forces, nevertheless submarines had [[a marked]] *no small* influence on the overall course of the war. They paralyzed enemy merchant shipping to a very considerable extent and provided Germany with an opportunity to extend the war.

Between 1915 and 1918 German submarines carried out over 2,500 sorties, 1,700 of which (68%) were during the 1917-1918

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period. During the war they destroyed 11 million tons of merchant shipping or 22 times as much shipping as was destroyed by German cruisers in the sea lanes during 1914-1915. In the course of military operations the Germans lost 178 submarines, 132 of which (74%) were destroyed in 1917-1918.[31]

Submarines scored no mean successes, also, in fighting naval surface ships, having sunk during the period of the war some 156 ships, including 10 battleships, 20 cruisers, 31 destroyers, and others. And although surface ships had not been prevented from carrying out their assigned missions, nevertheless their operations were greatly hampered *because of the constant threat of underwater attack*. Submarine *minelayers* extended the menace of mines to areas which had previously been considered safe in this regard. But despite the considerable successes of the German submarines, Germany was unable to defeat England. The decisive elements affecting the outcome of this war were the overall economic and military superiority of the Allied nations, and this[[, in the final analysis,]] enabled them to break German resistance on land and on sea.

Another thing that adversely affected Germany's situation was the strategic errors committed by their military leaders. The result of these errors was, first of all, to delay in setting up mass production of submarines. Miscalculations by the Germans in evaluating the capacity of their enemies to replace the tremendous losses in merchant ships and their ability to develop an effective system of combating the submarine menace also played a certain part. These circumstances did not permit them to get a completely clear idea of the capabilities of submarines for conducting the war at sea.

The Russian Navy had a marked effect on the general course of the war with Germany and its allies. Successful operations by army forces in the maritime sector greatly depended on the situation in the Baltic Sea, and this could not help but affect the situation along the entire Russo-German front. In addition, seaborne shipments of iron ore from Sweden were very important to Germany, and they were threatened by Russian naval activities.

At the beginning of the war the Baltic Fleet developed a defensive system which included a central mine and artillery position which, together with the fortifications of Revel and Sveaborg, became the principal strongpoint on the Baltic Sea. In the course of the war it was reinforced by the forward fortified positions of Moon Sound and Abo-Aland. In the rear of this system there was the fortified district of Kronshtadt. The

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defenses of the Gulf of Finland adequately ensured the safety of the capital against sea attack. [[Its]] *The* power *of the defense* was so apparent that the Germans did not once risk any attempt to breach it. The position covering the approaches to the Gulf of Riga -- this was created hurriedly -- was twice subjected to large-scale German naval attack, but *also* proved an effective barrier.

The Baltic Fleet ensured the stability of the right flank of the ground front. This was clearly demonstrated when the front flank reached the coastal area of the Gulf of Riga, as well as in the Moon Sound Operation in the fall of 1917.

The Moon Sound Operation, in which the entire main force of the German Fleet participated, had long-range objectives in fighting the revolution, which was uniting the Central Powers with England, the United States, and France. In evaluating these events Lenin wrote: "Does not the total inactivity of the British Navy and that of her submarines when the Germans captured Oesel prove that an agreement had been made between the Russian and English imperialists and between Kerenskiy and the Anglo-French capitalists to surrender St. Petersburg to the Germans and that the Russian Revolution would be suppressed that way?

"I believe it does."[32]

But the Baltic Fleet foiled this plan, and all the Germans could do was to capture the Moon Sound Islands which, by their own admission, were not absolutely essential. This "victory" subsequently played a negligible role.

The operations of the Baltic Fleet against the enemy lines of communication took on special importance in the blockade of the German coast and were very important in the overall plan of disrupting the German economy. And the Baltic Fleet carried out this task very successfully. One of the bright pages in its history deals with the blockading operations of the southern area of the Baltic Sea. During the fall of 1914 and in 1915 minefields were secretly planted on a very large scale and had the effect of paralyzing the movements of enemy warships and freighters. This caused them to discontinue transport by sea (Swedish ore was especially necessary for them) and to desist from active operations in the Baltic.

Black Sea Fleet operations had a marked influence on the course of military operations along the Caucasian and Romanian fronts. [[Initially,]] The Turkish Fleet was weaker than the Russian Fleet. However, following the augmentation of the

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Turkish Fleet by the German battle cruiser GOEBEN and the cruiser BRESLAU, which were faster than the old Russian ships, the enemy fleet had an opportunity to embark on its own operations. On 29 and 30 October 1914 it launched forays against Odessa, Sevastopol, Feodosiya, the Kerch Straits, and Novorossiysk. Because of confusion on the part of the Black Sea Fleet command this enemy raid escaped reprisal and it marked the beginning of Turkish participation in the war and her military activities in the Black Sea.

Later on, reinforced with new capital ships, the Russian Fleet was able to seal off the surface ships of the German-Turkish Fleet, greatly reduce enemy ocean shipping, undertake systematic operations along his coast, and provide direct aid for the coastal flanks of the ground fronts with gunfire support, amphibious landings, and by moving troops and supplies.

By disrupting enemy sea lines of communication, large-scale planting of mines, and actions taken against bases and ports, the Black Sea Fleet forced the enemy to limit his shipping exclusively to small vessels, and this had an adverse effect on the matter of troop reinforcements, and shipments of coal, petroleum, and other [[supplies]] *fuel and raw materials* to the main areas of Turkey.

The experience gained by the Baltic and Black Sea fleets during World War I proved a valuable contribution in the development of our own art of naval warfare.

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The fate of World War I was decided on the ground fronts. It was there that the masses of troops, weapons, and military equipment were concentrated, and it was there that the sides sustained their greatest losses. A large portion of the economic resources of the coalitions were expended to support military operations on land. However, the positional nature of the warfare and the virtually insignificant movements of troops into the depths of the adversary's territory never created a critical situation that threatened the capture or withdrawal from the war of any one of the countries in either coalition. The opposing fronts exhausted one another along the firing line, and in the rear the expanding rate of war production produced ever greater deprivation and suffering among the workers.

Actually, the German Army penetrated into French territory during the first days of the war, and all subsequent operations were conducted on French soil. However, this by no means brought the French close to defeat.

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The Eastern Front played an important part in disrupting Germany's war plans, because the Russian offensive in Galicia and East Prussia at the beginning of the war diverted large German forces from the Western Front, and for that reason the Russians were to a certain extent responsible for the "miracle of the Marne." Russian Army activities in 1915 permitted the Allies to consolidate their front-line positions in the West. Brusilov's offensive in 1916 saved Italy from defeat and made possible Romania's entry into the war on the side of the Allies.

However, these successes by Russia in the early part of the war and the subsequent successes of Germany on the Eastern Front did not produce an acute crisis in the situation in the land theaters of operations.

[[In the history of World War I,]] Military operations in the ocean and sea theaters [[did not hold the position they did in wars we have considered previously. But the decisive nature of actions by fleets in separate strategic areas]] produced, at different stages of the war, some very critical situations which greatly affected the war. For example, the German submarine blockade in 1917 placed England on the verge of catastrophe. Dependence of England's economy on raw material imports plus the fact that the British people would be threatened with starvation if foodstuffs were not supplied made that country especially vulnerable to a naval blockade. In this regard the German submarines inflicted a blow of staggering dimensions -- during the war they sank 65% of the merchant fleet, the greatest and most powerful fleet of the British Empire in the prewar period. England had never in her history been subjected to such extreme danger.

The steady build-up of British antisubmarine forces and the entry into the war of the United States of America with her powerful Navy had the ultimate effect of Germany's losing the struggle for domination of the sea lanes.

The battle in sea and ocean theaters had a profound effect on the course of operations and campaigns in the ground theaters. Moreover, this influence was strategic in nature. Here we should note, first of all, the prolonged, uninterrupted activities of the British Navy that were directed toward undermining Germany's economy, isolating her from her colonies and foreign markets, and restricting German naval forces to the confines of the North Sea.

Despite the rapid growth of her industry and its leading position in the prewar years, Germany was cut off from all her

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colonies during the war, as well as from her markets and sources of raw materials. For Germany the most important condition for attaining victory was a war of short duration, which her economy would be able to support. A long war would be equivalent to a defeat. By contrast, to Germany's enemies an extension of the war meant a gain in time in which to stifle the German economy, and to a very great degree it guaranteed the final victory.

The navies of the Entente played a great role in changing the blitzkrieg, which was desired by the Germans, into a prolonged war. It succeeded in isolating Germany. It was the Entente fleet that introduced a new factor into warfare: the element of long duration.

Allied suppression of Germany's economy was expressed in a system of economic warfare measures, but the most important of these was the naval blockade imposed according to plan. The naval blockade extended the war not only to Germany's military power, but also to the source of that power. In the final analysis, the blockade denied German armies the advantage of their equipment and shifted it to her enemies. The blockade also had an exceptionally great influence on the political situation and morale of the German people.

The blockade had the effect of converting such an important economic asset as the German Merchant Marine into a useless group of ships confined to their own ports. To be sure, Germany still continued to trade via the neutral countries adjacent to her borders, and of course this was a great boost to Germany's economy, but it could not stave off all of the disastrous consequences of the systematic naval blockade. It simply postponed the outcome.

The navies should also be credited with protecting the transportation of large contingents of ground forces across the seas and oceans, a fact which directly influenced the success of Allied army operations. In addition, some countries that were neutral at the beginning of the war emerged as Germany's enemies because of the influence exerted by the mighty Entente fleet.

Mention should be made of the almost complete absence during the war of joint army and navy operations such as amphibious landings. Actually, only one attempt was made to carry out an assault landing, and that was in the Dardanelles. However, Allied operations there did not bring about the desired objectives, and the unsuccessful experience long remained a factor which tended to discourage developing the theory and practice of amphibious landing operations.

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During World War I an important element in the total efforts of navies was the attempts by navies to achieve control of the sea. It was regarded as one of the measures that would assure the attainment of strategic objectives in naval theaters of operations. Those aims, as we previously pointed out, were the basis of German and English plans for conducting the war at sea and were continuously implemented by the opposing sides. Both sides felt that the principal method of attaining sea control was through a naval blockade and a general battle between capital ships of the opposing navies.

The results of World War I had a marked effect on the status of naval forces. The British Navy lost its dominant position in the world, and England was forced to depart from the "two-power standard"[33] which she had strictly maintained until the war. Now, England had difficulty in maintaining her Navy at the level of a stronger American Navy.

Germany was denied the right to have a navy. Her main forces, including all of her submarines, were turned over to the Allied nations for distribution among them. Germany was categorically forbidden to build submarines. In addition, the victors were the recipients of all freighters in excess of 1,600 tons and half of the smaller ships remaining in Germany. The equipment of all shipbuilding yards was awarded to England as reparations for the German ships taken to Scapa Flow and sunk there by the German command in defiance of the agreement. The terrible fate that befell the German Navy also testified to the especially important position of a navy in the war.

However, the restrictions imposed by the victors on the building of a navy and armed forces in Germany proved to be short-lived. The aspiration by ruling imperialist circles to crush the Soviet system in our country at all costs was greater than the real national interests of the Western nations. The Anglo-French and American imperialists felt that the main objective of their policy at that time was to set Germany, Italy, and Japan upon the Soviet Union. For that reason, they were generous in extending help to Germany in rebuilding her military-industrial potential, and when Hitler came to power, they first weakened and later actually removed all restrictions on the development of German armaments.[34]

Likewise, it was impossible to halt or even in some degree regulate the naval armaments race between the winning sides. The naval armaments race developed with a hitherto unseen force, first at the initiative of the Japanese militarists and then by the German Fascists in the 1930's.

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NAVIES IN WORLD WAR II

Following World War I and the division of the world into sociopolitical systems, the policy of the imperialist governments was determined very largely by their desire to destroy the Soviet Union. In the first half of the 1930's two hotbeds of a new world war appeared. The first one appeared in 1931-1932 as a result of the invasion of Manchuria by the forces of militarist Japan. This conflict concealed the danger of a great war by Japan against China, the Soviet Union, as well as the United States and England. The second hotbed of war appeared in 1933-1935 in connection with the Fascist coup in Germany and the active preparations that commenced there for a war against the USSR and the Western nations. With the support of world reactionary forces, the German Fascists launched a civil war in Spain in 1936, occupied Austria, and, following the Munich Pact, occupied Czechoslovakia.

The United States, France, and England were quite convinced that the armed might of Germany which they had restored would be directed against the Soviet Union and would ensure the destruction of Communism, while Germany, weakened in this struggle, would be incapable of opposing the other imperialist powers for a long time. Encouraged by the generous subsidies of international monopolistic capitalism, the military-industrial and the political ruling clique of Hitlerite Germany made rapid preparations for war. They modernized industries, put the entire economy on a war footing, and took the appropriate measures to influence the German people ideologically.

The restrictions of the Versailles Treaty, which opposed the rearmament of Germany, were soon rejected, and that nation openly proceeded with the development of powerful armed forces needed for a war of conquest.

The Anglo-German Naval Agreement was concluded in 1935. It actually rescinded the restrictive articles of the Versailles Treaty on naval armaments and freed Germany's hands to build a powerful navy. As early as *late* 1939 Germany had an army and air force that were greater than any of the armies of the capitalist world, capable, in Hitler's opinion, of establishing dominance in Europe. However, this dominance was not the ultimate objective of Fascist Germany's aspiration. It was to serve as the basic prerequisite for setting up a world German colonial empire. The process of achieving the main political objective -- gaining world dominance -- was divided into two basic stages. The first included establishing mastery over Europe and destroying the Soviet Union, without which mastery of the world was deemed impossible, and the second stage called for the conquest of overseas colonial possessions.

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Table 14 Relative Strengths of the Coalition Navies at the Beginning of World War II

Types of Ships	England	France	Total	Germany	Italy	Total	Ratio
Battleships	15	7	22	2	4	6	3.7:1
Aircraft carriers	6	2	8	-	-	-	-
Heavy and light cruisers and A.A. cruisers	66	19	85	11	22	33	2.6:1
Destroyers	119	70	189	42	128	70	1.1:1
Submarines	69	77	146	57	115	172	0.8:1

This policy called for Fascist leaders to build an army and an air force first. But since achievement of world dominance was associated with the seizure of colonies, Fascist Germany also planned on the [[construction]] *creation* of powerful naval forces capable of assuring her position as a very strong power. [["Plan Z," which was calculated for a period of 9 to 10 years and was]] *The shipbuilding plan,* developed in 1934, called for the construction of primarily battleships, cruisers, and a considerable number of submarines.

Failure of the London Conference of 1936 in matters pertaining to the further regulation of naval construction served as the signal for an all-out arms race among the imperialist powers. The very fact that attempts were made to regulate naval rearmament by various international agreements, as history has repeatedly shown, especially after World War I, testified to the special importance ascribed to the naval forces by the greater imperialist powers. At the beginning of the war the German Navy was weaker than the navies of England and France. But Germany had allies in aggression -- Fascist Italy in Europe and Japan in the Pacific, both with large navies (tables 14 *and 15*).

The plans for utilizing the navies of Western nations in the war bore the indelible impression of the dogmas of Mahan and *Colomb* . Thus, in the plans for the utilization of the German Navy the principal role in naval warfare was earmarked for capital ships. The Hitlerites planned, as a result of a raiding-type war, to cut England's lines of communication with her allies and colonies, and, having imparted an all-out nature to the war, to sap England's economic potential and her morale.

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The Germans underestimated the importance of aircraft and submarines. It is quite clear that such tasks and methods of operation did not correspond to the real capabilities of the German Navy, which was markedly inferior in fighting power to the enemy /navies/.

England and France perceived in their navies a means of gaining control of the sea through a general battle, and also as an instrument for imposing an economic blockade and launching attacks from the sea upon vulnerable enemy coastal targets. Just like the Germans, the Allies relegated aircraft and submarines to a secondary role, and for this they had to pay a very dear price in the course of the war.

[[Thus,]] The British plan of military operations at sea was based on the fact that the tactical situations in the impending war would not differ significantly from those of World War I, and provided for a long-range naval blockade of Germany by her Navy and protecting her own sea lanes. The French Navy and a portion of the British Navy, which were supported by a well developed system of bases, were to be used to assure control of the Mediterranean Sea.

World War II "broke out within the capitalist world as a result of the marked aggravation of antagonisms between capitalist countries because of their disproportionate development under imperialism. The elements responsible for its occurrence are imperialism as a social system, the ruling classes, and the governments of the greatest capitalist powers. . . .

"World War II, engendered by the mutual struggle of capitalist nations, began as an imperialist war on both sides. . . . But it could not halt or eliminate the objective processes of the gradual intensification of a just war by the nations against Fascist oppression. . . .

"The people of the European countries responded to the Hitlerite invasion with greater intensification of resistance, imparting to it an anti-Fascist, national-liberation character . . .

". . . The Great Patriotic War, to which the people of the USSR and the Party of Lenin responded, was a most important constituent part of World War II and the highest order of just war -- a war for the defense of the Socialist Motherland."[35]

During the initial period of the war -- from its beginning to the attack upon the USSR by Fascist Germany and her satellites (1939-1941) -- the naval forces played an important part and had a considerable influence on the course of the war.

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After Germany defeated Poland, England and France, still hoping to turn Fascist aggression agsint the Soviet Union, conducted virtually no military operations on the ground front. The prolonged period of the so-called "phony war" ensued. Taking advantage of this, the Hitlerites found an opportunity to concentrate their troops against the Western nations under peaceful conditions in order to defeat them and establish supremacy in Western Europe, a necessary prerequisite for an attack upon the USSR.

The naval theater was the only area in which active military operations were being conducted during this period. The struggle there was continuous from the very beginning of the war. The basic mission was to disrupt enemy shipping. For this purpose the German Navy made use of large surface ships and submarines. Although thier operations did not lead to the expected disruption of the British economy, nevertheless they forced the /British Navy to spread its forces/ over many parts of the global seas to protect lines of communication with the various countries of the world.

As a result, a favorable situation arose for the Hitlerites in the coastal waters of northern Europe, and in April 1940, utilizing their superior air forces, they made surprise airborne and seaborne assault landings in Norway and conquered that nation in very short order. Denmark was occupied at the same time. This operation had a great effect on the future course of the war. It improved the strategic position of the German northern flank, expanded the possibilities of naval operations, especially for submarines, and ensured deliveries of Scandinavian iron ore for Germany's economy along protected coastal routes.

On 10 May 1940 the "phony war" ceased. The Hitlerite forces concentrated on the Western Front invaded Belgium and Holland and then France; they cut up the Anglo-French army and advanced to the English Channel, where they pinned down nine English and 18 French divisions in the area of Dunkirk. Over 850 different ships and craft were required by the Allies to evacuate 338,000 men to England, while all their heavy equipment was abandoned to the enemy.

The Munich policy of the ruling Anglo-French circles was crowned by the ignominious capitulation of the French, which created the danger of an invasion of the British Isles by the Germans. The Fascist airfields were moved closer to England, and their submarine bases were organized on the Atlantic coast beyond the blockade lines, almost directly on the main British shipping lanes.

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It seemed that Germany's plan to achieve supremacy in Western Europe, mainly through the use of ground and air forces, was nearing a successful conclusion. But there remained an unbeaten England, and without an adequate naval force Germany could not compel that nation to surrender. And again, in order to get out of that impasse, Germany used her submarine fleet, just as she did in World War I. At a conference held in November 1940, Hitler adopted a program of expanded submarine production [[in order to stifle]] *aimed at stifling* England with a submarine blockade. However, the Hitlerites were incapable during a war already in progress of expanding in full measure the program of war contemplated against England. Without the required inventory of submarines and given a weakened fleet of surface ships as a result of losing several raiders that were operating against the British shipping lanes [[and the loss of the newest battleship, the BISMARCK, upon her first attempt to enter the Atlantic]], the German command was forced to scuttle its plan for the conquest of England and reconsider the order of priorities of tasks essential to achieving world mastery.

The new period of the war was nearing -- the attack upon the Soviet Union, the nation in which Hitler saw his main obstacle to achieving his irresponsible aims. Every action of Fascist Germany was now directed toward preparations for this attack. All military operations on the Western Front were relegated to a secondary position. Plans for the capture of England, Switzerland, Sweden; liquidation of the small Western European states; the conquest of India, the Arab Middle East and Africa -- all these were postponed pending the successful execution of Plan Barbarossa. The defeat of the United States and invasion of the American Continent also depended on the problem of destroying the Soviet Union.

Fascist Germany's treacherous assault upon the USSR, involving the bulk of the armed forces of Germany and her satellites, determined the beginning of the new period in the course of the war, which sharply changed the whole situation.

The war in the European theater assumed a clearly continental character, and the actions of the navies in the Atlantic theater, which included the Mediterranean, Baltic, and Black seas, developed more and more into actions to support the needs of the ground forces, emphasizing the land character of the greatest war in history.

A somewhat different situation developed in consequence of the military operations in the Pacific theater, where the navies played a more independent role. This imparted a naval character to the military operations and pushed to the foreground the practice of conducting joint land-sea operations.

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The main theater where the fate of the entire war was decided continued to be Europe, with its undeniably important Soviet-German Front. Hence the reason that the role of navies in the war and their influence on the general course of the war cannot be considered apart from that main theater of military action.

At the same time, although the military operations in the Pacific could not decisively affect the outcome of World War II, from the historical point of view, they were a typical example of the significance of navies in wars between countries separated by oceans. That separation of opponents by water and the important role of navies in such a situation have marked past wars (Sino-Japanese, Spanish-American, Russo-Japanese [[Wars]]) and have been generally accepted as fixed patterns.

Germany's attack upon the Soviet Union and the concentration of her total efforts in the East had an immediate and decisive effect on the conduct of military operations in other theaters, chiefly in the Atlantic. Air raids on England proper and air attacks upon her merchant shipping ceased almost completely. Once more, as in the First World War, the German submarines operating against British shipping were left to their own resources. Major surface ships and a considerable portion of the German submarines were transferred to bases in northern Norway in order to provide maximum support for the Eastern Front. The war against the lines of communication which linked our country with the Allies again heated up with great intensity. England now had an opportunity to protect, unimpeded, her own sea lines of communication and to disrupt enemy shipping. The Battle of the Atlantic turned into a relatively normal affair of conventional warfare against German submarines without the support of other forces. However, in spite of those conditions and the tremendously great development of the Anglo-American antisubmarine forces, they succeeded only in greatly reducing the successes of the German submarines, but failed even by the end of the war to eliminate the submarine threat.

The further course of the war demonstrated that the Soviet Union and her armed forces played a decisive role in the destruction of Hitlerite Germany and her allies. The events on that main front had a decisive effect on the nature of the struggle in other theaters of military operation, including the oceans.

British Prime Minister Winston Churchill stated in a report to the Wartime Cabinet on 20 January 1943, "All our military operations taken together are carried out on a very

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insignificant scale compared with the gigantic efforts of the Russians."[36] Also attributable to him were these words which became so widely known, "Russian resistance broke the back of the German armies."[37]

Japanese historian Hattori, in evaluating the significance of the capitulation of the German Fascist troops at Stalingrad, wrote: "Beginning with this moment the initiative on the Soviet-German front passed completely away from the German forces. This radically upset the plans of three nations -- Germany, Japan, and Italy."[38]

Concerning the dependence of the situation in the other war theaters on activities in the Soviet-German front, Secretary Ickes wrote in 1944: "The greatest gift the Russians gave the United States was time; without this time England could not even have treated her wounds received at Dunkirk, and the United States could not have set up war production and organized her Army and Navy . . . "[39]

On 2 December 1944 General Charles de Gaulle announced: "The French know what the Soviet Union did for them and they know that Soviet Russia played a very important part in their liberation."[40]

Stettinius, one of the great political figures of the United States, wrote the following after the war (1949): "The American people must never forget that they were very close to a catastrophe. If the Soviet Union had not been able to hold its front, the Germans would have had an opportunity to invade and conquer Great Britain. They could also have taken over Africa, and in that event they could have set up their own bridgehead in Latin America."[41]

The successes of all the outstanding, large-scale landing operations by the Allies in Africa and Europe was also assured by the activities of the Soviet Armed Forces; they prevented the Germans from maneuvering their forces to beat off the landings or destroy them.

Many outstanding Soviet military figures also emphasized the direct effect the events on the Soviet-German front had on the course of the war on other fronts. [[For example, Marshal of the Soviet Union A. A. Grechko in his book The Battle for the Caucasus wrote: "The victories at Stalingrad, Kursk, the Don, and in the Caucasus greatly strengthened the positions of our allies in the Near East and Mediterranean basin, and they helped to achieve a victory in North Africa over General Rommel's Army."]]

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

Figure 10. World War II 1939-1945

Key:

1. Legend
2. Areas of the most famous naval engagements
3. Regions in which the better known naval operations took place
4. Sites of naval bases
5. Operating areas of German submarines
6. Limits of Japanese submarine areas of operation
7. Operating areas of American submarines against Japanese sea lines of communication
8. Zones of action of German surface raiders
9. Territories of warring nations

It will be apropos to remember the evaluation of our Armed Forces' role in the past war by USSR Minister of Defense Marshal of the Soviet Union D. F. Ustinov: "It was they who for the first time halted the Fascist German Army, the most powerful Army in the capitalist world, and blocked the path to a further expansion of aggression. It was they who destroyed the primary forces of Hitler's hordes, who dealt a crushing blow to the Japanese militarists, and who played the deciding role in winning victory in World War II. It was they who freed many nations of Europe and Asia of foreign enslavement by worthily performing their international mission."42

Likewise indisputable was the effect of the overall strategic situation on the main Soviet-German front on the course of military operations in the Pacific. The Japanese choice of the southern alternative at the beginning of their aggression and their subsequent decision to discontinue the offensive and shift to a strategic defense were due to the fact that the blitzkrieg had been stopped and a number of defeats inflicted upon the Hitlerites by the Soviet Armed Forces.

In spite of the chiefly continental character of the past war, the navies of the belligerents accomplished a number of

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large-scale missions which exerted no small influence on the course of the overall struggle. This, successes by the Allies in the Mediterranean, first in North Africa and then in Italy, were in great measure determined by naval actions which assured the landing of large assault forces in Northwest Africa, Sicily, and the Apennine Peninsula. Simultaneously, the Allied fleets cut off supplies to Rommel's forces across the Mediterranean, which predetermined their defeat. These particular successes on a secondary front had a positive effect during the war, even though they diverted relatively small German forces.

Through their victories our valiant Armed Forces eventually seized the initiative, and in 1943, *after the German defeat at Stalingrad,* they launched a number of interconnected large-scale offensive operations. Hitler's intention to stabilize the situation on the Soviet-German front and to transfer some troops to counter the long expected invasion of Western Europe by the Allies came to naught; England and the United States could no longer postpone opening up a second front. By that time there was no doubt that the Soviet Union was capable of defeating Germany and ending the war without the direct participation of the Allies.

The invasion of Normandy by Allied forces in June 1944 was the largest amphibious landing operation in the entire history of warfare. Preparations for that invasion had been underway for 30 months without enemy opposition. A tremendous array of navy, army, and air force elements participated in the operation. About 4,500 amphibious landing ships and vessels were used to transport the assault landing force. The landings on the shore were carried out by means of 4,000 landing craft of various types. The landings were covered by more than 2,000 warships and about 14,000 aircraft.

By opening the second front in the summer of 1944 the United States and England made their greatest, though belated, contribution to the victory over Fascist Germany. However, the deliberately delayed opening of the second front was not the turning point of the war as Western historians often express it. "If things continue with the Russians as well as they are now, then, possibly, there will be no need for a second front next spring!" stated President Roosevelt in 1943.[43] As we can see, the second front was not of decisive importance even then, and it did not help the Soviet forces; on the contrary, the /Soviets/ created favorable conditions for the Allied invasion of Western Europe by allowing them to build up vast forces and gain a twelvefold superiority in naval forces and a twenty-twofold superiority in air power.

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As previously mentioned, in the Pacific, in contrast to other theaters, operations carried out by the naval forces had a more substantial effect on the course of the armed struggle. There, the principal opponents, the United States and Japan, were separated by ocean expanses, and that in itself predetermined the special and decisive role of the navies. The main type of combat action in that area was the amphibious assault landing operation by both sides and the blockading action of the American Navy. The other combat operations of the opposing armed forces were directed either toward supporting amphibious landings and providing covering action or taking counteractions against them; both were constituent elements of amphibious landing operations or of counterlanding operations.

Before the war the naval strength of the two powers in the Pacific theater was approximately the same (Table 15), except for aircraft carriers, in which category the Japanese enjoyed a threefold superiority.

War broke out in this theater on 7 December 1941 with Japan's surprise attack upon Pearl Harbor, the main base of the United States Pacific Fleet. Seven battleships and one cruiser moored there at the time were sunk or damaged and over 300 base aircraft destroyed as a result of the attack by Japanese carrier aircraft.

After destroying the British squadron in the Gulf of Siam 3 days later and hastily grouped Anglo-Dutch-American squadron in the Java Sea in February of 1942, the Japanese consolidated their control of the sea. This enabled them, in the first phase of the war, to carry out offensive operations with impunity. In a period of [[2]] *several* months Japan seized the Philippines, the Malacca Peninsula with its very large British naval base at Singapore, Indonesia, Burma, and a number of islands in the Pacific. She now possessed vast resources but needed time and transport means to make [[them]] *these resources* available for the machinery of war.

Having occupied a vast area, the Japanese shifted to a strategic defense as early as the beginning of 1943 due to the radical and sudden change in the course of the entire war following the Battle of Stalingrad and further intensified by subsequent victories of the Soviet Army.

Western historians are trying to prove that the turning point of the war in the Pacific occurred long before Stalingrad, specifically, in the American victory at the Battle of Midway ([[3-6]] June 1942), in which four Japanese carriers and only one American carrier were lost. However, the relative strength of the naval forces following Midway contradicts such assertions.

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Table 15 Ratio of Naval Forces in the Pacific Before World War II[44]

Types of Ships	USA	England	Holland	Total	Japan	Ratio
Battleships	9	2	-	11	10	1:0.9
Aircraft Carriers	3	-	-	3	10	1:3.3
Seaplane Tenders	-	-	-	-	6	-
Cruisers	24	9	3	36	36	1:1.0
Destroyers	80	13	7	100	113	1:1.1
Submarines	56	-	13	69	63	1:0.9

Japan maintained force superiority even after that event, having eight carriers to four for the Americans [[(counting those which had been put back into service again)]]. The ratio of battleships and cruisers was also in favor of the Japanese. Even the nature of the combat operations by the two sides following the Battle of Midway indicates that no turning point in the war had occurred at all. The Japanese continued to make amphibious landings and continued their offensives in New Guinea and the Solomon Islands; they created great difficulties for the Allied forces, destroying two more American carriers, the WASP and the HORNET. Churchill wrote that "in the fall of 1942 the Americans requested the support of the British aircraft carriers because a serious crisis had arisen in the Solomon Islands."[45] Actually, the Americans at that time had only two damaged aircraft carriers there, the SARATOGA and the ENTERPRISE. There was a very real threat that the Japanese would invade Australia. How could there be any talk of a turning point in the war there?

Likewise without foundation was the attempt by Western historians to present as the turning point of the war in the Pacific the landing of one division of US Marines in *August* 1942 on the Island of Guadalcanal, which developed into a prolonged battle with varying successes. Those statements were refuted by President F. D. Roosevelt, who in an address to the Congress on 7 January 1943 announced that the successes on the islands of Midway and Guadalcanal "were essentially defensive actions. They were part of the strategy of containment, which characterized that phase of the war."[46]

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If the Japanese High Command had decided to abandon its offensive strategy and shift to the defense at that difficult moment for the Allies (31 December 1942), the most important reason for that transition to the new phase of the war was the victory won by the Soviet troops at Stalingrad -- a victory over the main forces of the Fascist coalition when the faith of the Japanese [[militarists]] in the power of the German Army was truly shaken for the very first time. "The victory of the Soviet Army at Stalingrad was a severe blow not only to Germany but also to Japan and Italy."[47] The Japanese knew beyond a doubt that "if Germany ever weakened, Japan would in a very short time be confronted by the worldwide coalition."[48]

Another reason that the Japanese shifted to defensive operations was the fact that the scope of the expansion and the Japanese appetite were not commensurate with [[the]] *its* capability [[of the Navy]] to assume the protracted defense of the captured territories and the exploitation of their economic resources. [[The economy of Japan proper, which depended on supplies of raw materials from other parts of the world, restricted her capacity not only to augment the size of the Navy during the war, but also to replace losses sustained from American blows.]]

The United States was in quite another situation. Her industries were not vulnerable to enemy action, were adequately supplied with raw material resources, and were operating at an ever increasing pace. *The American Armed Forces were not fighting in the main theater of World War II -- in Europe.* As a result, the Americans quickly achieved superiority over the Japanese at sea.

Thus, the course of events in the war in the Pacific again confirmed that under those conditions the political objectives which had to be attained by military means depended directly on the capability of the Navy to ensure their attainment.

On 1 February 1943 the evacuation of Japanese forces from Guadalcanal was begun. A new, shorter defense line was established. In the summer of 1943 the Japanese reduced their defensive zone still more, shifting it to the Marianas and Caroline islands, and they withdrew their main naval elements to rear bases.

The economic superiority of the United States had begun to tell in the Pacific Ocean in the fall of 1943. Superiority at sea had irrevocably shifted to the Americans, who were beginning their offensive operations.

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Table 16 Growth of the US Fleet

Types of Ships	1941[49]	1944[50]
Aircraft carriers (large, light, and escort types)	7	125
Battleships	16	23
Cruisers (light, heavy and AA)	36	67
Destroyers and escort ships	180	897
Submarine chasers	—	app. 900
Submarines	112	351

Military shipments by sea between the mother country and the oceanic defensive areas, as well as deliveries of strategic materials from the conquered regions of the South Seas to Japan had also become very important factors in the Japanese shift to a defensive policy. However, those shipping operations were the most vulnerable link in the Japanese defense system. When the initiative shifted to the Americans and they began their offensive operations, the Japanese found themselves incapable either of maneuvering their forces to the defensive zones or of providing cover for shipments of strategic materials to Japan from the South Seas countries.

The struggle against the Pacific lines of sea communications assumed a unique and very one-sided character. Japanese submarines were operating against major enemy surface combatants and were not employed *in combat* against his lines of communications. Therefore, American shipping remained essentially unaffected by the Japanese Navy.

At the beginning of the war the United States used mainly submarines [[against]] *to disrupt* Japanese shipping. It was not until 1944 that aircraft and surface ships were *actively* included in the actions. Because of the weakness of the Japanese defenses for her lines of communication the American Navy used ordinary procedures to destroy Japanese shipping.

As a result of the warfare conducted against the lines of communication and American air raids upon industrial targets in the Japanese islands, the economic potential of Japan was considerably impaired. She could no longer replace her losses in

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naval ships and aircraft, whereas the United States continued to accelerate the program of building ships and planes, most of which were earmarked for action against Japan in the Pacific (Table 16).

All of that permitted the Americans to gain decisive superiority in strength and to dominate the situation in the areas of operations. In addition, in reaction to the prolonged war and the defeats suffered by the Germans on the Soviet-German front, the Japanese did not risk the main elements of their Navy in the defense of the islands they had seized; the garrisons there were small and were without sea or air support.

The offensive operations of the United States Navy commenced [[at the end of]] *in* 1943. Initially they were directed not against the main elements of the Japanese Navy but against the peripheral garrisons located on the Japanese-held islands.

In the battle to break Japan's outer line of defense one more important quality of the Navy was revealed -- its capacity for extensive maneuver in great force. Because of their superior naval strength, the Americans had the opportunity to select the point of attack at their own discretion. The net effect was that the Japanese frequently delayed in providing support for their island garrisons. After breaking through the outer line of Japan's defenses, the US Navy shifted to operations against the interior defense line which passed through the Philippine Islands, in the fall of 1944. There in those island waters occurred the greatest sea battle of World War II, in which Japan used the main elements of her Navy. As a result of that battle, *which went down in history as the Battle of the Philippines*, the Japanese Navy suffered very heavy losses, which proved fatal. Four aircraft carriers, three battleships, ten cruisers, eleven destroyers, and two submarines[51] were lost. That battle had a very marked effect on subsequent military operations in the Pacific theater, and predetermined the eventual successes of the Americans.

The last large-scale assault operation carried out by the Americans in the Pacific was the landing of troops on the Island of Okinawa. The battle for that island continued for 3 months despite the fact that the Americans had a sixfold superiority in manpower over the enemy garrison and despite complete American superiority at sea and in the air; that cannot testify to any high degree of skill in conducting the operation.

American air raids upon the cities and ports of Japan kept expanding, but her land army sustained only insignificant losses in the Pacific islands because of the small size of the

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garrison forces. The Kwangtung Army in Manchuria, which was the most powerful, combat-ready grouping of Japan's ground forces, remained untouched. The very important military and economic base of Japanese imperialism, like the industries in Manchuria and Korea, not only was unaffected by military action but continued to expand. All of that enabled Japan to continue the war despite the weakened Japanese Navy and the loss of previously conquered territories in the South Seas. Moreover, she hoped -- and not without foundation -- for the possibility of making an anti-Soviet deal with her capitalist opponent.

In 1945 Japan had major armed forces, including a multi-million-man army, 8,400 aircraft, and 600 warships consisting of 4 aircraft carriers, 6 battleships, 7 cruisers, 44 submarines, and many other craft.[52] To defeat Japan it would be necessary to conduct a long war with the involvement of major ground forces which the Allies did not have. Therefore, it was for that reason that the Americans developed plans for a long war with Japan. In accordance with that plan it was proposed to land troops on the Island of Kyushu at the end of 1945, and in 1946 or later in the vicinity of Tokyo. Hence the reason that it was necessary for the Allies to have the USSR enter the war against Japan. Without that, it would have been impossible to break the determination of the Japan militarists to continue the war. Convincing evidence of that fact is the telegram of the Commander-in-Chief of Japanese forces in China, General Okamura, to Tokyo dated 12 August 1945: "We understand that the entry into the war of the Soviet Union has made the situation more difficult. However, with an army in Japan proper of up to 7 million men and an expeditionary force on the continent of 1 million men whose morale continues to be high, we are prepared to inflict a decisive defeat upon the enemy. The land army has now become the main support of the Empire . . . Imperial Japan's fate is being decided in Manchuria."[53]

It is a known fact that in carrying out its responsibilities as an ally, the Soviet Army and Navy destroyed the Kwangtung Army and the Japanese strongpoints on Sakhalin and the Kurile Islands, following which Japan was forced to surrender unconditionally.

Basic Missions Accomplished by Navies during World War II. The Second World War, as we have already indicated, was a continental war because its main objectives were attained on the ground fronts. However, some strategic tasks in the European theater would not have been able to be accomplished without the participation of large naval forces. The war against the lines of communication. for example, was conducted almost exclusively by naval elements. The operations at sea, even though subordinated

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entirely to strategic missions that were being accomplished on land, nevertheless had a marked influence on the course of the war.

It should be acknowledged that the principal type of naval military operation in World War II was the struggle against the sea lines of communication [SLOC]. It was directed toward undermining the enemy's military and economic potential, protecting friendly shipping, and carrying out amphibious assault landing operations, which were used on an unprecedented scale.

The importance of the SLOC battle in the overall picture of naval operations was not the same in all theaters. In the Atlantic the scale and intensity exceeded those of such operations anywhere else. Thus, the fight for the sea lines of communication constituted the basis for all German naval operations. The special attention that was devoted to it can be confirmed by the fact that the heads of Allied governments at the 1943 Casablanca Conference recognized the urgency of directing their main effort and resources toward combating the German submarine threat.

The scope and intensity of the struggle against the communication lines increased gradually throughout the war, a situation that was also characteristic of the First World War. Without doubt, the biggest mistake of the German Fascist leaders was that they failed to develop the Battle of the Atlantic on a broad scale until several years into the war and when it became apparent that their land plans were a failure. No less an error, also, was the fact that the battle was conducted almost exclusively by the submarines without support from other arms, notably the air force. Because of those miscalculations, the Allies succeeded in building massive antisubmarine defensive forces and resources and gearing up production to replace shipping losses. Therefore, although the effect of the battle for the lines of communication was considerable on the overall course of the war, it could not, however, become decisive. That struggle gradually died down and became hopeless. The new element in it was the fact that it encompassed all the ocean theaters with the exception of the Antarctic[[. It]] *and* was waged most intensively on the shipping lanes that converged on England and Japan.

One important feature of the struggle on the sea lanes was the use of the various arms of the service, as well as the development and introduction of new weapons and technical equipment such as radar, sonar, new types of submarines and antisubmarine ships, homing torpedos, units for underwater operation of diesels, etc. The development of weapons, to be sure, brought about changes in methods of utilizing forces, led to mass

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attacks by submarines, and erased the boundaries between their night and day operations; it resulted in the organization of special operations on the lines of communication and in increasingly greater attacks upon ports and bases as a part of the battle on the sea lanes, and many other things.

Our attention is directed to the fact that, despite the exceptional threat posed by the antisubmarine forces to submarines, no one operation or any other specially organized military operation aimed at defeating or destroying the "antisubmarine warfare" forces was ever conducted. This was unquestionably one of the great drawbacks to the system of warfare against the lines of communication.

By no means did the various elements of the navy perform the same tasks in action on the communication lines. Thus, of all the freighters sunk, over 65% were attributable to submarine action, about 20% to aircraft, 6% to surface craft, and about 8% to mines.

Submarines have proved their capabilities, which were demonstrated even in the First World War, regardless of the vastly improved effectiveness of the antisubmarine defense force. In addition to destroying freighters, they could mount serious attacks upon warships and operate successfully against enemy submarines.

Although the air forces did not fully utilize their capabilities, they introduced radical changes in naval war as a whole. It should be emphasized that air elements that were part of a fleet generally operated more effectively than those which were temporarily attached to fleets to combat a sea opponent. But whereas aircraft held second position in the sinking of enemy freighters, they were in first place in defending and protecting their own lines of sea communication; over* 40% of all Axis submarines sunk were credited to air units.

The part played by surface craft in the battle against ocean shipping was limited. The number of large surface vessels which were involved was insignificant due to the great danger they faced from submarines and aircraft. At the same time, surface ships held an important position in the defense of friendly lines of communication; they destroyed more than 35% of the boats belonging to the Hitlerite coalition. It should also be recognized that, with improvements in and the greater availability of aircraft, surface ships began to carry them and thereby improve their own situation with the navy.

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In evaluating the total results of the battle for the lines of communication during World War II, let us see whether submarines justified their intended purpose as the principal means of warfare against enemy shipping.

Throughout the period of the war the Germans sank 5,150 merchant ships; [[54]] *around 55%* of that number (68% of the tonnage) is attributable to submarines. The most effective submarine operations occurred during 1939-1942, when 2,177 ships were sunk. Beginning with 1943 the effectiveness of submarine operations began to drop dramatically, and in the second half of the war they succeeded in sinking a mere 651 freighters.

The results of Japanese and Italian submarine operations against shipping do not particularly improve the data cited. According to American figures, during the entire period of the war Japanese submarines sank 147 freighters, but, according to data provided by the French, 170 ships with a total capacity of 776,000 register tons were sunk. Submarines of the Italian Navy (according to German statistics) sank 105 ships with a total capacity of approximately 1 million tons.[54]

What were the reasons for such a change in the effectiveness of submarine attacks? The principal reason, undoubtedly, was that a turning point had been reached in the war as a whole; this turning point developed on the Soviet-German front and had a direct effect on the course of events in all other theaters.

The effect of this turning point in the war on the lines of communication in the Atlantic was that Hitlerite Germany was forced to concentrate her main efforts on the Eastern Front and compelled to weaken her forces in the Atlantic by the removal from this area of her air elements and a considerable portion of her ships. For that reason, appropriations for the German Navy, which represented 12.1% of the overall allocations for the armed forces in 1942, dropped to 5.6% of the total in 1944. There was also a reduction in the total number of operating submarines among the Axis nations.

Taking advantage of the weakened condition of the Germans in the Western theater caused by the sudden change in the course of military events, the Allies made amphibious landings in North Africa, Sicily, and on the Apennine Peninsula, and they forced Italy to capitulate. This enabled them to transfer a large portion of their naval forces from the Mediterranean to the Atlantic. A very important role was played by the Allied antisubmarine forces, whose development required no great effort owing to the fact that the enemy had concentrated his main

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effort on the Eastern Front. Operating against the German boats were 5,500 specially constructed antisubmarine ships and 20,000 small craft. There were 25 Allied ships and 100 aircraft for each German submarine and 100 Englishmen and Americans for every German submariner at sea.

However, although the ASW forces exerted a great deal of pressure on the submarines, nevertheless they could not dethrone nor discredit them as was the case with battleships, for example. As a matter of fact, the submarines proved themselves quite capable of continuing the struggle even in 1945. Of all of Germany's [[armed forces]] *naval arms*, the U-boat fleet alone continued to pose a threat of serious dimensions, and the "underseas war" ended only after German territory was occupied by the Allied armies.

Also exerting a negative influence on the effectiveness of submarine operations was the delay in efforts to improve them technically and the deteriorated level of training of German submariners, which also enabled the antisubmarine forces to forge ahead in the competition with the submarines. Intensified production of the new XXI series of submarines which the Germans had begun, and the shift to the mass production of U-boats with improved Walter engines, though delayed, demonstrated clearly that even the preatomic submarines had sufficient capability to successfully overcome the advantages that the antisubmarine forces had gained.

In the Battle of the Atlantic the greatest role was played by the great shipbuilding program launched in the United States and England. During the war years /they constructed/ a total of 42.5 million tons of merchant shipping, i.e., almost twice the tonnage lost.

And so for the second time in history, Germany changed her prewar opinions concerning the use of her Navy and proceeded to shift to the wide-scale use of submarines for the battle against the lines of communication, though somewhat belatedly. Nevertheless, during the period of the Second World War Germany, with her more than 1,100 submarines, inflicted grievous losses on the enemy merchant fleet by destroying 60% of its prewar inventory. But she could do no more. The main reason for that, as we see it, is that the submarine fleet was not supported by other arms, chiefly the air arm. The latter could have served as an indispensable reconnaissance means, accomplished missions entailing the destruction of antisubmarine forces, employed its forces against the enemy's economy, especially through attacks on the shipbuilding industry, and it could have struck enemy shipping on the seas.

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That kind of support was especially necessary for submarines when they were forced to surface periodically in order to charge their storage batteries, which was the principal reason they were detected and destroyed.

Thus, the experience in the Second World War gives us a graphic picture of the role which support of submarines directly on the seas was supposed to play. As far as their mass employment was concerned, the German command left them to their own resources. Throughout the war they did not make a single attempt to employ organized counteraction against the Allied antisubmarine forces which were operating with impunity. That, obviously, is the reason that 70% of the German submarines were destroyed while proceeding to the combat areas.

The battle of the United States Navy against Japanese shipping was quite different. At the beginning of the war Japan had a merchant fleet capacity of 6.4 million register tons along with captured merchant ships of other nations with an overall capacity of 830,000 register tons. Her capacity for replacing losses was comparatively low, and the quantity and quality of the forces for the protection of convoys were clearly inadequate.

However strange it may seem for an insular power, the Japanese Navy was quite unprepared to protect its shipping.

To combat Japanese shipping, the Americans [[were able to make]] *made* wide use of submarines, surface ships, aircraft, as well as the laying of mines in Japanese waters, which was done mainly by aircraft. Given those conditions of warfare against the lines of communication and the relative strength of naval forces of the two sides, the Americans were able to sink during the period of the war some 2,143 Japanese merchant ships with a total displacement of about 8 million register tons,[55] gain control of the sea lines of communication linking Japan with the South Sea areas, and plant mines in the Japanese ports and on the approaches to them.

However, the Americans left unmolested the sea lines of communication linking Japan with such very important economic areas as Manchuria and Korea, which were also important because of the Japanese Armed Forces located there. Actually, the very strong grouping of Japanese ground forces and the mighty economic base on the Asian mainland, as well as the communications with them, were left quite untouched by American military action, thus enabling Japan to continue the war.

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Therefore, the American naval blockade of Japan, appeared inconsistent. For this reason attempts by the US Navy to disrupt enemy shipping, despite their impressiveness, proved inadequate to force Japan to capitulate.

Therefore, the battle for the ocean lines of communication, which involved tremendous naval forces in the Atlantic and Pacific, sapped the economic strength of the belligerents in no small degree. This, in turn, had a marked effect on the overall course of the war, although it did not produce decisive results.

The numerous amphibious landing operations were an entirely unexpected task for most of the world's navies; at the very outset, none of them was prepared for operations of that kind.

Based on the unsuccessful Dardanelles Operation of World War *I* , the seapowers all failed to give proper consideration to the importance of landing operations. Moreover, they exaggerated the capabilities of antilanding defenses, and they failed to take into account the increased offensive capabilities of ground forces on the beaches.

In the course of World War II, the belligerents (excluding the Soviet Navy) executed over 500 assault landings, not including small diversionary and reconnaissance raids. During the years of the Great Patriotic War the Soviet Navy made over 100 assault landings of varying magnitude.

As a rule, a large number of different forces and resources were involved in assault landing operations, which no other kind of operation could rival insofar as concentration of men and equipment was concerned. Such operations are characterized by a large number of engagements of varying scale, heavy casualties, and great expenditures of material and equipment. They were frequently accompanied or preceded by large-scale engagements for the purpose of destroying enemy forces at sea. The distinguishing feature of landing operations carried out by foreign navies was [[the fact]] that they were usually conducted under comparatively favorable conditions, in the course of a successful strategic offensive in the theater of operations.

Radical changes in methods of landing troops took place during the war, under the influence of the ever-increasing employment of aircraft. Air dominance in the area of operations was an indispensable condition for its success even if the enemy had superior naval strength. Airborne landings became a component element in all assault landings by the end of the war.

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The success of landing operations during World War II was determined by the marked increase in the offensive capabilities of naval forces, their greater ability to break through enemy defenses and reach the objectives of the operation, and by the large-scale use of landing and transport craft. During the war there were only two failures in large-scale landings (Midway and Port Moresby), and no single operation of a strategic scale was known to fail. This was explained by the military and political conditions that were generally favorable to the invaders, as well as by the fact that the landing forces were superior in strength to the defending force. In addition, during the entire war not a single model antilanding operation was conducted involving the application of powerful, follow-up blows against the enemy, beginning at the points of his concentration and extending on to the point where the assault force landed on the beach. The reasons therefore were usually either delayed intelligence information concerning enemy preparations for the landing operation or insufficient means for executing the attack at every stage of the operation.

On the whole, landing operations during World War II were one of the main aspects of naval warfare. In individual theaters, specifically in the Pacific, where the ground forces of the belligerents did not come into direct contact with each other, landing operations and the fleet engagements which accompanied them were the principal elements of the armed struggle.

Whereas in the First World War such an important type of naval operation as the destruction at sea of an enemy naval strike grouping was conducted apart from other tactical operations of the fleet, being a sort of end in itself, in World War II actions of that type were practically always integral parts either of the warfare against the sea lanes or of the assault landing operations. In that case the ship's guns as a decisive means of achieving victory in battle lost much of their significance, and in connection with this, battleships, the principal carriers of large-caliber guns, lost their dominating position in the navies. Naval battles were frequently fought using aircraft at distances considerably in excess of the range of gunfire.

During World War II the scale of combat operations against naval elements in bases and actions involving the destruction of important military and economic targets along the enemy coast was greatly increased. Whereas in the First World War only five surface ships and submarines were destroyed at their bases (about 1% of all ships lost), in the Second World War 158 ships (8% of all shipping lost) were destroyed in that manner. It should be mentioned that aircraft were responsible for 80% of the ships destroyed or damaged in strikes against naval bases.

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The Second World War made it necessary to re-evaluate the role of the individual forces making up navies, as well as the importance of the navies themselves within the armed forces system of a nation.

During the war the process of the departure of navies from employing type-command forces became more extensive. They began to include various combinations of forces in ratios optimal for combat at sea. Methods of combined action against the enemy by different kinds of forces and a variety of weapons with deeper and dispersed combat formations were developed and perfected.

The experience gained in sea operations during the two great wars confirmed the necessity of building balanced navies. The powerful Japanese Navy of World War II, which lacked the necessary elements for combating American submarines and protecting its shipping, is one example of an unbalanced navy.

Insofar as the importance of the individual forces making up navies is concerned, the most outstanding event during the war was the elimination of the battleship fleet, which had been supreme for ages. The war forced all the powers to call a halt to the construction of new battleships, and, when hostilities ceased, they were eliminated from the operating forces. Primacy in surface ships shifted to aircraft carriers.

The submarines became a very important instrument of naval warfare. Whereas some nations had underestimated its potential before the war, they changed their opinion during the war in favor of strong submarine forces. Thus, Hitlerite Germany, which had a total of 57 U-boats at the outbreak of the war, built 1,131 submarines during the war, not including midget submarines. Here, it is necessary to point out that, despite the extensive antisubmarine warfare measures undertaken, the total German active U-boat strength increased steadily, and by the first of January 1945 there were 493 active submarines.

The opinion had previously repeatedly been expressed that submarines are the weapons of weaker navies, and that stronger navies do not need them. However, this [[viewpoint]] was completely disproved by the war, when it turned out that the submarine force in the powerful American Navy had played a very important role not only against Japanese shipping but also in combating enemy surface ships and submarines. The effect was to stimulate large-scale production of submarines in the United States, practically tripling their original number.

Submarine construction in other nations was also pursued at a hectic pace. A total of 1,630 submarines were built by the

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leading imperialist nations during the period of the war -- almost four times the total that existed before the war. And despite the tremendous submarine losses (1,195 craft), there were twice as many when the war ended as the prewar figure.[56]

Naval aviation, both carrier and land-based, was vigorously developed during the war. The aircraft employed had to be specialized, in consequence of which attack planes (torpedo and bomber planes) and antisubmarine, fighter, and reconnaissance types of aircraft made their appearance. In the course of the war aviation became one of the principal and most important types of naval forces.

Air defense and antisubmarine warfare ships were being produced at the same time on a vast scale. Six thousand units were built during the war, and by the middle of 1945 their proportion in the naval inventory was several times greater than was the case during the prewar period.

Other surface ships were also the subject of further development. New types of surface ships appeared, which were built in very large numbers, including special escort ships and landing craft. They fully justified their intended purpose and continue to be integral parts of navies today. Amphibious landing operations, which were so widely practiced during World War II, called for the construction, in addition to landing ships, of a variety of assault craft. Thus, by the end of the war the United States naval forces included over [[200]] *2,000* specially constructed, large landing ships and several thousand assault craft.

Thus, navies made substantial contributions to the armed conflict and played a very important role in World War II, a war which was clearly continental in nature. To a large extent, naval operations were directed toward assisting and supporting the ground fronts and supporting their needs which logically stemmed from the nature of the conflict.

Of special importance is the fact that, after withstanding the assault of the main body of the armed forces of Germany and her satellites and then holding and destroying them, the Soviet Union provided the Allied nations with an opportunity to organize their military-economic potential without interference, mobilize their armed forces, and proceed with the broad, large-scale construction of their navies.

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THE BUILDING OF THE SOVIET NAVY

The beginning point of the history of the Soviet Navy is marked by the Great October Socialist Revolution. The Navy fleet played a very active role in the struggle to gain power and in the armed defense of the young Soviet Republic against military attack by international reactionaries and internal counterrevolutionary forces. The glorious revolutionary and military traditions of the sailors of the Russian Navy, their dedication to the cause of Lenin, and their very good organization put them in the front ranks of the fighters against the enemies of the October Revolution.

One of the important conditions that ensured the victory of the Revolution was the fact that the Party succeeded in creating an armed stronghold of the Revolution by uniting the worker Red Guard with the masses of revolutionary sailors and soldiers. The close union of navymen with the workers hardened in revolutionary battles and the constant leadership provided by the Central Committee of the Party formed the basis for the vigorous development of the revolutionary movement, first of all in the Baltic Fleet, and the active participation of naval personnel in the fight for the victory of the October Revolution. Supported by the Baltic Fleet naval personnel, the Bolsheviks were able to intensify their efforts to win over to their side the soldiers of the field armies and the sailors of other fleets and flotillas.

In the fall of 1917 the Russian Navy had more than 1,100 combatants and auxiliaries and about 180,000 men in all its operating theaters. The main strength of the Navy was in the Baltic Fleet units, which were based in Helsingfors, Revel, Kronshtadt, and Petrograd. It was the powerful force in being of the Proletarian Revolution which, according to Lenin's plan, was supposed to take over all key positions jointly with the worker detachments and military units which joined the Revolution in a combined attack. In accordance with this plan, the armed uprising of the Baltic Fleet had one of the key positions. Lenin wrote that the uprising "can and should be accomplished by Petrograd, Moscow, Helsingfors, Kronshtadt, Vyborg, and Revel. . . .

"The Fleet, Kronshtadt, Vyborg, and Revel can and should advance on Petrograd, rout Kornilov's regiments, proceed against both capitals, begin mass agitation for power, immediate transfer of the land to the peasants, and through the immediate offer of peace, bring down the Kerenskiy government and thereby create this authority."[57]

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According to Lenin's plan the Baltic Fleet was supposed to protect Petrograd from the sea against a possible attack by the German Navy and take direct part in the military operations in the capital and on its approaches.

Following the historic decision of the Central Committee for an armed uprising, the Baltic Fleet made preparations to carry out the following tasks: move the warships into the Neva River and place the Winter Palace and other important points within range of its guns, ensure tactical cooperation with detachments of the Red Guard and soldiers of the garrison, seize the railway lines leading to Petrograd, and dispatch large forces of sailors for joint military operations with the proletarians of Petrograd.

The Baltic sailors carried out the will of the Party and of Lenin, marching on Petrograd in great force. The battleship ZARYA SVOBODY entered the sea channel to bring her full firepower in support of the Revolution. A detachment of its sailors occupied the Ligovo station. Sailors of the First Fleet crew captured the Petrograd-Oranienbaum Railroad. The cruiser AURORA and the minelayers AMUR and KHOPER took positions on the Neva River to bring the Winter Palace under fire. The minelayers tied up alongside the embankment of Vasilevskiy Island. A composite naval detachment from Kronshtadt consisting of more than 10,000 men and about 4,500 sailors from Helsingfors arrived in Petrograd to participate in the seizure of the post office, telephone and telegraph stations, bridges, stations, electric power plants, military staff headquarters building, and the Winter Palace. The sailors also took control of the railroads linking Finland with Petrograd, and they prevented the counterrevolutionary forces from raising the bridges in the city; in this manner, they created conditions favorable for the victory of the Revolution.

At 2140 hours on 7 November the AURORA fired her historic round. This was the signal to storm the Winter Palace; at 0150 hours on 8 November it was over. The bourgeois government under a convoy of sailors was escorted to the Fortress of Peter and Paul. The armed uprising had succeeded. The workers and peasants of Russia led by the Communist Party seized government power.

Lenin personally directed detachments of sailors into the most important areas in the struggle for power. The Baltic sailors were dispatched to Moscow to support detachments of the Red Guards, and they participated in routing the counterrevolutionary forces. The sailors constituted the main force which liquidated the main focus of the counterrevolution on the front -- the headquarters of the commander in chief in Mogilev.

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A great contribution in the struggle to establish Soviet power was made by the sailors of the Black Sea Fleet and of the Arctic, Caspian, Amur, Siberian, Sayminsk, Amu-Darya, and Chudskoye flotillas.

Lenin had high praise for the sailors as steadfast fighters for the liberation of the workers. In a speech at the First All-Russian Naval Conference on 22 November (5 December) 1917, he stated: "We see in the Navy a brilliant example of the creative capabilities of the working masses, and in this regard the Navy showed itself to be in the vanguard."[58]

An indicator of the recognition of the services rendered by the navymen to the Revolution was the following event which was significant to the Navy. In December 1917 during the elections to the Constituent Assembly, Lenin was nominated as candidate for deputy in five electoral districts, including the Baltic Fleet district. In this connection, he wrote a letter to the committee on elections to the Constituent Assembly requesting that he be considered as the candidate from the Baltic Fleet. And so Vladimir Il'ich became the Baltic deputy.

Sailors in the Civil War. The power was won, but it had to be held and defended against many enemies. The interventionists and the White Guard attempted to throttle the young Soviet state. There were conspiracies and mutinies, and the fronts of the Civil War were formed.

In response to a summons issued by the Party, the sailors assumed their position in the front ranks to defend Soviet authority. They participated actively in destroying the main sources of counterrevolutionary action in the country; they fought the White Finns, the forces of Kerenskiy and Krasnov, the bands of Kaledin at Rostov-on-the-Don, the troops of the Central Rada in the Ukraine, the White Poles of Belorussia, and detachments of Ataman Dutov at Orenburg.

The victory of the Revolution in Russia gave rise to desperate resistance from all the forces of the Old World. Germany, England, France, Japan, the United States, and all their satellites took up arms against the new Soviet Republic. Their object was to destroy the first government of workers and peasants in the world. This is how military intervention began in 1918. In their role as suppressors of popular freedom, the governments of these countries took on their hirelings, including Kolchak, Denikin, Yudenich, Wrangel, and Pilsudskiy.

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With increasing dangers from within and without, the Red Guard and the temporarily formed detachments were no longer able to cope with the problems of defending the Revolution and protecting the nation. The Party took the necessary measures to create the Red Army and the Red Navy of workers and peasants; those forces were formed during a period of heavy fighting.

On 28 January 1918 Lenin signed a decree organizing the Red Army of Workers and Peasants, and on 11 February he signed another, creating the Red Navy of Workers and Peasants. The first Peoples' Commissar for Naval Affairs was the Baltic sailor, Bolshevik P. Ye. Dybenko. These decrees by Lenin laid the foundation for the building of the Soviet Armed Forces, represented by the Army and the Navy of a new Socialist type.

The backbone and cohesive force of the units formed were Petrograd workers, and revolutionary, inspired soldiers and navymen who fought heroically against superior enemy forces.

The morale and fighting qualities of the sailors manifested in battle for the development and security of the young Soviet Republic were highly appreciated by the military command element. Thus, as early as January 1918 a directive of the People's Commissariat for Military Affairs stated: "In regard to the training of detachments of the Socialist Army and their impending quick departure to the fighting front, it is essential to detail to each echelon of volunteers formed (1,000 men), in the interests of more effective cohesion, a platoon of sailors."[59] As a result of this measure, units of the new Red Army operating along the main (at this time) Petrograd front were assigned about 40 sailors per thousand Red Army men.

On 18 February 1918 the German forces launched an offensive along the entire front. The Kaiser's fleet steamed into the Gulf of Finland in order to strike at the heart of the Revolution -- Petrograd. The German armies moved forward rapidly and soon reached Revel (Tallin), Pskov, and Narva. The country was in mortal danger.

The situation of the Baltic and Black Sea fleets [[at this time]] *after the conclusion of the Brest Peace Treaty* was exceptionally difficult. G. V. Chicherin, People's Commissar for Foreign Affairs, stated at that time that the question of the Navy was uppermost in the discussions with the German diplomats. The Baltic Fleet, which was based in Helsingfors and Revel, was supposed to depart immediately for Russian bases or be dismantled, according to the Treaty of Brest-Litovsk. The Germans hoped to capture our ships which presumably could not break

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through the ice in the Gulf of Finland. However, the ships of the Baltic Fleet, by direct order of V. I. Lenin, successfully completed the heroic "ice voyage" and reached Kronshtadt and Petrograd. The Fleet was saved from possible capture by the German forces. This stabilized the defenses of the capital and strengthened the position of the Soviet Republic.

In March of 1918 interventionist forces were landed at Murmansk, in April at Vladivostok and later on at the Black Sea ports. It should be mentioned that they were landed and operated in those areas where the Soviet Republic did not have a naval force. In the Baltic Sea, where a rather powerful fleet was maintained, the interventionists [[decided against making a landing]] *did not succeed in doing this*.

In the summer of 1918 the imperialists, having set as their objective the city of Petrograd by an incursion from seaward, concentrated a considerable force of the British Fleet in the Gulf of Finland. To prevent the [[British]] interventionist Fleet from penetrating to Petrograd, ships of the Baltic Fleet on 14 August planted a large field of about 1,500 mines, thereby obstructing enemy passage from the sea to the city. The Kronshtadt coastal artillery batteries set up a defensive line of fire to protect the citadel of the Revolution. The great service rendered by the Fleet was that it prevented the interventionists and White Guards from capturing Petrograd.

During the Civil War years the Baltic Fleet served as the base and the force for training and supplying cadres in building the entire Soviet Fleet. Ships, aircraft, and arms were dispatched from its inventory, while the Baltic sailors became the nucleus around which many flotillas and detachments were formed.

In the southern part of the country the Germans occupied all of the Ukraine, and for that reason the Black Sea Fleet *Squadron* had to withdraw from Sevastopol and proceed to Novorossiysk. Since the latter was likewise in danger of being occupied, on orders from Lenin the ships were scuttled in Tsemessk Bay to avoid capture by the Germans.

The November 1918 revolution in Germany removed the shackles of the Brest Treaty. However, the breathing spell provided by this agreement soon ended. Open, foreign, armed intervention commenced[[, and in the spring of 1918 the first fronts appeared]]. The Soviet Republic was ringed by enemies.

Outstanding leaders of the Civil War, the main events of which /occurred/ on land, realistically evaluated the significance of the Navy to the interventionists, and they saw in it

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a force capable of exercising a considerable influence on the course of the armed struggle. This is what S. S. Kamenev, Commander-in-Chief of the Armed Forces of the Soviet Republic, wrote about it: "In fighting efficiency the enemy was stronger than the Red Army in his greater number of trained officers and better equipment.

"Another no less characteristic feature in the overall situation was the security of the enemy rear, which abutted on the sea. The enemy had continuous contact by sea with the Entente.

"Hence, the Entente provided continuous support for those enemy forces that had inadequate manpower and equipment. Without this support the enemy would probably have been obliged to withdraw after the initial unsuccessful actions."[60]

In other words, the navies of the imperialist governments, during the time of the Civil War and the period of foreign intervention, served as an important instrument of their policy and were used for the purpose of liquidating by force of arms the Great October Revolution's gains.

At the same time, the limited capabilities of the Soviet Red Navy, which was numerically inferior in ships and armament to the navies of the enemy coalition, caused more difficult conditions in our struggle on all the fronts of the Civil War. Red Army troops were forced to battle the interventionist armies after the latter had established beachheads and set up strongpoints and bases upon them. The young Soviet Armed Forces were unable to exert any pressure on the enemy on the sea passage or prevent reinforcement of his troops via the lines of communication, since no navy was available.

The Communist Party and the Soviet Government took all possible measures to secure the sea boundaries of the young Soviet nation. In July 1918 Lenin wrote the People's Commissariat on naval matters: "I urgently request that all possible measures be taken to hasten the delivery to the Caspian Sea of all kinds of appropriate naval vessels."[61] In August of the same year, following the arrival of four minelayers from the Baltic Fleet at Rybinsk, he sent the following telegram to that place: "You are hereby ordered to complete loading guns, shells, and coal as quickly as possible and to proceed without delay to Nizhniy. This work would be completed as quickly as possible. . . . Each minute of delay involves a serious responsibility and those guilty will be treated accordingly. Telegraph compliance."[62] On 24 August the minelayers arrived at Nizhniy Novgorod and shortly after took part in the battle for Kazan'.

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In October 1918 the Astrakhan-Caspian Flotilla was created on the initiative of V. I. Lenin.

In April 1919, in a letter to the Petrograd organizations, Lenin demanded: "Using all possible measures and manpower, get another flotilla ready for the Volga. *Repairs in particular.*"[63]

Reinforcement of the Volga and Astrakhan-Caspian flotillas, thanks to the vigorous intervention of V. I. Lenin, contributed to the defeat of the White Guards and interventionists who were attempting to capture an area of vital importance to the Soviet Republic.

The enthusiasm and military skills manifested by the sailors made it possible, under very difficult conditions, to create many flotillas and thereby successfully carry out a wide range of tactical assignments. Over 30 naval flotillas were built during the Civil War. In addition to the old surviving ships in the Navy at that time, over 2,000 different kinds of river and lake craft were refitted as warships and the personnel brought to full strength with naval replacements.

In the spring of 1919 the principal battles developed on the Eastern Front, where Kolchak's troops opened the offensive. The Volga Flotilla, which was operating on the *Volga*, Kama, Vyatka, Belaya, and Ufa rivers, figured very prominently in breaking up this offensive and defeating the White Guard forces.

In an attempt to support Kolchak, the forces under Yudenich and the White Finns began to advance on Petrograd. To [[ensure the]] capture [[of]] revolutionary Petrograd the English concentrated a large naval force consisting of over 100 combatants in the [[Gulf of Finland]] *Baltic Sea*. After losing 18 ships, the interventionist fleet was forced to quit the waters of the Finnish Gulf with 16 damaged ships.

Shortly after, the Army of Denikin began its offensive in the south. In connection with this event there was published a letter on 9 June 1919 by Lenin in which he exhorted "everyone to support the fight with Denikin." The letter stated that the most critical moment of the Socialist Revolution had arrived.

The sailors of the Dnieper and Volga-Caspian flotillas were actively engaged against the Denikin forces on the flanks of our southern and southeastern fronts.

In June 1920 Wrangel's Army took the offensive, which was pressed in a northerly direction. To unite the

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counterrevolutionary forces of the Don and Kuban the enemy attempted to land an assault force in the rear of our forces in the Sea of Azov coastal area. These landings were destroyed through the coordinated actions of the Red Army and the Azov Flotilla.

On all fronts in the Civil War the main feature of the tactical operations of the Soviet naval forces was joint actions with the ground forces in which the Navy provided fire support for the troops, landed assault parties, fought the enemy's river and sea forces, ferried troops across the water bodies, and transported military supplies.

While defending the gains of the Great October Socialist Revolution, the navymen performed feats of heroism not only in the ships in which they served, but also on the ground fronts, in which about 75,000 sailors fought. The names of A. G. Zheleznyakov, B. F. Lyubimov, N. G. Markin, M. I. Martynov, A. V. Mokrousov, P. D. Khokhryakov and many others will never fade from the memories of their grateful successors. The Soviet people continue to be inspired by the dedication of these people to the cause of Communism and by their amazing courage and fortitude, qualities which were characteristic of a great race of sailors, the heroes of the Great October Revolution.

In that difficult struggle the Navy justified the faith shown in it by the Party, the government, and the people. The events of the Civil War once again confirmed the necessity of having within the make-up of our Armed Forces a powerful, comprehensively developed Navy.

The main source of our victory in the Civil War was the leadership provided by the Communist Party headed by V. I. Lenin, our nation, and its Armed Forces. Our sailors proudly note that Vladimir Il'ich was the creator of our illustrious Navy, and all of its battle actions were illuminated by his great genius. He produced the foundations for our Soviet military science on the basis of which the Soviet art of naval warfare was founded.

[[Leninist Principles of Soviet Military Science.]] The scientific, ideological, and theoretical basis for the building of the Armed Forces of our state consists of Marxist-Leninist teachings about war and the army. Lenin said that in any field of Soviet construction it is necessary to take into account objective laws and principles, and the dependence of practical activities on political and economic conditions. This holds true for the Armed Forces as well. Therefore, creation of a

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new kind of armed force called for the development of our own type of Soviet military science, for, as Lenin pointed out, without such a science it is impossible to build a modern army.

To fight powerful enemy successfully, all personnel of the army and navy should be taught the necessary military skills and knowledge. In this connection, Lenin demanded that "the military arts be studied properly."[64] Hence the reason that great attention was given to military problems at all gatherings of the Communist Party and sessions of the Central Committee Plenum during the time of the Civil War. Lenin dedicated himself to the matter of developing Soviet military science. His contribution to the development of the more important military problems and fundamental military theory was of inestimable worth. He made a scientific analysis of the laws of modern warfare, and he described the methods of waging war. In contrast to many authorities of the past who limited the content of military science only to the sphere of art of war, Lenin regarded the theory and practice of military affairs as an inseparable part of the social activities of people living in a class society. In 1905, in an article entitled "The Fall of Port Arthur," he demonstrated the operation of objective principles in a modern war, the decisive role played in it by the masses, the significance of economic factors and morale, and he concluded that the outcome of an armed struggle depended not only on the army but also on all of the people, i.e., on the home front.

In determining the scope of military sciences necessary for the workers, Lenin observed that these skills include problems in tactics, organizing the planned action of conducting warfare, and mastering new, complicated military equipment and understanding modern methods of waging war. The workers need not only the ABC's of military affairs, he taught, but also a knowledge of the laws, principles and rules of the art of war.

In analyzing military forces, Lenin pointed to the necessity of taking into account the numbers and training of Army and Navy personnel, as well as the quantity and quality of weapons and military equipment. He sharply criticized the manifestation of scorn when evaluating an enemy's strength and capability; he always demanded that people study their enemy, his weak and strong sides. He said, "Everyone will agree that it is unwise or even criminal behavior on the part of an army which is not prepared to master all the weapons, the means, and techniques of warfare which an enemy has or might have."[65]

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On the theoretical plane this situation, which is of urgent importance even today, is manifested in our making use of the individual elements and achievements of bourgeois military science.

Lenin instructed the Party to the effect that "In any war, victory, in the final analysis, is determined by the spirit of the masses who shed their blood on the battlefield. Conviction as to the righteousness of the war being fought, and a recognition of the need to sacrifice one's life for the good of one's brothers rouses the soldier's spirit and enables him to endure unheard-of hardships."[66] During this era of imperialism, when wars are waged by nations, this situation takes on special meaning. Just wars give rise to patriotism and the manifestation of a high morale by the people and military personnel; and on the contrary, unjust wars cannot evoke high morale, since they are conducted in the interests of a small group of exploiters.

In all agencies of the Soviet government, including those of the Armed Forces, "the supremacy of Communist Party policy should be openly recognized."[67]

Communist Party guidance and leadership of the Armed Forces and Party and political work in the Army and Navy have been and will remain one of the main sources of their power. Lenin felt that moral steadfastness should be strengthened and skillfully maintained by the full force of the ideological influence of the Party on the masses and by the organizing role of the Party organizations, political agencies, and the command. *He repeatedly emphasized that where Party and political* work is well organized and conducted, where the discipline is better, and where the spirit and morale of the troops is higher, there are more victories.

Lenin's proposition played a tremendous role in developing the principles of Soviet military science. Their significance increased all the more during the age of technical progress, the creation of new Armed Forces, and the building of the Soviet ocean-going Navy. They served as the methodological base for Soviet military doctrine, the foundation of military [[and naval sciences]] *science*, and they constitute the basis of the military policy of the Party which is orienting the Soviet people toward the need to maintain the defensive capabilities of our nation at the highest level.

Vladimir Il'ich Lenin devoted much of his attention to the art of war, chiefly strategy, which is inseparably linked with the policies of a state. The vitality of his art of war lies, first of all, in its creative and scientific nature, its strict observance of the rules of warfare, its capacity for correctly determining the main direction of the war and for selecting the

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time, place, and method of striking the decisive blow, as well as its ability to utilize the tremendous revolutionary energy, initiative, and enthusiasm of the people.

Inherent in Lenin as a strategist were flexibility in selecting the form of the battle and the remarkable ability to determine the precise time for shifting over to decisive action. Under his leadership some very important principles for achieving victory have been carried out in practice: Be stronger than the enemy at the decisive moment at the decisive point; master all the forms and means of waging war; and intelligently combine defense with offense, depending on the specific situation. The leader of the proletariat was a supporter of decisive offensive actions (including the utter defeat of the enemy) and believed that one of the factors ensuring victory was suddenness of attacks, and seizing and holding the initiative. Catch the enemy unaware if possible, he taught, try to grasp the moment when his troops are scattered. At that time one must have military vigilance of the highest order. "To make a slip or lose your head means losing everything."[68]

Running through all of Lenin's directives and letters like a red thread is the idea of the need for firmness and purposefulness in the execution of projected plans, and that ruination is the consequence of vacillation and indecisiveness during the important moments of a battle.

One of the features of Lenin's art of war consisted in the special care devoted to the preparation of planned operations. "Every battle includes the abstract possibility of a defeat, and there are no means available for reducing this possibility other than an organized preparation for conflict."[69]

The principles of strategy developed during the period of the Civil War -- learning about the enemy's strengths and weaknesses, anticipating his intentions, intelligent actions and daring, purposefulness and flexibility of plans, creating superiority of men and equipment along the direction of the main effort, correctly determining the most dangerous grouping at a particular moment, decisiveness of actions -- all these elements were further developed during the Great Patriotic War and during the postwar period.

Many of the rules set forth by Lenin in his works, directives, and orders pertain to strategy, for example determining the objective of the operation, utilization of men and equipment, selection of methods and forms of action at the level of a front, fleet, army or flotilla. The requirement to always strive for unanimity of aims and actions of men in an operation

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and establishing firm controls over the execution of orders and directives continue to be of great importance to us even today.

He felt that the basis for correct, purposeful leadership was the principle of sole responsibility of the commander for both military and political matters, centralism, and unanimity of will from the top down.

Lenin was not only a theoretician who laid the basis for Soviet military science. His activities during the Civil War were an unsurpassed example of the ability to foresee the course of events and to mobilize and direct the efforts of the entire nation and its Armed Forces to gain a victory over the enemy. All of the more important operations of the Red Army and Navy during that period were developed under his guidance.

Lenin's very rich military legacy gives one a clear idea of our leader as a fighting leader of the defenses of the Soviet state, a very great military strategist, the leader of the revolutionary masses who combined directing the Armed Forces with administering the affairs of the nation during a very difficult domestic and international situation.

Lenin's life-giving ideas and the untiring organizational work of the Communist Party in implementing his ideas have had the full support of all Navy personnel, and they have served as their guiding star in the struggle with the enemies of the Soviet state.

The Restoration of the Navy (1921-1928). After defeating the interventionists and White Guard forces, our nation entered upon the peacetime Socialist construction of the nation under extraordinarily difficult conditions of destruction and devastation throughout the nation, the hostile policies of the imperialists directed toward the destruction of Soviet authority, and the continuing war with the remnants of counterrevolutionary forces.

At that time the Soviet Union did not have a fleet in the Far East or in the Arctic, and actually, there was no fleet in the Black Sea because all the ships that were left had been taken away by the White Guard forces to foreign ports. Only the Baltic Fleet and several river flotillas still existed. Many ships were in need of major overhaul. More than half of the command personnel were officers of the former Czarist Navy. The enlisted men and petty officers had to be replaced. The Soviet command cadre needed theoretical and practical training.

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In evaluating the state of the Navy at that time, M. V. Frunze wrote: "In the course of the Revolution and the hazards of the Civil War, the Navy suffered a very heavy share of the blows.

"As a result, we were deprived of the greater and better part of the equipment, we lost the great majority of our experienced commanders who played a greater part in their work with the fleet than in all the other branches, we lost many naval bases, and finally, we lost the nucleus of our Red Navy enlisted personnel.

"In summary, this meant that we had no Navy."[70]

But in contrast to the period of the history of our country before the October Revolution when it was customary for the ruling circles of Russia to misunderstand the role of the Navy, the Party and the Soviet government ascribed great importance to its development, and they properly evaluated the need for a Navy worthy of the Soviet government and its great ideals.

There was still some fighting with the White Guard forces in the southern part of the country, and Lenin was already becoming anxious to rebuild the Navy. In October 1920 the Council of the Labor and Defense accepted a decision presented by Lenin wherein the Petrograd Soviet of Deputies and the Committee for the Defense of Petrograd were charged "to pay special attention to accelerating the work of rebuilding the Baltic Fleet . . . "[71] This was the first decision to reinforce the Navy and to build the necessary material and maintenance base for this purpose.

A very important beacon of the project to build Socialism was the Tenth Party Congress, which passed the necessary measure to strengthen the defenses of the nation. Its decision served as a basis for the broad range of work in the country to restore the Navy. On Lenin's initiative, the decisions of the Party regarding the Navy read as follows: "The Congress deems it essential, in accordance with the general situation and the material resources of the Soviet Republic, to take measures for the restoration and strengthening of the Red Navy."[72] The Congress also determined the specific measures for attaining this objective.

A great contribution to the building of a Soviet Navy was made by the Leninist Komsomol, which assumed patronage of it at the Fifth Congress in 1922. In two years of Komsomol member recruitment some 8,000 youths joined the Navy, and about a thousand Komsomol members were sent to naval training

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institutions. This restored the political health of the men in the Navy.

The frequent holding of Red Navy Week, which provided the fleet with considerable material support, was a nationwide manifestation of the people's concern about the Navy.

Intensive work was begun in 1921 on the restoration of ports and shipbuilding industries and facilities. As a result, it was possible as early as 1922 to proceed with the repairing of ships and other craft and the formation of small but combat-effective forces.

By 1924 the Baltic Fleet had two battleships, one cruiser, eight destroyers, nine submarines, and other ships. The Black Sea Fleet had received one cruiser, two destroyers, two submarines, and twelve ships of other classes. The flotillas in the Caspian Sea and on the Amur were also restored. An indicator of the rate at which the Navy was restored was the increase in total displacement tonnage: In 1923 it was 82,000 tons; in 1924, 90,000 tons; in 1925, 116,000 tons; and in 1926, 139,000 tons.

In December 1925 the 14th Party Congress adopted the course for the Socialistic industrialization of the nation. The imminent development of the industry opened new prospects for strengthening national defense and technical renovation of the Armed Forces, including the Navy.

In November 1924 at a meeting of political workers M. V. Frunze said, "Some of the comrades have the idea that it would be best, in view of our limited resources, to concentrate our attention on a land army. This point of view is quite wrong. . . .

". . . The Revolutionary Military Council firmly and steadfastly adheres to the point of view that a navy is extremely necessary to us, and that we should further expand it. . . .

". . . We are faced with the urgent need to proceed with the construction of new ships."[73]

What kind of navy does the country need? This question has [[been on the agenda]] *arisen* since plans were made to restore the Navy. Its importance during that period was also dictated by the fact that limitations in material resources called for strict economizing in everything.

The answer to that question was provided by the Party Central Committee which, on the basis of a thorough analysis of

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the basic questions concerning the Navy and the practical possibilities of its construction, determined the role and place of the Navy within the Armed Forces system of the Republic. Accordingly, in December 1926 the first six-year program of new ship construction was inaugurated. It called for the construction mainly of small combatants (36 torpedo boats, 18 escort ships), as well as 12 submarines.

During the period of restoration of the Navy, the most burning and important problem was the matter of training a cadre, especially command cadre, that would be dedicated to Soviet authority, since most of the officers of the Czarist Navy were, by virtue of the class to which they belonged, in the counterrevolutionary camp.

By a resolution of the Party Central Committee thousands of Communist navymen who had left the ships for the fronts of the Civil War were returned to the Navy. This was followed by special mobilization for naval duty of Communists and Komsomol members, and in 1922-1923 the first volunteers were recruited from among the Komsomol.

All this made it possible to successfully resolve the problem of personnel, not only enlisted but command personnel of the Navy as well. Training detachments, command and engineering schools, and the naval academy began to function on schedule, accepting Communist naval personnel who had distinguished themselves during the period of the Revolution and the Civil War. Thus, in the first stage ships were either restored or rebuilt, a new cadre of men was trained, and the organizational principles of the Navy were /established/.

To be sure, the force was small, and the imperialists continued to make active preparations for an attack upon the young Soviet Republic. For that reason, the work of strengthening the Army and building the Navy was continued with persistence.

Due to the small number of ships at that time, there was a [[determined]] search to find methods for resolving the question of defending our maritime borders with a small Navy cooperating with ground forces. At the same time, an intensive, creative, military-theoretical effort was made to find effective means for resolving tactical problems with a limited naval force.

During the process of investigation the "small war theory" was conceived which, based on specific conditions, defined rational methods and forms of naval warfare against a more powerful enemy sea power. This theory corresponded in its

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entirety to the real tactical capabilities of our Navy at the time, the urgent problems of defending the country, which had just finished fighting the Civil War and was forced to prepare to repel the next aggression, and the economic capabilities of the Soviet government. The essence of this theory consisted of launching attacks from different directions upon the main enemy objective without breaking away from friendly bases by means of secretly concentrated, mutually supporting, diverse naval forces. It was proposed that the basic form of cooperation would involve a concentrated (combined) attack of surface ships and patrol boats, submarines, air elements and coastal artillery organized about a mine and artillery position. At the time, this was the most effective, realistic, and specific method of using limited naval strength for defending friendly shores in a battle with a more powerful enemy sea power. This was, on the whole, the *forced* defensive concept of a weak navy.

In May 1928 the Revolutionary Military Council reviewed and again precisely defined the role and place of the Navy within the Armed Forces system. The Navy was charged with the following basic missions: Assist the ground forces operations in littoral areas; jointly with the ground forces defend shores, naval bases, and political and economic centers along the coast; and operate against enemy lines of communication. Naval construction was oriented toward light surface forces and submarines, strengthening coastal and positional minefield defenses, as well as building shore-based naval aircraft.

Soviet navymen at that time, just like many generations of their predecessors, progressive figures of the Russian Navy, thoroughly understood the importance of a navy for strengthening the mlitary might of the nation and enhancing its international prestige, for protecting the immense sea frontiers, and for defending the national interests of the Soviet Union on the seas and oceans, and they persistently strove to find ways to strengthen its military power. In seeking out these ways in a battle of differing conceptions, opinions, and tendencies, the first book of Naval Regulations of the Workers' and Peasants' Red Army was prepared in 1930. The result of prolonged scientific study by Soviet military specialists, it summarized the experience gained in training large forces, units, and ships, and it took into account the view of potential enemies. The book of regulations controlled and regulated the combat operations of naval ships, naval aviation, and coastal defense units, and it laid special emphasis on cooperation and the concentrated utilization of these forces in battle and in an operation. In this manual, which is oriented toward real, limited forces, mainly coastal forces, preference was given to aggressive forms of battle, and it showed a tendency to carry out

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even defensive missions by a decisive offensive. Initiative and the application of new tactical procedures not known to the enemy were encouraged in every way. Incidentally, these tactical features were further developed in subsequent combat regulations and became, in their way, a tradition in which the command cadre are trained even today.

The basic rules of the Workers' and Peasants' Red Army Field Regulations (PU-29), which is common to both ground and naval forces, were used as the basis in developing the first book of Naval Combat Regulations. These basic documents reflected the indivisibility of Soviet military doctrine, which regarded the naval forces as an inseparable component part of the nation's Armed Forces. The Navy was assigned the *primary* missions of being prepared to conduct bold and decisive action against the enemy on the seas,[[directed toward]] protecting the shores of the USSR, to assist in the operations of the ground forces of the Red Army[[, and to support them]] both from the sea and [[from the river]] *on the rivers* and lake systems.

The Construction of the Navy (1929-1941). During the period of the prewar five-year plans, the Soviet people, with the guidance of the Party, very quickly industrialized the country, collectivized agriculture, accomplished a cultural revolution, eliminated the exploiting classes, and built the first Socialist state in the world. Aviation, automobile, electrical and powerful defense industries were developed in the country, and new shipbuilding facilities were built or old ones reconstructed. All of these contributed to the dramatic growth of the economic and military power of the Soviet Union. A material and supply base was established which permitted us to construct a great sea-going and ocean-going Navy adequate to the needs of the Soviet state.

The first Soviet submarines of the DEKABRIST-class were laid down as early as 1927 by the shipbuilding industry. In 1930-1934 the LENINETS-class submarines, as well as the medium-sized SHCHUKA and S-class, and the small MALYUTKA-class began to be commissioned. Shortly afterwards, construction began on the K-class ocean-going submarines. In summary, the Soviet Navy was provided with coastal sea-going and ocean-going classes of submarines with high performance characteristics for that time.

During the Second Five-Year Plan, one new cruiser joined the fleet, the number of destroyers and escort ships practically doubled, there were three and one-half times as many torpedo boats, almost three times as many minesweepers, and more than five times as many submarines. The aviation picture changed

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substantially) the total number of naval aircraft increased more than 6½ times. The number of attack aircraft was tripled, the total number of reconnaissance [[craft]] *aircraft* was increased more than sixfold. The number of coastal artillery guns of various calibers was increased by practically two and one-half times.

In the [[prewar]] decisions of the Party and the government regarding the [[construction]] *creation* of an ocean-going Navy, provision was made to build strong fleets in the Pacific and the Baltic, and to substantially strengthen the Northern and Black Sea fleets. It was deemed necessary to have as part of the Navy a powerful shore-based air arm for joint operations with ship forces.

The shipbuilding program adopted on the basis of these decisions was aimed at the construction of large surface forces -- battleships and heavy cruisers -- which would be superior in characteristics to analogous foreign ships. In 1938-1940 the keels were laid for the first two Soviet capital ships, the battleships SOVETSKIY SOYUZ and the cruiser CHAPAYEV. Construction of light surface forces continued. Simultaneously, plans were made to /build/ powerful submarine forces, including over 200 different submarines.

In carrying out the decisions of the Party and the government, the Soviet people, [[our]] shipbuilders, and the workers of the related branches of industry sacrificed no small amount of their individual effort in the accomplishment of the responsible and complex tasks involved in building the Navy. As a result of commissioning new, modern ships, the total displacement tonnage of the Soviet Navy increased from the beginning of 1939 to 1941 by 107,718 tons in surface ships, and the submarine tonnage was increased by 50,385 tons. In 11 months of 1940 alone, the Navy received 100 different naval ships, mainly destroyers, submarines, minesweepers, and torpedo boats. An additional 269 ships of all types were still under construction at the end of 1940. A portion of those were completed in the first half of 1941 and took part in the Great Patriotic War. These ships were equipped with new guns, fire control, radio navigation, and other special devices.

The Naval Air Arm, which increased by 39% in the year 1940, was being expanded. However, it was being supplied with the same type aircraft as the other branches of the Armed Forces. Although these aircraft operated successfully against targets on the ground, they were not sufficiently adapted to accomplish combat missions at sea. Because of their low speed, limited range, and low load-carrying capacity, the naval attack

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aircraft could not be used to carry torpedoes for operations against ships at sea at any distance from their bases. We had no special type naval aircraft at that time.

Naval fighter aircraft had [[a poor]] *an insignificant* capability for providing cover for ships at sea against air attacks. Because of their limited radius of action, weak armament, and short flying time, they could not provide reliable cover for ships at sea even at comparatively short distances from friendly shores. This essentially limited the use of the main forces of the Navy in areas accessible to enemy aircraft.

The strength of the coastal defenses of our Navy, which remained at the same level *up to the* 1930's as in World War I, was greatly increased. The equipment was renovated and the areas of tactical application extended. During 1940 alone the total number of coastal defense batteries was increased by 43%.

Extensive organizational measures were put into effect during the period of the prewar Five Year Plans, along with the building of ships and planes and improvements in their armament.

The Pacific Fleet was created in 1932 to protect the [[Far Eastern]] maritime borders on a resolution of the Party and the government, and in 1933 the Northern Fleet was created. Measures were taken at that time to master the Northern Sea Route which connected the Northern and Pacific theaters.

After Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, and Bessarabia became part of the Soviet Union the areas for basing the Baltic and Black Sea fleets increased considerably. The Baltic Fleet left the eastern part of the Gulf of Finland for the wide spaces of the Baltic Sea, while the Black Sea Fleet departed for the Danubian estuary where the Danube Flotilla was formed.

The continued concern shown by the Party and the government for the Navy had a good effect. In a relatively short time after the Civil War the Navy was rebuilt. It was capable of conducting military operations jointly with ground forces or independently in seas contiguous to our shores, mainly to defend our coastline and to disrupt enemy shipping.

As the economic might of our nation increased, the combat power of the Navy also increased. It was equipped with modern type submarines and escort and other surface ships. Many of them were equal to the better models of foreign-built ships in their performance characteristics.

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At the beginning of the Great Patriotic War our Navy consisted of four operational commands: the Northern, Baltic, Black Sea and Pacific fleets, as well as the Danubian, Caspian, Pinsk, and Amur flotillas. It consisted of three battleships, seven light cruisers, 59 destroyers and destroyer leaders, 22 escort ships, 80 minesweepers, 269 torpedo boats, 218 submarines, 2,581 aircraft of all types, and 260 coastal artillery batteries. As a whole, the Navy was very powerful, even though it was separated into several theaters.

Subsequently it was shown that the Navy clearly lacked sufficient minesweepers and auxiliary ships. None of the fleets, with the exception of the Baltic, had naval infantry forces. The antiaircraft defense force was low in manpower and had insufficient equipment. The fleets did not have enough influence mines, nor did they have sufficient sweeps to cope with them.

Along with the qualitative improvement and numerical growth of our Armed Forces and the improvements in their organizational structure, intensive scientific development of Soviet military theory continued. The essence of this theory was most clearly expressed in the Field Regulations of 1939, which state in part: "Against any enemy attack the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics will respond with a crushing blow with the full might of the Armed Forces. . . . We shall fight an offensive war, carrying it to enemy territory. Red Army operations will be conducted so as to destroy with the object of inflicting a total defeat upon the enemy. . . ."

It was thought that the tactical missions would be performed through the combined efforts of all the branches and arms of the Armed Forces. The documents governing the tactical operations of the Navy are characterized by these same ideas. The Navy was supposed to assist the ground forces in the event of war and conduct independent operations at sea.

At the beginning of the war the Navy had a harmonious theory of preparing for and conducting an operation -- a form of warfare that was new at the time. It contained clear and precise recommendations on the main questions of the operational art that were formulated in the documentation at that time. The command group and staffs of fleets and other operational commands acquired the necessary experience in organizing and planning operations at sea by the time the war broke out. This gave them a tremendous advantage in resolving the principal problems dealing with the strategic utilization of forces in warfare at sea.

The requirements to persistently seek out and resolutely carry the attack to the enemy ran like a red thread through all of our handbooks, manuals, and regulations.

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The basic method of accomplishing naval missions called for the destruction of the enemy by inflicting powerful strikes by superior mixed forces in the direction of the main effort with perfect cooperation and the use of tactical surprise and speed of attack. As was the case in the past, a major role was assigned to positional warfare -- coastal artillery, minefields and powerful mine-and-artillery positions. With these as support, naval ships and aircraft learned how to inflict defeat upon a numerically superior enemy force. Therefore, even then, based on the composition of forces and their tactical capabilities, the operational and strategic plan assigned missions to the Navy which were defensive, for the most part, mainly in the coastal zone, and called for protection of the nation against invasion from the sea.

Along with the development of naval forces, the naval personnel achieved a higher level of service mastery and skills. Tactical exercises for fleets were conducted with great intensity; coordinated action between ships as parts of tactical groupings and forces were improved upon, and naval battle tactics were worked on. Much attention was given to the matter of organizing joint attacks by surface ships, torpedo boats, aircraft, and submarines upon enemy groupings of surface ships in our mine and artillery positions set up in narrow passages and at the approaches to naval bases.

At the same time, the influence of adherents of the defensive role and use of the Navy in a future war predominated in solving questions of the art of naval warfare. The consequence of this was the preservation of the "small war theory" tradition -- which had been valid in its day -- under a new set of conditions when our Navy had become capable of carrying the operations beyond the limits of our coastal waters. The negative influence of this theory on the further development of Soviet naval thinking was manifested through this. Essentially, the view that prevailed in our art of naval warfare was to employ the naval forces for defensive purposes, and the Navy proper was regarded as a defensive factor, although the missions assigned to it in the tactical and operational plans were accomplished using offensive methods.

Such viewpoints, naturally, were reflected in the direction of *naval organizational development and* training of the command cadre of the Navy. In none of our fleets was the question of waging warfare on the ocean brought up, although [[they all]] *the fleets* had submarines with an extended range of operation and the nation had decided to build a huge ocean-going Navy.

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Hence the reason that the use of such long-range naval forces such as submarines, including raiding submarines, was restricted by the narrow framework of tactical application mainly to nearby areas. This is further confirmed by the fact that the submarines were allocated among the theaters. In the Barents Sea, where conditions for entering the ocean were most favorable, there were fewer submarines when the war broke out than in the Baltic or Black seas.

One good aspect of the Soviet art of naval warfare was [[the fact]] that the problem of mutual support between the Army and Navy in conducting tactical operations along coastal areas was highly developed. In the training process, naval ships drilled in providing fire support for the coastal flank of the Army, in landing assault troops (chiefly tactical landings), and in covering troops against attacks from the sea. In the 1930's we developed the theory of the amphibious landing operation -- for the first time in the history of the art of warfare -- which was tested in battle training.

However, not enough attention was paid to the matter of building landing ships or to the organization of special amphibious forces. All of our fleets went into the war without a single specially built landing ship. Nor did the fleets have the number of surface gunfire support ships needed to support an assault landing. All this limited the Navy's capability to accomplish missions in support of ground forces, and it made for difficulties in carrying out seaborne assault landings, which experience showed to be necessary from the very first days of the Great Patriotic War.

Nurtured by the Communist Party and the Komsomol, naval personnel were distinguished by their high morale and fighting qualities. Their military comradeship, loyalty to duty and to the great revolutionary and military traditions, and dedication to their Motherland served as an example to many elements of our Armed Forces. As a whole, the state of combat readiness of the fleets was high on the eve of the war. Contributing to that was the system of putting our forces into a state of high combat readiness, which was organized and developed in peacetime. Fleet staffs watched attentively for changes in the situation on the seas in order to detect signs of impending war, a fact which permitted the fleets to carry out a number of measures of a defensive nature */ahead of time /*.
When the threat of immediate enemy attack appeared, every fleet went into a state of readiness and was able, as a result of these measures, to avoid the many serious consequences of a surprise enemy attack.

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THE SOVIET NAVY IN WORLD WAR II

Fascist Germany's treacherous attack on 22 June 1941 interrupted the peaceful labors of the Soviet people. A savage struggle, unparalleled in its scope, developed between the striking forces of imperialism and the first Socialist state.

The beginning of the war did not catch the Navy unawares. Despite the fact that many naval bases had been subjected to bombardment by enemy air forces in the first hours of the war, our Navy did not lose a single ship or aircraft to the enemy's first strike. The Hitlerites also failed to attain another objective -- they failed to plant magnetic mines in the areas of our bases to interdict the passage of our ships to the opean sea.

From the very first day of the war all the fleets went into action against a powerful enemy who availed himself of the support of three air armies and had a number of important strategic advantages, including surprise and the convenience of forming-up areas. Whereas each of our fleets could engage in combat operations only in its own theater, the enemy had the capability of executing a strategic maneuver with his naval forces between theaters, reinforcing those areas where the most important missions were being carried out, and setting up groupings that exceeded the Soviet fleet in quality and numbers.

For example, whereas at the beginning of the war the enemy in the Barents Sea area had eight torpedo boats, six submarines, and 35 escort ships and patrol boats, by 1943 a rather considerable fleet was concentrated here, consisting of two battleships, three cruisers, two coastal defense armorclads, 20 destroyers, 21 submarines, about 100 escort ships and minesweepers, 20 landing ships, and about 300 aircraft. In 1944 the number of operating submarines in this theater was increased to 34, and in 1945 it was further increased to 65.

During the height of the Battle of Leningrad, the German command concentrated a large grouping of surface ships in the Baltic Sea to destroy our fleet. A similar force, including battleships, was set up in the North, where the enemy did his utmost to cut off outside lines of sea communication. During the battles for Odessa and Sevastopol powerful groups of German bomber, minelaying and torpedo aircraft were transferred from the Mediterranean to Black Sea bases.

The capabilities of our Navy for intertheater maneuver were very limited. Although the Northern Sea Route permitted the transfer of a portion of the forces from the Pacific Fleet

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to the Arctic and back, this situation was limited to a period of from 2 to 3 months a year. Intertheater maneuver utilizing the internal waterways became completely impossible shortly after the outbreak of the war since the principal canals ran through the front lines of the ground forces. Shipment of small craft and small submarines by rail failed to satisfy requirements.

As the war expanded, conditions for basing fleets became progressively worse. Very soon, the Baltic Fleet could get support from the bases in a very limited area -- Kronshtadt and Leningrad -- and these were within enemy artillery range. The Black Sea Fleet had to be based at ports on the Caucasian coast which were not adapted for that function.

From the first day of the war and until the capitulation of Germany, the Soviet Navy was continuously involved in combat operations. The submarines conducted search and destroy operations against German warships and transports, and planted mines in the sea lanes. Naval aircraft and surface ships, especially torpedo boats, persistently sought out enemy ships and destroyed them at sea, along the coast, and at the enemy bases.

Surface ships and aircraft of the Black Sea Fleet carried out strikes against the naval base of Constanta and the oil fields of Romania. Aircraft of the Red Banner Baltic Fleet hit enemy airfields where preparations were being made for large-scale air raids on Leningrad. *In August 1941 Baltic Fleet aircraft struck Berlin -- the capital of Fascist Germany.* [[while the]] Aircraft, ships, and coastal artillery of the Northern Fleet struck the enemy communication centers in the Petsamo-Kirkenes region. The Danube Flotilla landed several assault groups on the fourth day of the war which then proceeded to capture the Romanian shores of the Danube for a distance of *over* 75 kilometers. This caused the enemy to assign a force of considerable size to fight the landing forces, thereby weakening the pressure on our forces along the direction of main effort, a fact of no small importance during that period of great difficulty for us. Ships of the Pinsk Naval Flotilla on the Western Bug River inflicted heavy losses upon the enemy.

The battle for the sea lines of communication required a tremendous amount of effort. In the course of the war, submarines, aircraft, torpedo boats, destroyers, and occasionally coastal artillery batteries destroyed enemy troop transports and freighters. This type of action was carried out in a systematic manner, and there was never a day when success in this type of mission was not reported. Even when the submarines of the Baltic Fleet had to negotiate the Gulf of Finland

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in order to get out to sea -- the Gulf was literally strewn with mines and overlapped with an abundance of antisubmarine barriers -- the enemy was constantly exposed to attacks by our fleet. The Northern Fleet [[had control over the only sea lane by which]] *delivered incessant strikes against German transports carrying* reinforcements [[were being brought up]] to the German ground forces in Norway and northern Finland and *carrying* nickel *ore*[[, shipped]] out of Petsamo.

Even Hitler had to recognize the effectiveness of the attacks by the Northern Fleet sailors on the German lines of communication. In his directive No. 36, dated 22 September 1941, he acknowledged that "enemy disruption of our coastal lines of communication in the Polar regions have reduced the possibility of realizing the plans of the alpine corps -- to reach Murmansk this year."[74]

The Black Sea Fleet also dealt the enemy heavy losses on his lines of communication.

A convincing picture of enemy losses due to Soviet Navy actions during the Great Patriotic War is obtained from Table 17, which was compiled from bilateral data confirmed, among others, by German sources. As we can see from the table our Navy inflicted very appreciable losses on the enemy in the course of the Great Patriotic War.

Destruction of sea transports had a substantial effect on the combat capability of the enemy forces. For example, one supply ship with a cargo of aviation bombs carried enough ammunition for 2,000 bomber aircraft sorties; one medium tanker provided enough fuel for 1,500 bombers or 5,000 fighter planes. By destroying about 1,300 enemy ships on the sea lanes, our Navy exerted no mean effect on the course of the armed struggle on the Soviet-German ground front where the outcome of the war was decided.

Military shipping and protection of this shipping were important elements in naval operations during the entire war. They assumed special importance after the enemy cut the Murmansk railroad line. On the Black Sea it was vitally important to maintain the shipment of supplies during the defense of Odessa, Sevastopol, and the northern part of the Caucasus, while conducting the Kerch-Feodosiya Landing Operation. On the Baltic, shipping was essential during the defense [[and evacuation]] of Tallin, Khanko, and the Moon Sound Islands *and evacuation of their defenders*; while reinforcing the troops at the Oranienbaum staging area; and in the

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Table 17 Shipping Losses Sustained by Germany and Her Allies as a Result of Soviet Naval Action

Type of Action	Number of Ships and Auxiliaries Sunk	Number of Transports Sunk	Total Displacement of Ships Sunk, Reg. Tons.
Aircraft	407/428	371/369	800296/870550
Submarines	33/54	157/165	462313/476100
Surface Ships	53/106	24/60	45197/138400
Mines	103/18	110/24	250101/58000
Coastal Artillery . . .	18/25	14/13	28646/19000
Total Losses Due to Military Action	614/631	676/631	1586553/1562050
Losses Due to Unknown and Other Causes .	94/2	115/3	251666/7800
Total Losses During the War	708/633	791/634	1838219/1569850

Note: The numerator indicates the number of ships and transports sunk (confirmed by both sides); the denominator indicates [[the]] *an additional* number of ships and transports sunk (sinking not yet confirmed by other than our own data).

subsequent liberation of the Baltic republics. The fleets and flotillas accomplished an extraordinarily difficult mission by providing shipping for troops and the national economy in the immediate areas of the front, especially across Lake Ladoga, when Leningrad was in very dire straits, as well as on the Volga.

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Over 100 million tons of different types of cargo, a good part of which was petroleum and petroleum products, were delivered via the sea lanes to all theaters of operation during the war. Naval forces shipped 17 million tons of cargo over the internal waterways. Behind these figures are thousands of voyages by ships and aircraft sorties, hundreds of armed encounters with surface ships and submarines, beating off attacks by enemy planes, and sailing through defense minefields.

In the years of the Great Patriotic War, the Navy fully discharged its duty to the nation. Our servicemen not only found the most proper tactical and operational solutions, but they also demonstrated their unquestioned superiority over the enemy in the art of employing new methods in warfare. The officers and men distinguished themselves by their [[mass]] heroism, firm determination and endurance on the defensive, daring on the offensive, and a high order of military skill which has enriched the Soviet art of naval warfare. Throughout the war our fleets not only gained abundant combat experience, but also developed what is essentially a new kind of tactics and the theory and practice of preparing for and conducting naval operations. At the same time, the continental character of the past war left its imprint on [[our]] *the Soviet* art of naval warfare.

The operations of our Navy against the enemy at sea constituted an important part of the war as a whole. However, the main effort of our Navy in the early days of the war was directed toward the more important missions of aiding the ground forces which bore the brunt of the task of defending the nation against the enemy and which, in the final analysis, determined the outcome of the war. In accomplishing the missions assigned to the Navy, it proved itself to be a powerful striking force, capable of quickly changing a situation in the coastal zone of operations of a land force, and thereby greatly facilitating conditions for the fulfillment of their operational and strategic tasks.

Through combined sea and air attacks against German forces pushing toward Murmansk, the Northern Fleet under Rear Admiral A. G. Golovko played an impressive role in stalling the German offensive on the right flank of the Soviet-German front through repeated seaborne assault landings, coastal operations by naval infantry, and by halting enemy shipping. Over 39,000 officers and men of the Northern Fleet were assigned to duty with the naval infantry.

Holding the ice-free port of Murmansk and the naval base at Polyarnoye was of great importance because it permitted the

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use throughout the war of the shortest sea route to our allies. This provided the Northern Fleet with an opportunity to defend its own lines of communication, to disrupt enemy shipping, and to assist ground force operations on the defensive and later on the offensive.

The Red Banner Baltic Fleet, commanded throughout the war by Vice Admiral V. F. Tributs, immobilized an enemy force of 100,000 men advancing on Leningrad jointly with the ground forces defending Liepaja, Tallin, the Moon Sound Islands, and the Khanko Naval Base.

The stubborn defense of Leningrad, especially in the early phases of the siege, was to a great extent determined by the vigorous actions of the Baltic Fleet, which ensured the holding, throughout the war, of the Oranienbaum staging area against which the Germans had committed vast forces. The Red Banner Baltic Fleet sent over 110,000 men and officers to fight on land. Baltic sailors fought in every one of the divisions defending Leningrad. The powerful long-range artillery of the Fleet served as a dependable fire shield and the basis for the defense of the near approaches to the "hero" city. Its fire-power was augmented by the unprecedented tenacity and irresistible attacks of the naval infantry.

We cannot overestimate the role of the Black Sea Fleet, headed by Vice Admiral F. S. Oktyabr'skiy, in the defense of the more important ports and in providing stability for the southern flank of the ground front.[75] The successful, prolonged resistance in the enemy deep rear of the Odessa defense zone, whose garrison consisted mainly of enlisted naval personnel led by the commanding officer of the naval base, Rear Admiral G. V. Zhukov, was possible only because of the continued assistance provided by the naval ships and by the uninterrupted delivery of all needed supplies to the besieged city. The heroic defense of Odessa, which for more than 2 months immobilized virtually the entire Romanian Army (which suffered very heavy losses), delayed the movement of the southern flank of Army Group South and seriously affected the strategic plans of the German High Command.

Because of the danger of losing the Crimean Peninsula and, therefore, the main base of the Black Sea Fleet, and because of the impossibility of simultaneously defending the Crimean Peninsula and the city of Odessa, on 30 September 1941 Supreme High Command Headquarters decided to evacuate the Odessa area and assign its troops to strengthen the defenses of the Crimean Peninsula.

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Carrying out the orders handed down by the High Command, the Black Sea Fleet proceeded to evacuate the troops defending Odessa to the Crimea, where they assisted in holding up the enemy advance on Perekop Isthmus, and then took part in the defense of Sevastopol.

The Fleet command was charged with directing the defense of both Odessa and Sevastopol, which, under the prevailing conditions, was the only proper decision. The Fleet prepared, organized, and ensured the defense of Sevastopol, which was under the direct command of the Commander in Chief of the Black Sea Fleet, Vice Admiral F. S. Oktyabr'skiy. The Fleet accomplished the mission assigned by Supreme Headquarters to the letter. The heroism manifested, which was unprecedented in history, and the duration of the defense of Sevastopol tied down the enemy grouping of 300,000 men for a period of 8 months and thereby prevented them from joining the offensive in the south. In addition, maintaining Sevastopol in our own hands prevented the enemy from using the sea route to the Sea of Azov to supply the Army Group South and kept the Fascist forces from breaking through to the ports of the North Caucasus.

A telegram from the Supreme High Command to the defenders of Sevastopol dated 12 June 1942 contained the following statement on the actions of the forces defending Sevastopol: "The unselfish struggle of the men of Sevastopol serves as an example of heroism for the entire Red Army and the Soviet people."

An announcement of the Soviet Information Bureau on 4 July 1942 in connection with the abandonment of Sevastopol stated: "The military and political significance of the defense of Sevastopol in the Great Patriotic War is tremendous. By pinning down a large force of German and Romanian troops, the defenders of the city threw the plans of the Germans into disarray and confused the command. The steadfastness of the defenders of Sevastopol was one of the more important reasons that the famous German 'spring offensive' failed. The Hitlerites lost their stride and time, and they suffered extremely heavy casualties.

"Sevastopol was abandoned by the Soviet forces, but the defense of Sevastopol will enter the pages of the history of the war as one of its brightest episodes. . . . The unbounded courage, the fury with which they fought the enemy, and the selflessness of the defenders of Sevastopol inspire the Soviet patriots to further heroic achievements in the struggle against the despised occupiers."

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Following the retreat of our forces from Sevastopol and the entire Crimean Peninsula, favorable conditions arose for an enemy breakthrough into the northern Caucasus, and this meant a real threat of a Fascist take-over of this very important region and a change in the military and political situation in the Black Sea theater because of the possibility that Turkey, which had thus far maintained a dilatory position, might enter the war against us. The existence of the Black Sea Fleet depended on our Army's holding the Caucasian coastline. But the stability of the land forces defending the coastal areas of the Caucasus could, in turn, only be ensured by the Fleet. And this mission was successfully accomplished by the Black Sea Fleet, which played an important role in the outcome of the battle for the Caucasus.

In his book The Battle for the Caucasus, Marshal of the Soviet Union A. A. Grechko writes: "In the defensive period of the battle for the Caucasus, of the nine defense operations carried out by Soviet forces between July and December 1942, the Black Sea Fleet and the Azov Flotilla took direct part in six of them. . . .

"The Black Sea Fleet and the Azov Flotilla, closely cooperating with the ground forces, rendered great assistance in the defense and in routing the Hitlerites in the Caucasus. . . .

"The Black Sea Fleet and the Azov Flotilla provided great support for the gound forces during the offensive period as well. Landings of naval infantry forces enabled these troops to breach the long-held enemy defenses. . . .

"The very important task assigned to the Black Sea Fleet during the battles for the Caucasus -- providing reliable support for our lines of communication along the Caucasian coast -- was carried out successfully. . . .

"The Caspian Flotilla ensured the defense of exceptionally important sea lanes. . . .

"The Black Sea Fleet and the Azov and Caspian flotillas carried out their assigned missions in the battles for the Caucasus in a creditable manner."[76]

During the war the Navy sent to the ground fronts over 400,000 enlisted men and officers who had graduated from the naval schools. They were used to form 40 naval infantry and Navy rifle brigades, 6 separate regiments, and a large number of separate battalions and detachments. These forces and units distinguished themselves by their excellent combat qualities, and for

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that reason were used by the Army command elements at the more responsible sectors of the front line. During the most intensive period of the battles for Moscow, eight Navy rifle brigades formed a part of the Western and Northwestern army groups.

In addition, units of the naval infantry that remained as part of the fleets and flotillas, about 100,000 men in all, conducted the land defense of the naval bases and islands, and they took part in numerous amphibious landings.

When the Soviet Armed Forces gained the strategic initiative, the main task of the Navy continued to be to provide support to coastal groupings and ground forces, although the nature of this support changed considerably. The scale of the operations increased and the conditons under which they were carried out became still more complicated due to the impossibility of using some of the base areas. Despite this, however, the fleets successfully accomplished all of their assigned missions.

Insofar as the Red Banner Baltic Fleet was concerned, this consisted in the participation of naval air elements, long-range artillery and naval infantry [[*brigades*]] in breaking the blockade of Leningrad; the transfer of large contingents of troops to the Oranienbaum staging area; making assault landings; providing artillery and air support for troops on shore; and increasing the scope of operations against the sea lines of communication for the purpose of destroying enemy troops evacuated by sea from Liepaja, Klaipeda, Schweinemuende, and other ports.

The Black Sea Fleet provided effective support to 18th Army of the North Caucasus Front in the fierce struggle for Novorossiysk, which the Hitlerites had converted into a powerful center of resistance -- the key position of the so-called Blue Defense Line, beyond which the Germans had taken shelter on the Taman' Peninsula.

The landing of a major amphibious force in a suburb of Novorossiysk in February 1943 concluded with the establishment of a beachhead in the enemy rear, which was designated Malaya Zemlya and which soon was converted into a legendary, inaccessible fortress.

L. I. Brezhnev, an active participant of the events described, called the landing of a force at Malaya Zemlya "a model of military art."[77]

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[[By virtue of a major operational assault landing, the Black Sea Fleet and the 18th Army of the North Caucasian Front laid the foundation for]] *In September 1943 troops of 18th Army liberated the port and city of Novorossiysk by swift attacks from the Malaya Zemlya beachhead and from the area of the cement plants, together with a new, daring force landed by the Black Sea Fleet directly in the port. This predetermined the rapid* elimination of the Taman enemy [[staging area]] *grouping and creation of conditions for the subsequent* [[ensured the]] forcing of Kerch Strait by our forces and seizure of the Crimean staging area. *The troops of 18th Army covered their colors with unfading glory in routing the enemy's Taman' staging area and conducting the Kerch-El'tigen amphibious landing operation, which marked the beginning of the liberation of the Crimea. To a significant extent, this was a glorious summarization of the titanic Party-political work performed among the troops by political entities headed by the Chief of the Army's political department, Leonid Il'ich Brezhnev.*

Subsequent Fleet operations resulted in cutting off the eva uation routes of the German forces out of the Crimea, and by carrying out a large number of amphibious landings it was possible to liberate the southern parts of our country, Bulgaria, and Romania much more quickly.

The Northern Fleet played a very important part in routing the enemy on the extreme right flank of the front and liberating the Pechenga region and northern Norway.

In the course of the defensive and offensive operations in the coastal areas, the Soviet Navy, using warships and vessels ill-suited for the purpose, landed *a total of* over 250,000 men with their equipment and weapons in seaborne assaults. This was the equivalent of about 30 divisions of troops. On the average, the Navy staged one assault landing every 2 weeks. At the same time, through its active operations it denied the Germans even one *major* assault landing on our coastline, despite the fact that they had specially built amphibious landing craft and the experience of successfully executed operations of this kind in the Western European theater.

The Pacific Fleet, commanded by Admiral I. S. Yumashev, with a number of offensive operations to his credit, the Northern Pacific Flotilla, commanded by Vice Admiral V. A. Andreyev, and the Amur Flotilla, commanded by Rear Admiral N. V. Antonov, played a very important part during August 1945 in the quick capture by our forces of Southern Sakhalin, the Kurile Islands, and the ports of Korea. In addition, they assisted our Soviet forces in their rapid penetration of Manchuria. As

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a result of the fast-moving landing operations by the Pacific Fleet, communications between the Kwangtung Army and the Japanese mainland were severed, and their envelopment successfully accomplished. The Azov, Ladoga, Onega, White Sea, Volga, Danube, and other flotillas scored outstanding successes in fighting the enemy on the interior seas, large rivers, and lakes. They provided direct, important aid to the ground troops both in defensive operations and during the offensive.

The White Sea Flotilla was involved in accomplishing missions associated with the functioning of sea routes in the Arctic regions and the passage of ships and convoys via the Northern Sea Route. The Caspian Flotilla reliably defended our principal petroleum shipping line across the Caspian Sea. The Ladoga Flotilla established the Road of Life, the only route which connected besieged Leningrad with the rest of the nation. The Danube Flotilla sailed more than 2,000 kilometers upstream on the Danube, frequently engaged in military action, and participated in the liberation of six European countries from the Fascists. In the course of the military operations the ships of this flotilla transported and ferried along the Danube a total of about 250 divisions [[of troops]]. Marshal of the Soviet Union V. I. Chuykov gave a very precise estimate of the activities of the Volga Flotilla in the Battle of Stalingrad, saying: "As for the part played by the men of that Flotilla and their achievements, I can only say that if it were not for them, the 62d Army would have perished without ammunition and supplies and would not have accomplished its mission."[78] During the grimmest period of the Great Patriotic War the men of the Pinsk Flotilla fought heroically, side by side with units of the Soviet Army. During the bloody defensive battles along river lines, that Flotilla's ships supported the ground troops and took part in the defense of Kiev. The Dnieper Flotilla, re-established in 1943, fought its way up the rivers and canals and ended its military trail on the River Spree in Berlin.

Thus, in the course of the war, the Navy successfully accomplished missions which were dictated by the requirements of warfare in the main theater where its outcome was being decided, i.e., on the Soviet-German front. The strategic utilization of naval forces was determined by the need for closely tying its operational plans in with those of armies and army groups, primarily in the interest of destroying the main enemy forces on land. The Soviet Navy made a noteworthy contribution to the victory over Fascist Germany and imperialist Japan. It destroyed enemy seapower on the Barents Sea, the Baltic Sea, and the Black Sea, providing stability for the strategic flanks of the ground front and all-around support for

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our troops on the defensive and during the offensive. During this most difficult of wars, the Navy vindicated the hopes placed on it, the great faith of the Soviet people, and it performed its duty to the nation.

The Great Patriotic War once again confirmed the correctness of the basic premise of our military doctrine to the effect that victory over a powerful enemy can be achieved only through the common effort of all branches of the military services. Experience has also demonstrated that in a war with a continental enemy a very important role devolves upon the Navy. Only through the coordinated efforts of all the services of the Armed Forces that are harmoniously developed, well trained, prudently deployed, and adequately supplied and supported is it possible to destroy the military might of an aggressor and achieve total victory.

From the very beginning of the war our Navy was faced with serious problems of a technical and strategic nature. Under the conditions of wartime stress it was necessary to correct, in a very short time frame, not only the shortcomings that were revealed in the course of the war, but also to solve many problems of a pressing nature associated with the conduct of military operations. And it should be recognized that the cadres of our Navy were equal to the requirements which the war imposed upon them. Improved methods were found for utilizing naval forces in operations involving support of ground forces on the defensive and the offensive as well. In essence, the Soviet school of amphibious operations was set up anew. The organization and methods of carrying out these landings were established, and ships not well adapted for such activities were used. Improved tactics for submarines and aircraft were developed, and many problems that arose in battle dealing with the defense of bases from the land side, the organization of cooperation between forces, exercising control over forces, and supporting their operations were resolved.

Soviet industry delivered sufficient amounts of essential military and technical equipment to satisfy the needs of the Navy. The question of replacing ship losses was very complicated owing to the loss of a number of shipbuilding facilties and the conversion of a considerable portion of the shipbuilding industry to the production of tanks and other equipment for the Army. Therefore, during the war only small warships and patrol boats were built. Despite these difficulties, the Navy was reinforced with 2 light cruisers, 19 destroyers, 38 minesweepers, 54 submarines, and about 900 various other small combatants during the course of the war. The quality of naval armament and combat equipment, including guns, torpedoes,

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hydroacoustic gear, and communications equipment improved greatly. Radar appeared aboard ships. Mines and minesweeper equipment, to the development of which such outstanding Soviet scientists as I. V. Kurchatov, A. P. Aleksandrov, and many others dedicated their talents, were changed owing to the introduction of influence mines. Naval aircraft, especially torpedo aircraft, were enhanced in numerical strength and in quality.

Thanks to the heroic efforts of the Soviet people, the Navy proved more powerful when the war ended than it was in the beginning. It was sufficiently combat effective and did not, by any means, lose its dominant position in any of its theaters. Of no small importance, also, was the experience gained by the personnel of the Navy in savage battles.

Thus, the Soviet Navy had to simultaneously accomplish two groups of missions during the war. First, we had to wage war at sea with a strong enemy who was stubbornly trying to seize the initiative and to destroy our Navy. Second, our Navy was supposed to stabilize the strategic flanks of the front and assist the ground forces on the defensive and the offensive. This method of utilizing the Navy in war was the only correct approach and it was in line with the situation. By simultaneously accomplishing both groups of missions, our Navy showed itself to be an active and powerful force, capable of dramatically changing the situation on the sea and in the coastal zone of ground force operations.

The desperate struggle that developed on the seas exceeded in scale and scope all predictions made before the war. The [[above]] figures *in Table 17* of enemy naval losses meant many thousands of voyages by ships and aircraft sorties, numerous battles and operations at sea, and they clearly demonstrate that the Soviet Navy was continuously in action against the enemy navy. This struggle, which continued day after day, required a tremendous amount of effort. It should be emphasized that our Navy usually operated in areas which were selected by the Soviet command, and they were not imposed by the enemy. Naval forces fought where they could inflict the greatest damage on the enemy and that was essential to the successful outcome of the battle.

Through its active and decisive operations, our Navy not only contributed to victory on the Soviet-German front, but provided support for the navies of our allies in the anti-Hitlerite coalition. Through strikes against bases, sea lines of communication, and enemy ships it made a sizeable contribution in the battles with enemy fleets on the ocean. As a result of our

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naval actions, the German command was not only forced to maintain considerable naval forces to combat our ships, but also to systematically reinforce them with ships and aircraft from the Atlantic, Mediterranean, and North Sea. Even during the most desperate period of the "Battle of the Atlantic," out of 141 German submarines in the combat zone or in readiness in bases in 1941-1944, about 30, or 20% of the total, were in action on the Black, Baltic, or Barents seas. The enemy air force in these theaters was greatly reinforced during periods of bitter fighting, oftentimes to 1,200 planes. No such mass employment of German aircraft was noted in other sea theaters following the Fascist attack upon the Soviet Union.

By its action the Soviet Navy contributed to the accomplishment by the Allies of their missions during the "Battle of the Atlantic" to which they ascribed great importance, although that sector could not exert a decisive effect on the outcome of the war. Even the German command did not consider it to be the main feature, according to Hitler's announcement in January 1943: "We should clearly understand that this submarine war will prove useless if we cannot defeat Russia in the East."[79]

It was for that reason that the United States and England were able, without any special interference from the enemy, who was using all his resources on the Soviet-German front, to build a huge new transport fleet during the war, a fleet that was double the losses suffered on the lines of communication. They were also able to develop a tremendous force for fighting German submarines, including 133 escort carriers, 1,500 destroyers, frigates, and corvettes, 1,900 submarine chasers, 1,000 minesweepers, and several thousand aircraft. Consequently, the fact that the Allies succeeded to some extent in winning the Battle of the Atlantic was due in no small measure to the services of the Soviet Army and Navy.

Correctly evaluating this situation, many American and Australian servicemen who corresponded with Soviet counterparts stated in their letters: "While we were building our forces for future battles you were fighting and dying."[80]

Thus, our Navy successfully executed every mission assigned to it under very dfficult circumstances during the war.

Transports and freighters of our transport and fishing fleets actively participated in the war at sea with the Navy. Transports and other ships made thousands of trips along interior and exterior lines of communication, constantly exposed to attack by enemy ships, aircraft, and submarines, and they participated in numerous seaborne assault landings. After

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appropriate refitting a considerable number of them accomplished combat missions in daily operations as part of the naval base ship inventory. An especially important task of the transport fleet was to carry cargo for the needs of the Armed Forces and the national economy.

Throughout the war the Soviet transport fleet, with a comparatively small number of ships, moved [[about]] *over* 100 million tons of cargo essential to the nation and the front lines.[81]

A portion of the ships from the transport fleet was turned over to the Navy. With the outbreak of hostilities, 32 transports that were in enemy ports were seized by the enemy. The rest carried out [[independent]] *selfless* missions of transporting essential cargo from the very outset. Our transports suffered great losses while sailing and engaging in loading and unloading operations in the war zone.

A portion of the war shipping losses was replaced by the United States through Lend-Lease. However, that could not radically improve the situation. Successes in shipping operations were achieved mainly through the superhuman effort, heroism, and courage of the sailors in the transport fleet, as well as through better organized security measures for shipping.

Concerning the heroism of the sailors, an article in the newspaper PRAVDA stated in 1942: "The Patriotic War of the Soviet people called for a military-like effort on the part of the transport fleet and the Soviet sailors. Very difficult circumstances arose for them from the very onset of the war. The enemy savagely attacked the Soviet ships. . . . Transport together with naval ships are fearlessly delivering military equipment, fuel, and food supplies to the valiant Soviet soldiers under enemy fire. The enemy has tried and continues to try to interfere with the foreign voyages of our ships. . . . Our sailors have passed the test in the fire of war. They have shown themselves to be courageous, worthy sons of our Motherland."[82]

Not only *by crossing* [[crossed]] the [[great]] Atlantic, but by [[supplying distant garrisons and]] sailing the Northern Sea Route, *Northern Fleet* sailors made some really heroic contributions to the history of the war. The enemy strove persistently to break our important northern line of communication, utilizing aircraft, submarines, and surface craft (including battleships) to that end. However, thanks to the courage and steadfastness of the Soviet sailors the Northern Sea Route reliably served the cause of our victory.

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The Baltic merchant ships also became involved in transporting military and civilian supplies from the very beginning of the war. Constantly exposed to enemy attack, they delivered necessary supplies to the coastal and island garrison in the Gulf of Riga and the Gulf of Finland, and they efficiently evacuated the populace and industrial equipment out of the threatened areas.

Transports and the naval ships protecting them sailed in areas that were heavily mined; they were subjected to constant enemy air attack as well as torpedo attacks launched by small enemy naval units. But even under those conditions the sailors of the transport fleet made their contribution to the 900-day defense of Leningrad, making important deliveries by sea to the various garrisons in the eastern part of the Gulf of Finland and across Lake Ladoga, the line justly called the Road of Life.

The sailors of the Azov-Black Sea basin were very sorely tested. Together with the Navy they kept open the sea lanes to the besieged cities and contributed much to make possible the 73-day defense of Odessa and the 250-day defense of Sevastopol, which were completely cut off from land.

In spite of the violent counteraction by the enemy, communications on the Black Sea, not only between Odessa and Sevastopol but along the Caucasian coastline as well, functioned effectively, which played an important part in the Battle for Novorossiysk and the Battle of the Caucasus. During the period from the beginning of the war to the end of 1942, by virtue of close cooperation between naval and merchant units about 1.5 million men and one million tons of general cargo were transported via the Black Sea lines of communication.[83]

Sailors of the transport and fishing fleets played a truly outstanding part in carrying out daring landings in the areas of Feodosiya, Kerch, Novorossiysk, building up assault landing force strength, and providing them with all necessities.

Sailors of the Caspian Sea transports also carried out their tasks in the war in a creditable manner. They provided continuous supplies to the Army and the nation of petroleum from the main reservoir of oil, the city of Baku. They accomplished the very difficult task of providing shipments, both military and civilian, through the Caspian Sea, including cargo from abroad routed through Iran from the Persian Gulf. The enemy strove to disrupt our lines of communication, especially in the more vulnerable areas, such as the Astrakhan roads, the Volga-Caspian Canal, and the Makhachkala region. However, the escort ships and the transports boldly engaged the enemy. In

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the second half of 1942, when the enemy temporarily succeeded in cutting our land communications with the Caucasus, the brunt of the work of supplying the troops operating there devolved upon the Merchant Marine and the Caspian Flotilla. As for the scale of the work performed by the sailors, we can judge merely by the fact that in August and September 1942 alone they transported from Astrakhan and Krasnovodsk to Makhachkala without loss some two infantry corps and one cavalry corps with all their equipment; these units played a most important part in the Battle of the Caucasus.[84]

The sailors of the Far East also made a noteworthy contribution to the cause of victory. Although their sailing areas were not military theaters of operations when the war started, in December 1941, however, they became quite dangerous owing to the war that had erupted between Japan and the United States and England. Frankly speaking, the naval forces of militarist Japan did not greatly trouble themselves to differentiate between ships encountered at sea -- whether enemy or neutral. Operating according to pirate rules, Japanese submarines and planes attacked Soviet transports. During the war the Far Eastern State Merchant Shipping Line lost 25 transports from those actions;[85] this represented about 30% of their original total.

No less heroic are the achievements during that threatening period of the sailors of the fishing fleet, a considerable portion of whom reinforced the ranks of the Navy. They courageously coped with the menace of mines and submarines, and they carried out other combat missions. Crews of fishing vessels, not infrequently exposed to enemy attack, courageously continued to catch fish and other products of the sea in order to supply the troops on the front lines and the workers in the rear areas.

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To ensure the accomplishment of military and political missions, nations have always striven to have armed forces, including a navy, and to maintain those forces on a modern basis. Within the armed forces of any nation the navy performs the important role of one of the instruments of a nation's peacetime policy, and it is a powerful means of militarily achieving political objectives during war. In this case, the policy which takes into account the need for a nation's seapower is an important factor determining the type of naval construction. Even a brief consideration of the matter of the role of navies in wars and in a nation's peacetime policy inevitably leads one to conclude that this component of a state's seapower

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has always played an important part. With the aid of navies, maritime states have attained important strategic objectives in wars, as well as in peacetime, using such navies as impressive arguments in quarrels with competitors.

The real contributions of navies in attaining the aims of a particular war have been determined by many conditions and factors, first of all by the nature of the war and the special features of the armed forces of the adversaries. In some instances the navies have had the dominant role in the war, and in other instances they were auxiliaries to the ground forces. As a whole, in the vast majority of cases, navies had made impressive contributions to attaining the objective of the war in which they were active participants.

At the same time, history offers examples of how a navy by its very presence or existence on one of the opposing sides has exerted a definite and sometimes very substantial influence on the outcome of an armed struggle in land theaters in which it posed merely a potential threat to the further continuance of the war or has changed the nature of the war in favor of the nation having the more powerful navy.

This tendency, characteristic of many wars, /found/ [[new]] *clear* manifestation during the period of imperialist wars, especially in the Sino-Japanese, Spanish-American, and Russo-Japanese wars, in which the navies played the decisive role in attaining the strategic objectives of the [[overall]] armed struggle. Later on, however, in both World War I and World War II the nature of the influence exerted by naval operations on the outcome of a war changed substantially.

With the aid of navies the armed forces of the opposing coalitions extended the war to practically every corner of the World Ocean, and imparted a virtually global character to it. Nations expended vast resources of material and manpower to build, develop and utilize navies in their sphere of operation. The war at sea was waged with exceptional violence, and abounded with critical situations, but nevertheless it was impossible to bring about an immediate, quick, decisive defeat of German Fascism. The heroic, selfless, and uncompromising struggle of the Soviet Army alone, which crushed the most powerful military ground force in the capitalist world, led the entire anti-Hitlerite coalition to the great victory.

In World War II the influence of the versatile, intensive activities of navies on the overall course of the war in the main theater was [[indirect and]] not manifested in warfare as it was in the past, *when results of a particular naval engagement had an immediate effect on the course of the war as a whole.*

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The results of naval operations, the most important of which was the battle for the lines of communication, could affect the course of the armed struggle on the main Soviet-German front only [[as]] *through* a partial weakening of Germany's economy due to losses at sea. The proportion of these losses vis-a-vis the total balance-sheet of the economic resources of practically all of Europe that were used by the Hitlerite command during the war was very small.

It was not until the final phase of the war, when the might of the German Fascist Army was undermined through the heroic efforts of the Soviet Armed Forces, that the navies of our former allies undertook a series of efforts to influence the course of war on the ground fronts *directly at a strategic level*. These consisted of the invasions of Sicily, the Italian mainland, and then Normandy. As a whole, these operations were successful. They definitely hastened the unconditional surrender of an already doomed German Army, [[but were begun]] *and appeared* only *as a secondary factor in the process of crushing Hitler's war machine* after the enemy had practically lost the capacity to effectively oppose the amphibious operations launched by the combined Allied fleets.

Quite different was the role of the navy in the case of those countries [[whose economies depended to a very great degree on]] *for which* sea communications[[, which in essence]] were vitally important arteries that fed their military potential and in the final analysis determined their military power. In the case of Great Britain, for example, where the Navy held the dominating position in the Armed Forces of that country, that nation's capacity not only to continue the war but to survive was to a large extent detemined by the results of naval operations. But [[this]] *the latter* did not become real until the main portion of the Fascist bloc's potential had been consumed on the Soviet-German front.

In other words, during the First and especially the Second World War, the navies of the capitalistic seapowers represented factors for ensuring the prolonged participation of those powers in a war to exhaust an enemy with large ground forces. The navies performed this function with the application of great effort, *sometimes creating* [[in oftentimes]] critical situations which threatened the [[armed forces]] *enemy* with [[a disastrous]] defeat.

In the course of two world wars navies have convincingly demonstrated that they had such qualities as powerful striking force and high mobility which enabled them to concentrate powerful forces in the various regions of the World Ocean for

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the purpose of accomplishing vitally important missions. They demonstrated their capacity to achieve important results in a short time and to substantially change the strategic situation in individual theaters of operations. At the same time, navies have demonstrated great capabilities in accomplishing multifaceted strategic tasks of an offensive type both in encounters with the enemy fleet and in operations against the shore.

Also typical is the successive redirection of a navy's main efforts away from the area of engaging the enemy fleet's strike forces to operations against his lines of communication, and later against the shore as well, procedures that were widely used in World War II. This tendency was dominant in the postwar period when the general trend of naval development consisted of developing forces and resources capable of exerting a direct effect not only on the course but also the outcome of a struggle on the ground fronts and not just in the sphere of direct encounters with the enemy fleet.

Analysis of today's alignment of forces in the international arena and of the markedly increased capabilities of modern navies to *employ strategic naval nuclear missile systems and to* decisively influence all fighting fronts provides a basis for stating that the importance of naval warfare has unquestionably increased, not just in absolute terms but in relative terms as well.

A powerful navy, as an indispensable component of the armed forces, has been necessary to our country -- a great continental and [[land]] *naval* power -- in every stage of its history.

The need for having a powerful Navy corresponding to the geographic position of our country and her political importance as a great world power has been obvious for a long time. However, this problem became especially acute in the postwar years when, as a result of changes in the alignment of forces in the world arena, the USSR and other Socialist countries found themselves surrounded by a hostile coalition of seapowers, a situation which raised the *serious* threat of nuclear attack from the *ocean and* the sea. Accordingly, the Central Committee of the Communist Party and the Soviet government, while pursuing the policy of peacefully coexisting with nations having different social systems and [[of]] *struggling for a reduction in strategic offensive weapons and for* avoiding another world war, is implementing Lenin's precepts for strengthening our nation's defenses and is manifesting an unflagging interest in [[steadily increasing the defensive power of the

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nation and]] strengthening [[her]] *the* Armed Forces, including the harmonious, balanced development of an ocean-going Navy in keeping with modern requirements and capable of resisting enemy intrigues and forcing a potential aggressor himself to cope with the problems which he seeks to impose on our country.

The concern of the Communist Party and the Soviet government for the valiant Armed Forces of the nation, including the Navy, is a pledge that the Soviet Union will continue to be not only the most powerful continental power, but also a mighty seapower, a faithful guardian of the peace on Earth.

Considerable changes have occurred in views on the role and place of warfare in ocean theaters, and consequently of navies within the system of the states' armed forces under present conditions, in connection with the creation of intercontinental missiles armed with nuclear warheads and of nuclear-powered submarines. New military shipbuilding tasks have arisen, the art of naval warfare has been developed further, and new forms of employment of naval forces have arisen.

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3. Marx, K. Das Kapital, Vol. III, [[1954]] *1955*, p. 345.

4. Lenin, V. I. Polnoye sobraniye sochineniy (Complete Collected Works), Vol. 30, p. 7.

5. Quotation from book: Mahan, A. T. Vliyaniye Morskoy Sily na Frantsuzskuyu Revolyutsiyu i Imperiyu (The Influence of Sea Power on the French Revolution and the French Empire), Vol. 2, Moscow-Leningrad, Voyenmorizdat Publishing House, 1940, p. 152.

6. *Cf: Istoriya SSSR (USSR History), Moscow, Nauka, 1966, Vol. I, pp. 306, 307.*

7. Sorokin, A. I. Russko-Yaponskaya Voyna 1904-1905 gg (The Russo-Japanese War, 1904-1905), Moscow, Military Publishing House, 1956, p. 19.

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8. Itogi Voyny. Otchet General-Ad'yutanta Kuropatkina (A Summarization of the War. A Report by General Kuropatkin), Vol. 4, Warsaw, Tipografiya okruzhnogo shtaba (District Staff Printing Office), 1906, p. 68.

9. Cf. Shatsillo, K. F. Russkiy Imperializm i Razvitiye Flota (Russian Imperialism and the Development of the Fleet), Moscow, Nauka Publishing House, 1968, p. 12.

10. Lenin, V. I. Polnoye sobraniye sochineniy (Complete Collected Works), Vol. 9, pp. 153, 154.

11. WASHINGTON POST, [[5 August]] *No. 5 [sic]* 1970.

[[*** In 1871 Russia succeeded in abrogating this humiliating interdict.]]

12. Quoted from KOMMUNIST, No. 7, 1978, p. 40.

13. Marx, K. Taynaya Diplomatiya XVIII v. (Secret Diplomacy of the 18th Century).

14. In the Chesma Operation the Turks lost all their ships -- 15 ships-of-the-line, 6 frigates, 50 other vessels, and 10,000 men.

15. Boyevaya Letopis' Russkogo Flota (Military Annals of the Russian Fleet), Moscow, Military Publishing House, 1948, p. 97.

16. Istoriya Russkoy Armii i Flota (History of the Russian Army and Navy), Vol. 9, Moscow, Moscow Obrazovaniye Book Publishing House, 1913, p. 57.

17. Admiral Ushakov's principal victories were won as follows: Fidonis Island -- 1788; Kerch Straits and Tendi -- 1790; Cape Kaliakra -- 1791; and the capture of Corfu in 1799. Admiral Nelson's victories occurred at later dates: St. Vincent -- 1797, Abukir Bay -- 1798, and Trafalgar in 1805.

18. Iz Pisem i Pokazaniy Dekabristov (From Letters and Depositions by Decembrists), Under the editorship of A. K. Borazdina, St. Petersburg, 1906, p. 61.

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19. Quotation from an article by G. Ye. Pavlova, Decembrist Nikolay Bestuzhev and his "History of the Russian Fleet." In the book, Bestuzhev, N. A. Opyt Istorii Rossiyskogo Flota (History of the Russian Fleet), Leningrad, State Publishing House of Literature for the Shipbuilding Industry, 1961, p. 9.

20. Marx, K., and F. Engels, Sochineniya (Works), 2d Edition, Vol. 11, p. 522.

21. Ibid, Vol. 22, p. 39.

22. Lenin, V. I., Polnoye sobraniye sochineniy (Complete Collected Works), Vol. 30, p. 164.

23. Cf. Istoriya voyenno-morskogo iskusstva (History of the Art of Naval Warfare), Moscow, Military Publishing House, [[1969]] *1967, p. 82.*

24. Lenin, V. I. Polnoye sobraniye sochineniy (Complete Collected Works), Vol. 10, p. 252.

25. This law envisaged a Baltic Fleet composition by 1924 of the following: 16 battleships, 8 armored cruisers, 18 cruisers, 72 destroyers, and 24 submarines.

26. Cf: Morskoy Atlas (Sea Atlas). Vol. 3, Part 1, p. 37.

27. Cf: Morskoy Atlas (Sea Atlas). Vol. 3, Part 1, pp. 41, 42.

28. Lenin, V. I. Polnoye sobraniye sochineniy (Complete Collected Works), Vol. 27, p. 1.

29. Lenin, V. I. Polnoye sobraniye sochineniy (Complete Collected Works), Vol. 30, p. 340.

30. Ibid., p. 241.

31. Cf. Istoriya Voyenno-Morskogo Iskusstva (The History of the Art of Naval Warfare), p. 117.

32. Lenin, V. I. Polnoye sobraniye sochineniy (Complete Collected Works), Vol. 34, p. 347.

33. According to this principle, England was supposed to maintain a level of power equivalent to that of the world's two strongest navies.

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34. The decisive step in this direction was the Anglo-German agreement of 1935, whereby Germany was authorized to rebuild her Navy to one-third the size of the British Navy.

35. Istoriya Vtoroy Mirovoy Voyny, (History of World War II), Vol. 1, Moscow, Military Publishing House, 1972, p. VIII, XI-XIII.

36. Churchill, W., Op. cit., Vol. [[III]] *IV*, p. 613.

37. Ibid., Vol. [[II]] *III*, p. 352.

38. Hattori, T., Yaponiya v Voyne 1941-1945 (Japan in the War 1941-1945), Moscow, Military Publishing House, 1973, pp. 293, 294.

39. KRASNYY FLOT (The Red Fleet), 27 June 1944.

40. Sovetsko-Frantsuzskiye Otnosheniya vo Vremya Velikoy Otechestvennoy voyny 1941-1945 (Soviet-French Relations during the Great Patriotic War of 1941-1945), Moscow, State Political Publishing House, 1959, p. 340.

41. Quotation from book by Yeremeyev, L. M., Glazami Druzey i Vragov (As Seen by Our Friends and Enemies), The Role of the Soviet Union in the Destruction of Fascist Germany, Moscow, Nauka Publishing House, 1966, p. 150.

[[** Grechko, A. A. Bitva za Kavkaz (The Battle for the Caucasus, 2d Edition, supplemented, Moscow, Military Publishing House, 1973, p. 456.]]

42. PRAVDA, 23 February 1978.

43. Roosevelt, E. Ego Glazami (As He Saw It), Moscow, Publishing House of Foreign Literature, 1947, p. 161.

44. Cf. Roskill, S. Flot i Voyna (The Fleet and War), Moscow, Military Publishing House, 1967, p. 510.

45. W. S. Churchill, The Second World War, V. II, "Their Finest Hours," Boston, 1949.

46. The President's War Addresses to the People and to the Congress *of* the [[NSA]] *USA*, Washington, 1945, p. 61.

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47. Istoriya Voyny na Tikhom Okeane (History of the War in the Pacific Ocean), Vol. IV, Moscow, Foreign Literature Publishing House, 1958, p. 16.

48. Nyurnbergskiy Protsess (The Nurnberg Trials), Collection of Materials, Vol. I., Moscow, Legal Literature, State Publishing House, 1952, p. 402.

49. *Cf:* Yeremeyev, L.M., and A. P. Shergin. Podvodnyye Lodki Inostrannykh Flotov vo Vtoroy Mirovoy Voyne (Submarines of Foreign Fleets during World War II), Moscow, Military Publishing House, 1962, p. 375.

50. *Cf:* Spravochnik Korabel'nogo Sostava Voyenno-Morskikh Flotov Mira, 1944 (Handbook of Ships of the World's Naval Fleets, 1944), Moscow-Leningrad, Naval Publishing House, 1945, p. 295.

51. *Cf:* Morskoy Atlas (Sea Atlas), Vol. III, Part 2,[[Naval General Staff, 1963,]] folio 48.

52. *Cf:* Smirnov, N. I. Tikhookeantsy v Voyne s Imperialisticheskoy Yaponiyey (The Pacific Fleet in the War with Imperialist Japan), MORSKOY SBORNIK, No. 8, 1970, p. 7.

53. Hattori, T. Yaponiya v Voyne, 1941-1945 (Japan in the War, 1941-1945), p. 573.

54. Yeremeyev, L. M., and A. P. Shergin, op. cit., pp. 66-69, 334.

55. *Cf:* Stepanov, M. Ye. Replacement of Naval and Merchant Fleet Losses during World War II, MORSKOY SBORNIK, No. 11, 1959, p. 84.

56. *Cf:* Stepanov, M. Ye. Replacement of Naval and Merchant Ships during World War II, MORSKOY SBORNIK, No. 11, 1959, p. 83.

57. Lenin, V. I. Polnoye sobraniye sochineniy (Complete Collected Works), Vol. 34, p. 390.

58. Lenin, V. I. Polnoye sobraniye sochineniy (Complete Collected Works), Vol. 35, p. 114.

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61. V. I. Lenin, Op. Cit., Vol. 50, p. 121.

62. Ibid., p. 167.

63. Ibid., p. 296.

64. Ibid., Vol. 36, p. 26.

65. Ibid., Vol. 41, p. 81.

66. Ibid., p. 121.

67. Ibid., p. 402.

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70. Frunze, M. V. O Molodezhi (The Young People), Moscow, "The Young Guard," 1937.

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72. KPSS v Rezolyutsiyakh i Resheniyakh s"yezdov, Konferentsiy i Plenumov Tsk (The CPSU Central Committee in Resolutions and Decisions of Congresses, Conferences, and Plenums of the Central Committee), 8th Edition, revised and supplemented, Vol. 2, Political Literature Publishing House, 1970, p. 265.

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84. *Cf:* Boyevoy Put' Sovetskogo Voyenno-Morskogo Flota (Campaign Record of the Soviet Navy), Moscow, Military Publishing House, 1974, p. 416.

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CHAPTER III
THE DEVELOPMENT OF NAVIES AFTER WORLD WAR II

The imperialist powers, with leadership of them seized by the United States, did not give up plans for crushing socialism and restoring their former undivided rule over the planet after World War II ended. In describing this period, Comrade L. I. Brezhnev wrote in his book entitled Vozrozhdeniye (The Rebirth): "The 'cold war' had begun. It set in for many long years, essentially for two decades. This was not the first and, unfortunately, not the last instance where the capitalist powers rested hopes on our difficulties and attempted to dictate their will to us and intervene in our internal affairs."[1]

Having unleashed the "cold war," the imperialists began an unchecked arms race and feverish preparations for a new world war against countries of the socialist community through an intensive investigation of ways for more effective development of their armed forces and methods of their employment and by attaching special importance to the Navy.

After the [[end of the]] Second World War, as, by the way, after all past wars, [[the views of]] the further development and build-up of naval forces were for a time determined [[on the basis]] *by views which arose as a result* of the analysis of acquired wartime experience, which recognized the growing role of aircraft carriers, submarines, and amphibious forces within the total concept of naval warfare. Moreover, the employment by Americans of the atom bomb in the latter stage of the war to a certain degree caused a state of shock among naval theoreticians and government circles in the traditional maritime states. In view of that, *a peculiar depression appeared in* naval construction *of some capitalist states* [[practically ceased]] for approximately ten years after the war.

In the military circles of that era there was widespread discussion regarding the influence of nuclear weaponry on the nature of armed combat in all spheres -- both on land and at sea. Many military experts were disturbed by questions of the stability of the navy under nuclear warfare conditions and the effect of nuclear weaponry on warship design, ship armament, their ability to absorb damage, and on their other tactical characteristics. Initially in many countries, including our own, the desire arose to look at that problem from its negative side, which frequently served as a basis for the voicing of extreme views which even went so far as to deny the possibility of naval operations when nuclear weapons are employed.

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The Americans even made about the same analysis with regard to the capabilities of land armies, and for a long time the question of the advisability of their existence within the composition of the armed forces never left the pages of the US military press. All of that took place when there were limited capabilities for employing atomic weapons, which only the United States had. At that time the United States had nuclear weaponry which was quite far from being perfected. The weaponry was an atom bomb which its sole carrier, the aircraft, could employ only at relatively short ranges to the target, after having practically penetrated the strongest air defense zone.

It should be stressed that the dissemination of views on the omnipotence of the atomic bomb was to a great extent fostered by intentionally exaggerated propaganda emanating from US imperialist circles in pursuit of the achievement of [[many]] *certain* political goals. Using every means at their disposal, they strove to elevate the atom bomb to the category of the solitary "absolute" weapon. Utilizing their monopoly on this means of combat, the American militarists attempted to intimidate the peoples of the world and strengthen US military superiority, which was looked on as the most important prerequisite for political leadership of the entire world. This was fostered by the widespread publicity given to the testing of nuclear weaponry, including those tests conducted on the Bikini Atoll in 1946 in order to determine the effects of the destructive factors on ships of various military designs.

Yet the capabilities of the American propaganda to inspire fears and foster agitation concerning the new weaponry turned out to be far from limitless. The unrestrained showering of praise on that weapon and the intentional exaggeration of its capabilites were transformed into a negation of it. The louder the propaganda on deterrence became, the more rapidly grew the circle of people capable of comprehending and revealing the capabilities of the new weapon. The voices of those trying to find the practical framework and conditions in which armed forces could operate on land and at sea and to determine the principles of employing not only nuclear, but also conventional means of combat in a real combat situation began to be heard more and more frequently and more and more loudly in many countries. Among those voices we would note the French Admiral P. Barjot, whose interesting book "The Navy in the Atomic Age" was published in 1956.[2] The book asserted that the testing of nuclear weaponry off Bikini Atoll had not led the navy into a blind alley, but just the opposite, had opened wide the doors to the high seas for them.

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The development of nuclear weaponry in the Soviet Union *fundamentally* altered the entire approach to the problem of nuclear war. It led to the liquidation of the so-called American monopoly on the new means of combat and to the dashing of their hopes for world supremacy. Many political and military leaders in the Western countries who had meekly followed the wake of the American propaganda began the agonizing quest for a way to realistically appraise the emerging relative strength of forces in the world. We may consider that from that moment a new stage began in the building of the armed forces of the leading countries in the world, which had recovered from the oppressive effects of the American publicity concerning their own absolute superiority. The role and position of the various branches of the armed forces in armed combat were reviewed, and new methods of delivering nuclear weaponry to the attack targets and means of protection from its damaging factors were sought out. As a realistic appraisal of the capabilities of that weaponry appeared, the general outlines of the armed forces capable of conducting combat operations under all possible conditions began to be more clearly delineated.

That process has been called the beginning of the military-technical revolution, since in its scale and depth it exceeded every reform and transformation which has occurred in the past in the armies and navies of the world. It forced a review not only of tactics, owing to the fundamental changes which the armed forces repeatedly underwent upon the appearance of new weaponry, but also a review of the many technical means of waging war. [[The effect of]] *A large part in accelerating* the process of technical change [[on]] *in* all [[facets]] *aspects* of military affairs [[also increased with]] *was played by* the employment of nuclear propulsion in [[naval shipbuilding]] *ships* and the outstanding discoveries in the fields of electronics and missile construction. The need arose for a fundamental transformation in the structure of the armed forces as a whole and each branch in particular, as well as in armament and control systems and in communications between the armies and the rear. This circumstance considerably altered the concept of balancing armed forces. Balanced forces were supposed to be capable of carrying out various combat missions with and without the employment of nuclear weaponry.

The Soviet Union could not be an exception in this quest; on the contrary, in the resolution of many questions it became the leader of those who soberly analyzed the capabilities of nuclear weaponry and its influence on the nature of warfare, the building of armed forces, and the development of modern

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military equipment. But at the same time in our military-scientific circles extreme views were voiced whose essence amounted to the denigration of the role of individual branches of the armed forces and armament systems. Even the Navy's capability to operate at sea and, consequently, the country's need for it, was denied. With the appearance of missile weaponry, the very same fate was predicted for aircraft. The misunderstanding of the nature of modern warfare and the [[influence]] *role* of nuclear-missile weaponry [[on]] *in* it as well as the blind admiration for the "omnipotence" of the atomic and hydrogen bombs /led to/ a striving [[toward]] *to follow the principle of* a one-sided development of armed forces. All of that produced a certain erosion in our military theory, but it also produced useful discussions among various categories of military experts.

To the honor of our military science, which cast subjectivism aside and firmly based itself on Marxist-Leninist teachings on war and the Army, it not only refuted those *erroneous* concepts [[which were not applicable to real life]], but also opened up paths for the [[rapid]] development of new views reflecting the actual alignment of forces in the world arena and fully responsive to modern trends in the development of armed forces.

THE MILITARY DOCTRINES OF THE UNITED STATES AND NATO

The great victory of the Soviet Union over the most powerful military machine in the capitalist world, Fascist Germany, and militarist Japan, considerably weakened the forces of world imperialism. Under those conditions the United States headed the imperialist camp in order to unite all anti-Communist forces in the struggle against the forces of Socialism [[which were getting stronger day by day. Practically immediately after the end of the Second World War the imperialists began to prepare for a new war against the countries of the Socialist community]].

In accordance with those plans, in 1949 the aggressive NATO military bloc was formed, which intially included 12, and later 15, capitalist states among which were such sea powers as the United States, Great Britain, France, Canada, Italy, Turkey, the FRG, Greece, Norway, and Denmark. Soon two more aggressive blocs, CENTO and SEATO,[3] were formed. In this connection, the United States, Great Britain, France, Australia,

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New Zealand, Pakistan, the Philippines, and Thailand were included in SEATO. All of those military blocs were oriented toward supporting the conducting of an expansionist policy by imperialism in the most important areas of the world.

In NATO the position of leadership was held by major sea powers, primarily the United States and Great Britain, whose total naval displacement after the Second World War was 10.5 million tons.[4] Although Denmark, Iceland, the FRG, Norway, Turkey, and Greece do not have strong navies, they occupy extremely favorable strategic positions in the sea theaters, so that NATO forms the western half of the ring around the USSR and can exercise constant control over the exits from the Baltic and Black seas. Italy also does not have a strong navy, yet her favorable position in the central part of the Mediterranean Sea is very convenient in the organization of the basing and support of US and NATO naval operations in that most important theater.

Thus, NATO is a union of maritime states and the possessor of powerful naval forces which occupy favorable strategic positions on the World Ocean.

The spheres of influence of other aggressive blocs also extend even to the Pacific Ocean. This makes it possible for the countries, the participants in NATO and other blocs, primarily the United States, to utilize numerous foreign military bases and offshore areas in the Eastern Hemisphere to threaten the USSR from the direction of the sea, and also to have prepared, favorably located, fortified positions and jump-off points for deploying in the shortest possible time the forces and equipment which they need in the ocean zones.

Moreover, the American military command ismaking every effort to intensively develop its own armed forces, which, backed by nuclear weaponry, are supposed to occupy a dominant position in the world, and to have unquestioned strategic superiority over the armed forces of the countries of the Socialist community. In this connection, constant and unremitting attention has been devoted to the development of naval forces. A considerable portion of the military appropriations are regularly spent for that purpose, permitting a rapid growth in the striking power of the US Navy. The oceans have been gradually transformed into areas for strategic weapon launching sites. The desire in all cases to resolve foreign political problems, backed by armed forces, has become the basic form of American imperialist activity, which, together with the development of the general crisis of capitalism, inevitably has led to the intensification of the militarization of those countries and of the arms race. The United

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States' military doctrine has been altered and developed in accordance with that policy and in the interest of supporting it.

The military doctrines of the other NATO countries stem from the doctrine of the United States, the leading state in that bloc. They have been developed on the basis of the concept of so-called mutual dependence, or military integration. /Moreover/ the growing desire of a majority of the states of the bloc to conduct a policy more independent of US policy and to create national military-strategic concepts is having a considerable influence on the formation of those doctrines. [[A definite role is also played by the fact that]] The strongest US partners are waging a struggle for key positions in that bloc, thereby achieving a more favorable resolution for themselves of the more important political problems in Europe.

Such traditional sea powers as Great Britain and France follow the United States in the development of their own naval forces and in their views of the combat employment of those forces. However, their economic capabilities permit them to build only limited strategic submarine nuclear-missile systems and carrier forces.

The navies of the other participants in the NATO bloc, including the FRG and Italy, are given an auxiliary rule under the "mutual dependence" concept. Their missions are limited mainly to cooperation with ground troops and protection of sea communications. Therefore it will be quite proper to concentrate our main attention on the analysis of the evolution of US military doctrine.

We may divide the development of that doctrine into three main stages which were brought about by the appearance of three main strategic concepts.

The first stage, encompassing the period from the late 1940's to the early 1960's, is characterized by the birth, development, and official adoption by the American leadership in 1953 of the so-called new course in US national policy known as the policy of "a position of strength" and the strategy of "massive retaliation."

The idea of a preventive nuclear war against the Soviet Union, which had arisen as early as when the decision was made to destroy Hiroshima and Nagasaki, received wide dissemination in the United States in that period. Such a barbaric demonstration of "absolute" weaponry was clearly in pursuit of

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political goals, and there was no military need for it. It was needed by the military-monopolistic circles who were striving to gain world supremacy and who hoped that that act "would make Russia more tractable in Europe." A highly accurate characterization of the nuclear bombing of the two Japanese cities was given by American Professor P. Blackett, who called it not so much the last military act of the Second World War as the first act of the "Cold War" against the Soviet Union.

President Truman, the leader of the new pretenders to world supremacy, most accurately demonstrated his intention to dictate his will to the world, including the Soviet Union. He stated: "Today the United States is the strongest power, there is no one stronger than she. . . . Possessing this strength, we must assume the responsibility and the leadership of the world."[5] Because the destruction of Hiroshima and Nagasaki had no effect on the policy of the Soviet Union, a wave of military hysteria was raised anew. Yet now not only was the reactionary press calling for a preventive war against the USSR, but also voices were being heard from the rostrums of Congress, saying that the United States "had the strength" and must "use it right now," while it had the monopoly on the atom bomb and an enormous Navy and Air Force. Not only the military, but even President Truman himself, "brandished" the atom bomb. Believing that the atom bomb was very suited to "oust the Russians from Europe," he made the decision to employ it in Europe in "extreme circumstances."

The idea of an American nuclear omnipotence was widespread in higher military circles. The terrifying destructive force of the atom bomb gave rise to the point of view that it would permit the United States to establish her own global police supervision and to foist an American-style peace on peoples.

Initially it was the Air Force whose role was strengthened as the main force in nuclear warfare, since one of its advantages was combat experience in employing nuclear bombs. The "overwhelming might" of American strategic aviation and the "invulnerability" of US territory to a retaliatory enemy attack were cited as other advantages.

The Pentagon counted on the fact that, with a considerable number of long-range bombers and also a /ring of air bases/ in direct proximity to the Soviet borders, the American nuclear forces would be in a position to break through the enemy air defense and to destroy all intended targets or an overwhelming majority of them.

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Based on those considerations, the US leadership sharply intensified its efforts to develop the Air Force and to expand its network of overseas bases.

In June 1948 the American Congress passed a bill expanding the strength of the Air Force to 70 wings, and in July the United States obtained the consent of the British Laborite Government to station 60 B-29 bombers with nuclear bombs aboard in that country. After the signing of the North Atlantic Pact in April 1949, all of Western Europe was tied to the American nuclear strategy. In the late 1960's the number of US military bases reached 3,400. The gaps in that network which ran through sea and ocean sectors were to be covered by the Navy. Multimillion-man armies ten times greater in strength than the armed forces of the allies in the main theaters during the Second World War were deployed in territories adjoining the borders of our country. All of that was done on the premise that US territory would, as before, remain outside the range of retaliatory attacks and thus not be a theater of military operations. In analyzing the significance of that treaty, the influential Congressman C. Cannon stressed that the signing of the NATO pact gave the United States the necessary bases and "now in order to deliver an attack on Moscow and on all the other Russian cities, we must have only the necessary number of aircraft suitable for transporting nuclear weaponry."

At the same time, influenced by the successes of the Soviet Union in developing atomic weaponry and an American loss of the "nuclear monopoly," the gaze of the American military leadership began to turn more and more frequently toward the Navy, which, as a potential platform for nuclear weaponry, was less dependent on the inhibiting influence of foreign political factors which arise one way or another when the question of basing aircraft in foreign territory comes up. "Nuclear power plus sea power will provide the kind of freedom of action for the country," wrote the journal MILITARY REVIEW, "with which it will easily be able to implement its God-given right to lead the entire world."

Thus, in American militarist circles the tendency more and more clearly emerged toward a partnership of the Navy with the Air Force in employing nuclear weapons in a future war. This was a direct result of tests of nuclear devices at Bikini Atoll, which had given rise to the doubts of the American military leadership as to the possibility of employing the Navy in nuclear warfare. Moreover, this was one of the manifestations of the intentions of the American imperialists to employ all the forces and equipment available to them in the total nuclear war for which they were preparing, to make

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all-out nuclear attacks against ground targets in [[our]] *the* territory *of the Soviet Union*, and to fully utilize an area of armed combat which was new for our country, the oceans, where at that time the United States had a decisive superiority in forces [[over our Navy]].

It should be noted that this change in the employment of navies by the imperialist countries was uniquely oriented in such a way that the entire strength of the American and British navies was aimed primarily against the shore. It was precisely this tendency in naval operations which was acknowledged to be the main one, [[and it was precisely it]] which served as the further basis for establishing strategic nuclear forces within the composition of the navy, giving rise to the beginning of the tendency displayed even today to strengthen the concentration of strategic nuclear weapons in the field of naval operations.

As the doubts about the possibilities of employing the Navy in a nuclear war were dispelled, the opposite concept now defining the Navy as the most important branch of the Armed Forces capable of prosecuting major strategic missions in a nuclear war and having a direct influence on the course and outcome of the war gained strength.

In the latter half of the 1950's, sharp and fundamental changes occurred in the views of the role and position of naval forces in a war and of the importance of oceanic theaters of military operations. Based on the alignment of forces in the international arena, and taking into account the limited capabilities of the Soviet Navy, the Americans made the traditional problem of protecting ocean communications, which had disturbed them for almost a century, a secondary matter. On the basis of a report by the special Poseidon Committee, in 1957 this problem was relegated to a secondary position. [[and]] The oceans were declared no longer an arena for the battle for communications, but, rather, vast launch areas for the launching of various strategic nuclear weapons carriers designed to destroy important ground targets located in enemy territory.

However, in the "massive retaliation" strategy, which was officially recognized in the West, the main stress was still on strategic air superiority, which at that time was considered in the United States to be the main means of delivering nuclear weapons to the target. This circumstance gave rise to the boastful statements by the commander of the US Air Force that in a future war the new types of weapons would make it possible to end the war so quickly that conventional guns or

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naval actions would not be needed. Nevertheless, this extreme point of view did not receive the support which the Air Force leaders and the military-industrial circles backing them had counted on. American imperialism, which for more than a century had used the Navy as the main instrument of its aggressive foreign policy, in line with the tradition which had emerged, was impressed by the concept of sea power which represented an indispensable means for achieving world supremacy.

The ideas of Admiral N. Nimitz, who proposed retaining the Navy's priority by uniting the Navy and Air Force and creating an "air-sea hybrid" in the form of attack carriers, were an attempt to eliminate this contradiction. This idea was greeted with approval and was adopted as the doctrinal thesis of the US imperialist policy of "from a position of strength." "The delivery of massive retaliatory nuclear attacks by aircraft from land airfields and aircraft carriers," wrote Finletter, "that is the essence of the new policy."[6]

The employment of those systems in warfare against the Soviet Union was based on the totally unfounded premise that US territory would be invulnerable to the agents of destruction existing at that time in the Soviet Union. On the basis of this, the "massive retaliation" strategy proposed waging only an all-out nuclear war against the Soviet Union and the other Socialist countries. In accordance with this strategy, the military-political leadership of the United States counted mainly on the development of nuclear weaponry and the means of delivering it, primarily strategic aviation and attack carriers, at the expense of conventional forms of armed forces, especially ground forces. With regard to that issue, General M. Taylor wrote: "From fiscal year 1955 through fiscal year 1959 funds were allocated in the following manner: about 46% to the Air Force; about 28% to the Navy and Marine Corps; and about 23% to the Army. . . . As for the most important part of the appropriations which went for the purchase of new weaponry, during that period the Air Force regularly received about 60% of the allocated funds, the Navy and Marine Corps, about 30%, and the Army, about 10%."[7]

In the 1950's the "massive retaliation" strategy became the official military strategy of NATO. However, in NATO it was transformed into the "Shield and Sword" strategy. In this connection, the role of the "sword" was supposed to be played by strategic aviation and US attack carriers, while the role of the "shield" was supposed to be played by the armed forces of the NATO member nations deployed in Europe. Like the US strategy, NATO military strategy assumed that the armed forces

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of that bloc should employ nuclear weaponry in every instance, regardless of whether the enemy did or did not. The possibility of waging limited warfare without the employment of nuclear weaponry against the Soviet Union in Europe was practically precluded. The possibility of waging limited wars was permitted only in the "less developed areas of the globe beyond the boundaries of Europe."

But soon the complete bankruptcy of the "massive retaliation" strategy was detected. The main reasons for its failure were the change in the relative strength of forces in the world arena, the growth of the military might of the Soviet Union, and above all the great successes in the development of strategic nuclear-missile weaponry, which not only made it impossible for the United States to achieve her goals using her former strategy, but also eliminated the former invulnerability of [[her]] *the* territory *of America*. In September 1963 the American journal ORDNANCE wrote: "Our loss of the nuclear monopoly and the onset of the situation of mutual deterrence between the United States and the Soviet Union has led to the fact that the strategy of 'massive nuclear retaliation,' as the overriding basis for US military policy, has been made obsolete. Another reason for the change in strategy was that we finally understood its unsuitability as a single 'big stick' for our foreign policy: The stick has turned out to be too big for many situations."[8]

In other words, the US military leadership came to the conclusion that, by counting only on strategic nuclear weapons in an all-out war, it would be unable to achieve its main military-political goals. US military doctrine has proved to be inflexible. Yet they were unable to renounce war as an instrument of policy; therefore in the early 1960's J. Kennedy's administration began a partial review of military strategy without, of course, altering the goals of US policy.

The second stage of the development of the American military doctrine began with that. The French journal REVUE DE DEFENSE NATIONALE in May 1964 defined the basic principles of the new US strategy in this manner:

"1. The United States is supposed to have and maintain unquestioned superiority over the Soviet Union in the field of strategic and tactical nuclear weaponry.

2. The United States should have sufficient means to successfully counter the enemy in any situation without the obligatory employment of weapons of mass destruction.

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3. The United States should, at her own discretion, define (depending on the nature and scale of the conflict) the scope and means for waging combat operations in order to eliminate any risk of an uncontrolled spread of the conflict."

In contrast to the former strategy, the new military strategy of "flexible response" called for the preparation for and conduct of both all-out nuclear warfare as well as limited wars against the Socialist countries [[including those in Europe]] both without and with the employment of nuclear weaponry. A flexible response to the emerging international situation and the readiness to employ military force in accordance with that situation was the main idea underlying the new US strategy. It was based on the need to prepare for and wage wars of any type -- all-out nuclear and limited wars with the employment of nuclear weaponry or only with conventional weaponry.

The United States believed that all-out nuclear warfare could begin in two ways: as a surprise nuclear attack or as a result of the development (escalation) of a limited war. In this connection, the implementation of a surprise nuclear attack and the unleashing of a preventive war against the USSR and other Socialist countries was brought to the fore. It was also envisioned that the preparation for the surprise attack would be conducted under the cover of propaganda depicting the United States as the defensive side, oriented toward the delivery of only a "retaliatory strike."

For limited warfare, the "two-and-one-half" variant was advanced according to which the United States proceeded from the possibility of simultaneously waging two limited wars, in Asia and Europe, and one small local war, primarily in Latin America. The concepts of "graduated deterrence" and "nuclear threshold" stemming from the "flexible response" strategy were advanced for waging war in Europe. According to the "graduated deterrence" concept, a limited war in Europe could begin with the employment of only conventional weaponry while allowing for the possible further development of the conflict. It was considered that the NATO Armed Forces would initially utilize only conventional weaponry, while, if the situation became complex and the threat of defeat arose, the employment of tactical nuclear weaponry to achieve the established goals was envisioned.

The development of the Armed Forces of the United States and of the other NATO countries proceeded in accordance with the "flexible response strategy." In this connection, the

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Americans disseminated among the European nation members of the bloc a new version of the principle of "mutual dependence" which consisted of the creation within the NATO framework of balanced armed forces, and, on that basis, determining the responsibility of each country for the development of those national armed forces needed to achieve the political goals of the United States. The United States, and partly Great Britain, assumed the task of developing strategic offensive forces. The remaining NATO countries were supposed to develop basically ground forces and relatively small air and naval forces. That kind of "mutual dependence" did not suit the European countries of NATO, primarily France and the FRG, which are pretenders to the leadership role in the bloc.

Moreover, realizing that the American strategic forces are primarily a means of achieving [[US]] national goals *of the US*, and not [[of meeting the needs]] of the European NATO countries, and that the Americans can even refuse to employ them in a military conflict if it does not involve the vital interests of the United States, the European NATO member nations lost confidence in the effectiveness of the US nuclear umbrella. Therefore, in 1966 France left the NATO military organization and independently began construction of national strategic nuclear forces. Other countries (West Germany and Great Britain) proposed the establishment of "European nuclear forces" of the bloc and demanded a lowering of the "nuclear threshold," i.e., the unlimited employment of nuclear weaponry from the very outbreak of war in Europe. That produced considerable disagreement within the NATO bloc due to the desire of the European member nations to free themselves from the US dictate to a certain degree. Yet they did not succeed in eliminating ruling status of the United States in the Western Bloc, because she possesses the main nuclear power of the bloc. The European and NATO countries depend on the United States not only in the area of strategic nuclear weaponry, but also for tactical nuclear weaponry. Operational-tactical missiles, nuclear artillery, and [[a large]] *the greater* part of the tactical aircraft of the European nations are obtained from the United States; the nuclear warheads for the ammunition are in the hands of the American command.

As in the strategy of "a massive retaliatory strike," /strategic means of destruction remain the basic ones/ in the "flexible response" strategy. However, whereas in the [[former]] *previous strategy*, strategic aviation and attack carriers comprise the foundation of those means, in the [[latter]] *new strategy*, the so-called invulnerable missile forces which include the MINUTEMAN missiles and the POLARIS submarine strategic system have become its foundation. In this

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connection, a large part of the US military leadership has a clear preference for nuclear-powered missile-armed submarines.

After adopting "invulnerable missile forces" as the basis of its strategic offensive forces, whose nucleus is the nuclear-powered missile-armed submarine with which it is proposed to create a "nuclear missile ring" around the Soviet Union, the US military command did not give up on the further development of an attack carrier fleet, which *up to that time had been* the "backbone" of their Navy. In the opinion of the American command, the attack carriers, together with tactical aircraft, should comprise the foundation of the striking power of the general-purpose forces.

The recognition in the "flexible response" strategy of the possibility of waging limited wars against the countries of the Socialist Community provided the American command with the basis for concluding that aircraft carriers with the air power carried aboard them are of greater significance in various armed conflicts than they had previously been. In speaking of this, US Chief of Naval Operations Admiral MacDonald asserted: "Our high-speed attack carrier forces together with their mobile logistical support give the United States the capability of having military bases beyond the limits of the mainland."[9]

The third stage in the development of US military doctrine began in 1971 with the proclamation of the "Nixon Doctrine" and the development of the military strategy of "realistic deterrence" based on it. The new strategy called for the achievement of class goals through the common struggle of imperialism against world Socialism and the national-liberation movement by /implementing/ a policy of "deterrence" backed primarily by the military might of the United States and also her allies in military blocs. On the whole, the new strategy is a modernized "flexible response" strategy, and the changes introduced into it do not affect the principles of US military strategy, its anti-Communist and anti-Soviet bent, the views of the probable types of wars, and of their sociopolitical nature.

The need to review the "flexible response" strategy was brought about by the fact that it did not fully correspond to the emerging military-political and strategic situation in the world in the early 1970's and to the principles of national policy and US strategy set forth in the "Nixon Doctrine." The basic principles proclaimed in the "Nixon Doctrine" are: the principles of strength, of partnership, and of negotiation. The principle of strength remains the main principle which

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calls for military superiority by the United States and her allies with respect to the USSR and to the Socialist Community as a whole as a most important condition for implementing the "deterrence" policy in mutual relations with them.

The principle of partnership lies in the maximum utilization of the military, economic, and financial resources of allied and dependent countries in order to preserve the political influence and position of the United States in the world. It is assumed that the implementation of that principle will permit a reduction in the direct participation of American troops in local wars. According to the Pentagon's calculations, the pay of an Allied soldier is several times lower than that for a US military serviceman.

The principle of negotiation is given a subordinate role, since it is believed that the United States can conduct negotiations with the Soviet Union and other countries only when backed by her own military strength and the resources of her allies.

Being forced to hold talks with the Soviet Union on limiting strategic arms, the United States stubbornly attempts to "seek its own advantage to the disadvantage of others,"10 despite the principle of equality and equal security recognized by both parties.

The essence of the strategy of "realistic deterrence" lies in the desire to resolve international problems backed by one's own strength, while utilizing to the maximum degree the men and material resources of the countries allied with the United States, for which purpose it is essential to increase their military strength and increase their role and responsibility for preparing for and waging war.

The new strategy, like the former strategy, is based on the possibility of waging both local wars as well as all-out nuclear war. However, the "realistic deterrence" strategy lays a great deal of stress on "partnership" -- a more active employment of partners in the aggressive blocs to carry out the military-political plans of the United States, including the accomplishment of tasks in combating national-liberation movements using the "Vietnamization" method.

The new strategy and the strategic concept stemming from it are determining the direction of the development of the Armed Forces of the United States and of her allies, the ratio between various components of those forces, and criteria for determining force levels. In accordance with that, they call

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for a sharp qualitative improvement in the armed forces, especially in strategic weapons and general-purpose factors; the achievement of technical superiority over the Soviet Union, especially in the area of the development and production of strategic nuclear-missile weaponry; an increase in the strategic mobility of the American general-purpose armed forces; and an increase in the combat might of the armed forces of the US allies.

The maintenance and support of "sufficient" strategic nuclear might as the basis of the "nuclear deterrent" will remain the main task in the development of the US Armed Forces over the next decade. The concept of [[sufficiency]] *"sufficient" strategic might*, according to American strategists, means the assured *possibility of* destruction of the military potential, human resources, and economic potential of the enemy even in the event of a retaliatory nuclear attack which is unfavorable to the United States, and also the ability to maintain her ability to fight in any situation.

The United States presently is working at a forced pace to create a neutron weapon. It is clear from open sources that the Americans already have tested the neutron bomb. The creation by the United States of this new kind of weapon for mass destruction of life marks the next leap in qualitative improvement of nuclear weapons. The consequences of this leap are obvious. Above all, it means a nuclear weapons race and new problems of antimissile defense. This has also brought about the more characteristic traits of the modern stage of the strategic arms race in the United States, that is the qualitative development of weaponry and the replacement of outmoded systems with new, more improved systems.

With regard to the employment of general-purpose forces, the "realistic deterrence" strategy calls for the renunciation of the "two-and-one-half war" concept and the adoption of the "war-and-a-half" concept. The essence of this concept lies in the fact that the United States must maintain general-purpose forces in peacetime which together with the forces of her allies would be capable of simultaneously successfully waging a large war in Europe or Asia and participating in a small conflict in any part of the world.

An important role in the new strategy is being given to the "strategic mobility" of the US Armed Forces which assumes the capability to rapidly transport and deploy them in *overseas* theaters of military operations in order to reinforce existing forces there or to create new groupings. The need for "strategic mobility" stems from the global nature of the

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military-political aspirations of the United States, and *its existence* is [[considered]] a most important condition for implementing the "realistic deterrent" strategy. Particular attention is being devoted to improving the mobility of airborne and air-mobile troops and of the Marines and, in that connection, to the development of transport aircraft and the construction of general-purpose landing ships.

In developing military strategy and military policy in the 1970's, the American leaders have put special stress on the so-called oceanic strategy as an important integral part of the strategy of "realistic deterrence." Its essence lies in shifting the main strength of the strategic offensive forces to the expanses of the World Ocean. To that end, the main efforts are being concentrated on /developing general-purpose naval forces, on increasing the relative weight of the nuclear-powered missile-armed submarines within the composition of the strategic offensive forces,/ and on employing naval power as the main means of military support for the political course of American imperialism, which, in the final analysis, is supposed to ensure sea control in a war.

The bases for the advisability of shifting to the "oceanic strategy" are as follows:

--Strategic nuclear offensive weaponry located at sea permits the creation of a dispersed system of arms capable of supporting the delivery of nuclear strikes against the territory of the countries of the Socialist Community from practically all directions;

--The shifting of the launching of ICBM's to the ocean permits the removal from US territory of ground installations for those missiles, which, according to the Pentagon, sharply reduces the number of objectives which could become targets for enemy missiles and, consequently, considerably reduces the number of nuclear attacks which could be delivered directly against US territory;

--Submarine nuclear-missile weapons systems possess greater viability, concealability, and mobility than similar systems located on land;

--The stationing of the main part of the strategic forces at sea leads to a considerable dispersion of enemy nuclear-missile attacks over vast areas of the ocean; considering the comparatively low vulnerability of missile-armed submarines and the complexity of detecting

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them before the first strike, one can assume that a considerable part of the nuclear-missile strength of the enemy will be wasted to no purpose, while the main part of the nuclear-missile strength of the US strategic forces will be preserved.

It is planned to employ the TRIDENT-/class/ quiet-running nuclear-powered submarines of an improved design as the missile platform. We shall say more about this submarine below. The POLARIS-POSEIDON submarine strategic nuclear-missile system will remain in the inventory of the strategic naval forces.

In addition to those strategic forces, the "oceanic strategy" calls for the employment of major general-purpose naval forces "to control strategically important areas." [[New]] *Other* multi-purpose ships, called "sea control ships" by the Americans, are supposed to occupy the main position in those forces *along with aircraft carriers*.

Proponents of the "oceanic strategy" believe that naval forces having in their inventory effective strategic weapons in nuclear-powered missile-armed submarines and multi-purpose aircraft carriers, a modern general-purpose surface and submarine fleet, a large naval air and Marine arm, and possessing such qualities as maneuverability and relative invulnerability, are the most promising and versatile branches of the armed forces to achieve the goals advanced by the "Nixon Doctrine." It is also believed that the "oceanic strategy" provides the necessary flexibility in employing military might in keeping with the current situation in the world, the capabilities of the United States, and the principles of the "realistic deterrence" strategy.

An analysis of the basic prerequisites for the "oceanic strategy" and of the practical measures of the American military command in the area of building and employing armed forces attests to the fact that the main goals of the strategy are the strengthening of the military-strategic position of the United States and supporting those global positions with the aid of naval forces. These ideas are not new. They are borrowed from the ideologists of American expansionism of the late 19th and early 20th centuries, [[particularly]] *primarily* A. Mahan, and modernized as applied to the imperialist policy of the United States conducted under current conditions.

A review of the content of the military doctrines of the imperialist states shows that all of them, regardless of their aims, are directed against the world Socialist system, and their primary task is the saving of capitalism which is doomed by history.

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According to the theories of the ideologists of imperialism, the sole means for saving capitalism is military strength. In their opinion, at the present time this strength can only be nuclear strike forces which, in the postwar period, became the main argument of the aggressive military doctrines of the main imperialist countries. The navy is playing an ever growing role among those forces.

In the opinion of the American military and political leaders, the advantage of naval forces lies in the fact that naval strike forces can be quickly moved in a timely manner (prior to making political decisions) to so-called areas of unrest and can be kept there for a prolonged period of time at a high level of combat readiness to prosecute missions on any scale. In examining the advantages of the navy in carrying out the strategic plans of the Pentagon, former US Secretary of Defense Laird in particular said in his report on the military program for 1972 through 1976: "In certain situations, a timely reaction or presence will have considerably greater significance than major forces which could be deployed, let's say, within 60 to 90 days."

According to an estimate by *former* US Chief of Naval Operations Admiral Zumwalt, "Naval forces, including amphibious forces aboard ship, are the only forces which can be quickly and effectively brought to bear reagardless of the presence of forward bases, the presence of the right of aircraft overflight over any territory or the right to land in one area or another, and also regardless of the other types of support which would require the authorization of the governments of the given territories to employ them."

The plans, construction programs, and practical measures being conducted by the military-political leadership in the United States attest to the fact that the United States, as in the past, intends to intensify the development of her nuclear-missile potential and the striking power of her naval forces, and to improve the combat and mobilization readiness of all types of naval forces.

[[In the next few years]] The *US* naval command [[plans to accelerate the accomplishment]] *actually has begun implementation* of future plans for building new strategic weapon systems and for modernizing weaponry, which had been delayed in connection with the vast US expenditures to support the war in Southeast Asia.

It is no secret that these military preparations are directed against the peaceloving states, primarily against the countries of the Socialist Community. [[This]] *The* continuing

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nuclear arms race again and again confirms the evident truth that so long as imperialism exists, so long as it increases its military might, a real possibility of *its* unleashing a war remains. Therefore, the Communist Party of the Soviet Union "regards the safeguarding of the Socialist Motherland and the strengthening of the defense of the USSR and the might of the Soviet Armed Forces . . . as the most important function of the Socialist state."[11]

This line was fixed by law in Chapter 5 of the new USSR Constitution, where articles 31 and 32 state: "The defense of the Socialist homeland is among the most important functions of the state and is a cause of the whole people. . . . The state ensures national security and defense and provides the USSR Armed Forces with everything necessary."

THE DEVELOPMENT OF THE NAVIES OF THE IMPERIALIST STATES

In the postwar years, the navies of the imperialist states were steadily being developed and improved. The United States attached particularly great significance to the development of naval forces. Thus, according to a report by US Secretary of Defense Schlesinger to Congress in 1974, US naval expenditures were about one-third of the total US appropriations for all branches of the Armed Forces. Since fiscal year 1971/72, US naval forces have been in first place with respect to appropriations, receiving 23.7 billion dollars, i.e., 34% of all funds allocated for the three branches of the Armed Forces. It should be noted that the trend toward increasing the appropriations allocated for building the US Navy *is preserved* at the present time. Thus, [[in 1972/73, the Navy received 25.4 billion dollars (36%),]] in *FY* 1973/74 the Navy received [[27.6]] *26.8* billion dollars (37%), [[and]] in 1974/75 it [[was scheduled to receive 29.6 billion dollars (37%)]] *received 27.9 billion dollars (37%), in 1975/76 it received 31.5 billion dollars (37%), in 1976/77 it received 36.5 billion dollars (38%), and 39.6 billion dollars (39%) were appropriated for 1977/78.*

Speaking in February 1974 before the Armed Services Committee of the American Congress, *former* US Secretary of the Navy J. Warner defined the goals, as he expressed it, of the "maritime policy" of his country. In his words, this is the "preservation of strong sea-based strategic nuclear-missile deterrent forces and the capability to ensure freedom of sea communications in areas vitally important to US national

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interests, including the well-rounded capability to influence events in the terminal areas of sea communications routes to the point of conducting offensive operations and landing amphibious forces where it appears necessary."

In developing and substantiating this idea. Warner stated that "Never before in US history has the maintenance of strong naval forces and Marines capable of ensuring the complete achievement of the goals . . . of maritime policy been so important as today. . . . During the lifetime of our generation, the dependence (of the United States -- the author) on the sea has expanded and has been extended to our economic security. For example, today the United States in whole or in part imports 69 of 72 materials which are extremely important for industry, and more than 99% of the bulk of these materials is delivered by sea. . . . Today the ability to ensure the security of the sea lanes has become doubly important."

In justifying the draft of the US Navy's 1978 budget before the US Senate, US Chief of Naval Operations Admiral D. Holloway declared that US national security is inconceivable without preservation of sea supremacy by the United States and its allies and that the US naval forces represent the main force needed for attaining and maintaining sea supremacy, and the main force on which the nation relies.

In the postwar years great changes occurred in the strength and the qualitative composition of the navies of the imperialist states.

As can be seen [[(see)] *from the data in* Table 18, battleships and escort carriers, which in the early postwar years represented a rather large group, have practically been eliminated from the naval inventories.

The inventory of attack carriers has been changed qualitatively and quantitatively. The approximately 50% reduction in the number of carriers has been compensated for by a considerable improvement in their tactical [[characteristics]] *capabilities* as a result of new scientific achievements in shipbuilding, [[the]] *their* conversion to *use of* jet aircraft, and the transformation of the carriers into floating bases for nuclear weapons platforms. The reduction in the number of battleships and carriers also entailed a corresponding sharp reduction in the number of cruisers armed with guns, and also in destroyers, frigates, and escort ships.

But the degree of transformation which the navies have undergone cannot be measured by that alone. The main point

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Table 18 Changes in the Inventories of the Navies of the USA, England, France, Canada, Italy, FRG, Japan, and Australia

Ship Types	1945	1949	1960	1970	*1978*
Battleships	48	29	9	4	*4*[1]
Attack (Multipurpose) Carriers	42	60	24	19	*20*
ASW Carriers	--	--	19	8	*4*[1]
Escort Carriers	117	68	22	--	--
Attack Submarines	781	266	263	196	*185*[2]
Missile-Armed Submarines	--	--	5	45	*49*
Cruisers	161	121	58	16	*40*[3]
Destroyers [[escorts]] *and* Frigates	2023	1053	1059	715	*391*
Standardized Landing Ships	--	--	--	--	*3*
Amphibious Assault Ships	--	--	6	10	*9*
Amphibious Transport Docks	--	--	--	12	*19*
[[LSTs]]					

1. *In reserve.*
2. Of these [[69]] *78* are nuclear-powered.
3. *Including 20 US frigates reclassified as cruisers.*

lies in the fact that they have acquired a qualitatively new strategic weapon -- nuclear-powered missile-armed submarines. Because of that, naval capabilities for conducting operations against the shore and for having a direct effect on the course of a present-day nuclear war have increased many times over.

The development of the American Armed Forces in the post-war period has been determined by a series of different strategies, yet the naval forces of the United States and NATO have invariably remained a most important integral part of their armed forces regardless of the [[changes in]] *nature of* those strategies. Unremitting attention has been devoted to their development, and the discussions of the advisability of

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building a navy which arose in other countries after the appearance of [[atomic]] *nuclear* weaponry did not reach the official stage in the United States and did not extend beyond the realm of private opinions of individual authors.

The development of the navies of the United States and other NATO countries in the initial postwar years followed a trend which was characteristic of the Second World War. The main mission was to ensure the security of the sea lanes connecting the trans-Atlantic war arsenal with the groupings of armed forces deployed in the main, European theater, and aimed against the Soviet Union. Another mission which also emerged was associated with amphibious operations of various scales in a war primarily against the Socialist and developing countries.

Later, after the American and later the British and French navies were equipped with strategic nuclear weaponry, the determining factor in the development of those navies was /their/ capability to prosecute strategic missions involving the destruction of important ground targets located deep in the territories of the countries of the Socialist Community.

The navies of the United States, Great Britain, and France have now already been developed as a branch of the armed forces capable of having a decisive effect on the course of a worldwide nuclear war. The new strategic qualities which naval forces have acquired have determined their main purpose as a means for operating against land. Those same qualities have produced one of the basic trends in the development of armed forces in the West: The steady shifting of greater and greater parts of the strategic nuclear-missile potential to the naval forces' sphere. In the late 1960's and early 1970's that trend [[ultimately]] led to the proclamation of a military doctrine oriented for the first time toward the priority development of the Navy and which found expression in the "oceanic strategy."

As we /have said/ above, until 1957 aircraft were the main means for delivering nuclear weaponry. That is why at that time particular attention was devoted to the all-around development of strategic and carrier aircraft and attack carriers, which became the main striking force of the American Navy.

After 1957, when the Soviet Union demonstrated remarkable achievements in the area of missilery, missiles began to be employed with increasing confidence as nuclear weapons carriers on land and at sea. At the same time that did not

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affect the role of aircraft carriers within the armament system of the Anglo-American navies. At the present time, these ships comprise the foundation of the seapower of the US Navy despite the ever-growing threat from improving *antiship* missile weaponry.

The construction of new aircraft carriers in the United States had already begun within seven years after the end of the Second World War. The FORRESTAL-Class carriers were the first series of those ships. They had a displacement of 78,000 tons, and each of them carried more than 80 aircraft. In addition, construction was completed on the MIDWAY and ORISKANY-Class aircraft carriers which had been designed during the war, having a displacement of 43,000 to 62,000 tons and each carrying up to 80 aircraft.

In the early 1960's the US Navy had 17 attack carriers: one nuclear-powered ENTERPRISE-Class carrier;[12] six FORRESTAL-Class carriers; three MIDWAY-Class carriers; and seven ORISKANY-Class carriers. Up to 1970 the Americans had kept their inventory of attack carrier forces at about that same level.

The attack carriers are consolidated in forces which operate in the Atlantic and Pacific oceans and also in the Mediterranean Sea. They have a strong defense against submarines and aircraft extending several hundred kilometers in depth. The attack carrier forces conduct intensive training for delivering nuclear attacks against ground targets and cooperating with their own ground forces.

In the early 1970's, the US Naval Command reviewed a future program for the construction of a general-purpose naval force in order to bring it in line with the requirements of the new strategy. Significant changes were made in the program directed at further improving the combat capabilities of those naval forces, primarily the carrier and antisubmarine forces.

The US Congress passed a law in 1975 whereby large American surface warships had to be built only with nuclear propulsion plants. The administration, however, retained the right to make necessary adjustments as dictated by national interests.

The attack carrier forces, which are the main means of attck by the Navy in local wars and are a highly trained reserve for the strategic strike forces in an all-out nuclear war, remain now as before the main element of the general-purpose naval forces.

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At the present time, the US Navy has [[14]] *15*[13] attack *(multi-purpose)* carriers, including [[two]] *three* nuclear-powered attack carriers *(the ENTERPRISE and two of the NIMITZ Class*[14]*)*, in its inventory. There [[are two]] *is one* more nuclear-powered NIMITZ-Class carrier under construction.

To support the combat operations of the nuclear-powered carriers, series construction is underway *in the US* on nuclear-powered guided-missile [[frigates]] *cruisers*, taking into account that [[no less than]] *up to* four nuclear-powered screening ships are needed for each nuclear-powered aircraft carrier. Already today the United States has [[three]] *eight* nuclear-powered screening ships at her disposal[[, and five more nuclear-powered frigates are in various stages of construction]].

Along with the construction of new aircraft carriers, work is also being done on upgrading the armament and equipment of older ships. *At the beginning of the eighties the Americans plan to begin modernizing all carriers of postwar design with the aim of extending their service life to 45 years or more.* Exceptional attention is being given to qualitative improvement in the aircraft inventory of aircraft carriers, both with regard to the steady improvement in aircraft added to the inventory, as well as with regard to the building of aircraft with improved performance characteristics and more powerful weaponry, including missile weaponry.

In addition to the United States, France has two multi-purpose aircraft carriers[[, and Great Britain has one]]. There is a total of up to 1,500 aircraft aboard [[those ships]] *NATO carriers.*

The development of the attack carrier forces is proceeding along a path toward transforming them into multi-purpose carrier forces whose main function [[in the next few years may be shifted]] *is shifting* to the field of accomplishing missions covering vast areas of the sea and ocean theaters. The Americans[[, in particular, have already begun]] *are completing the* equipping *of* attack carriers so that they can be employed in a multi-purpose attack/ASW mode.

In the quest for means to expand naval capabilities to gain control of the sea, the United States and other NATO countries, in addition to the construction of multi-purpose air-capable ships, are expanding construction of nuclear-powered [[guided-missile]] *multi-purpose* submarines, and missile-armed ships and patrol boats, including hydrofoils and

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air-cushion vehicles. The aircraft and helicopters of the [[Naval Air arm]] *Navy* are armed with "air-to-ship" type missiles.

[[The multi-purpose air-capable ships, called "Sea Control Ships" in the United States, are designed to provide antiair and antisubmarine defense for forces of ships, landing detachments, and convoys in transit, and also for air support of amphibious landings. VTOL aircraft and heavy multi-purpose helicopters will be based aboard those ships (with a displacement of about 14,000 tons and a speed of about 30 knots).]]

[[In fiscal year 1974/75 the US Navy requested funds for the construction of the lead ship of that design, and the Americans intend to build eight such ships by 1980.]] Great Britain [[has also begun]] *began* construction of multi-purpose air-capable ships [[similar to those of the Americans]] in [[June]] 1973, *when an* [[the]] INVINCIBLE-*Class ship* [[the first such ship,]] was laid down *(with a displacement of 20,000 tons and a speed of 30 knots).*

The US Navy also planned to begin construction of such ships in 1975, but their construction was postponed until the eighties. Several designs for ships with displacements from 8,000 to 40,000 tons are being developed.

France, [[and]] Japan, *and Italy* also plan to build [[similar]] *air-capable* ships.

The establishment of defensive forces for aircraft carriers and convoys, which include guided-missile cruisers, destroyers, [[antisubmarine escort ships,]] and frigates, has been and continues to be an important trend in the development of the American Navy. In [[the]] early [[1970's]] *1978*, the US Navy had [[253]] *193* such ships and there were a total of [[523]] *474* such ships in the NATO countries.

In the postwar period, the American Navy attached great significance to submarine forces, primarily nuclear weapons platforms. The first nuclear-powered submarine NAUTILUS, which was armed with torpedoes and was the prototype multi-purpose submarine, was commissioned in 1954. Within three years the United States began the construction of nuclear-powered missile-armed submarines designed to deliver attacks with ballistic missiles against ground targets in the territories of the countries of the Socialist Community. In late 1960, the first nuclear-powered missile-armed submarine, GEORGE WASHINGTON, armed with 16 POLARIS missiles, set out on combat patrol.

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In developing submarine strategic nuclear forces, the US military-political leaders proceeded from the fact that the development of sea-based systems is one of the main means of improving the combat effectiveness of offensive strategic forces. It was precisely for that reason that in 1961 the Kennedy Administration took measures to push the POLARIS program, *which concluded in 1967 with the construction of 41 nuclear-powered submarines: five of the GEORGE WASHINGTON-Class, five of the ETHAN ALLEN-Class, nine of the LAFAYETTE-Class, and 22 of the MADISON-Class.*

[[On the whole,]] The US submarine strategic nuclear system *also* includes [[41 nuclear-powered missile-armed submarines armed with POLARIS and POSEIDON missiles,]] tenders and fixed bases, the LORAN radio navigational system, and the TRANSIT space navigational system.

[[In 1967]] The United States [[concluded the POLARIS program and immediately]] began to modernize the POLARIS *system even while deploying it* -- to backfit the POLARIS A-1 submarines with POLARIS A-3 missiles. *This was completed in 1967.*

In 1965, in order to further improve the combat effectiveness of the strategic missile forces, the Johnson Administration adopted the POSEIDON program [[scheduled for the period from 1970 through 1976]]. That program called for the development of the new POSEIDON C-3 missiles with MIRV-type multiple warheads, (in each warhead there are ten *independently targetable* nuclear charges with a yield of 50,000 tons each) and the conversion of 31 nuclear-powered strategic submarines *of the LAFAYETTE and MADISON classes to this missile.* [[The POSEIDON program]] *This* was the main link in a chain of measures aimed at improving the American strategic forces.

[[The POLARIS-POSEIDON system is the most important part of the US nuclear forces and is the main strategic striking force of the Navy. However, the aircraft carriers continue to be an indispensable part of the forces intended for operation in nuclear and local wars.]]

By [[early 1975, the POSEIDON missile system was already equipped with 20 submarines. After the entire program is implemented (by 1977), it is planned to have]] *the end of 1977 the backfitting under the POSEIDON program was completed. There are* 31 nuclear-powered strategic submarines equipped with POSEIDON C-3 missiles, and ten *nuclear-powered strategic* submarines *armed with the* POLARIS A-3 missiles[15] in the inventory of the strategic offensive forces of the American Navy. [[The capability of the missile-armed submarines in]] The number of

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nuclear warheads [[they can deliver]] *that can be delivered* in a single salvo has increased more than threefold since 1970 and exceeds the number of warheads contained in a single salvo of [[MINUTEMAN]] *ground-based* missiles by a factor of 2.5.

The [[development]] *number* of strategic missiles and the increase in the proportion of naval missiles [[planned by the American command]] is shown *by the data* in Table 19.

Table 19 [[Planned]] Number of US Missiles Nuclear Charges for [[1977]] *1978*

Missile Type	No of Missiles	No of Warheads	No of Warheads in Air Force and Navy (%)	Total Megatonnage
Air Force Missiles				
TITAN-2	54	54		540
MINUTEMAN-2	*450*	*450*	} *28*	*900*
MINUTEMAN-3	*550*	*1650*		*280*
*Naval Missiles**				
POLARIS A-3	160	480	} *72*	*96*
POSEIDON C-3	496	4960		248
TOTAL....	1710	*7594*	100	*2061*

Thus, the POLARIS-POSEIDON submarine nuclear-missile system is becoming the main component of the strategic nuclear forces of the United States and NATO. It is envisioned that its importance within the overall strategic arms system will increase.

In 1968 the Americans adopted the TRIDENT protram, which called for the development of a new generation of nuclear-powered missile-armed submarines armed with 24 ballistic missiles with a range up to 12,000 kilometers.[16] The missiles will be equipped with an improved [[MIRV-type]] warhead. On the basis of an analysis of ten years of employing a submarine nuclear-missile system, the US military leaders came to the conclusion that [[that system]] *it* has great advantages over land-based missiles and aircraft. [[It is no accident that the assumption of power by the Nixon Administration in the

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United States was marked by the setting of a course toward the further strengthening of the nuclear-missile capability of the US naval forces. The concept of redeploying the main weapon in the strategic arsenal of the country at sea and the further development of a missile-armed Navy underlies the "oceanic strategy."]]

The development and combat [[development]] *deployment* of the TRIDENT system currently has the status of a priority program for developing the strategic offensive forces [[of the United States. In late 1971 the decision was made to accelerate the period for deploying the TRIDENT system and to commission the lead missile-armed submarine not in 1980, as previously planned, but rather in 1978]]. It was announced that the US Department of Defense had decided to build the first series of *seven* nuclear-powered [[missile-armed]] submarines of the TRIDENT system *by 1986* [[in series of ten units, which would replace the GEORGE WASHINGTON and ETHAN ALLEN-class submarines armed with POLARIS A-3 missiles. It is envisioned that the TRIDENT SYSTEM will also replace the POSEIDON system]]. *It is planned to turn over the lead submarine, named the OHIO, to the Navy at the end of 1980.*

Implementation of a program to backfit 12 POSEIDON missile strategic submarines of the MADISON-Class with TRIDENT-1 missiles by 1982 has begun along with construction of OHIO-Class submarines. Submarines with the POLARIS A-3 missiles gradually will be placed into reserve.

The United States lately has attached special importance to developing standardized cruise missiles for the Navy, suitable for employment from submarine torpedo tubes as well as from surface ships and flying craft. The US Navy has accepted into the inventory the HARPOON antiship cruise missile with a flight range of 110-130 kilometers, and it is being introduced in a number of other NATO countries. Work is underway to improve it.

The Americans also are forcing the development of the TOMAHAWK cruise missile in strategic (with a range of 2400-3200 kilometers) and tactical (480-560 kilometers) versions.[17] *It can be launched from submarines, surface ships, aircraft, or ground-based launchers.*

The strategic missile is intended for the destruction of ground facilities with a well-developed air defense system, and the tactical missile is for combating large surface ships.

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Great Britain, France, Italy, and other countries also are working on the development of cruise missiles.

[[The US military-political leaders, in striving to achieve a considerable advantage over the USSR in sea-based strategic missile forces, made a decision on the need to develop strategic cruise missiles with a range of about 3,000 kilometers, which are designed as the armament for nuclear-powered missile-armed submarines.]]

On 20 June 1972, while appearing before the Senate Armed Services Committee to justify the program for building strategic forces, then US Secretary of Defense Melvin Laird stated: "Work on the cruise missile system for submarines is needed in order to provide the United States with the opportunity of making a future decision on additional American forces, if this turns out to be necessary. The appropriations which we propose would permit making an accelerated study of the 'cruise missile and submarine' system and initiating the development of important tactical components such as the engine and control system. . . ."

The US military-political leadership is [[now]] evaluating the development of the cruise missile [[for submarines]] as the fourth element of the US strategic offensive forces.[18] In President Nixon's budget message to Congress published on 29 January 1973, it says in particular: ". . . We will maintain our current strength in order to guarantee the viability of our deterrent forces. . . . We will: 1) continue to build the TRIDENT sea-based ballistic missile system; 2) continue work on the latest B-1 manned strategic bomber; 3) continue the transition of the ballistic missile forces to the MINUTEMAN-3 and POSEIDON systems; and 4) we will initiate work on the development of a strategic cruise missile for submarines."

The Carter Administration basically accepted this program for the development of strategic weapons and is pushing its fulfillment.

In the 1960's France and Great Britain followed the Americans and began to build nuclear-powered submarines.

The construction of the first British nuclear-powered submarine DREADNOUGHT was completed in 1963.

By the end of [[1974]] *1978* Great Britain *and France* had four nuclear-powered strategic submarines *each* and France had [[three, with]] two more under construction.[[[12] France intends to build a sixth missile-armed submarine.]]

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Thus, at the present time the nuclear-powered missile-armed submarines constitute the foundation of the strategic nuclear forces of Great Britain, and are also the most important component of the national nuclear forces of France.

The building of attack, or, as they are called, multipurpose nuclear-powered submarines armed with torpedoes and antisubmarine rockets, is an independent trend in the development of US submarine forces. *The HARPOON antiship cruise missiles have begun to come into their inventory, and the TOMAHAWK cruise missiles are being prepared for the future.* Those [[ships]] *submarines* are [[mainly]] designed for antisubmarine warfare *and for combating surface ships.*

[[In 1974]] *By 1978*, the NATO country navies had [[69]] *78* nuclear-powered, and [[more than 100]] *up to 140* diesel multipurpose submarines. Their number is steadily growing.

[[The Americans have also begun to develop a "subsurface-to-surface"-type tactical missle. Part of the LOS ANGELES-Class nuclear-powered attack submarines, which are under construction, and all future nuclear-powered attack submarines, are scheduled to be armed with that missile. A similar missile is being developed for the French and British navies.]]

Amphibious forces intended for landing operations have undergone considerable development in the American Navy. The basic requirement for those forces is to provide the rapid movement of troops and equipment via the seas and oceans and the rapid landing of them on an unimproved shore under strong opposition from the shore and at sea.

In the postwar period fundamentally new landing ships were built in the United States. They include amphibious assault ships, [[and]] amphibious transport docks, *and general-purpose landing ships.* The latter have a displacement of [[about 14,000]] *up to 40,000* tons and carry [[6 to 12]] *up to 30* transport helicopters and *up to 15* landing craft in the docking well space. The US landing ships are capable altogether of embarking a force of Marines of about 50,000 men with their equipment, transporting them by sea, and landing them on an unimproved shore. The combat operations of those ships are supported by the necessary screening and support forces. Major contingents of Marines, whose strength approaches 200,000 men, are also included in the composition of the US Navy.

From what has been said it is evident that the main mission of the modern navies of the Western powers is to operate against hostile territory. At the same time the naval forces

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of the United States and NATO have great capabilities for warfare against a fleet, above all for antisubmarine warfare.

The development of antisubmarine forces is being carried out mainly by increasing the number of nuclear-powered and diesel attack submarines,[19] renovating the ship inventory of the ASW forces, bringing new ASW aircraft and helicopters into the inventory, equipping ships and aircraft with the latest ASW weaponry, and building fixed long-range sonar detection systems.

The United States has already begun the series construction of the LOS ANGELES-Class nuclear-powered multipurpose submarines (it is planned to build more than 40 submarines of this class), [[and]] SPRUANCE-Class [[large antisubmarine ships]] *destroyers* ([[construction of]] 30 ships [[of this class has been approved]]), [[it is completing the construction of 46 KNOX-Class escort ships,]] *OLIVER H. PERRY-Class guided missile frigates (74 ships)*, and has begun equipping ASW ships with new [[manned]] antisubmarine helicopters, which considerably improve detection and antisubmarine defense capabilities beyond the operating range of ship radar and sonar systems.

All [[frigates]] *cruisers*, destroyers, and [[escort ships]] *frigates* under construction in the United States and NATO countries will have antisubmarine rocket systems and [[manned]] helicopters in their armament.

The rate of the scientific-research and experimental-design work in developing new classes of ASW ships, weapons, and equipment is increasing.

On the whole, the combat capabilities of the navies of the United States and NATO will increase considerably [[in the latter half of the 1970's]]*by the early 1980's*. The ships, aircraft and helicopters, and combat equipment and weaponry in the military inventory will be qualitatively upgraded and expanded.

In order to strengthen the firepower of the navy's surface forces and expand its combat capabilities, the naval commands of the United States and NATO have begun to carry out measures to [[develop]] *install* antiship-type shipboard guided-missile weapons systems [[and to equip]] *in* ships under construction and ships in service [[with them. In the United States a program for building 50 guided-missile escort ships with the HARPOON missile system (with a range of more than 100 kilometers) has been approved. The decision has been made to install this system on all frigates and destroyers under construction]].

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In the latter half of the [[1970's]] *1980's* the United States intends to begin construction of guided-missile air-cushion ships with a displacement of 3,000 to 5,000 tons and a speed of about 100 knots. Without exception, almost all of the leading seapowers have begun *large*-series construction of guided-missile patrol boats[[, including hydrofoil and air-cushion patrol craft]].

The radical changes in naval armament and the new alignment of forces on the World Ocean have produced changes in the views of the British and Americans as to the role of navies in a future war, and of the priority and importance of the missions being carried out by them. Missions entailing the destruction of land targets and submarines have been pushed to the fore[[, while such a traditional mission as protection of one's own ocean communications was made a secondary mission beginning in about 1957]]. An important factor bringing about this orientation is that the traditional Anglo-American enemies, Germany, Italy, and Japan, do not have forces capable of operating on the ocean, as a result of their defeat in the Second World War. Moreover, West Germany and Italy have become US allies in the aggressive NATO military bloc. The Soviet Navy, on the other hand, as they believed at that time, could not represent any sort of substantial threat to the shipping of the United States to the countries of the aggressive bloc. At that time, in the opinion of the Anglo-Americans, the development of the navy as a "means of deterrence" was more rational. A report by one of the House of Representatives committees on civil defense published on 1 July 1960 gives a rather complete idea of what essence the American military leaders impart to the concept of "deterrence." In this report it was asserted that if the American Navy did not have its own mission of destroying the enemy's strategic forces before they could be employed against the United States, then the construction of naval strategic weapons systems "would inevitably lose a considerable part of its attractiveness to the American people."

In expressing the hopes of the Pentagon which were aroused by this statement, the journal AIR FORCE MAGAZINE (No. 9, 1960) called it the most long-awaited official acknowledgement that the enemy would now take into consideration only one type of "deterrent"--the ability of the American Navy to deliver the first strike. This idea was expressed in an even more concrete form by R. Strausz-Hupe, W. Kintner, and S. Possony in the book "The New American Strategy" [A Forward Strategy for America], published in 1961 in the United States. They straightforwardly wrote that the United States could not renounce the fact that it would resport to the use of nuclear weapons first.

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Responding to questions by the Socialist Democratic Party of Germany weekly VORWAERTS, Comrade L. I. Brezhnev said: ". . . Too often we hear judgements from the other side concerning a readiness to deliver 'powerful, destructive, preemptive strikes,' and so forth . . .

"With regard to the Soviet Union, I repeat that it does not think 'about delivering the first strike.' To the contrary, our official proposal to all participants of the pan-European conference, including the United States, is well known -- to sign an agreement not to be the first to use nuclear weapons against each other. It is also generally known that the NATO countries reject this proposal, giving to understand rather transparently that they do not wish to part with plans for delivering the first strike against our country."[20]

As is seen from this and a multitude of other *facts and* assertions, the concept of "deterrence" and its frequently employed synonyms mean nothing other than maintaining a constant readiness to immediately and unexpectedly employ nuclear weaponry against the most important strategic objectives in the countries of the Socialist Community. This mission is considered to be the main mission for the strategic forces among which naval forces play an important role. [[Guided by this,]] The military-political leadership of the United States and [[Great Britain]] *other leading NATO countries* look on the Navy as a means possessing a high survivability and great versatility in carrying out missions in a worldwide nuclear war. The Navy is also given an important role in local wars. With a strong Marine Corps, the Navy has a certain independence in land operations, especially in wars against small nations and weakly developed countries.

The brief description given above of the process of the development of the naval forces of the United States and of the other NATO countries shows that today they are one of the most important strategic factors in modern warfare. They should be regarded as a highly mobile force possessing high survivability, and which is capable of operating undetected and of accomplishing major missions [[involving force]].

THE DEVELOPMENT OF THE SOVIET NAVY

In the postwar years, the imperialists, having unleashed the "cold war" against the community of Socialist countries, expanded their [[furious]] preparations for a new world war. The threat to the security of our country from seaward clearly became increasingly more imminent. [[In the face of such a

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threat,]] Could the Soviet Union [[agree to eternal control of the seas and oceans by the Western seapowers,]] *reconcile itself with such a threat,* especially under conditions when vast areas of the ocean were becoming launching pads for nuclear-missile weaponry? Of course not[[!]]. Under those conditions the one solution to the problem of our country's security could be only to create a situation posing the militarist circles of the West with the very same problems which they were trying to foist upon us. Primarily it was essential to force the Pentagon to recognize that the ocean, which previously had protected the American continent from retaliatory attacks by the victims of aggression, had completely lost its former role of protective barrier, and that, in the event of the unleashing of a war by American imperialism, it would find itself faced with the terrible threat of retaliatory punishing attacks for its aggression. And it was precisely that path which was chosen by the CPSU and which the development of our Armed Forces has followed.

The postwar development of the Soviet Navy can be divided into two stages.

In the first stage, which covered the first decade after the war, ships and aircraft armed with conventional guns, torpedoes, and bombs were built. The building of the Navy mainly followed the path of establishing squadrons of surface ships. The Navy continued to be [[a]] defensive [[factor]] on the operational-strategic plane. As in the past, it was a Navy concerned with coastal operations, capable of conducting operations only within the framework of achieving the goals of major front operations. The views of the purpose of the Navy and of its missions at that time had been formulated under the influence of the experience in the Second World War and of the victory over a strong continental enemy.

It should be noted that in the first decade after the war, especially early in it, when decisions were being made on building the Navy, there were no real technical capabilities to build fundamentally new forces. We still had no nuclear weaponry, and the first models of missiles were only being designed.

In 1947 the Soviet government stated that the atom bomb was no longer a secret. Yet whereas at first the American leadership tried to ignore that statement, in September 1949 it was shaken by the single fact of the undoubted recording of the first nuclear explosion carried out in the Soviet Union. "With one blow," write the prominent American military theoreticians Mills, Mansfield, and Stein, "the entire military-political

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situation has been transformed. . . . The potential capability to totally destroy the enemy, which we more and more habitually regarded as our main instrument of military power, had now lost its unilateralism which had attracted us. The entire equilibrium in world policy had undergone sharp and terrible changes. . . . This was a crisis -- an intellectual, moral, and technical crisis -- which far exceeded ordinary crises in international relations."[21]

Major efforts to build a powerful oceangoing nuclear-missile Navy were begun in our country around the mid-1950's in accordance with a decision by the CPSU Central committee. This began the second stage in the development of the Soviet Navy.

The decision of the Central Committee of the Communist Party was based on a profound knowledge of the characteristics of the technical progress, which by that time was assuming the form of a scientific-technical revolution, departing from many of the traditional paths in the development of technology. That, in turn, opened up the possibility of developing fundamentally new ships, weapon systems, and naval equipment.

The most important factor to be considered was a strict calculation of the following: the alignment of forces in the world arena, the strategic situation which had emerged in the oceanic theaters with the formation of the aggressive blocs and with the unrestrained growth of imperialist seaborne nuclear weaponry, the prospects for the development of naval equipment and weaponry, as well as the economic capabilities of the country. [[In that connection, all the latest achievements in science, technology, and production were utilized in the course of building qualitatively new submarines, surface ships, and armament.]]

Along with the development of intercontinental missiles, the intensive development of an oceangoing Navy was begun which rapidly assumed all of the earmarks of a strategic factor in modern warfare. The building of an oceanic navy capable of preventing attacks on the Soviet Union from the ocean by the aggressor was complicated by the fact that our country does not have overseas territories and bases at which we could base our Navy to repel attacks. The periodic appearance in the Western press of reports on the presence of any sort of naval bases belonging to the USSR in the territories of nations friendly to us are clearly slanderous and pursue the goal of covering up and justifying the efforts of the imperialist powers to expand their military bases in many areas of the world. In this connection, it should be stressed that the USSR

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in conducting a Leninist peaceloving foreign policy, does not aspire to any such acquisitions. A way to overcome the difficulties connected with the prolonged separation of our ships from their bases has been found with the aid of engineering, technical, and design decisions which gave [[them]] *ships* the capability to remain for a prolonged time in distant areas of the ocean theaters and to satisfy all of their own requirements for logistical support without replenishment from fixed bases.

Our country has built a modern Navy and sent it out into the ocean in order to support our own state interests and to reliably defend [[us]] *the community of Socialist countries* from attack from the vast ocean sectors. If today the rhetorical question of why the Soviet Union needs an oceangoing Navy frequently resounds throughout the pages of the foreign press and in speeches of the political and military leaders, then this is done primarily for propaganda purposes, and in order to justify the constantly increasing size of the appropriations for armament and the intensification of preparations for a new world war. The politicians who are sowing doubts as to the true goal of the development of our Navy and who are ascribing aggressive intentions to it are striving through their demagoguery to cover up the unseemly /deeds/ of their own navies, which are performing a police function in suppressing national-liberation movements and in acting as the main striking force of imperialism on the World Ocean.

In every stage of the existence of our state, the Communist Party of the Soviet Union has firmly maintained a course aimed at building the material base of Communism, and has steadily conducted a policy of strengthening peace and friendship between peoples and states. Moreover, it is devoting the necessary attention to strengthening the defense capability of our country. In accordance with the Party's will, the Soviet Armed Forces were to become a strong shield, an insurmountable barrier in the path of the new pretenders to world supremacy, capable of checking and stopping aggression at its very onset, and of confronting the imperialists with the inevitability of unstoppable retaliatory strikes. The latest achievements in science, technology, and production, which served as the basis for the development of improved weaponry and military equipment for all branches of the Armed Forces, have been put into service to ensure the security of the country.

The ending of the US nuclear monopoly was a most important event at this stage. Today it is no secret that as early as 1954 the Soviet Army and Navy had nuclear weapons of various yields, including hydrogen bombs, and had begun the practical study of that weaponry and methods of operating in combat when it is employed.

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That was associated with the beginning of a new stage [[in the development of the Soviet Navy]] -- the stage of establishing and developing the Soviet oceanic nuclear-powered Navy armed with nuclear-missile weaponry, which strengthened the position of our country as a great seapower. The bringing to life of the Party's plans for establishing an oceanic Navy fully appropriate to the task of defending the country in the atomic age, and its transformation into a real force capable of supporting the state interests of the Soviet Union on the World Ocean and capable of successfully opposing a strong enemy navy, and repelling his attacks from seaward, have played a vast role in strengthening the defense capability of our country and of the entire Socialist Community.

The leadership of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union through its vast effort in establishing a powerful oceangoing Navy and the selfless years of labor of the shipbuilders, scientists, and navymen have ensured the establishment in a short time of our country's qualitatively new oceangoing Navy which is in complete conformity with the Soviet military doctrine.

As is well known, [["]] by military doctrine we mean a "system of views adopted in a [[given]] state [[and in its armed forces]] *for a given time* on the *goals and* nature of [[warfare]] *a possible war*, on the preparation of the country and Army for it, and on methods of waging it."[22] *It determines the probable enemy, the Armed Forces necessary to combat him, and directions of their organizational development.* [["Military doctrine is the result of a complex process of the development of national ideas regarding the accomplishment of military missions. All of its]] *The* basic theses *of military doctrine* stem from actually existing conditions -- [[primarily]] from *the state's* foreign and domestic policy, [[the]] *its* sociopolitical and economic system, level of production, the condition of the resources for waging war, [[and]] the geographical location of [[both]] one's own state and the probable enemy, *and so forth*[["[15]]].

Soviet military doctrine stems from the policy of our Party and meets the most important requirements of Marxist-Leninist teaching on war, the Army, and the armed defense of the Socialist Motherland. It embodies the entire wealth of progressive military-technical thinking, and also the military experience of the Soviet state and experience in numerous wars of the past. Soviet military doctrine is a doctrine of a peaceloving Socialist state which directly contradicts the modern aggressive reactionary military doctrine of the imperialist states, including that of "bloc" military doctrine.

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In the postwar period our military doctrine was steadily developed, primarily due to consistent growth in the might of the Soviet Union and [[of the entire]] *countries of the* Socialist [[camp]] *Community*, the growth in the national-liberation movement in the world, and the changes in the material resources for waging war. However, the essence of that doctrine and its basic trend has remained unchanged.

In every stage of development, the Soviet military doctrine, in resolving problems of the structure of the armed forces, has devoted and continues to devote the necessary attention to the Navy, which is certainly regarded as an important branch of the Armed Forces capable of accomplishing major missions in war. With regard to equipping our ships with nuclear-missile weaponry, the doctrine recognizes the capability of the Navy to prosecute important strategic missions. The theses of Soviet military doctrine concerning the Navy have been an important factor defining the general trend in its development, its basic missions, the balancing of its forces according to the various criteria, and the direction of operational and combat training. They have been the guide in developing all aspects of the operational-strategic employment of the Navy and the tactics of its forces.

The scientific-technical achievements and the discoveries of the postwar period had a particularly beneficial effect on the development of the Navy and the elimination of the lag in the overall seapower of the state after the war.

One of the most important achievements in modern scientific-technical progress was the discovery and development of ways of utilizing the practically inexhaustible new source of energy, the nucleus of the atom. This made it possible to create fundamentally new nuclear-missile weapons of heretofore unknown power, and also nuclear power for combatants, which sharply increases their combat capabilities. The introduction of chemical processes into modern production with the aid of which the transition was made to the utilization of fundamentally new synthetic substances and materials with previously unknown properties played a vast role in the development of the latest weaponry and combat equipment.

Of outstanding importance were the achievements in the area of electronics, on the basis of which staggering results were /achieved/ in the automation of the most complex process of control of forces, computer equipment was widely introduced, and mathematical calculation methods were employed to resolve problems of building the Armed Forces and developing the art of war.

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Through its practical activity, the Communist Party created all the conditions so that the achievements of scientific-technical progress were utilized to strengthen the defensive might of out Motherland, including the construction of the Navy which is one of the branches of the Armed Forces most saturated with complex combat equipment. The Navy has always been the focus of the latest achievements in technology and has always been [[very]] sensitive to developments and changes in it. This dependence of the Navy on the achievements of scientific-technical progress is explained by the fact that its inventory contains, in addition to particularly complex structures such as warships, practically every type of troops and weaponry which the Armed Forces have at their disposal. Naturally, even small changes in the armament of any of the types of forces have a considerable effect on the condition of the Navy as a whole. Profound qualitative changes in basic military hardware are producing truly revolutionary transformations not only in the entire military-technical base of the Navy as a whole, but also in all of the component parts of the art of naval warfare which support its combat employment.

The main directions which the qualitative transformation of the Navy under the influence of the scientific-technical revolution took were: a shift to the construction of a nuclear-powered submarine fleet; the introduction of missile and nuclear weaponry and the creation of strategic [[submarine]] *naval* nuclear-missile systems; arming of the Navy with long-range aircraft -- oceanic aircraft; the introduction [[into the Navy]] of shipboard aviation; the qualitative change in the equipment to monitor the subsurface situation and in ASW forces and equipment; the introduction of diverse electronic equipment, and of automation in the control of weapons and combat equipment, as well as mathematical research methods employing computers.

/Explosive/ scientific-technical progress is uncovering ever newer capabilities for the employment of the latest achievements in the development of the Navy, and in further expanding the maritime might of our Motherland.

Of the factors bringing about the postwar development of our Navy, the decisive one was the economy of [[our]] *the* country and its military-economic potential as a whole. Engels scientifically proved the dependence of methods of waging war on the economic base of society and on the development of production: "Nothing depends so much on economic conditions as the Army and Navy. Armament, personnel, organization, tactics and strategy depend primarily on the level of production achieved at a given moment and on means of communications."[23]

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The military-economic potential of the state is determined by such indicators as natural resources, above all strategic raw materials supporting the needs of production; industry -- plants, factories and power plants; agriculture; transportation and communications networks; labor productivity; human resources satisfying the high requirements of modern production both from the qualitative and quantitative standpoints; the level of development of science and technology; and state material resources.

The strength of these basic indicators is ensuring the establishment and further development of an oceangoing Navy for our country. It has permitted the widespread ultilization of the achievements of science and technology and the implementation of the construction of precisely those ships whose need was defined by Soviet military doctrine, of course within the limits of those resources which the country could allocate for the Navy's needs.

Military-geographical conditions have always emerged as one of the most important factors in the development of any branch of the Armed Forces, but they are of special significance for the Navy, since its diverse forces have to operate on the water and under the water, in the airspace above the water, and on the shore, under the most varied climatic conditions and zones and at different times of the year and day. The importance of that factor for the development of the Navy is also due to the character of the alignment of forces on the World Ocean, the development of the base systems for the forces of the opposing sides, and the relative location of their strategic positions ensuring the deployment and utilization of existing forces and equipment to accomplish a series of operational-strategic missions.

From that point of view the navies of the imperialist states have favorable positions on the World Ocean. Having naval bases located in direct proximity to the territories of our country, and acquiring more and more areas to base their own forces, they are concentrating their efforts in the strategically important zones of the World Ocean. Even during peacetime, by establishing control over straits and narrows, they are striving to establish every condition for achieving control of those areas immediately after the outbreak of war.

The imperialist states are taking advantage of their positions by building both ships and systems of bases and comprehensive support for them. Even in determining cruising range, endurance, or the possibilities of repair of ships, they do not need to attach as much significance to tactical elements

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as we do in our Navy, because the extensive system of bases embracing almost the entire World Ocean permits supporting the ships with everything necessary in the shortest possible time.

Historically the situation has arisen that, in order to reach the ocean, our Navy, not having overseas bases, had to cover vast distances and force narrows and straits either controlled by the navies of the imperialist states or constantly under surveillance by their allies in the aggressive military blocs.

Moreover, a majority of our naval bases is located in areas with severe climates where difficult ice conditions are present for a long period of time, hindering the movement of ships and the application of a number of measures to ensure a high degree of combat readiness of the naval forces.

Naturally, all of that has left its mark on the construction of the combatants and auxiliaries of our Navy and on the development of methods for employing the Navy in peacetime and in war.

In that connection, of particular significance for us are not only the seakeeping qualities of ships, but also cruising ranges, endurance, ability to withstand numerous attacks by an enemy employing various weapons, i.e., high combat effectiveness, exceptionally high reliability of systems and machinery, and long engine service life. Moreover, under the influence of military-geographical conditions our Navy has to establish special forces and develop means for the logistical support of operations in distant areas of the oceans and take special measures with regard to the special training of ship crews, including repair training.

Experience in past wars has been the main historical precondition influencing the postwar development of our Navy. Armed combat has always played the role of the arbiter which determines the degree of appropriateness of the prewar views of employing forces and equipment in the course of a war. In the course of the war, weapons, military equipment, and the basic theses of the operational-tactical and strategic utilization of forces are tested. That makes it possible to draw important conclusions as to the development of weaponry and the art of war in each postwar period. Therefore, the skillful summarization of the experience of military operation is a task not only of military historians, but also of leaders determining the direction of naval construction.

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At the same time it is essential to take into account that after the end of the Second World War the armed forces of all countries were developed on a fundamentally new technical basis. Missile and nuclear weaponry become dominant. Armed forces were established and trained primarily to accomplish missions in a nuclear war. Therefore, the experience of the Second World War turned out to have less influence on postwar development of forces than, for example, the experience of the First World War had in its day. This, however, does not eliminate the need to attentively study all the results of armed combat which were taken into account in the postwar construction of navies and to develop methods of utilizing them in nuclear warfare.

The Second World war demonstrated the growing importance of naval warfare and the intensified relationship between military operations on land and operations at sea. This reinforced the views on the need for the comprehensive development of the Navy as an indispensable part of the armed forces of the country.

Experience in combat operations in the sea and oceanic theaters showed that submarines and aircraft had become the main, more versatile and effective types of naval forces. In this connection, less importance was assigned to heavy ships with guns and to such forms of employment of naval forces as in engagements of surface forces in the course of which major operational results were achieved.

Experience in employing aircraft carriers to destroy land targets and enemy naval forces had a great influence on the postwar development of many navies. That influence was expressed in the further development of aircraft carriers and forces to support their operations. Moreover, attention was also turned to developing forces and equipment capable of engaging carrier forces.

Experience inconducting numerous amphibious landing operations on various scales also played an important role in the course of the postwar development of navies. This was manifested in the building of a large number of special landing ships capable of landing forces with heavy combat equipment on an unimproved shore with the aid of high-speed landing craft and helicopters.

Combat experience on the ocean and sea communications routes was also considered in building new ships and weaponry of the postwar period.

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In many countries a great deal of attention was devoted to experience in employing mine weaponry by various types of naval forces in order to achieve various goals. This was expressed in the development of new models of mines and the mass employment of them, for example, by the American Navy to blockade the approaches to the ports of the Democratic Republic of Vietnam and her internal waterways.

Communications, which play an especially important role in navies because their forces are constantly located in various areas of the ocean frequently distant from their own shores, are the most important means of controlling forces and weaponry. Therefore, a modern navy needs global communications capable of ensuring control of forces over distances of many thousands of kilometers. Moreover, it is essential to ensure control of naval forces operating on the water and under the water, in the air and on land. It is not hard to understand that the establishment of that kind of communications system represents a problem of vast scientific-technical complexity. Many countries have worked on this problem. This task is also being successfully accomplished in our Navy.

Of particular value was the experience in employing radar, which fostered [[the]] *its* widespread development [[of this equipment]] in the postwar period and the employment of it on all ships, aircraft, in shore-based detection systems, and aboard auxiliary ships.

In reviewing the preconditions which had an effect on postwar development of our Navy we must note the following.

Each of them had its own special effect on the development of the Navy, and these effects were not all the same. For example, the policy of the CPSU and the military-economic potential of the country were the main determining influences.

The nature of the influence of those preconditions also varied. Thus, the influence of the military-economic potential was universal in the depth of its effect on the entire complex process of the development of the Navy, while the development of the navies of the imperialist states [[primarily] influenced the construction of the forces needed to accomplish *primarily* defensive missions. The aforementioned preconditions varied in the degree of their influence on naval construction during the process of development, and the significance of the achievements of scientific-technical progress steadily grew.

In addition to the aforementioned preconditions for building the Navy, a certain influence was exerted by the

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development of the art of naval warfare, which, influenced by military hardware, and striving to maintain a certain adequacy in standards with respect to the hardware's intrinsic operational-tactical characteristics, and, consequently, also being dependent on them, the art of naval warfare itself emerged as a stimulus to the development of naval ships and weapons systems. The dialectical unity and mutual influence of the hardware and the art of waging warfare at sea are displayed therein.

A careful weighing of all the aforementioned considerations enable the CPSU Central Committee to scientifically manage the building of our Navy in the postwar period, to make that process workable, and to direct it along an independent path, not copying, but only intelligently utilizing the experience of world naval shipbuilding.

The development of a navy is a most complex process which is far from limited to replacing outmoded weapons systems with new ones which to a great extent correspond to the current level of development of technology and to the requirements of naval warfare. That replacement is only the [[final]] result of a vast effort to determine optimal options in the resolution of many operational-strategic and operational-tactical problems, and also of a colossal number of technical questions. Here it is a question of concentrating in each ship the maximum combat capabilities with the most economical "mix" of dimensions and displacements, thereby assuring effective resolution of problems at minimal cost.

The modern naval ship is a most complex combination of technical devices, systems, and complexes, which are the latest achievements in science, engineering thought, and production. These include nuclear power, high-powered gas and steam turbines, strategic and operational-tactical missiles, homing submarine weaponry, automatic guns, equipment providing integrated automation of the control process, precision navigational equipment, the most complex sonars and radars, and so forth. Many hundreds of plants from various sectors of industry participate in the building of a modern warship. Her construction is preceded by profound scientific research.

Behind the idea to build every warship lies the desire to build it in the form most suitable for accomplishing the tasks for which it was intended. Yet, in this connection, the traditions of domestic shipbuilding and the capabilities of domestic production are also taken into account.

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To resolve the problems associated with the building of the Navy, efforts are made to define the optimal combination of attack and defensive capabilities for warships and such elements as armament, automation, speed, range, endurance, habitability, and so forth. Moreover, for submarines, operating depths, *permissible* noise, favorable precavitational speeds, and so forth, are critical. In this connection, the displacement of a ship, given the general desire to reduce it within reasonable limits, is regarded only as a function of that main factor which is the ability of a ship to accomplish all those missions for which she is being built.

To ensure the Navy's capability to carry out operational-strategic missions, scientific research is being conducted to determine the nature of the Navy's balance, the overall qualitative and quantitative make-up of ships and aircraft, and the distribution of those forces by theater and base area.

Thus, the development of the Navy requires serious and profound scientific research. Here, a display of voluntarism or of subjective principles is totally impermissible. The greater the attention that the leaders who are making the responsible decisions on the development of the Navy pay to the recommendations of the research institutions and to the opinions of the practitioners, the naval officers, and the more they take into account the capabilities of industry, the more correct their decisions will be, the less painful the process of building a Navy will be, the fewer funds will be needed [[in the final analysis]] to build it, and the more powerful it will be. Such an approach to the problems of building the Navy assumes the comprehensive development of scientific methods of management. The scientific method of managing the building of the Navy requires extensive multidiscipline scientific-research work in the area of engineering-technical and operational-tactical problems. It assumes a strict system of optimization, ensuring the selection of the most rational option based on quantitative analysis and military-economic justifications, and built according to standard criteria and close tolerances.

An important integral part of the process of building the Navy is the shaping of a technical policy, whose bases are determined by the country's political leadership taking into account the conditions for employing the Navy and the characteristics of its interaction with the other branches of the Armed Forces.

Up to recent times the scientific method of managing the building of the Navy was based only on the analysis of modern

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capabilities of science and technology and of their development in the near future. Now this field includes scientific forecasting built around the uncovering of trends in the development of weaponry, electronic equipment, power engineering, shipbuilding theory, and a series of "general civil" sciences, the state of which influences the development of the Navy.

A description of the most important trends in the scientific-technical revolution attests to the fact that they are based on the development of science, and that they essentially represent the results of a fusion of fields of science with production. Along with this, the interrelationship between science and technology has been considerably strengthened. Science, in expanding the volume of its knowledge, is providing favorable conditions for the revolutionary development of technology. At the present time, all the latest achievements in technology stem directly from discoveries in the *field of* natural sciences. The development of technology and production in turn creates the appropriate technical base which brings about the rapid rate of scientific research, and introducing it into the practice of military affairs.

With the current rapid rate of development of science and technology it is very important to anticipate new qualitative changes in the development of the Navy, and to determine in a timely manner the appearance of new military hardware, its role and position in the existing hardware, and the principles of employing it.

Naturally, one cannot reliably plan on one scientific discovery or another. In the resolution of major military-scientific problems, a certain degree of uncertainty will always exist owing to the incomplete information [[on the enemy at our disposal and insufficient data]] on a number of [[other]] questions. The presence of uncertainty brings about the need to calculate several decision variants with an analysis of their positive and negative aspects. This is to a certain degree facilitated by the achievements in the field of mathematics and the widespread utilization of computer equipment, *which provides us additional opportunities to resolve complex tasks comprising multiple criteria.*

The modern armament of the Navy is characterized by its extreme complexity and diversity, and it has specific characteristic features. In light of this, the Navy represents a complex dynamic system whose development and functioning requires a great expenditure of various material resources.

No single country can put unlimited resources into armament. In every country the permissible level of expenditures

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for military needs is defined. Economic limitations lead to the fact that, of the large number of problems posed by new scientific-technical achievements, one must select the more important problems which must be resolved in order to maintain the combat capability of the Armed Forces at the required level.

In today's context our Navy is charged with important strategic missions. Its relative weight within the composition of the Armed Forces is continually increasing. That, in turn, is generating the need to further improve the level of scientific management of the development of the Navy in order to ensure the timely development of more effective forces and equipment, taking into account the actual capabilities of the country's economy.

A great role in the development of scientific methods for managing the building of a Navy is played by the well-organized and reliably functioning scientific information system, which aids the shaping of views on the development and employment of naval forces in modern warfare and in peacetime. The main requirements for this system are operational efficiency in conducting analysis and structured distribution of scientific information among consumers.

The development and employment in practice of scientific management methods in building the Navy have already led to the achievement of important results which have found expression in the practical resolution of many major problems [[comprising the essence of this complex process. These include primarily the resolution of]], *for example*, the problems of balancing the Navy's forces with respect to various attributes and characteristics, defining rational ways of building the Navy while giving priority to the more effective forces, and the priority development of missile weaponry as the more promising means of naval warfare among the other weapons comprising the Navy's armament system. On the basis of thorough scientific research a determination was made of many optimal combinations of the tactical characteristics of submarines and surface ships and the rational limits for automating the control of forces and ships and their weapons systems, and criteria were found for evaluating the combat worthiness of weapons platforms and their combat effectiveness, both as individual weapons platforms and as tactical groups fashioned in various combinations and mixes.

This, of course, does not exhaust the range of those problems which have already been resolved and which are in the decision stage in the scientific organizations. They only illustrate the scope with which that work is being conducted and the main trend in the development of that process, which

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will consist of further extending scientific methods of justifying all crucial decisions made by various departments in support of the development of the Navy.

As a result of extensive and multifaceted scientific-research work, views have been developed on the position and role of the Navy within the framework of our Armed Forces and the direction in the development of all of the types of naval forces and weaponry.

The quest for new directions in the development of the Armed Forces of the great powers began with the development of the atom bomb and later also the hydrogen bomb, as well as with other technical discoveries.

That was manifested abroad in the development of various strategic nuclear weapons systems. Initially these were attack carrier forces and land-based strategic aircraft. Later the POLARIS submarine nuclear-missile system was given an increasingly more important position in the Pentagon's plans. The stress in the development of general-purpose forces was put on the construction of new, more powerful and advanced antisubmarine forces and equipment. Various automated and electronic warfare systems began to be introduced into the Armed Forces on a widespread scale everywhere. However, this occurred only after the recognition of the practical value of all the scientific discoveries which the opposing imperialist and Socialist camps had at their disposal at that time.

For the American and British navies, which had managed to renovate the overwhelming part of their combat inventory of warships in the war years, the question of further developing them in connection with the appearance of nuclear weaponry was very complex. Therefore, initially they strove to only talk under their breath about the possibility of employing nuclear weaponry in naval warfare in order not to cast doubt on the practicality of the striking power of the strongest navies in the world at that time.

In the early postwar years, when the United States still had a monopoly on nuclear weaponry, the leadership circles in the military departments of the Western countries spoke only of the modernization of ships, and of replacing weaponry and equipping them with various types of radar equipment, since it was believed that the navy, even in the condition in which it found itself, would be able to carry out its missions in a war against the USSR for which the United States, above all, was making feverish preparations.

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The decisions of the Central Committee of the Communist Party aimed at further development of the Navy were based on a careful consideration of the characteristics of the scientific-technical revolution [[which deviated from the traditional paths in the development of technology]]. That[[, in turn,]] opened up the possibility of developing fundamentally new warships[[,]] *and* weapons systems.[[, and naval equipment based on the utilization of the latest achievements in science, technology and production. About]] *Over* two decades have passed since that time, and in this relatively short historical period the Soviet Navy has been transformed into an important strategic factor, into a force capable of opposing aggression from the sea and of accomplishing major operational and strategic missions on the World Ocean.

Today, submarines and naval aviation are the main arms of the forces of our Navy, and ballistic and cruise missiles with nuclear warheads are the main weapons. Diverse surface ships and aircraft are included in the inventory of our Navy in order to give combat stability to the submarines and comprehensively support them, to battle the enemy's surface and ASW forces, and to prosecute other specific missions. They are armed with torpedoes, various types of missiles, rifled guns, and other types of naval weaponry. In the Navy there is widespread use of electronic equipment and control equipment based on electronic computers, and analog and modeling equipment.

It should be noted that in view of a number of conditions in the postwar period, the Soviet Navy developed along an original path. Th[illegible] originality was based on a strict scientific consideration of the characteristics of building and utilizing its forces in naval warfare. It has been manifested in the design features of the ships and aircraft, in the nature of the balancing of the Soviet naval forces, and in its own distinctive organization.

THE IMPROVEMENT IN NAVAL FORCES AND EQUIPMENT

Submarines. In the Second World War submarines proved themselves to be an arm of the naval forces capable of actively operating on the seas and oceans and of accomplishing important missions. In individual sectors submarine operations were the main effort in naval warfare. As we mentioned above, in the Second World War submarines sank more transports and combatants than did surface ships and aircraft combined. We would recall that Great Britain, the United States, and their allies (without the USSR) and the neutral countries lost 2,770 merchant ships with a total tonnage of 14.5 million register tons, i.e.,

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69% of the total destroyed ship tonnage, to the weapons of the German and Italian submarines. As a result of the operations of the American and British submarines, Japan lost about 62% of the entire tonnage which was sunk. Under the influence of the great losses from enemy submarines, the Allies were forced to deploy [[effective]] *major* ASW forces. Those forces made it possible to disrupt the German plans for unlimited submarine warfare in a context in which the German Command gave completely unsatisfactory combat and operational support to its own submarines. In the course of the war, German submarine losses grew, and the goal which had been set for the submarine forces by the German High Command, i.e., to strangle England with a blockade, was not achieved.

The problem of the effectiveness of submarine forces was widely discussed in the world press in the initial postwar years in view of those contradictory results in the employment of submarines. Could submarines, despite the constantly improving antisubmarine weapons, achieve strategic goals in warfare at sea?

Much research had to be conducted in order to answer that question. All of that research invariably confirmed the high degree of effectiveness of submarines when correctly employed and when given combat support. That conclusion turned out to be particularly convincing as it applied to submarines with nuclear propulsion.

After the end of the Second World War, our submarines were transformed into an arm of forces capable of accomplishing important missions on the ocean. They became the combat bulwark of the Navy. Military-economic considerations, which also favored the orientation of our Navy toward the building of primarily submarine forces, also were an important condition.

In defining the direction of development of the Navy in the nuclear age, we could not fail to take into account, for example, the fact that the imperialist states opposing us have vast surface fleets and a powerful shipbuilding industry. In order for us to even attain parity in the main types of surface ships, long years of competition between [national] potentials would be needed, entailing the expenditure of vast material and monetary resources. Achievement of superiority under such conditions would be a highly problematical matter, since, in view of the characteristics of its development, a navy having a superiority over another navy could maintain it at a relatively low cost.

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Giving the priority to the development of submarine forces made it possible in the shortest possible time to sharply increase the attack capabilities of our Navy, to pose a serious threat to the main forces of the enemy navy in the ocean theaters, and, at a cost of fewer resources and less time, to intensify the growth in the maritime might of our country, depriving the enemy of those very advantages which he could have had at his disposal in the event of war against the Soviet Union and the countries of the Socialist Community.

However, this far from exhausted the significance of the new nuclear-missile Navy which was based on the nuclear-powered submarine. The qualitatively new technical base made it possible for our Navy to abandon its many years of attachment to coastal areas and closed seas, to considerably expand its sphere of operations on the oceans, and in the event the imperialists unleash a war, to carry out its own missions of an operational-strategic nature in combat with the fleet of the aggressor in areas of the ocean selected by us. But it was particularly important that, in having the new military hardware, the Navy had acquired the capability to open up new sectors of combat for the Armed Forces, sectors which were long considered inaccessible to us. We mean the ocean sectors in which our Navy has become capable of prosecuting strategic missions in defense of the country.

All of this fundamentally altered the situation which had emerged over the course of centuries on the ocean expanses, where the navies of the imperialist powers had heretofore held complete sway. This was an intrusion into the sanctum of imperialism, where it strove not to admit even its comrades-in-arms in the aggressive military alliances.

We can discern two stages in the postwar development of submarine forces. [[In the first stage, which lasted about 10 years, improved submarines of new designs having diesel propulsion plants were built. In the second stage, which has lasted up until today, mainly submarines with nuclear propulsion plants are being built.]]

In the first stage, *which lasted about 10 years,* it was possible to devote our main attention only to slightly improving the performance characteristics of submarines, including increasing speed and range when running under diesel power, and providing the capability of prolonged navigation and charging of batteries when the submarine steams at periscope depth. In the building of diesel-powered submarines, experience in the Second World War, the nature and conditions of accomplishing missions in a future war, and also possible prospects for the development of antisubmarine forces and equipment of the foreign navies were taken into account.

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In that period diesel attack submarines were built in two versions, coastal and oceangoing submarines. That permitted the employment of submarines not only in the seas adjacent to our territory, but also over rather extensive ocean areas. The new diesel submarines had a speed under water and an operating depth markedly greater than the submarines of prewar construction. They were equipped with the latest means of detection, radars and sonars, modern communications systems, control instruments, and highly effective torpedo weaponry.

In the latter half of the 1950's, several of the diesel submarines of postwar construction were further upgraded and received cruise and ballistic missiles. However, prior to the introduction of nuclear propulsion plants, the increase in speed and range of submarines running submerged was limited by the constraints of the power-to-weight-ratio which was determined by the capabilities of the diesel-electric propulsion plants. The submergence depth of submarines was increased owing to the employment of new, high-quality materials and improvement in hull design.

Diesel submarines are improved, powerful warships, and they undoubtedly will also be widely employed under present-day conditions. Even today, when we look at the state of submarine construction in light of the [[vast]] achievements in science and technical progress, we must not fail to recognize that important role which the experience in building diesel submarines of postwar design played, permitting the resolution of a multitude of problems of a scientific and technical nature during the transition to the construction of fundamentally new, nuclear-powered submarines.

In the process of building diesel submarines in the postwar years, our industry acquired the necessary experience in building many new military and engineering systems, owing to which the new submarines differed considerably from the best models of submarines of prewar and wartime construction.

The /construction/ of new oceangoing and coastal diesel submarines, and the assimilation of them in the fleets in the process of combat training and long cruises, established all the conditions for the transition to the second stage of the postwar development of submarine forces. That [[second stage]] is marked by the building of submarines with nuclear propulsion plants, which fundamentally changed the combat capabilities of submarines, making them an underwater combatant in the full sense of the word. The high power-to-weight ratio of nuclear-powered submarines permits them to remain at sea for a prolonged period of time, to make long transits at high speeds,

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while standing in immediate readiness to deliver attacks against the enemy. They can close on high-speed surface ships of the enemy, track them for a long time, repeatedly attack, rapidly redeploy from one sector to another, and successfully evade enemy antisubmarine forces.

The powerful sonars with which the nuclear-powered submarines are equipped provide a high search potential, and consequently, considerable capabilities to combat enemy submarines.

The capability to remain submerged over practically her entire endurance, her great operating depth, and running at low-noise speeds provides a high degree of undetectability for the nuclear-powered submarine. Thus, all the main indicators characterizing the power of the Navy are concentrated in nuclear-powered submarines: great striking power, high mobility and concealment, and the capability to conduct combat operations on a global scale to destroy important enemy ground targets, submarines, and surface ships. That is why under present-day conditions nuclear-powered submarines are the strategic resource of our Armed Forces.

Two primary directions have been defined at the present time in world submarine building: building missile-armed submarines and building multipurpose submarines.

Missile-armed submarines are platforms for powerful, long-range strategic missiles intended to destroy important enemy land targets. They are the main component of the combat might of the leading navies in the world, including the Soviet Navy. They are the largest of all existing submarines. Thus, for example, the American missile-armed submarine GEORGE WASHINGTON, built in the early 1960's, has a displacement of some 8,000 tons and a length of 116 meters.

It must be noted that the displacement of missile-armed submarines continues to grow. The Americans consider it inevitable that missile-armed submarine displacement will increase to 10,000 tons or more. Thus, the displacement of the new missile-armed nuclear-powered TRIDENT-*system* submarine, which is in the design stage in the United States, is at this time calculated to be as much as 18,000 tons.

Nuclear-powered missile-armed submarines are the "youngest" combatants. They were developed when numerous models of ballistic and cruise missiles and the latest surface ships and submarines of other classes had already been developed and put into service. Therefore, all of the latest achievements in the area of shipbuilding, *nuclear power engineering*, missilery, means for monitoring the subsurface situation, automation of control and navigational equipment are concentrated aboard the missile-armed submarines.

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The need to rigidly limit the weight-size characteristics of missiles for submarines required the development of special naval ballistic missiles. The Americans [[at one time]] tried to employ Army missiles to arm submarines; however, owing to their great weight and large size they had to give up that idea. At the present time, /every country/ with missile-armed submarines employs relatively small ballistic missiles to arm them. [[They]] *These missiles* are constantly being improved with respect to increasing flight range, improving accuracy, and by building *increasingly* more powerful warheads (in the later American models they are made to separate). Today only the United States, France, and the USSR produce their own naval ballistic missiles.

The increase in missile flight range and the employment of separating warheads are the main trends in the development of this weaponry ([[see]] Table 20), which expands the area of destruction and also the combat patrol area of the missile-armed submarines.

Table 20 Change in Flight Range of American Submarine-Launched Ballistic Missiles

Missile	Year put into service	No. of warheads	Flight range with a single warhead, Km	Flight range with multiple warheads, Km
POLARIS A-1 . . .	1960	1	2200	–
POLARIS A-2 . . .	1961	1	2800	–
POLARIS A-3 . . .	1964	3	–	4600
POSEIDON. . . .	1970	3-14	–	5600-2800
TRIDENT-*1*	*1979*	10	–	*Up to 8000*
TRIDENT-2	*After 1985*	*10*	–	*Up to 12000*

The desire to increase missile flight range is leading to a growth in their weight characteristics. Thus, whereas the weight of the POLARIS A-1 missile was 12.7 tons, the weight of the POLARIS A-2 missile was increased to 13.6 tons, and the weight of the follow-on POLARIS A-3 model reached 15.0 tons. The weight of the new POSEIDON missile is 30 tons. This missile already has a flight range of 5,600 kilometers and multiple warheads. It is assumed that the effectiveness of this missile, despite the fact that the power of each of the warheads is only 50 kilotons, will be several times greater than the effectiveness of the POLARIS A-1 missiles.

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Missile-armed submarines are also armed with torpedoes, which are needed primarily for self-defense.

Modern nuclear-powered missile-armed submarines which are in the inventories of the navies of the Soviet Union, the United States, Great Britain, and France, are the weapon of the strategic nuclear forces of the country.

American military specialists believe that the missiles of the missile-armed submarines have indisputable advantages over land-based MINUTEMAN missiles: [[These advantages include]] a greater ability to remain concealed, greater mobility, [[the]] deployment and dispersion [[of them]] outside the country's territory, and lower vulnerability. That explains the clearly defined trend in the United States toward distributing nuclear-missile resources, aimed at steadily increasing the role of sea-based forces, which is seen in Table 21.

Table 21 [[Distribution]] *Ratio* of US *Sea and Land-Based* Strategic Nuclear Missile Weapons [[Among U.S. Armed Services]]

Index	1960	1970	[1975]	*1978*
No. of missiles	48/29	656/1054	[656/1000]	*656/1054*
Percentage of total missiles	62/38	38/62	[26/75]	*38/62*
No. of nuclear warheads	48/29	2384/1314	[5440/2000]	*6440/2154*
Percentage of total nuclear warheads	62/38	65/35	[73/27]	*72/28*
Total yield in megatons	24/290	183/1923	[290/1050]	*344/1720*

Note: Numerator shows the number of naval missiles and the denominator indicates Air Force missiles

The United States is devoting a great deal of attention to improving the qualitative characteristics of the strategic nuclear-missile system. While keeping the number of missiles virtually unchanged since 1970, the Americans have achieved a sharp increase in the number of nuclear warheads which can be launched against targets. This is particularly marked with the missile-armed submarines, where those very same 656 missiles can [[deliver]] *carry* almost 2.3 times more nuclear warheads. Due to this circumstance the percentage of strategic nuclear-missile warheads carried aboard submarines has increased from 65 to [[73]] *72* percent in [[five]] *seven* years, and the percentage of land-based warheads has dropped from 35 to [[27]] *28* percent. This is one of the practical manifestations of the reorientation of the American leadership toward an "oceanic strategy."

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Multipurpose, nuclear-powered submarines are designed to destroy surface ships and transports of the enemy, and also for antisubmarine warfare.

As noted above, the displacement and basic dimensions of multipurpose submarines are considerably smaller than missile-armed submarines. For example, the first such American submarine, NAUTILUS, had a displacement (submerged) of 4,040 tons. Within [[12]] *seven* years after the commissioning of the NAUTILUS, the multipurpose submarine [[JACK]] *THRESHER*, with a displacement of 4,300 tons, entered the inventory of the American Navy. [[In the future the displacement of these submarines apparently will reach 5,000 tons or more. Some of the multipurpose submarines of the American Navy are being specially built in an antisubmarine version. They]] *LOS ANGELES-Class submarines under construction have a displacement of 6,200 tons. Contemporary nuclear-powered submarines* are distinguished by their low-noise level and higher speed, and are equipped with powerful sonar systems.

The following fact attests to what an important place sonar occupies aboard multipurpose submarines. On the American THRESHER and STURGEON-Class submarines the entire area of the bow section normally occupied by torpedo tubes has been set aside for the sonar antennas whose diameter is about 4 meters. In this connection, the torpedo tubes are located along the sides of the ship at an angle of about 10 degrees to the diameter plane. Thus, the submarine weaponry was displaced from its traditional position by a technical system designed to support the employment of this weaponry.

In our Navy, the appearance of nuclear-powered submarines paved the way for the establishment of powerful submarine forces capable of prosecuting strategic missions on the ocean. Already the first submarines with nuclear propulsion plants have demonstrated themselves to be a completely modern, powerful and reliable weapon and have been quickly mastered by the personnel. On the basis of the experience in designing, building and operating them, industry has proceeded with the /construction/ of more powerful improved submarines with nuclear propulsion. The latest achievements in the technology of world shipbuilding have found application in the design of these ships. These submarines, possessing better combat qualities than the initial submarines, have considerably increased the capabilities of the Navy to accomplish strategic missions.

Soviet nuclear-powered submarines are first-class, modern, versatile combatants possessing operational-combat qualities which permit them to accomplish a broad range of missions on

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the world oceans. They are not only platforms for tactical weaponry, but are also an integral part of the strategic nuclear shield of our Motherland. The aggressors [[also]] know this. They cannot fail to take into account the severe consequences of the retaliation which /would/ be rained on them from seaward, should they dare to unleash a nuclear war. The remarkable qualities of our nuclear-powered submarines have been proven in many exercises and on long cruises. More than once Soviet submarines have reached the North Pole. [[A group]] *Groups* of *our* nuclear-powered submarines made *several* [[a voyage]] *voyages* around the world without surfacing, which was unprecedented in history.

Technical improvement in modern submarines has made it possible to examine questions of organizing their combat operations in a completely new manner. Under the conditions in the Second World War these submarines operated primarily independently, and only operated in concert with surface ships and aircraft in a particular operation[[, while the difficulty of mutual recognition and communications forces surface ships to avoid meetings with their own submarines]]. At the present time, the situation has fundamentally changed, and the possibility has arisen of achieving the close coordination in battle and operations between submarines and surface ships which has greatly improved their combat effectiveness.

It is [[also]] essential to note that our submarine forces are now a modern, constantly improving weapons system which has its own special characteristics. [[These characteristics are determined by the presence in its inventory, in addition to strategic missile-armed submarines, of submarines armed with various cruise missiles and long-range torpedoes. This record of development of submarine forces, which is characteristic of only our Navy, was the result of great scientific research directed toward the quest for more rational methods of combating the enemy's naval forces.]]

Surface Ships. Although as early as the Second World War these ships had lost their role as the main arm of the naval forces to the submarines and naval aviation, they are still an important component part of modern navies.

In the second stage of the postwar development of the Navy, when our country stressed the establishment of powerful submarine forces, the construction of surface ships, and especially oceangoing ships, began to be limited. This was also brought about by the appearance of fundamentally new military hardware, represented by nuclear weaponry. Initially it was not clear what missions surface ships would have to prosecute on the ocean and what characteristics they had to have in order to

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effectively participate in armed combat employing nuclear weaponry.

As noted previously, foreign military experts, having yielded to the hypothesis of the omnipotence of nuclear weaponry, were convinced that under the new conditions all surface ships would lose their combat value. An exception was made only for aircraft carriers, because they had their own sufficiently strong air cover from air attacks. Only a few of these experts saw in the high mobility of a Navy a means not only of surviving enemy attacks, but also of retaining the capability to accomplish combat missions. Among these we should single out Admiral Barjot, whom we have already cited, who was able to grasp the essence of what was happening and correctly analyze the effect of nuclear weaponry on the development of a Navy and methods of employing it in nuclear warfare. [when]] He wrote: [The determining factor is that the ship has a future in the atomic age, because the sea itself gives it an unlimited amount of material (uncontaminated sea water), owing to which it can remain in zones of radioactive contamination. This capability, permitting the ship to survive, has profound consequences. Modern naval doctrine must proceed from the fact that a navy needs ships of various types, which will provide it with great operating range and high mobility."[24]

It must be acknowledged that initially even in our Navy we did not have the necessary confidence in many of the theoretical theses on the role and position of surface ships in naval warfare in relation to the growth in *importance of* the destructive factors of modern weaponry, because all of the theoretical analyses had been made on surface ships built in the initial postwar period. Those ships did not differ fundamentally from their predecessors, especially in defensive and protective equipment. The most vulnerable area in defense of those ships was their antiair defense, whose development lagged behind the development of aircraft striking power. As soon as surface ships without reliable cover from air attack steamed out from under the "umbrella" of the continental air defense system, they became a tempting target for bomber and torpedo aircraft.

Modern surface ships differ significantly from those which were built in the years of the Second World War and soon after the war. Their antiaircraft armament has been considerably strengthened, enabling them to more successfully counter enemy aircraft and repel combined attacks from other naval forces of the enemy while carrying out their own main mission.

Modern hardware imparted completely new combat qualities to surface forces and expanded their capabilities in the combined employment of long-range missiles of various types, guns,

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and torpedoes, owing to which they [[are]] *became* capable of successfully engaging mixed groupings from an enemy fleet utilizing a combination of surface ships, submarine forces, and aircraft.

Surface ships remain the main and frequently the only weapon supporting the deployment of the main attack forces of the Navy, the submarines. The First and Second world wars showed the mistakenness of the opinion that the submarine, in view of its ability to remain concealed after departing its base, could *fully* assure its own invulnerability.

An important positive quality of surface ships is their ability to maintain uninterrupted two-way communications with shore command posts. This considerably facilitates control and ensures the timely transmission to ships of all the necessary information and orders, which is extremely important in a prewar [deployment] situation, when the factor assumes particular importance.

Surface ships comprise the foundation of the landing and landing support forces. They have the main role in mine warfare and in the protection of our own communications lines.

In closed theaters and in coastal areas surface ships can be employed in operations against sea communications lines. An example of this was the operation of the *Egyptian* guided-missile patrol boats [[of the Egyptian Navy]] which sank the Israeli destroyer EILAT *in 1967* and also the operations of the Indian Navy in delivering an attack against forces of the Pakistani Navy concentrated in Karachi.

As the conflicts of the postwar period have shown, surface ships are capable of carrying out a broad range of missions in local wars. They have been widely used for gunfire support of ground troops operating in coastal areas in Korea and Vietnam, for carrying out amphibious landings, and for blockade operations. Using surface ships, the American Marines penetrated over the rivers and canals deep into areas of South Vietnam.

In building a modern, balanced, nuclear-missile Navy, the development and construction of surface ships [[lays stress on]] *conform to* their capabilities. The most numerous group of surface ships is the antisubmarine ships. They are divided into ships capable of operation at sea for a prolonged period of time and ships for coastal operations. The former include large antisubmarine ships and also antisubmarine cruisers. The coastal antisubmarine ships include specially built small high-speed ships which can successfully search for and destroy enemy

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multipurpose submarines and diesel submarines operating in closed seas or coastal areas of ocean theaters.

We have to say that in their design, armament, and propulsion plants, our ASW surface ships compare favorably with similar ships in the navies of the Western countries.

Our Navy's surface forces include high-speed guided missile ships and small combatants. These ships are unquestionably the pride of Soviet shipbuilding. Their creation was a new direction in world surface shipbuilding and had a considerable effect on the shipbuilding programs of Western countries.

[[Construction of guided-missile surface ships in the Soviet Union began with the development of experimental ships armed with a single launcher for cruise missiles. Subsequently we began the construction of ships with two launchers for such missiles. At approximately the same time, the Navy received the first guided-missile patrol boat armed with two cruise missiles.]]

On the basis of experience in building and operating the first guided-missile ships, more powerful guided-missile surface ships were developed and built, and later, guided-missile cruisers and new designs of guided-missile patrol boats as well. The guided-missile patrol boats can operate not only in closed-sea theaters but also in coastal areas of the oceans, accomplishing missions to destroy enemy surface ships and transports.

The installation aboard guided-missile cruisers and other guided-missile ships of powerful antiaircraft missile and gun weaponry and radars for air target detection and fire control has made it possible to successfully repel enemy attacks from the air.

As mentioned previously, during the Great Patriotic War our Navy constantly felt the need for specially built landing ships. The specific conditions under which our Navy was forced to operate made that problem, which was engendered by the lack of balance in its forces, particularly acute. While well understanding the Navy's need for those ships, we were still unable to build them in the first decade after the war because the shipbuilding industry was busy mainly with the construction of major surface combatants (cruisers, destroyers and escort ships), and also of transport ships for the Merchant Marine. Only in the second decade after the war did the addition to the Navy of specially built landing ships begin.

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At the present time, the surface forces of our Navy, represented by diverse oceangoing and coastal combatants, are capable of prosecuting a broad range of missions on the oceans and in closed sea theaters independently or in concert with submarines and aircraft.

The development of naval surface forces is not proceeding only along the path leading to new displacement ships with higher performance characteristics and more effective weaponry than their predecessors. Scientific-technical progress has presented the real possibility of developing fundamentally new surface ships possessing a series of tactical characteristics which are impossible to achieve in displacement ships.

On the basis of scientific-research and experimental-design work which has been intensively carried out since the early 1950's in the [[USSR,]] United States, Japan, Great Britain, France, and other highly developed countries, a considerable number of types of fundamentally new ships which have been generally termed surface-effect ships in world shipbuilding have now been built. They include hydrofoil shps, air-cushion vehicles, and others.

Surface-effect ships are to a certain degree devoid of many of the disadvantages inherent in displacement ships, such as high vulnerability to *the effects of* torpedo and mine weapons, insufficient speed, and limitations on areas for their combat employment, such as water depth, ice situation, and so forth.

Naval air-cushion vehicles and hydrofoils are employed abroad as patrol, landing, gun, and picket ships, and also as ships for the coast guard and border guard services.

The initial surface-effect ships were hydrofoil ships, which have been most highly developed [[abroad]] in the United States, Italy, and Japan.

The development of hydrofoil ships was a substantial step forward on the path to development of the surface fleet. However, the basic disadvantages inherent in surface ships could not be avoided, because hydrofoil ships were incapable of completely lifting off the water. Moreover, they were poorly suited to carry out certain combat missions, for example the rapid landing of amphibious landing parties particularly in shallow water areas due to the great danger of damaging the foils on the bottom.

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Thus, hydrofoil ships can be regarded as a transitional stage in the development of modern surface ships which differ in principle from displacement ships. These ships are air-cushion vehicles and wing-in-ground-effect vehicles, whose development is receiving great attention abroad. The air-cushion principle is applicable to ships of various displacements up to oceangoing ships. Possessing a speed greater than 100 knots, this kind of oceangoing ship is capable of crossing the Atlantic Ocean in 30 to 40 hours, whereas the conventional transport takes up to 8 days or more.

Air-cushion vehicles have a low specific power for their propulsion plants, which decreases as displacement increases, and a large utility factor, which increases as cargo carrying capability increases. The relative useful cargo carrying capacity is greater than in displacement ships.

The main tactical property of air-cushion vehicles lies in their ability to move over the water surface and over land, even over an ice cover, and their ability to travel over shallow water areas, and move freely from water, to land, to ice covered areas, and back again. All of this, combined with high speed and high cargo carrying capacity, gives the new ships a series of highly significant tactical advantages.

It is fully evident that, by possessing such qualities, the air-cushion vehicle will be able to find the broadest combat application. Foreign experts believe that in the future they will be employed as landing ships, aircraft carriers or attack ships armed with missiles and antiaircraft missile systems, as well as to seek out and destroy high-speed submarines and to plant mines. Combatants and auxiliaries of this type can play an important role in replenishment of ships at sea, carrying military cargo, accomplishing mine defense missions, screening naval forces during a sea transit, and so forth.

At this point in time more than 140 air-cushion combatants and auxiliaries have been built abroad; however, the majority of them (about 70%) have a relatively small displacement (up to 10 tons) and a limited speed (up to 80% of the ships have a speed of about 60 knots).

In attaching great importance to *construction of* air-cushion combatants, the United States, Great Britain, and France have expanded their efforts aimed at the building in future years of new combatants and auxiliaries of this type with a displacement of 4,000 tons or more with a speed of some 100 knots, even including ships with nuclear propulsion plants.

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In the area of wing-in-ground-effect vehicle building abroad, scientific-research and technical problems have been defined which touch mainly on the development of oceangoing, transport wing-in-ground-effect (WIG) vehicles. A total of a little more than ten flight models of WIG vehicles have been built, and a series of designs of WIG vehicles weighing from 100 to 2,000 tons have been prepared. Although experience in the construction and operation of these vehicles is still insufficient, one can already see promise in this direction. In comparison with air-cushion vehicles, WIG vehicles will have higher speed with lower energy expenditure, and, consequently, other conditions being equal, greater operating range. Moreover, they are capable of surmounting obstacles of considerable height.

Thus at the present time in many countries work is being done on a large scale to implement the latest achievements in science and technology in the field of surface ship construction. The development of surface-effect ships has already become a reality. There is no doubt that the mass appearance of such ships within naval inventories will increase their combat capabilities, and surface forces will be able to successfully prosecute combat missions and assume completely new qualities.

The further development of surface ships of various types is an important stage in building a modern balanced Navy.

In concluding the review of the postwar period of the development of surface ships, we must single out our priority in the development of a series of trends in the construction of this arm of the forces. This concerns primarily the development of missile-carrying ships armed with missiles of various ranges, and also ASW cruisers armed with helicopters.

Begun in its own time, the process of blending aircraft with surface ships, the material expression of which was the development of aircraft carriers, continues even today, but on a [[broader]] *deeper* technical base. In addition to the development of aircraft carriers in the navies of various countries, even greater attention is being devoted to the construction of qualitatively new helicopter-carrying ships. Our Navy also has them, and the United States, France, and other countries are constructing such ships. Many navies are striving to have as large as possible a number of ships of all types capable of carrying helicopters. This is explained primarily by the fact that the helicopter is to an ever greater degree becoming an "integral" part of modern surface ships of various types, imparting completely new combat qualities to them. Helicopter

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participation in submarine searches, for example, not only expands the field of "view" of the ship carrying them, but also considerably increases her capabilities for prolonged tracking of the detected enemy, and improves the reliability of destroying him with antisubmarine weaponry. By utilizing their considerable superiority in speed over a submarine and also their advantage in detection capabilities, helicopters create for the submarine those conditions under which it becomes difficult for her to avoid [[encountering]] an antisubmarine [[surface]] ship.

Ship-based helicopters are bringing about many other significant changes in the tactics of landing operations. For example, the US Navy employs a tactical device in an assault landing with the participation of helicopters which is called vertical envelopment of the enemy. It eliminates the need to make passages through barriers in the water and ashore and, what is most important, greatly increases the tempo of the landings, and the irresistible speed and momentum of the amphibious landing forces.

Ship-based helicopters also perform many other functions which make them an indispensable weapon in modern naval battle. Their functions are primarily reconnaissance and target indication for weaponry, transport and transfer of various objects to other ships underway, rescue of personnel, difficult jobs in servicing various types of technical equipment, and many others.

Naval Aviation. Prior to the appearance of missiles, aircraft were the main and only carriers of nuclear weaponry, and therefore they were made responsible for the destruction and neutralization of various important targets on land, and also for destroying attack groupings of naval forces at sea and in bases against which the forces and equipment of other branches of the armed forces could not effectively operate.

With the development of land- and sea-based missiles, the new capability arose to deliver nuclear warheads over great distances. The tremendous qualitative advance in the development of nuclear weaponry, submarines, and, to a degree, surface ships, led to a sharp change in the nature of naval warfare. The newly acquired capability to effectively operate against stationary targets made it possible to relieve naval aircraft of attacking such targets. That, of course, does not mean that naval aircraft will not be employed to deliver attacks against shore-based stationary targets. Modern aircraft have everything needed for such attacks, and consequently can accomplish those missions. However, under present-day conditions such aircraft operations should be regarded not as the rule, but rather as the exception, since the missions which until

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recently aircraft were supposed to accomplish have now changed. Today they can direct their main efforts against strike forces of surface ships, and submarines and transports, including those with troops and cargo in transit or in port, and can also destroy the most diverse, mobile, highly maneuverable, small targets at sea.

In connection with the change in missions, the role, position, and significance of each air arm as well as the trends in their development are being defined anew. For example, in the recent past, prior to the appearance of nuclear-powered missile-armed submarines, the main mission of aircraft in combat operations at sea was to destroy strike groupings of the enemy navy's warships. This doubtlessly had an appreciable effect on the development of aircraft systems, with which the destruction of surface ships was envisioned. Yet as an ever greater number of nuclear-powered submarines, above all of missile-armed submarines, entered the inventories of the navies of various states, and as the construction of them was widely expanded, antisubmarine warfare became the main mission of aircraft. Therefore, there is a sharp increase in the role and importance of antisubmarine aircraft which are capable of carrying out an effective search for and destroying submarines in distant areas of the sea and ocean theaters.

Considering the importance of the missions being accomplished by aircraft, and looking at the possible nature of naval warfare, it is fully logical to believe that the importance of aircraft in comparison with the last war is greatly increasing.

In citing the preconditions which had an effect on the employment of various aircraft at sea, we should dwell on the probable conditions under which aircraft could overcome air defense opposition. In this connection, we would note that in the past air defense capabilities were relatively limited, because groupings of warships at sea had mainly antiaircraft guns, and the range of detecting airborne targets was not great. With the appearance of antiaircraft missiles and electronic equipment for air surveillance, air defense capabilities increased sharply (the field of radar detection of airborne targets at low and medium altitudes has increased in depth and degree of sensitivity, and the combat capabilities of ships and fighter aircraft of the screening forces have improved), but the designers of airborne missiles have been able to ensure that the missile platforms launch the missiles at a range which is sufficient to eliminate the need to enter the zone of active fire from the antiaircraft defense system while delivering the attack. This, of course, does not mean that an ultimate

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superiority of aircraft over the air defense system has been achieved. The eternal competition between offensive and defensive weapons will continue with unweakening intensity.

The development of aviation technology and weaponry has had a great influence on aircraft capabilities in naval warfare. In that connection, in almost all countries there has typically been a clear trend toward specialization, i.e., toward designing aircraft to carry out fully defined missions. This is precisely why specially built search and strike ASW systems, attack systems for destroying surface ships, and reconnaissance systems for monitoring the sea situation are being added to the armament of aircraft in a majority of the countries. Information published in the foreign press shows that aircraft capabilities will increase if the so-called aviation systems are concomitantly developed to carry out missions which are fully defined and related in content and conditions of execution. It is believed that those systems will assure that aircraft can conduct operations according to the "independent search-detect-destroy" principle and, taking into account the high degree of effectiveness of aircraft nuclear-missile weaponry, will give it the capability of successfully combating naval forces at sea and will improve its independence, mobility, and combat readiness.

Modern electronic surface search equipment is being particularly rapidly developed (PPI radars, side-looking radars, electronic intelligence and radio intelligence equipment, infrared instruments, and television and other equipment), which enable aircraft to detect targets at sea at a range of several hundred kilometers and frequently considerably sooner than the ships spot the reconnaissance aircraft. With the aid of this search equipment not only can targets be spotted but the composition of ship groupings and the parameters of their movements can also be determined.

The manner of searching for submarines, especially nuclear-powered submarines with their high speeds and great diving depths, is considerably more complex. And, although the search [[for them]] is based on the use of the many physical fields which accompany a moving submarine, the detection of [[those fields]] *the submarine* presents many difficulties.

The growing combat capabilities of aviation units, the increase in range of the missiles launched by them, and the ability to overcome opposition by active forces and a ship's air defense system by employing those missiles, have made air nuclear-missile attacks against sea targets practically unstoppable. This rapid qualitative advance in the combat

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capabilities of aviation units and forces in the delivery of attacks against sea targets, along with other factors, foreordained significant changes in the employment of *naval* aviation, including changes in the principles of utilizing it, methods of accomplishing missions, organization of mutual support, control, and other types of support.

A clear trend has been seen in the postwar development of naval aviation for its comprehensive penetration onto various surface ships. Ship-based aviation presently is in the inventory, in one respect or another, of practically all ships with a displacement of from 3,000 to 4,000 tons. This is facilitated by a considerable improvement in helicopters and accelerated development of VTOL aircraft.

The combat capabilities of naval aviation are one of the main indicators of the striking power of our modern Navy. Naval aviation has become truly oceanic in nature, and it has been transformed into a most important naval warfare resource.

Weaponry and Combat Equipment. Immediately after the end of the Second World War work on developing qualitatively new military hardware, including hardware to be used at sea, was widely expanded in our country and abroad.

As is well known, the first missile weaponry *at sea* during the Second World War was employed in the Soviet Navy. They were unguided rocket projectiles of an Army model, and the very same guiderails which were developed for the *famed* "Katyusha" multiple rocket launchers[[, so famed in battle,]] were installed aboard torpedo boats for those projectiles.

The Americans were highly skeptical about that weaponry during the war. Only after they had received the first intelligence reports on the work being done in Fascist Germany on developing the V-2 did that attitude begin to undergo a radical change. Then the United States made great efforts, on the one hand, to obtain specific /data/ on the German rockets and, on the other, to conceal those /data/ from the USSR. That added to the complexity of the situation at that time.

In early 1944, when after massive raids by Allied aircraft on Peenemuende the Nazis moved the V-2 tests to occupied Polish territory, the Anglo-American military command used its ties with the Polish guerrillas to obtain models of the main system of the German rockets, which sometimes fell at considerable distance from the areas where the German search teams were waiting for them.

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The Pentagon's interest in the new weaponry is confirmed by the fact that prior to the Allied landing in Normandy the American military command carefully developed a plan for the secret Operation Paper Clip for capturing Nazi missile scientists. Von Braun, the designer of the V-2, and his group made that task considerably easier. With the approach of Soviet troops, they fled westward toward the American vanguard units.

With Von Braun's aid, the Americans took the first group of 102 of the more highly qualified Nazi scientists. Moreover, the American command took care to bring out all rockets which they found, both those which were assembled and those ready for assembly.

In order to more quickly master unmanned systems for delivering nuclear warheads to the target, immediately after the war the United States began to implement a program for building flight vehicles with air-breathing jet engines, or aerodynamic missiles. Several of the designs in this program, the REGAL, REGULUS-I, REGULUS-II, and MATADOR were medium-range aerodynamic missiles. The /missiles/ of the first three types were supposed to be launched from surface ships or from submarines on the surface, while the latter type of /missile/ was supposed to be launched from American military bases in Europe or Japan.

Two other designs, also developed within the framework of that program, the SNARK and the NAVAJO, were intercontinental type weapons, and their flight range was supposed to vary up to "more than one-fourth the distance around the globe."

A program for the construction of purely missile warhead delivery systems began to be rapidly expanded almost simultaneously. In that field the United States had already had by her own account several, albeit modest, successes. By the end of 1944, American missilemen had succeeded in carrying out the first experimental launch of the prototype of a ballistic missile, and in 1945 one of the test missiles of that type reached an altitude of 64 kilometers.

With the arrival of the German experts in the United States, work was begun on assembling and testing the V-2, and later also on perfecting it. The American leaders [[also]] made no less vigorous efforts to develop submarine nuclear-missile systems.

In 1946 a design group under the leadership of the naval engineer Rickover began to design a nuclear-powered missile-armed submarine. Much later, in November 1955, after the

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cessation of work on aerodynamic missiles for submarines, a joint Air Force and Navy working group was established and charged with examining the possibility of adapting the ATLAS missile for launch from surface ships and submarines. However, that group was dissolved rather soon, and its place was taken by another under the leadership of Admiral Raborn, which proceeded to design the Navy's POLARIS missile.

In September 1955, the POLARIS program was officially shifted to the category of a priority program of national importance. Gradually the missile program was moved to an accelerated schedule, whose goal was to obtain the "absolute" weapon more quickly. The statement of Wilson, who was then Secretary of Defense, that the missile program was carried out with unlimited financing cannot be considered an exaggeration: By spring of 1957, no less than 100,000 persons were /engaged/ in the implementation of the American missile program and 20,000 firms in 22 sectors of industry were working on it; even in 1952 the appropriations allocated for the implementation of the missile program exceeded 1 billion dollars, and the total expenses for those goals in the first postwar decade exceeded 17 billion dollars. "Congress," the NEW YORK TIMES later wrote, "has always approved all governmental budget projects for the development of missile weaponry."

In building the new hardware, Soviet scientists went their own way, confidently using as a basis the achievements of Soviet science and technology. The quest was begun in our country for possibilities of arming ships with qualitatively new missile weaponry at the same time as new missile weapon systems were being developed for the ground and air forces, and as the existing models, which had brilliantly proved themselves in the flames of the Great Patriotic War, were being upgraded.

New unguided missiles for our submarines appeared in our Navy in the late 1940's. In contrast to the Army missiles which were used during the war by [[torpedo boats]] *Soviet ships* primarily to fire against land targets, the new missiles were designed to destroy mainly enemy surface ships. Initially it was proposed to fire them from single-barrel and later multi-barrel unguided missile launchers; however, during the thorough test process, their low effectiveness in firing against a moving target became evident, and as a result such launchers were not developed.

Even in that day scientific research had made it possible to determine the tremendous advantages of missile weaponry over those such traditional means of naval warfare as guns of various calibers, even the heaviest guns. The advantages of these missile weapons lay primarily in their incomparably

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greater firing range and capability to deliver warheads of tremendous destructive power to the target. However, the accuracy of the arrival of the missile warhead at the target depends not so much on the technical qualities of the missile itself as on the accuracy and reliability of the target indication data (because the flight range of the missile is considerably greater than the range of the equipment for monitoring the surface situation found aboard missile-carrying ships), as well as on the missile flight control systems.

One has to consider the fact that replacing guns with missile weaponry inevitably [[required overcoming]] *generates* great difficulties associated with the installation of major size missiles aboard the ships existing at that time. However, the question was this: Either seek out the possibility of replacing guns with missile weaponry or, failing that, build qualitatively new warships.

Another important effort which was underway at that time was the development of cruise missiles for naval aviation. The intention to initially utilize [[that]] *a* missile to arm naval aircraft was due to the inadequate engine installed at that time in the missile, which limited the capability of launching it from aboard a ship. There were no limitations on launching it from an airborne platform.

In the course of work to improve [[that]] *the* missile, a new, even more promising trend in the development of missile weaponry was determined. Therefore, the development of shore-based and airborne systems was temporarily curtailed, and the main attention was focused on a versatile missile complex, which was intended to be employed to arm aircraft, surface ships, and shore-based launch installations. Work on them proceeded basically in a successful manner, and in the mid 1950's, a cruise missile was put into service in naval aircraft and with shore-based missile units.

The next stage in the development of cruise missiles was the development of missiles specially designed to arm small displacement combatants. This was a great achievement in the development of the combatants of our Navy, due to which the ships acquired completely new qualities, their capabilities were fundamentally altered, and consequently the methods of operational and tactical employment of naval surface forces in naval warfare also changed. The missile weaponry practically equalized the striking power of ships of various types. Even gunboats, which previously one could not even consider employing in battle against surface ships owing to their missile armament, turned out to be capable of destroying ships of practically any type.

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It should be noted, however, that for many years only the ships of our Navy were armed with cruise missiles. The navies of other countries were very careful in approaching the analysis of the capabilities of that weapon, and even after acknowledging its effectiveness did not hasten to put it into service. Only after the sinking of the Israeli destroyer EILAT by the Egyptian guided-missile patrol boat did cruise missiles receive recognition even in the navies of the traditional seapowers, which began to step up work to develop cruise missiles for surface ships of various types, intending to correct their mistake in a short time and at least achieve parity with the Soviet Navy in this area if not surpass it.

Because of the cruise missiles, high-speed guided-missile patrol boats were recognized as the striking force of a modern Navy. In Norway, for example, guided-missile patrol boats with four launchers were put into service[[, and 20 gunboats were backfitted with cruise missiles]]. Construction of guided-missile patrol boats is expanding in the FRG, Denmark, Italy, Israel, Greece, and other countries. Such seapowers as the United States, Great Britain, and France have also begun construction of guided-missile patrol boats. Many foreign naval experts today [[agree on the fact]] *believe* that guided-missile patrol boats give even small navies offensive capabilities out of proportion to the size of those navies.

Shipboard antiaircraft armament, which also has basically become missile armament, has undergone qualitative changes. The resolution of problems of antiaircraft missile armament established the conditions for a new approach to analyzing the actual combat capabilities of modern surface ships. [[By considerably improving]] *Creation of antiaircraft missiles considerably affected* the defensive qualities of surface ship forces [[antiaircraft missiles]] *and* created conditions under which surface ships can successfully carry out a combat mission far beyond the range of their own continental air defense system, trusting in the reliability of their own antiair defense.

In contrast to the missile armament of surface ships, which came to replace guns, primarily the main batteries, missile weaponry for submarines was a qualitatively new armament system which radically changed the submarines themselves, their mission, and combat capabilities with all of the resulting consequences.

Missile weaponry for submarines developed in two directions, the first of which envisioned development of cruise missiles to destroy major surface ships [[and large targets]]. The equipping of submarines with such missiles expanded their

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capabilities to utilize various weapons in the most advantageous combination in battle against *heavily screened* enemy ships and to deliver attacks against them without entering the zone of effective antisubmarine defense.

Another independent trend in the development of missiles for submarines was the development of long-range ballistic missiles. The first model of this kind of missile appeared in our Navy in the early 1950's. Later, more advanced models of ballistic missiles for submarines were built using the first missile as a basis. In the late 1950's the submarines put into service their first operational combat ballistic missile. However, it was not free of such a significant disadvantage as surface launching, for which purpose the submarine was forced to surface. Therefore, a persistent search was carried out for ways to conduct underwater launching of missiles and at the same time to increase their flight range. As a result of intensive research and numerous experiments, our submarine fleet received a missile which is launched from underwater. This marked the beginning of the development of the strategic nuclear submarine system of our Armed Forces. The submarines acquired the ability to carry out strategic missions precisely owing to the ballistic missiles which are launched from underwater, carry a nuclear warhead of tremendous power, and have a great flight range measured in thousands of kilometers.

The process of improving missile weaponry for submarines, surface ships, aircraft, and shore units continues even today. In this connection, range and firing accuracy are being increased, and the combat effectiveness of the missiles and of their platforms is growing. Missile weaponry firmly occupies the leading position within the Navy's armament system, and the Navy has acquired a solid arsenal of strategic systems to assure the accomplishment of complex missions in warfare. Today the Navy is capable of successfully carrying out strategic missions not only by destroying important targets in enemy territory, but also by destroying submarine platforms for nuclear weaponry at sea.

The creation of strategic cruise missiles is a new direction in development of missile weapons abroad. With a flight range of several thousand kilometers and low trajectory, these missiles are capable of penetrating enemy territory to a great depth and hitting installations there. The United States presently is performing extensive work to complete construction of such missiles, which can be launched from ground-based launchers as well as from surface ships, submarines, and aircraft.

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The Americans estimate that conditions for employing these missiles from seagoing platforms are very favorable in connection with opportunities for dispersing the platforms in the ocean expanses, employment of the missiles from underwater, and the considerable survivability of every underwater missile platform. It is therefore believed that US Navy capabilities for employing strategic weapons will be expanded substantially in the future.

After the end of the Second World War the opinion was widespread in the navies of various countries that the antisubmarine systems existing at that time, if not yet ideal, then were at least close to it. The basis for such an opinion was the unique process of competition between weapons of attack and defense in the sphere of submarine operations during the Second World War. The thing is that the development of submarines in that period proceeded mainly along the path of partially improving them on the basis of prewar materials and technology. In this connection, those improvements, even [[very]] substantial improvements, had an influence only on individual tactical characteristics of submarines, without simultaneously altering their main qualities and without freeing /them/ from those deficiencies which were organically characteristic of that type of warship. This process was most clearly followed in the submarines of the Fascist German Navy.

The antisubmarine forces of the navies of the Allied countries were established on a new technical base, in consideration of the latest achievements of science [[in that area]]. Therefore, during the Second World War the gap which had existed in the prewar years between the capabilities of attack systems and antisubmarine defense systems was considerably reduced. Yet the assertions that submarines did not win that competition and were defeated, as we have already noted, were very far from the true state of affairs.

As soon as the first *postwar* diesel-powered submarines [[of postwar construction]] appeared in which all those improvements that had been made in various navies in the Second World War were employed in an integrated manner *in thier construction*, and as soon as their operating depth was doubled and their submerged speed was increased, the gap between the capabilities of the offense and the defense was even more evident. Not a single navy had managed to develop submarine detection systems which could expand the sphere of "visibility" of the antisubmarine equipment up to values comparable with the ranges of antisubmarine weaponry being used by surface ships, aircraft, and attack submarines. The partial increase in range of "undersea vision" which was achieved in our Navy and in foreign navies did not

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solve that problem, since the capabilities of the submarines to leave the field of operation *of the detection system* became considerably greater than theretofore.

At the same time submarines were receiving ever greater recognition in all the navies as the mainstay of armed combat at sea, and were considered the main threat to surface combatants and transport ships. It was also important that, in both the Soviet Union and the United States, a search was begun in the early postwar years for ways to develop nuclear-powered submarines which, even according to the thinking of that period, were supposed to make [[very]] significant changes in the conditions of naval warfare in general, and in the accomplishment of antisubmarine missions in particular. Therefore the question of developing antisubmarine systems not only did not slip in importance, but became more and more acute. This was also due to the constantly increasing scale of scientific research, studies, and development of new systems for combating that dangerous enemy.

The intensive development of submarines, and especially the appearance of missile-armed nuclear-powered submarines, countermeasures against which had assumed the nature of a national mission, made [[the question of]] *necessary* the further, sharp improvement in the effectiveness of antisubmarine weaponry [[the order of the day]]. Even at the time it was clear that the primary solution to that problem should not be sought in improving existing hardware, because the technical possibilities of developing it were approaching a maximum. It was a question of developing completely new principles of antisubmarine warfare, which also brought about new requirements for antisubmarine systems.

The main requirement was that, in order to assure the destruction of missile-armed nuclear-powered submarines, it was essential to sharply increase the operating range of submarine detection systems, and to develop weaponry capable of destroying submarines through the entire range of their operating depths in the shortest possible time and with high probability. Based on those requirements [[and existing scientific data]], the development of antisubmarine weaponry was channeled toward improving homing systems, increasing the speed and range of torpedoes, and also increasing the depth at which targets could be destroyed.

The need to employ propulsion plants with a high specific capacity aboard combatants became especially apparent in the process of the postwar development of the Navy. That need was met in several ways, the most important of which was the design,

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improvement, and introduction of nuclear propulsion plants, and also the development and introduction of improved steam turbine, gas turbine, and diesel propulsion plants with a high specific capacity.

By greatly increasing the cruising time and range of ships, nuclear propulsion also significantly increased their combat capabilities. However, the fundamentally new qualities were imparted mainly to submarines, which were transformed into truly undersea combatants, which to the greatest degree embody such basic indicators of combat strength as speed, striking power, and undetectability. Submarines are also becoming full-fledged antisubmarine combatants, capable of detecting enemy missile-armed submarines, tracking them for a prolonged period of time and, when necessary, attacking them.

The equipping of submarines with nuclear propulsion sharply increased their power-to-weight ratio, their submerged cruising range, and speed. The [[introduction]] *use* of nuclear propulsion [[into]] *aboard* surface ships also considerably improved their combat capabilities: [[their]] cruising range at high speeds is increased, and at the same time their dependence on shore bases and support ships is reduced.

The improvement in steam and gas turbines and more efficient diesels have permitted the development of new surface ships with increased cruising ranges, endurance, and speed and have opened the way for the development of fundamentally new surface-effect ships, of which we spoke earlier.

In the process of the development of naval forces and hardware, a special place is occupied by electronics, which not only comprises the technical foundation of the systems for the control of forces, but is also an indispensable part of the most important weapons systems.

All forms of naval activity are to a greater or lesser degree, of necessity, linked to the employment of electronic equipment. The trends toward the automation of the control processes of shipboard systems, weapons complexes, and ships and forces attest to the growing role of electronics in the functioning of all control and weapons systems. That is precisely why superiority in the field of development of military electronics is becoming one of the indispensable conditions for military superiority over the enemy.

However, in improving the combat capabilities of weapons and forces, electronics at the same time makes control systems and equipment more vulnerable to enemy action. Now it is

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possible to hinder control not only by destroying the control systems themselves, but also by affecting their electronic equipment, as was convincingly demonstrated in the course of the Egyptian-Israeli wars of 1967 and 1973 and the combat operations in Vietnam.

On the whole, electronics, by penetrating deeply into all spheres of operations of the armed forces, and by occupying an important place in force and weapons control systems in all units and at all levels, is assuming the role of one of the decisive factors determining the actual relative strength of the forces and equipment of the opposing sides.

This circumstance is of special significance for the Navy, in whose sphere of operations electronic equipment is being employed [[considerably more]] *especially* widely [[and more diversely than in any other branch of the armed forces]]. Today the Navy has in its inventory the latest electronic equipment, which is built in shipboard (including airborne) and stationary versions. It is distinguished by its great operating range, accuracy in measuring target coordinates, high reliability, and extensive automation. All of this assures high-speed analysis of observational data, issuance of target indication data and current coordinates, and selection of optimal decisions for employing forces and weaponry.

At the present time, it is impossible to conduct combat operations without employing electronic equipment. Naval weaponry itself (missiles and even gun projectiles) has various electronic devices. The need to have a multitude of radar sets and systems aboard ship required a considerable volume of ship space [[to accommodate]] *for* the equipment and the personnel manning it and also a greatly enlarged superstructure and mast for the large number of antennas. The further expansion of the missions and capabilities of radar is producing an ever greater saturation of ships with radar equipment. The widespread employment of radar has made it possible for it to become an important factor in modern naval warfare.

Radar as a system of naval armament has introduced great changes into the organization and conduct of combat operations of its forces, which has brought about the need to develop principles for combat employment of radars as an indispensable part of naval tactics.

Under present-day conditions, greater significance is being attached to equipment for monitoring the subsurface situation, among which sonars and sonar arrays designed to detect submarines and surface ships, search for mines, and support ship

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navigation and rescue work occupy a special place. Sonar systems are being intensively developed in all navies and have already become an indispensable part of the equipment of submarines, surface ships, helicopters, aircraft, and fixed systems. The widespread employment of sonar has had a serious influence on the development of the navy and the art of naval warfare. Sonar capabilities are far from being exhausted, work on improving its effectiveness, especially for antisubmarine warfare, [[will continue,]] *is continuing,* and therefore even more effective devices for combating the enemy's naval forces will be developed.

Everyone well knows of the measures which have been taken in recent years by the Central Committee of [[our]] *the Communist* Party and by the Soviet government toward the radical improvement in scientific management in all areas of the life of our country. The Party teaches that the establishment of the material-technical base of Communism and the formation of the new man, the man of the Communist Society, greatly depend on the scientific organization of control.

The importance of control today has increased so much that it determines not only the degree of efficiency and results of the activity of a society, but also the [[actual]] capability of that activity. This is manifested especially clearly in naval warfare. The nature of naval warfare is distinguished by its global scale, the briefness of its engagements, and the considerable increase in the effectiveness of its combat operations in comparison with operations of the past. This circumstance greatly increases the responsibility of every commanding officer in making decisions and carrying them out without delay, and confronts him with the need to display exceptional operational efficiency appropriate to the dynamics of the events taking place.

It was not long ago at all, even during the years of the Great Patriotic War, that the Commander-in-Chief of the Navy could observe the field of battle in the main, decisive sector of an operation, give the necessary orders, and thereby directly influence its course. The combat equipment and its rapid operation were to a certain degree commensurate with man's capabilities. Control of forces was implemented with the aid of previously developed and [[entirely]] common methods without employing complex machines and equipment. Only three decades have passed since that time, yet the former approach to that matter is to a considerable degree outmoded. The enormous power of the weapons, the increase in their range and in the scale of combat operations, and the accelerated speed of reaction of military weapons, to the degree that it is already beyond man's

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physical capabilities, has forced a new look at the most important facet of waging war at sea, i.e., the means, methods, and organization of the control of naval forces.

In this case we will examine only the material without which control of naval forces is unthinkable today not only in the vast ocean spaces, but also in relatively small sea areas even when naval forces are carrying out missions of a tactical nature, limited in scale. Among these there is a special place for communications equipment, which for a long time has been the most important means for controlling forces and weaponry in any branch of the armed forces. Yet there is no branch of the armed forces for which the operating range of communication systems has such great significance as for the Navy, whose forces can be located in practically any area of the World Ocean, even the most distant areas. A modern Navy needs global communications capable of assuring control of forces located at a distance of tens of thousands of kilometers from their homeport areas.

Each of the branches of the armed forces has a specific operational environment within whose limits it exercises control of its forces with the aid of various communications equipment utilized in this given environment. The Navy also significantly differs from all of the other branches of the armed forces in this respect. It needs those kinds of communications equipment which will assure simultaneous control of its forces located in various environments: underwater and on the surface, in the air and on land.

One more specific feature of naval forces as the object of control lies in the fact that the forces operate not in a compact formation, as do, let us say, aircraft or ground troops, but rather in open combat formations and even as individual ships located at [[very]] great distances from one another.

In view of these objective causes, the Navy needs the kind of organization of communications which will permit reliable control of its highly mobile forces located at enormous distances from their homeports, and operating in various environments, in open formations, covering many thousand miles along a front and also over the same distances within the ocean depths. [[Taking these special features of]] *In* modern warfare [[into account,]] these communications must be high-speed, constant, stable against enemy jamming, and they must be two-way.

Taking into account these features and requirements, a communications system for our Navy has been developed which is gradually being extended far beyond the boundaries of the seas

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adjacent to [[our]] *the* territory *of the Soviet Union*, as the forces of our Navy have become familiar with ever newer and more distant areas of the World Ocean. Today the ships, aircraft, and command posts of the Navy are equipped with powerful communications equipment which provide reliable control of naval forces over great areas.

Underlying the process of control, including control in the area of naval operations, lies the work of the men implementing or supporting this process. This most complex work in all cases amounts to two types of intellectual activity by man: the analysis and synthesis of information, or, as they say in the armed forces, the estimate of the situation, and the preparation of the decision.

Efficiency in the control process considerably depends on the completeness, refinement, and accuracy of the analysis on one hand, and on the maximum correctness (lack of error) of the synthesis of the information, on the other. The completeness and optimal correlation of those two individual processes will assure maximum efficiency in the work of the command and headquarters departments in the area of the control of naval forces.

When preparing decisions on the basis of which all the combat and daily activity of the forces and organs of control of the Navy proceed under present-day conditions, the commander is obliged to bring out possible alternatives, i.e., various paths toward achieving a goal and various methods of accomplishing each mission with an analysis of the advantages of each in order to select the optimal variant.

It is fully evident that the realization of those requirements in the process of organizing and planning combat and daily naval operations, and more so in the process of conducting operations of various scales which extend over vast areas of the ocean, is unthinkable without the extensive employment of modern technical equipment based on the use of computer technology.

Concurrently with efforts to develop new computer technology on a broad scale in the postwar years in industry, scientific research was being conducted in the Navy, in the process of which a method was developed for the practical utilization of computer equipment to improve the efficiency of the combat employment of naval forces.

The postwar period of development of our Armed Forces was a special stage in their history. The foundations of the ocean-going nuclear-missile Navy of the Soviet Union were /established/ at that time.

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The special characteristics of naval forces, their high maneuverability, their ability to assemble covertly and form powerful groupings of surprise to the enemy, and also their greater ability to withstand the effects of nuclear weapons than that of forces operating on land, have advanced navies to the fore of modern means of armed combat. Their employment under conditions of nuclear-missile warfare is associated with the introduction of much that is new in tactics and operational art, in the design of warships, and in their equipment and armament.

An important circumstance determining the trend in the construction of our Navy was the fact that the strategic situation which arose in the World Ocean in the postwar period was characterized by unified planning of the development and employment of the navies of the imperialist states. At the time when various types of missiles were becoming the main weapon of the Navy, they enabled the latter to renounce the traditional criteria for determining the strength of force groupings at sea.

Although military-technical progress is constantly introducing innovations into all areas of military affairs, the final goals of naval warfare remain the same: to defeat the enemy, to destroy his men and material, i.e., his ships with their crews and weapons stores, or shore objectives [[located within range of modern weapons from seaward]].

The qualitative changes occurring in naval forces have also altered the approach to analyzing the comparative strength of navies and their combat groupings with respect to their capabilities for achieving those goals. We have had to abandon the comparison of numbers of ships of one type or another, their total displacement (or the number of weapons in a salvo or the weight of a salvo) and shift to a more complex, but also more correct analysis of the offensive and defensive strengths of ships based on the mathematical analysis of their capabilities and qualitative characteristics.

The vast effort to build and develop an oceangoing Navy in the postwar period entailed the development of a corresponding theory of the art of naval warfare, which today is characterized by new categories and a unique interpretation of former concepts and principles. The area of employment of the Navy and the range of missions being prosecuted by it have expanded. In other words, cardinal changes, both in the new alignment of forces in the world arena and in the forces and equipment themselves, have occurred in the sphere of operations of the navies in the postwar period. Yet this naturally has had an effect on methods of naval warfare, the missions of the navies, and the

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role which our Navy is called upon to play in the defense of the country from the attacks of aggressors. The Navy undoubtedly will continue to develop even further and in a highly intensive manner so long as the threat of attack by an aggressor on our country does not disappear. And if it is true that a combatant embodies the latest achievements in technical progress, then the warships of the future will also reflect the level of development of science and industry in our country.

Today it is difficult to assert what heights human thinking can attain in the next 20 to 25 explosive years, but one can say with certainty that warships will not resemble today's ships.

To our mind, this "lack of resemblance" will primarily be displayed in the increasingly more widespread replacement of traditional systems of guns and torpedoes, which are common today, with missiles and new electronic systems. Even today the Americans are developing laser technology in general, and high energy lasers in particular, which, in their opinion, will lead to the development of completely new military technology and, consequently, to the appearance of new tactics.

We do not doubt the fact that warships of the future will need propulsion plants of colossal power which will assure not only the rapid movement of ships in various environments, but also provide for the needs of the [[ever]] growing number of diverse electronic equipment and instruments of detection, control, and communications. Air-capable ships, and indeed other combatants, will to an ever greater degree be equipped with VTOL aircraft and other air vehicles like the modern helicopter, but of a more advanced type To an ever greater degree combat operations will move into the subsurface and air environments.

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[[In the conclusion to this chapter we can say that]] The alignment of forces in the international arena and the sharp increase in the capabilities of modern navies to affect armed combat on all fronts provide the basis for the assertion that the absolute and relative significance of naval warfare in the overall course of a war has undoubtedly increased.

Today our Armed Forces have within their inventory a fully modern oceangoing Navy equipped with everything necessary to successfully accomplish the missions assigned to it on the ocean expanses with respect to assuring the security of the country and protecting its interests at sea.

It is essential to stress once more the fundamental difference in goals for which the navies of the imperialist

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states on one hand, and the Navy of the Soviet Union on the other hand have been established and exist. Whereas the naval forces of the imperialist states are an instrument of aggression and neocolonialism, the Soviet Navy is a powerful factor creating favorable conditions for the building of Socialism and Communism, a factor for the active protection of peace and for the strengthening of international security.

The Central Committee of the Communist Party and the Soviet government, in bringing to life the teachings of V. I. Lenin on strengthening the defense of the country, are [[displaying]] *giving* unremitting attention to strengthening the Armed Forces of the state and to the harmonious, balanced development of an oceangoing Navy which meets today's requirements and is capable of carrying out the missions assigned to it. Through the efforts of the Soviet people, this Navy continues to be built, developed, and improved on the basis of [[rapid]] *achievements of* scientific-technical progress.

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1. *Brezhnev, L. I. Vozrozhdeniye (The Rebirth). Moscow, Politizdat, 1978, p. 7.*

2. *Cf:* Barjot, P. Flot v Atomnyy Vek (Vers la marine de l'age atomique) [The Navy in the Atomic Age], Foreign Language Publishing House, Moscow, 1956.

3. *Both blocs fell apart in 1978-1979 under attacks by the national liberation movement.*

4. The total displacement of the ships of the British Navy was 3.5 million tons.

5. Citation from the book: Listvinov, Yu. N. Pervyy Udar (First Strike), International Relations Publishing House, Moscow, 1971, p. 12.

6. Finletter, T. K. Sila i Politika (Power and Policy; US Foreign Policy and Military Power in the Hydrogen Age), Foreign Literature Publishing House, Moscow, 1956, p. 128.

7. Taylor, M. Nenadezhnaya Strategiya (The Uncertain Strategy [The Uncertain Trumpet]), Voyenizdat, Moscow, 1961, p. 89.

8. Citation from the book: Voyennyye Doktriny Stran NATO (The Military Doctrines of the NATO Countries), Voyenizdat, Moscow, 1966, p. 71.

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9. ARMY, NAVY, AIR FORCE JOURNAL, 10 August 1966.

10. *"Comrade L. I. Brezhnev's Answers to Questions by the American Journal TIME," in PRAVDA, 16 January 1979.*

11. Programma Kommunisticheskoy Partii Sovetskogo Soyuza (The Program of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union), Political Publishing House, Moscow, 1971, pp. 110-111.

12. Her displacement was about 90,000 tons, and her main armament was up to [[120]] *95* aircraft. The time required to build her was about four and one-half years.

13. *Of these, two are in reserve.*

14. *A displacement of 91,400 tons, carrying up to 100 aircraft.*

15. *Including* five GEORGE WASHINGTON-Class [[nuclear]] submarines [[which were initially armed with POLARIS A-1 missiles, were]] converted [[to POLARIS A-3 missiles]] in the period 1964-1967, *and* [[the conversion of]] five ETHAN ALLEN-Class submarines [[to POLARIS A-3 missiles, which was begun in late 1972, is scheduled to be completed in 1975]] *converted in the period 1972-1976.*

16. *The TRIDENT-1 missile has a range up to 8,000 kilometers and the TRIDENT-2 missile has a range up to 12,000 kilometers.*

17. *Cf: MORSKOY SBORNIK, No 7, 1977, p. 89.*

18. The first three of these elements are: the submarine nuclear-missile system, land-based strategic missiles, and strategic aircraft.

[[12. ZARUBEZHNOYE VOYENNOYE OBOZRENIYE, No. 11, 1974, pp. 68, 71.]]

19. By the [[late 1970's]] *early 1980's* the United States alone plans to have about 90 nuclear-powered multipurpose submarines.

20. *Citation from KOMMUNIST, No. 8, 1978, pp. 9, 10.*

21. Citation from the book: Listvinov, Yu. N. Pervyy Udar (First Strike), p. 19.

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[[15. Grechko, A. A. Vooruzhennyye Sily Sovetskogo Gosudarstva (The Armed Forces of the Soviet State), Military Publishing House, Moscow, 1974, pp. 314-315.]]

22. *Sovetskaya Voyennaya Entsiklopediya (Soviet Military Encyclopedia). Moscow, Voyenizdat, 1977, Vol. 3, p. 225.*

23. Marx, K. and F. Engels. Sochineniya (Works), 2d Edition, Vol. 20, p. 171.

24. Barjot, P. Flot v Atomnyy Vek (The Navy in the Atomic Age), pp. 261-262.

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CHAPTER IV

Modern PROBLEMS OF THE ART OF NAVAL WARFARE

The art of naval warfare is an historical category[[, because there is a correspondence between each period of history and its own theory and practice of the art of naval warfare which]]. *It* adequately reflects the [[level achieved in the development of naval material.]] *objective capabilities of the material means of warfare in a given period.*

The art of naval warfare has developed unevenly in the course of many centuries of the history of navies. It has known a smooth, gradual movement forward and various explosions [[which raised it to previously seemingly unattainable heights]]. The periods of decline most frequently coincided with increased reaction and depression in economic and political life. The periods when it thrived normally coincided with revolutionary events in the lives of peoples. This was true, for example, in the case of the radical change in the field of military affairs associated with the victory of the Great October Socialist Revolution which, by opening up the broad road to creative work for the masses of the people, paved the way for great revolutionary transformations in military affairs, which were needed by the young Socialist government in the struggle against the imperialists who were trying to take away the power which the people had won.

The art of naval warfare, like any other scientific theory, is closely linked to practice, and is based on experience in past wars and on the diverse experience of operational and combat training conducted in peacetime. [[Practice is the criterion of the truth.]] Without studying the experience of past wars and selectively drawing on it, one cannot assure the development of the *contemporary* art of naval warfare. The study of historical experience based on dialectical materialism is a method of comprehending the patterns of naval warfare[[, and the laws, paths, and trends in the development of the art of naval warfare]].

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[[The development of the art of naval warfare is closely tied to the development of the art of war, despite the fact that, even with the common nature of the goals of the ground forces and navies, their operational missions and methods, which are determined by their environment and material, differ considerably.]]

THE STRATEGIC EMPLOYMENT OF A NAVY

Among the many categories comprising the totality of the art of naval warfare, special places are held by the strategic employment of a navy and the problem of coordinating its efforts with the actions of other branches of the armed forces to achieve common goals in an armed struggle organized on the basis of a unified military strategy. The principle of the unity of military strategy objectively arose at the time of the appearance of mixed armed forces. One may assert with a certain degree of accuracy that as a battle by a tactical grouping of mixed forces requires the development of tactics which would be common for all elements of a combat formation, so then does the armed struggle as a whole have a unified military strategy as its basis.

Whereas this was understood in tactics and was realized practically in the very first battles which were conducted by the ground forces and Navy, on the strategic level, despite the objective requirement for a unified military strategy, the recognition of such a strategy as the methodological foundation of warfare came considerably later. At the same time, a need has always existed for the realization of a unified military strategy in practice. The significance of this requirement has varied in different stages of history. This situation is of paramount significance under today's conditions, when all branches of the armed forces have at their disposal particularly powerful and long-range weaponry and when they are all capable of carrying out missions in various spheres of warfare. In this connection, they are capable of employing their own striking power not only in their traditional sphere of operations, but also far beyond its limits.

Distant regions of sea and ocean theaters have come into range of land-based missile weaponry. In turn, the Navy has become capable of more effectively operating against targets on land with its own missile weaponry.

Similar changes have also occurred in the sphere of operations of the other branches of the armed forces. All of this undoubtedly has increased the need for and the significance of

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coordinating their efforts at all levels and on all scales from the strategic to the tactical level. Moreover, each of the branches of the armed forces retains specific characteristics, inherent only to it, of employing its arms in peace and war, and also in its ways and methods of conducting combat operations, which are due primarily to the medium in which it conducts those operations. Various views of the content of the concept of "strategy" often are enunciated in theoretical works under the influence of these specific characteristics; these views include an acknowledgement of the need to divide strategy into land, sea, and air strategy.

In studying the question of the strategy of warfare, one must take into account one important fact -- the difference in the content of the contribution to this concept made by our own and foreign military theoreticians.

Soviet military doctrine, being based on Marxist-Leninist methodology and on the experience of past wars, firmly adheres to its position on the recognition of a unified military strategy. In this connection, it regards the art of war, which includes three component parts -- strategy, operational art, and tactics -- as a most important part of military science. In many foreign countries, a category such as operational art belongs to the area of strategy. This naturally leaves an imprint on the content of military strategy, which often is subdivided into general and particular strategies and into the strategies of the branches of the armed forces.

The appearance and the prolonged separate existence of military (or, as it is sometimes called, land) strategy and naval strategy have historically proved of little value, and, at certain stages in the development of armed forces, have stemmed to a certain degree from the limited capabilities for mutual support by the Army and Navy due to the level of development of the material means for warfare, including the means for control and communications. At the same time, the Navy has since ancient times been capable of, and has conducted, warfare not only against the enemy navy, but also against ground troops, against which the delivery of naval strikes often has played an important role in achieving the intermediate strategic goals of the war and which has often led to the occupation of certain territories. Of important significance is the fact that, when waging war with contiguous countries, a defeat of troops on land was fraught with the threat of the loss by the defeated power of its own independence, while at the same time defeat at sea has frequently led only to a loss of part of the Navy's forces, and, in the worst case, to a loss of previously captured territories. In other words, the employment of navies in wars was regarded in

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those far off times as a method of more easily, quickly, and effectively achieving the goals of war. Increasingly this trend was strengthened in practice by the strategic employment of the armed forces of seapowers and was increasingly more vividly displayed in the differentiation of strategy into two strategies: land and naval strategy, although both of them serve the very same state policy, jointly supporting the achievement of the common goals stemming from this policy. Thus, the appearance and independent existence side-by-side of two strategies over the course of centuries have determined the principles for the conduct of warfare and the employment in war of land armies and naval forces. The development of this trend has also been influenced by various factors of a political, economic, and social nature among which, in our view, the emerging process of development of the structure of capitalism, which was accompanied by major colonial robbery and the seizure of newly discovered lands, should be kept foremost in mind. Subordinated to the goals of colonial seizure, naval strategy increasingly broke away from the strategy of the ground forces, acquiring new traits and features, and new followers.

The more the maritime rivalry of the imperialist plunderers grew, the more the theses of naval strategy, unconditionally adopted by the navies of these countries as a practical guide, acquired an international character. These theses thereby were confirmed to be stable, universal, and effective in any war, regardless of its nature. In this regard, Mahan wrote: "From time to time, the edifice of tactics changes or is entirely blown away, but the old foundations of strategy remain as unshaken as if they rested on rock."[1] The theses of naval strategy, the concepts of naval warfare, the principles of gaining command of the sea, the factors of seapower, and so forth, were elevated to universal dogmas, supposedly ensuring the successful accomplishment of all plundering missions.

Analyzing past wars from the point of view of these dogmas has become fashionable. Attempts are even made to explain bourgeois revolutions in capitalist countries from the point of view of the effect of naval force on these revolutions. The concepts of naval strategy have become a fetish to such a degree that in a number of countries the postulates of this strategy are accepted as a concentrated expression of the content, goals and methods of imperialist policy. The well-known thesis of the strategy of command of the sea even today serves as the foundation of the expansionist plans of imperialism, which is busy in its quests for new avenues to achieve world supremacy.

The victory of the young American state over the decrepit Spanish colonial power in the war of 1898 fostered a further heating up of the hullabaloo concerning naval strategy, and

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fostered a publicizing of its all-conquering force, its universality, and its suitability for all times and all peoples.[2]

The laurels of the easy victory achieved by the American imperialists did not rest easy with the militarists of Japan, which was one more pretender to the role of the leading sea-power that had embraced the dogmas of naval strategy as the main credo of its own expansionist policy. With the aid of the universal methods of gaining an easy victory recommended by the naval strategy of the Western countries, the Japanese attempted to achieve their own immediate aggressive aims, counting on the striking power of its own armored fleet in the Russo-Japanese War.

The fundamental question of the Russo-Japanese War, i.e., gaining command of the sea, was resolved to the advantage of the Japanese Navy. As V. I. Lenin noted in his article "The Fall of Port Arthur," among the reasons for the defeat of Russia in this war the "criminal ignoring of the elementary principles of naval and land strategy" was of important significance.[3] *While the latter, i.e., the land strategy, had been thoroughly worked out in Russia, the former was still in the conception stage at the outbreak of the Russo-Japanese War.*

Actually at the end of the 19th century in Czarist Russia insufficient attention was being devoted to the theoretical thinking on the patterns of armed combat in sea theaters. Still worse was the matter of the practice of strategic planning. The higher military command frequently worked out plans for war separately for the Army and Navy, ignoring the need to coordinate them. The land war plan in the Far East, for example, was based on the premise that the Japanese would not risk landing on the shores of Korea Bay without first having defeated the Russian Fleet. The Naval High Command evaluated the situation differently. On the naval plane it was believed that the Russian Fleet could not prevent the landing of Japanese troops on the eastern and southern coasts of Korea due to their proximity to the Japanese Islands. It is well known what this lack of coordination and contradictions in the recommendations of each of the war plans and the failure to aim toward a unified military strategy led to.

As the armed forces developed and the technical means of warfare and control were improved, capabilities which were new in comparison with the era of the sailing fleets appeared in the organization and maintenance of coordination between forces of the Navy and Army at all levels, from the operational-tactical level up to the strategic level.

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Therefore, doubts had arisen already he beginning of the 20th century as to the correctness and advisability of having two independent strategies. These doubts began to grow after the Russo-Japanese War. All of this served as the basis for domestic military thinking to decisively review the relationship between naval and land strategies. A professor at the Russian Naval Academy, N. Klado, wrote in this regard: "The principles of strategy are the very same for a war in every situation, i.e., on land, at sea, and in the air. This means that everything worked out by our ground forces colleagues in connection with the principles of this science also serves us. Yet indeed this is very little. There still remains the broad area of applying these principles to standard combinations of situations. This cannot be done for us, and, of course, the ground forces military writers have not done this, since they are unfamiliar with the situation of naval war."[4] He further noted: "The division of strategy as a science into land and naval strategy is both unnatural and harmful in the respect that it deepens the estrangement between the Army and Navy. That is why practical strategy, i.e., the strategic art, can be divided into all sorts of strategies."[5]

Thus, the military thinking of the Russian Empire had a very cautious regard for the hypertrophied, one-sided interpretation of naval strategy which the potential enemies of Russia in the area of naval rivalry were counting on. And therefore it is not accidental that Russia objectively turned out to be the first country in which the need for a unity in military strategy was recognized earlier than in the West.

At the same time Western naval theoreticians were hypnotized by the experience of the employment of navies in the Russo-Japanese War. This experience had an influence on the construction of navies in the interwar period. It was the methodological foundation of the planning and organization of naval operations in the First World War. However, errors in the prewar plans for conducting it were detected even in the course of this war.

Both the land and the naval strategies of the belligerents and their plans for the war on land and at sea turned out to be bankrupt. They most vividly revealed such most important defects as the degree of isolation and the lack of coordination of the ideas of the war on land and at sea and the underestimation of the technical capabilities of the navies. As is well known, prior to the outbreak of World War I, military theoreticians, proceeding from the recognition of the two strategies, believed that an Army and Navy should exist and be developed independently of one another. It was also recognized that the

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combat operations of an Army and Navy could be conducted jointly, but the constant coordination of their efforts on a major scale was not envisioned.

Quests for a way out of this "strategic impasse" in which both belligerents found themselves in the course of World War I led their military-political leaderships to conclusions which, while different in content, were similar with respect to results. The German command more or less came to think that with the aid of the Navy it would succeed in undermining the weakened economy of England and the stability of the ground forces of the Entente on the Western Front, interdicting their supplies by sea and thereby bringing the end of the war closer.

The Entente command, in turn, by strengthening the blockade of Germany from the sea, counted on completely isolating it from the outside world. According to its calculations, this was supposed to exhaust the resources of the enemy to a significant degree and create the prerequisites for achieving victory. All of this forced the military leadership of the belligerents to gradually depart from their former orientation on two independent strategies and to strive to unite the efforts of the Army and Navy to achieve the goals of war, which had been defined by a unified strategy independently of the view of the general staffs.

The practice of the strategic leadership of the armed forces in all spheres of warfare began to contradict with increasing frequency the separateness of the strategies and with increasing clarity confirmed the advisability of uniting them under the aegis of a common war strategy stemming directly from the policy of the state. And although, on the theoretical level, naval and land strategy continued to exist independently, as the entire course of events showed, they objectively were integral parts of a common war strategy regardless of whether the theorists recognized this or not.

Yet even this fact could not shake the positions of the proponents of divided strategies, who obstinately did not want to take into account either the experience of the latter campaigns of World War I (which actually were run according to principles of a unified military strategy), or the experience of the Civil War in the Soviet Republic, where the young Armed Forces of the Soviet state from the first days of their creation have been undeviatingly led by the principle of the unity of military strategy.

The Second World War once again confirmed the bankruptcy of the concepts of parallel strategies which, as was already

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mentioned, both belligerents had tried to move away from even prior to the end of World War I.

An analysis of the experience of the Second World War shows that the overwhelming number of belligerent states actually adhered in practice to concepts of a common strategy, the component parts of which were naval and land strategies and which were sometimes called theater and sector strategies.

However, an obliviousness to the experience of the past, the ignoring of the lessons of history, and the blind belief in the permanency and unchanging nature of the principles of naval strategy continued on the theoretical plane.

The Soviet Armed Forces were guided in the Great Patriotic War by a unified military strategy which directed the actions of all branches of the Armed Forces toward achieving a common goal and toward the successful fulfillment of strategic missions on land and at sea. The unity of Soviet military strategy and its universal nature are truly a great achievement of our Armed Forces.

Owing to the unity of their strategy, the Soviet Armed Forces had none of the problems for which the military theorists and major military leaders of a majority of the capitalist countries sought ways to resolve. It was no accident that some of the foreign figures who displayed an inclination toward objective analysis of events and phenomena not only arrived at the conclusion regarding the need to have a unified strategy, but were even guided by one concept or another of such a strategy in practice.

As was noted above, a striving toward a unity of strategies was characteristic even of World War I. Yet as soon as the flames of the world war had been extinguished, they forgot about this rather quickly. Witness to this was the mass of publications of all types appearing abroad after World War I, and especially after World War II. Theories of land, naval, and air strategies were enunciated in them and recommendations were given on diverse military doctrines whose authors tried to surpass one another in the originality of their works. This tendency is characteristic to this day of the military theorists of the imperialist states.

At first there were strategies (sometimes called doctrines) based on the US monopoly of nuclear weapons -- strategies which were most widespread in the mid-1950's. Yet the more the nuclear-missile power of the Soviet Armed Forces grew, the more clearly untenable these strategic lines became. Therefore, new

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strategies came to light: "flexible response" and "realistic deterrence," which, in continuing to retain their aggressive essence, only altered the means and ways of achieving their goals.

In recent years the US has proceeded to the practical realization of still another strategy, the so-called oceanic strategy, the essence of which is a greater concentration of strategic, nuclear-missile capabilities in naval forces.

It is characteristic that all these naval, oceanic, nuclear-missile, air, space, and other modifications of strategies are now emerging, not independently, but as component parts of an overall strategy of the imperialist powers that is a continuation and an expression of their aggressive policy permeated by anti-Communism and directed toward the achievement of world supremacy. The unity of strategies is regarded by bourgeois military figures as a condition making it possible to employ the Army and Navy more fully and purposefully to combat the forces of peace and Socialism. Actually this is a unique form of the agony of American military doctrine which is dreaming in its quest for an alternative capable of extracting it from a blind alley in the face of the increasingly more evident truth of its inability to crush socialism.

The unified Soviet military strategy, reflecting the policy of the Communist Party, directs all branches of the Armed Forces toward the solution of one mission or another in accordance with the situation. While being the same for all branches of the Armed Forces, Soviet military strategy calls for the strategic use of these forces both jointly and as individual services independently taking into account their specific capabilities. Therefore, in some cases it requires the employment of the Armed Forces as a whole to carry out missions which arise, and in other cases [it calls for] individual components of these forces, having appropriate scientifically-based arguments and recommendations for this.

An important task of Soviet military strategy is to unite all components of the military power of the state so that the organic whole turns out to be significantly greater than the simple sum of its component parts.

The special and constantly increasing significance of the missions carried out by the Navy, the expansion of the sphere of its employment, and its increased capability to have a decisive influence on the course and even the outcome of a war as a whole are bringing about an intensive and comprehensive development of the forms of the strategic employment of the Navy. Moreover, it

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should be remembered that today there is not and cannot be a sphere of warfare in which any one branch of the Armed Forces is the absolute sovereign.

Modern military operations represent the joint employment of various branches of the Armed Forces in the name of achieving a common goal. In this connection, specific military operations objectively predetermine the leading role for one branch of the Armed Forces or another, which carries out the main missions of the armed struggle under given specific conditions. The forms of the strategic employment of naval forces in warfare in the oceanic theaters of military operations are naturally brought to the forefront during the accomplishment of missions by forces comprised basically of naval forces which, in turn, are supported by the operations of other branches of the Armed Forces. And in such a case it is possible and even advisable to scrutinize the forms of employment of our Armed Forces (not only or primarily the Navy) in accomplishing strategic missions in oceanic theaters of military operations.

The trend toward concentrating strategic nuclear systems in the sphere of naval operations, which has been noted and has received widespread development abroad, has brought about a further growth in the role of the Navy, and of the oceanic theaters and sectors in wartime. This in turn has evoked the need for a versatile orientation of military strategy, permitting a more expedient utilization of the branches of the Armed Forces under any variant of the conduct of war and as the significance of the continental and oceanic theaters of military operations varies in a war. It is therefore right, in our view, to examine under today's conditions not a great number of strategies, even within the framework of the unified strategy, but rather the strategic employment of the branches of the Armed Forces brought about by their specific features and the sphere of their employment within the framework of the unified military strategy.

The need to improve the forms of the strategic employment of Armed Forces in the struggle in the oceanic theaters of military operations stems naturally from practical requirements. Military science is called upon to aid in this in every way by researching the problems of employing various forces in war which are unified by a common purposefulness and, in the final analysis, by a common goal.

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Thus, we have arrived at the conclusion that the problems of the art of naval warfare embrace a broad range of questions. An important place among them is held by such questions as predicting the nature of naval warfare and, in accordance with this, defining requirements for equipping and training the Navy, and working out effective methods of coordination among all

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branches of the Armed Forces in the oceanic theaters. This also essentially is part of the concept of "the strategic employment of the Navy within the framework of the unified military strategy." This strategic unity in the employment of Armed Forces at the same time is based on specific differences in the operational art and tactics of each of the branches of the Armed Forces, and this operational art and tactics serve as categories of the unified strategy. The study of these differences and an analysis of the accumulated historical experience indeed will serve the goals of improving the strategic employment of the Navy.

FLEET AGAINST FLEET AND FLEET AGAINST THE SHORE

The development of the art of naval warfare is linked closely with the development of military art, despite the fact that, with the common nature of goals of ground forces and naval forces, their missions and methods of operation as determined by the environment and means of warfare, differ substantially.

The main mission of ground forces, as we know, has always been to destroy the adversary in order to occupy his territory and objectives. In this instance, one can graphically express the [[mission of]] ground force operations from a purely military point of view by the formula "soldier against soldier." It is another matter with the Navy. In addition to missions concerned with engaging the enemy fleet, the Navy also has missions involving operations against territories and against groupings of ground forces deployed in those territories. Thus, the formula "soldier against soldier" when applied to the Navy takes the form of "fleet against fleet and fleet against shore."

It is natural that throughout history the relationship between these two missions has not been constant. In fleet-against-fleet operations we can include battles and operations involving the destruction of enemy ships at sea and in bases and the battle for sea and ocean communications (interdiction and defense). A striking example of this was the campaigns, naval operations, and battles of the First World War, in the course of which the Navy operated very little against the shore. However, there are many examples in history of active naval operations against the shore. Landings by amphibious forces on various scales and ship gunfire attacks on targets located ashore have been traditional. The new methods of naval operations against the shore lie in the delivery of attacks by carrier aircraft against ground targets and groupings of forces and in the destruction of strategically and economically important land targets by submarine-launched nuclear-missile attacks.

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Since the goals of war have been achieved primarily by occupying enemy territory, successful naval operations against the shore have brought greater results than fleet-against-fleet operations. In the first instance, the Navy has accomplished a direct "territorial" mission, while in the second case the victory over the enemy fleet [[only]] created the *conditions, at times very important, but nevertheless only* conditions for the subsequent accomplishment of [[territorial]] missions *for capturing territory*. It is true that in individual cases such conditions were of dominant significance in comparison with the associated ground force actions. For example, the British Navy's defeat of the so-called invincible Spanish Armada in the Atlantic Ocean completely eliminated the possibility of invasion of English soil by the Spanish ground forces. The already cited defeat of the French squadron at Abukir Bay doomed to failure Napoleon's plan to conquer Egypt. The defeat of the Spanish squadron by the American fleet off the Lesser Antilles Islands and off the Philippines actually decided the outcome of the territorial pretensions of the Americans and, consequently, also the outcome of the Spanish-American War.

Decisive and active operations by the Soviet Navy in the Great Patriotic War forced the German command to completely abandon its attempts to employ its Navy against Soviet ground forces and to capture territory from seaward even in the period when it held the strategic initiative.

Let us dwell in more detail on the mutual relationship between these two basic trends in naval combat operations.

The final results of naval operations against the enemy navy have been achieved by various methods which were determined by the particular material and technical base which navies had at that certain point in history.

For the navies of ancient times, clashes between masses of ships which grew into a wild melee were typical, and the fleet which was larger in number and had stronger ships than the enemy emerged victorious. In the era of sailing navies, this contest assumed the nature of a competition between relatively small squadrons of ships-of-the-line to detect one another on the vast sea expanses and to take up a more advantageous position in order to maneuver and employ [[their own]] weapons. Greater and greater significance was attached to combining maneuver and fire of line forces representing the highest concentration of a fleet's striking power against like enemy forces. This special feature of operations of basically homogeneous forces was fully retained even in the initial stage of the development of steam navies, whose principles of employment differed very little from those which had been adopted in the sailing navy.

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The competition between navies at sea took on ever newer characteristics as navies developed, as mixed (submarine and aircraft) forces were established, and also as the arsenal of naval weaponry (guns, torpedoes, [[and]] mines *and aerial bombs*) expanded. Gun duels between equal ships were supplemented by attacks by light, high-speed armorless torpedo-boat forces, submarines, and aircraft. In this connection, fleet-against-fleet operations became multifaceted. Naval tactics began to consider battles of mixed forces with extensive coordination between them in combination with major defensive measures and other forms of support. The appearance of missile weaponry intensified this tendency. The latest expression of this is the battle against weapons, which has assumed almost the same significance as the destruction of warships, the platform for the weapons. In individual cases, this can become the only means of ship defense.

The evolution of the forms of naval combat operations examined above makes it possible to discern a tendency toward a further complication of this process. The employment of missiles with nuclear warheads, for example, is giving rise to more complex problems connected with the analysis of the relative strength of forces in fleet-against-fleet operations at sea and in protecting naval forces.

Today the criterion for comparing naval capabilities is the relative strength of their total combat might in various combinations of mixed forces and equipment for various variants of the situation. An objective approach to determining the combat strength of naval forces makes it possible to define the necessary and sufficient composition of forces in the most rational combination which we shall call the balanced combination.

An analysis of naval engagements, battles, and operations makes it possible to conclude that in spite of the most decisive forms of operations during confrontation of naval forces, their results, as a rule, have not been of strategic significance. There are certain exceptions, for example the results of the naval engagements in the Spanish-American War of 1898, of the Russo-Japanese War of 1904-1905, and also of the attack by the Japanese Fleet on Pearl Harbor in December 1941. At the same time, the totality of [[naval]] operations *by fleet* against [[the enemy's]] fleet in war has frequently been of strategic significance. Thus, for example, of undoubted strategic significance were the naval campaigns of the Russian Fleet in the Mediterranean in the 18th and 19th centuries, the battle for the Atlantic communications lines in the First and Second World Wars, and also operations by the Soviet Navy in years of the Great Patriotic War in the sea theaters adjacent to our

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territory. In the event world imperialism unleashes a new world war, the *delivery and* prevention of nuclear attacks *against ground facilities* from the sea will doubtlessly be of a strategic nature.

An important attribute of naval forces in operations against the enemy's fleet is their relatively great independence in comparison with operations against the shore. This is determined to a considerable degree by the fact that fleet-against-fleet operations occur primarily in areas of the seas and oceans distant from the shore, where combat missions can be carried out primarily by naval forces. In this sphere, the Navy more fully utilizes such qualities as its high degree of readiness for immediate operation, mobility, and ability to stay at sea for a long time and wage war with the enemy fleet at great distances from its own homeport areas. The exercise of these qualities, as numerous examples from the wars of the past attest, has always given the advantage to the side which was able to combine them and utilize them to achieve the goals of the war.

The tendency noted today toward a mutual expansion by the branches of the Armed Forces into each other's spheres of military operations, brought about by the development of military hardware, is causing certain adjustments in this situation. However, at the present time the Navy has the leading role in combating the enemy fleet.

Fleet-against-fleet operations embrace a vast area of the operational-strategic utilization of this branch of the Armed Forces in the sea and ocean theaters. This kind of utlization of the Navy can be viewed as a bitter struggle which is being conducted in two main areas. The first of these consists of naval force operations against the enemy's navy in the pure form, i.e., operations not directly tied to the simultaneous accomplishment of other missions either in the sea or continental theaters.

In the past the essence of these operations has been the contest between the main forces of the naval adversaries to gain control of the sea, and to seize and hold the strategic initiative in a theater to ensure the accomplishment of subsequent missions stemming from the goals of the war or campaign.

In the era of the sailing fleets, these were general engagements of line forces. Later, the steam fleets strove to conduct them according to the established tradition right up to the end of the First World War. The last such battle was the Battle of Jutland. The final result of this battle turned out

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to be completely different from what each of the opposing sides wanted to see. This revealed the objective pattern in the development of navies and of the art of naval warfare, which lies in the fact that general engagements, which previously could have made a profound change in the situation at sea to the advantage of one of the opposing sides, not only have lost their significance, but have also actually become impractical. At the same time, the sphere of employing the main strike forces of navies to battle forces equal to themselves in the hope of gaining control of the sea had also been narrowed. The tendency which had become the main trend in the course of the Second World War became increasingly stronger; this was the trend toward an increase in the overall scale of fleet-against-fleet operations through follow-up and simultaneous operations in battles in different sectors or theaters, conducted independently or in concert with other branches of the Armed Forces.

Operations by units of British naval forces in destroying groupings of ships of the Italian Navy at Taranto serve as an example of this. As a result of this operation, the British actually gained control of the Mediterranean Sea, but were unable to maintain it throughout the course of the war. They turned out to be in a difficult situation after powerful groupings of German aircraft, which had been specially shifted to the Mediterranean Sea, expanded active operations.

Approximately a year after the Taranto Operation, the Japanese, employing the carrier forces of their Navy, delivered an attack on the main grouping of the American fleet at Pearl Harbor to gain control in the Pacific Ocean.[6]

Thus, the Second World War, with minor exceptions, actually did not provide classical examples of independent naval operations against the enemy fleet to gain and maintain sea control.

Actions associated with operations against the shore and also in support of transoceanic and sea communications lines are the second area in this form of fleet-against-fleet military operations. Without exaggeration we may assert that the majority of combat clashes between major forces of opposing navies in this war were precisely in this area. Thus, the Battle of *the Coral Sea*, Midway Island and the Philippine Sea, in the area of Wake and Rabaul islands, [[and]] off Port Moresby and other battles were an integral part of the amphibious landing operations in the Pacific Ocean. The battles off Cape Matapan, the operation to destroy the German battleship BISMARCK, *special operations against German submarines in the Atlantic*, and others, at the same time were part of the operations connected with the support of communications lines.

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Today, equipping of navies with nuclear-missile weapons has strengthened the manifestation of the tendency toward an increase in the importance of naval operations against the shore.

An analysis of the views of experts from various countries on the direction of the development of naval forces and material over the past 10-15 years leads to the conclusion that under present-day conditions the role of the fleet-against-fleet confrontation to achieve the goals of other operations continues to grow. The exception could be operations in limited theaters, where one cannot rule out possible attempts by one of the opposing sides to achieve control in a given theater. This course of events can characterize a situation in which one of the sides has clear superiority in a particular theater. Here we have in mind events similar to those which /transpired/ in the Gulf of Tonkin during the war against the Vietnamese people, where the American Seventh Fleet, which had overwhelming superiority in forces throughout the war, strove to transform this superiority into control of the sea within the zone of operations of its own main forces.

However, the course and outcome of a large war [[will be]] *are* determined by the global-scale events and by the decisive goals for which each of the opposing sides will be striving. The employment of naval strike forces will be directed precisely to this end. In other words, in every sphere of the confrontation of naval forces under today's conditions, the employment of forms and methods of utilizing forces directly associated with operations against the shore will have an increasingly greater influence. The transition of naval operations from the operational-tactical to a higher, strategic plane installs these operations among the decisive operations, subordinating to themselves all others, including those directed toward gaining control of the sea. Whereas previously the /bulk/ of the naval efforts has been directed against the enemy's fleet, today supporting all missions related to operations against enemy land targets and to protection on one's own soil from attacks by his Navy is becoming the main goal of the Navy.

When speaking of naval operations against the shore, it is essential to stress that they are just as ancient a form of employing a Navy as fleet-against-fleet operations. [[Here]] The most striking examples are those relating to transporting troops across the sea and landing them in enemy territory, which have been conducted by navies throughout their entire history.

As early as the 5th century B.C., in the course of the Persian Wars the Persians employed a fleet to land troops in the

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rear of the Greek Army. In the 3d century B.C., during the so-called Punic Wars, the Romans undertook major landing operations which played a large role in the struggle against Carthage.

If we are talking about a later period, then we may recall the numerous amphibious landings of the Russian Navy which were made on the Swedish coast in 1720 and 1721 in the course of the Northern War and also on the island of Corfu, the landing of the Japanese on Liaotung Peninsula in 1904, the landing of German Fascist troops in Norway in 1940, the landing operations conducted by the Soviet Navy during the Great Patriotic War, and also the landings of the Second World War.

The role and significance of landings and the stress on this form of naval operation have varied in different periods of history. For instance, in Napoleon's plans to crush England (at a time when the French still had hope of gaining control of the English Channel) he envisioned the landing on the British Isles of a strategic landing force; the so-called Boulogne Expedition was readied for this purpose, but was not carried out due to the failures of the French fleet in the contest against the British Navy. It should be noted that this event is analyzed by the English and other historians after them to be the result of the unquestioned superiority of the British Navy and art of naval warfare over the French Navy and its employment of the Navy. The actual reasons for the success of the English lay primarily in Napoleon's one-sided strategy, which stemmed from [[his preoccupation with operations in the land theater and]] his lack of understanding of the role of the Navy, his disregard for its capabilities in war and, consequently, also his inability to utilize it in combat with a naval power such as England was at that time.

Napoleon undoubtedly understood this one-sided nature *of* [[his]] strategic thinking himself, which is attested to by his intention to lay the blame for these failures in employing the Navy on his own admirals. Therefore, he was evidently not completely frank when with regard to the failures of the Navy he wrote to his own naval minister: "Since I have been at the head of the government, all of the sea expeditions undertaken have always been unsuccessful because the admirals look on the matter incorrectly and have learned -- and I don't know where -- that one can win without risk."[7]

Here, of course, it was not just a matter of the admirals and their passiveness, although they were not distinguished by either their decisiveness nor their high naval leadership skills. When Napoleon needed talented marshals to carry out the plans for his campaigns on land, he was able to find them in the

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Army. And the fact that the French Navy repeatedly suffered defeats in the course of these campaigns serves as one more confirmation of Napoleon's inability to make a timely analysis of the French Navy's capabilities and to utilize them in the struggle with the enemy.

Later, in the course of the Second World War, the Japanese and Americans laid major stress on amphibious landing operations in the Pacific Ocean. It must be noted that the decisive naval engagements in this theater occurred precisely in the course of landing operations. These engagements naturally took the form of fleet-against-fleet operations; however, the overall goal of these operations was the goal which is characteristic of naval operations against the shore.

It should be added that the opening of the second front, i.e., the landing of strategic amphibious forces in Europe in the period of the Second World War as a result of the successes of Soviet troops in the campaign against the Hitlerites, depended on the capabilities of the Allied navies to successfully operate against the shore.

At the same time we must not fail to note that in the course of the First World War a total of five amphibious forces were landed, and the largest landing operation, undertaken by the British in an attempt to land near the Dardanelles, was a complete failure.

In the Second World War naval operations against the shore in the form of landings became so widespread and were of such great importance as to give rise to a separate trend in naval development and construction, i.e., the building of large numbers of amphibious transports and landing craft. More than 600 amphibious landings were made during the war. This is about [10] 9 landings a month or an average of one landing every three days. Some 1,700,000 men were put ashore in just ten of the main landing operations. A total of more than 18,000 ships participated in the amphibious operations. It was characteristic that almost all landings were successful. The Soviet Navy also employed amphibious landings extensively.

It should be noted that the amphibious operations in the Second World War were mainly of a tactical and operational nature, and only individual landings were of strategic significance.[8]

Naval bombardment of objectives located on the coast is a form of naval operations against the shore which has been widely used by navies throughout the course of their history. Here we

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have in mind not preparation by naval gunfire conducted in the course of the battle for the beachhead, but rather specially planned gunfire whose delivery constituted the completion of the given combat operation. This form of operation was most widely developed in the period of the Second World War, and also in local wars unleashed by the imperialists in the postwar period.

By way of example [[in]] Table 22 [[we]] presents some data characterizing the operations of the British Navy in making naval bombardments on targets in coastal areas in the Second World War.

Major naval forces have been employed in naval bombardments of coastal targets. Battleships, cruisers, and destroyers have been included in the forces dispatched to carry out this mission. In the war against Vietnam, the Americans even took the

Table 22 Results of British Naval Bombardments of Coastal Targets in WW II.

Attack Target	Attack Forces	Losses due to gunfire
Mers-el-Kebir 3 July 1940	Detachment "X" of 2 battleships, 1 battle cruiser, 1 carrier, 2 light cruisers, 11 destroyers	Battleship BRETAGNE sunk, battleships DUNKERQUE and PROVENCE and 1 destroyer damaged.
Genoa 9 Feb. 1941	Detachment "X" of 2 battleships, 1 carrier, 1 light cruiser, 10 destroyers	Arms and electrical equipment plants seriously damaged. Fires and explosions in base and city. Ships in base unaffected.
Tripoli 21 April 1941	Combined Mediterranean Fleet, 3 Battleships, 1 carrier, 4 light cruisers, 13 destroyers, 1 submarine	3 transports sunk. Several transports and other ships damaged. Fires, and several buildings destroyed.

Note: The attacking forces suffered no losses.

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battleship NEW JERSEY out of mothballs and recommissioned her for this purpose. Although the groupings of [[forces]] *gunships* operating against the Vietnam coast were basically operational in composition, the results achieved by them did not extend beyond the tactical realm. As a rule, this type of naval operation against the shore did not yield the expected results despite the employment of considerable forces.

The explosive development of aviation *construction* and shipbuilding in the Second World War brought about the appearance of a new form of employing naval forces against the shore, i.e., the delivery of attacks by carrier aircraft against enemy territory and troops. It is true that the experience in such operations was limited to the employment of aircraft carriers by only three countries, Great Britain, Japan, and the United States. However, this experience has become convincing proof of the practicality of employing this form of operation, which has led to a considerable expansion in carrier construction. Whereas at the outbreak of the Second World War these three countries had seven, six, and five carriers, respectively, in December 1941 at the outbreak of war in the Pacific Ocean, Great Britain already had 12 carriers in service, Japan had ten, and the United States had seven. During the war a total of 221 carriers were built. By the end of the Second World War the United States had 118 carriers, 20 of which were attack carriers, i.e., carriers capable of delivering attacks not only against ships but also against enemy ground targets.

Initially carriers were regarded only as warships providing fighter cover for surface forces and transports against air attack. Later they were given the mission of destroying enemy surface ships at sea and in bases. Subsequently, carrier aircraft operated widely against land objectives, both in the course of landing and in antilanding operations, and also in operations and combat actions aimed at softening up the enemy air groupings. The attacks on the Gilbert, Marshall, and Wake and Marcus islands and on Tokyo in 1942 serve as examples of this. These raids were carried out on the "hit and run" principle. Important ground targets, including also naval targets, were subjected to attacks during the operations to destroy enemy naval forces and bases. The attacks by British carrier aircraft on Taranto in November 1940 and by Japanese carrier aircraft on Pearl Harbor in December 1941 are the most typical examples.

Carrier operations against the shore were most widespread during the conduct of amphibious operations, when aircraft were employed to "soften up" and neutralize the antilanding defense of the enemy and cooperate with own troops in accomplishing

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missions ashore after the landing. The experience during the Second World War in employing carrier aircraft against land objectives has been widely used by the American militarists in local wars, especially to deliver attacks against troops, cities, bases, airfields, and ground communications [[in the wars against]] *of* the People's Democratic Republic of Korea and [[against]] the Democratic Republic of Vietnam.

The introduction of nuclear weaponry into the navies of great powers considerably expanded the scope of employing naval forces against the shore. Initially, carrier aircraft, and later ballistic missiles launched from submarines, constituted the colossal capabilities of the Navy to deliver attacks against *targets on* enemy territory. Naval operations against the shore have assumed a fundamentally new significance in warfare in general. They make up an important part of the strategy of warfare.

[[In our day]] *At the present time*, a navy operating against the shore possesses the capability not only of prosecuting missions related to territorial changes, but also of directly affecting the course and even the outcome of a war. In this connection, naval operations against the shore have assumed dominant importance in naval warfare, and both the technical policy of building a navy and the development of the art of naval warfare have been subordinated to them. Confirmation of this is the fact that the United States nuclear-powered missile-armed submarines are assigned to the strategic forces, while all other warships are assigned to the general-purpose forces.

The new capabilities of a navy to operate against the shore and the enormous threat from seaward arising in connection with them have determined the character of the main efforts of the Navy in the battle against the enemy fleet. The employment of naval forces against the enemy's seaborne strategic nuclear systems in order to disrupt or blunt their attacks against ground targets to the maximum degree has become the most important of these efforts. Thus, under the new conditions which arose with the appearance of nuclear weaponry, the fleet's battle against the enemy fleet has become a secondary mission in comparison with naval operations against the shore.

In light of this, even the significance of naval operations in carrying out such traditional missions as interdicting the sea communications of the enemy and protecting own communications has changed. These operations are now a most important integral part of naval efforts aimed at undermining the military-economic potential of the enemy, i.e., carrying out one of the individual missions stemming from the main mission of a modern navy in warfare.

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Operations entailing the disruption and interdiction of the enemy's sea shipping, which formerly were directly related *primarily* to the sphere of employing a fleet against the enemy's fleet, today are taking a new direction. By being included in the overall system of naval operations against the shore, they [[are strengthening the]] *emphasize that* attribute [[of]] the Navy [[which it]] has [[acquired]] due to its modern hardware -- the capability to carry out strategic missions of an offensive nature through direct action against the source of the military strength of the enemy.

Thus, the traditional fleet-against-fleet operations, which since ancient times have been characteristic of the battle for sea communications by the belligerents, are being employed today in a new, decisive area -- in naval actions against the shore. This trend in the operational-strategic employment of the Navy is more and more decidedly coming to the forefront and is [[acquiring the earmarks of]] *becoming* the primary area of naval operations, subordinating all other operations to itself at every operational level.

Some Theoretical Questions of the Art of Naval Warfare

The [[art of naval warfare and]] methods of employing a navy under today's conditions of possible military actions will differ significantly from those which dominated in past wars, including the Second World War. Therefore, in examining the navy as the most important of the components of the seapower of the state, let us dwell[[, albeit]] briefly on some principles of employing a [[modern]] navy which the theory of the art of naval warfare is presently developing.

A most important feature of the current stage of the development of the art of naval warfare lies in the intensive expansion in its [[volume and]] content, and in the ever greater diversity in the development of new forms and methods of employing naval forces at various operational levels. This is due primarily to the influence of scientific-technical progress as a result of which drastic qualitative changes in military hardware are taking place, which in the final analysis means radical qualitative transformations in the material base of naval warfare. The creation, testing in combat training, and constant improvement of new forms of employing naval forces and of new operational methods in various situations naturally are associated with changes in many categories comprising the content of the art of naval warfare in its totality. These categories are the most sensitive to transformations in all factors influencing the

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development of the art of naval warfare. Therefore, changes in these categories can be regarded as initial manifestations of the objective multifaceted process of the development of the art of naval warfare as a whole.

The change in many categories of the art of naval warfare due to natural causes is displayed at all of its levels. For example, one can speak of the coordination of forces and the control of them from the strategic, operational, and tactical point of view. This applies in equal measure to such concepts as maneuver, strike, concentration, and may others. At the same time such concepts as battle, attack, and others are characteristic only of tactics.

Without examining the entire diversity of the categories pertaining to the field of the art of naval warfare, let us dwell only on those in which, in our opinion, one can trace the general trends in [[the]] *its* development [[of this area of naval science]].

The Scope of the Conflict. The increase in the capabilities of the Navy to accomplish strategic missions is due to the increase in its role and importance in warfare.

A modern navy possesses versatility and mobility, and is capable of concentrating striking power which can be employed not only to combat a naval adversary, but also in the sphere of operations of the other branches of the armed forces. Owing to this, the scope of naval warfare is increasing to global dimensions.

In examining this category from the strategic point of view, it is also essential to note the constantly growing capability of nuclear navies to achieve increasingly more decisive goals in modern warfare. This particularly applies to operations of naval forces aimed at crushing the military-economic potential of the enemy which can have a direct influence on the course and even the outcome of a war.

The individual operations conducted by a navy are assuming an ever greater scope. The increase in the capabilities of a navy to accomplish missions relating to the destruction of land objectives entails the expansion of the front and an increase in the range of seaborne strategic weapons systems. For example, the range capabilities of the American POLARIS-POSEIDON undersea strategic nuclear system has more than doubled during the past decade. Assuming the transition to the new TRIDENT submarine nuclear-missile system of which the Western press writes so much, the Americans are counting on again doubling the range

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in comparison with the POLARIS-POSEIDON system. It is assumed that the operational front will also be expanded accordingly. With the completion of the transition of the American Armed Forces to the oceanic strategy, evidently the operations against land objectives will also take on a global scale. A further expansion in the spatial scope of operations against land objectives is not only the pattern, but also the future trend, in the development of the art of naval warfare of nuclear navies. Probably it will also be displayed in operations in the sphere of combating seaborne strategic nuclear weapons systems; these operations can embrace almost the entire area of the World Ocean and can assume a global nature.

In examining the element of the scope of operations concerning the composition of the forces involved, it should be noted that a sharp expansion in force capabilites offensively and defensively is more and more frequently being achieved not only and not so much through the traditional manner /of/ simply increasing the number of ships and other weapons platforms. The importance of increasing the capability of each combatant to accomplish diverse missions with more modern weaponry is becoming an increasingly more evident factor. In other words, in analyzing the actual capabilities of force groupings, today it is not the number of platforms, but their quality expressed as the total striking power of the weaponry and combat technical equipment concentrated on them that is becoming the prevailing criterion. For example, in 1945, after the Second World War, the US Navy's submarine forces represented 263 submarines. At the present time, according to data from Jane's [[handbook for 1973-1974]] *Fighting Ships 1977-1978*, that Navy has only [[127]] *119* submarines in its inventory of which 41 are nuclear-powered *strategic* submarines, [[61]] *67* are multipurpose nuclear-powered submarines, and [[25]] *11* are diesel submarines; however, their total cannot even be compared with the power of the previously existing submarines. They are the most important part of the strategic resources of the country's Navy due to their power.

Groupings of other branches of the armed forces can participate on an increasingly greater scale [[in the forces taking part]] in operations in the oceanic theaters. Therefore, new opportunities will be available for the full realization of one more functional area of the art of naval warfare stemming from the [[strategy]] *conditions* of armed combat in the oceanic theaters of military operations, i.e., mutual support. The origin of mutual support within the framework of a unified strategy is in turn nothing but the [[expression]] *result* of the continuing process of the formation of the categories of the art of naval warfare corresponding to the current state of military hardware.

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Strike. At a certain stage in its development the increase in the strength of seaborne weapons brought about a completely new understanding of the category of strike. Previously the idea of strike was accompanied by such refining modifiers as "artillery," "torpedo," "bomb," and at one time also "ramming," i.e., this category was considered to be only a tactical concept, and only in individual cases, for example, in the expression "strike from the sea," did it assume [[the significance of a concept on the]] *an* operational scale. Today, however, the concept of "strike" has also been extended to the area of achieving strategic goals. It is believed that the strike will become the dominant form of employment of forces, since through modern combat operations it permits the fullest realization of one's own capabilities over enormous distances and from various directions and thereby the achievement of such strategic goals as crushing the military-economic potential of the enemy.

In the operational art, the strike is proving to an ever greater degree to be one of the main methods of accomplishing combat missions. In this connection, in every operation a strike is not only a combination of certain combat actions linked by a unity of goals or missions; it can also be an independent, and even one-time operation by any single weapons platform or by a group of them. For instance, a strike against a grouping of surface forces can be delivered by a group of ships armed with cruise missiles. Naval aviation is equally capable of carrying out such a mission.

On the tactical plane, the strike, in contrast to the past when it was only one of the elements of a battle and was regarded as a combination of attacks linked by the unity of their tactical mission, is to an ever greater degree becoming equal in significance to the battle. For instance, a combat mission can be accomplished by delivering a strike against an enemy submarine or against the missiles launched by it. A major surface ship can be destroyed by a strike from a single submarine employing long-range missiles. The steady increase in the range and power of naval weaponry is fostering the further development of this trend, which permits the accomplishment of tactical missions under certain conditions, not through prolonged and stubborn fighting, but by a single unilateral action against the enemy.

Thus, through strikes one can achieve strategic, operational, and tactical goals. In individual cases, a strike delivered "according to the norms and roles of tactics," e.g., by missiles from a submarine against land targets, permits the immediate achievement of strategic results. This is already a new quality of the strike category so familiar to us, which has

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undergone changes in the process of development of the material base of naval warfare and of the art of naval warfare appropriate to it.

Battle. The battle has always been and continues to be the main means of accomplishing tactical missions. Over a prolonged period of time it [[has remained]] *was* the sole form of the combat employment of the Navy. And like any phenomenon, the battle is undergoing constant evolution. One of the /earmarks/ of this process is the increase in range of combat engagements and in their spatial scope, which is determined by the increase in the operating ranges of naval weaponry, in maneuverability in different planes and environments, and in the endurance and cruising (flight) range of its platforms, and also by the participation in battle of other arms of naval forces, above all naval aviation. At the dawning of the development of navies essentially one could not even speak of the ranges at which battles were fought, because the accomplishment of the mission was determined by the opportunities for boarding the enemy or ramming him. Gradually the range of the weaponry increased, and the ships of the opposing sides became capable of hitting the enemy over long distances. Already by the Second World War [[, they]] *the operating range of weaponry* began to exceed not only visual range, but even the range of the technical means of detection existing at that time.

The first [[sea]] battles which began "contactless" combat operations [[by ships]] was the Battle of *the Coral Sea and the Battle of* Midway Island [[on 4 June]] *in* 1942. Under today's conditions, ranges of several hundreds of kilometers are already characteristic. And one can state with assurance that in the future a naval battle will, as a rule, range over vast areas, and the monitoring of the situation will be possible only with the aid of special, primarily airborne or space systems.

The development of naval battle as a form of employment of naval forces has always been accompanied by a change in its spatial characteristics. Initially the battle represented a clash between surface forces only on the water surface; later it embraced the subsurface and air environments. [[Ever]] Increasing significance is being attached to the specific feature of modern naval battle which is that the opposing sides are expending [[an ever]] *the* greater share of their efforts on combating a torpedo or missile which has already been launched, while steadily reducing the share of their efforts directed toward destroying the platform for this weaponry. Thus naval battle is already displaying a new quality.

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In many instances, battle today may not include tactical deployment which was such an indispensable element in the past. This deployment may be carried out in advance. In this event, predeployment of forces may be carried out in order to form the most rational combat formations when there is a change in the tactical situation as a result of a maneuver by the probable enemy or when there is a change in composition of one's own forces. At the same time, it is assumed that the elements of tactics comprising the content of the classical scheme of a naval battle[[, i.e.]] (the search for the enemy, tactical deployment, and a delivery of the strike after the platform assumes a launch position) will also be retained in the future.

The attack and defensive capabilities of naval forces are constantly being strengthened, and this provides the basis to assert that in the future tactical coordination of mixed forces will be required to overcome an organized and deeply-echeloned enemy defense. However, in individual cases due to the sharp increase in the attack capabilities of naval forces, which are outstripping their defensive capabilities, the practice of conducting a battle by type of forces will also apparently continue.

The further growth in the destructive power of weapons and the timely execution of the deployment will permit a reduction in the time needed for accomplishing combat missions. The acceleration of the tempo of the development of events is also introducing changes in the categroy of battle, and it will become briefer, more dynamic, and productive of immediate results.

A special feature of naval battle lies in the fact that it has almost always been conducted to destroy the enemy. The equipping of naval forces with nuclear weapons is strengthening this attribute still further.

Mutual Support. Mutual support is, as is generally known, one of the most important functional areas of the art of naval warfare. The rational combining of offensive and defensive capabilities of mixed groupings and compensating for the weaknesses of some forces by the strength of others permits the accomplishment of missions considerably exceeding those which are accomplished by the conventional summation of the capabilities of type forces.

The organization of mutual support is steadily becoming more complex as the range of weapons, their diversity, and the power and speed of their platforms increase. At the present time, the importance of and opportunities for mutual support are increasing owing to the development of communications and control systems.

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Military hardware is becoming more advanced under the influence of scientific-technical progress, and therefore new possibilities are appearing for the mutual expansion of other branches of the armed forces into each other's spheres of military operations. The significance of mutual tactical and operational support is growing in the accomplishment of all missions by the Navy. In this connection, the mutual tactical support of mixed forces in combating nuclear-missile weapons platforms evidently will be arranged when there is an acute need to carry out this mission in the shortest possible time.

The capabilities of other branches of the armed forces to operate jointly with the Navy in the latter's sphere of missions, as well as the Navy's capability to accomplish missions on land and in the air will increase steadily.

The expansion of the sphere of combat operations of the branches of the armed forces will undoubtedly complicate the organization of their mutual support at the operational and strategic levels.

Thus, in the near future the organization of mutual support will become even more complicated, the degree of its importance will increase, and its forms and methods will become more diverse.

Maneuver. Maneuver is the oldest category in the art of naval warfare. For a long time, *the concepts of* "fire and maneuver" practically represented the essence of naval tactics. Through maneuver, naval forces became capable of moving their weapons into a position in which the capabilities of this weaponry could be exercised in the fullest measure in a strike or, in addition, would provide the needed concentration of forces in certain instances. It should be noted that, as the range of weapons increased, maneuver in battle as executed in the tactical deployment stage constantly decreased in terms of linear distance. With the appearance of naval guns, the need vanished to close on the enemy, and maneuver distances became shorter. When rifled guns appeared, maneuver was reduced even further and, after the development of missiles with a great over-the-horizon flight range and high accuracy, it acquired new qualities. The replacement of a considerable part of the maneuvering of the platform by the maneuvering of weapon trajectories has proved to be fully practical. For example, the area in which one can hit the enemy with ship guns with a range of 20 kilometers is 1,256 square kilometers. Whereas, if we speak of employing a missile with the range of [[200]] *300* kilometers, then this area will be [[125,600]] *282,600* square kilometers. If we consider that as the firing range of a weapon increases by one order of

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magnitude, the area hit by it increases by two orders of magnitude, then it is not difficult to imagine the scale of the maneuver possibilities for the trajectories of missiles with a flight range of several thousand kilometers. However, it does not follow that the significance of maneuver of forces in battle is diminishing, and that the implementation of it is becoming simple.

On the contrary, the maneuvering of forces situated beyond the detection range of the enemy, who is in turn taking measures to assume a favorable position and who is also situated beyond detection range, requires reconnaissance and target designation data support. The maneuver will be carried out on the basis of data received from various electronic systems, even under conditions of the most intensive electronic warfare which, when correctly organized. can fully paralyze data acquisition and monitoring systems. Therefore the execution of a maneuver and the use of the various technical means for monitoring the situation and for target designation require true skill. The acute need is arising for efficient mutual support of strike groups not only by reconnaissance forces, but also by external target designation systems. Undoubtedly the need will remain to support the maneuver and concentration of forces equipped with such short-range weapons as torpedoes and guns, which undoubtedly will also remain within the naval inventories in the future.

The maneuvering of ship forces in the future will become more rapid owing to the widespread introduction of surface-effect ships into many of the world's navies.

In examining maneuver from the operational point of view, it is essential to note that its significance as a form of operations directed toward ensuring the operational deployment of forces and the concentration of them in certain areas of the ocean theaters will increase considerably in the future.

Speed. Speed is a characteristic category of modern naval warfare inherent in all forms and varieties of combat actions at sea. Its manifestation is associated with the development of military hardware, owing to which former methods of conducting a battle, consisting of prolonged maneuvering of forces and repeated and long operations by them against the enemy, gradually lost their significance and were replaced by dynamic, short-lived, decisive, and increasingly more effective combat action.

Scientific-technical progress is leading to the development of increasingly more mobile platforms and long-range high-speed

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weapons systems. Therefore, in the future speed will become an indispensable characteristic of any operation, battle, and strike.

The manifestation of speed at the operational level will be reflected in a further reduction in the duration of actions against the enemy with a simultaneous increase in the strength and effectiveness of attacks and combat operations, which constitute the essence of naval operations.

It is precisely the speed of various groupings of forces directed toward the most important enemy objectives which will become the deciding factor in selecting their operating methods. Speed ensures a more complete utilization of every combat capability of the forces in order to rapidly achieve operational goals and make their attacks overwhelming and irresistible.

The abundance of swiftly implemented operations, strikes, and other combat actions is imparting a special dynamism and a high degree of effectiveness to naval warfare. Therefore, the combat activity of the navy in the future will be a complex combination of simultaneous and follow-up, swift, brief combat actions concluded with the achievement of decisive goals and having in certain cases a direct influence on the course and outcome of the armed struggle as a whole.

The importance of speed, this most important factor in naval warfare, will grow, and the ability to conduct swift actions will become the most important indication of a mastery of the art of naval warfare.

Time. As naval hardware was developed, and as the speed of the platforms and the range and power of the weapons increased, the art of naval warfare was faced with the need to accomplish an ever growing volume of missions within even shorter time frames.

Even in the Second World War the destruction of a particular enemy grouping was not always limited to a strictly defined time frame. If the mission was, for instance, to destroy an enemy convoy during a sea transit, then this could be accomplished at any moment in the course of this transit, lasting days and even weeks. There was not even a significant difference in whether the assigned mission was accomplished at the beginning of this period or at the end of it. It was only important that the mission be accomplished while the grouping of enemy ships was at sea.

Today, however, this kind of approach will frequently be not applicable. In many cases, the grouping of enemy naval forces will have to be destroyed within a very short, specific time frame, before they can employ their own weapons in full measure.

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An important feature in the change in the significance of this category is that the time needed by the navy to accomplish strategic missions after the outbreak of military hostilities is becoming of the same order as the time which is needed to accomplish tactical missions.

As naval hardware is further developed, this *feature* will be displayed ever more strongly. The growing requirements to reduce the time needed to accomplish missions, which have become the determining requirements for the development of all forms of naval warfare, have led to the need to maintain naval forces in readiness to immediately deliver attacks on the enemy and the need for comprehensive automation of the control of these forces.

When examining categories of the art of naval warfare, it seems advisable to also dwell on the establishment of certain conditions which ensure that naval forces achieve their assigned goals. Without examining the entire range of such conditions, we feel it necessary to dwell on those which ensure freedom of operation of own forces in battle and in operation and at the same time create serious impediments for the enemy. In other words, we are dealing with what is frequently called control in the area where one's own forces are operating, or simply control of the sea.

Control of the Sea. Control of the sea is a special category inherent only in armed combat in the maritime theaters. Naval forces do not form a front line, they are mobile, and their operations do not involve advancing, seizing, or holding territory of any kind. They operate in "no-man's" water, in water areas where there is no "sovereign" owner, because the international conventions provide for the principle of seas which are open (free) for all. Victory in a naval engagement or operation does not always mean the achievement of any sort of territorial changes. Moreover, the victor frequently hastens to depart the field of battle, as submarines do after an attack, for example, although the results of the attack may be severe losses for the enemy. However, any navy always strives to establish the regime which it needs in a certain area of the sea, for example, control of navigation and guaranteeing its safety, freedom to deploy own forces, and so forth, in a region.

It is difficult to replace the losses of a naval fleet. Therefore, every defeat inflicted on the enemy means not only the achievement of the goal of the given engagement, but also the establishment of favorable conditions for a rather prolonged period of time for the accomplishment of follow-up missions. To a considerable degree it deprives the enemy, sometimes for a prolonged period of time, of the possibility of conducting

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organized *offensive* operations [[of an offensive nature]] and creates a [[very]] specific situation. /This situation is characterized by the fact/ that the victor is free to choose the time, direction, and character of the offensive operations, frequently using even weak groupings of his own forces for this purpose.

Having deprived the enemy of the possibility of decisive counteraction, the victor can exploit this victory by cutting off the enemy's shipping through blockades of his ports, bases, and coastal sectors, seizing islands or certain distant territories, or delivering unopposed attacks against the coast.

In the distant past, loss of control of the sea could mean even defeat in a war for the losing side if its economy was highly dependent on sea communications or if its fleet was a main part of its armed forces.

If we speak of the "growth" of this category of the art of naval warfare, then we boldly assert without fear of error that history knows no older or more vital concept. The idea of sea control originated when specially organized naval forces began to be used on the sea expanses in wars.

A great deal of attention was devoted to control of the sea in the period of the colonial seizures carried out with the aid of the fleets of the West European powers, primarily England, which justified her desire for world supremacy through colonial robbery and piracy by using the lofty expression of the well-known British adventurist and pirate, W. Raleigh: "He who controls the sea controls world commerce. And he who controls world commerce controls the resources of the earth and the earth itself." This somber slogan was repeated time and again by Winston Churchill, and today serves as the banner of the militant circles of British and American imperialism.

The regular Russian Navy, the building of which is associated with the name of Peter I, through its own decisive actions convincingly demonstrated [[an understanding of the essence of the idea]] *the significance* of sea control [[and the ability to transform this idea into reality]]. By crushing the sea power of Sweden in the Baltic Sea, it ensured itself freedom of operation in the more important areas of the theater, and skillfully used this freedom to force the enemy to sign a peace treaty. The major Russian naval leaders -- Suvorov, Potemkin, Ushakov, Spiridonov, and others -- supported and developed the idea of control of the sea.

In 1865, Fredrich Engels wrote the following on control of the sea and its significance in a war: ". . . If you control the sea . . ., then this is an advantage."[9]

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In a textbook on naval tactics written for the Russian Naval (Cadet) Corps in 1873, which was 20 years earlier than works on the same question published in England and the United States, Captain-Lieutenant Berezin clearly enunciated the theory of control of the sea and methods of achieving and maintaining it. The textbook said, "When a war breaks out in which fleets are participating, then the achievement of control of the sea is usually the first and primary mission. When there is a considerable disproportion between forces, this mission is accomplished by direct blockade of the roadsteads or harbors in which the enemy squadrons are located, and through a blockade of the entire coast; in the absence of such a disproportion, this control has to be gained by delivering attacks (squadron battles) on the enemy fleet, and then establishing a blockade with the goal of destroying the sea commerce of the enemy and all of his sea communications." Berezin further asserted that control cannot be absolute, that, in addition to the blockades, cruisers must be dispatched in pursuit of individual enemy ships, that landing operations in near areas are possible even without control of the sea, and so forth.

In contrast to the interpretation of the idea of control of the sea accepted in Russia, a political meaning was given to this concept in England, the greatest colonial power in the world, where "exploitation of the colonies was the main source of the enrichment of the British bourgeoisie and the maintenance of colonial supremacy was its foremost mission."[10] In this connection, the preservation of control of the sea became of vital importance to British capital. This idea also became the main guiding principle of English military doctrine.

The idea of control of the sea was enunciated as the basis of British military doctrine by Admiral Colomb and his successors. In the United States, which at the onset of the epoch of imperialism was hastening to take the leading position among the pretenders to world supremacy, its own theory of sea control appeared, fathered by Admiral Mahan.

In their works, both of these authors were carrying out the [[social]] *special* aims of [[rising]] imperialism, and therefore transformed the category of the art of naval warfare into a political concept of the bourgeoisie, who were aspiring to world supremacy, and into the ideological banner of imperialism. Gaining control of the sea was proclaimed as the sole goal of naval warfare, the achievement of which ensured, in their opinion, the establishment of world supremacy.

It is well known that control of the sea, as one category of the art of naval warfare, was given serious attention by

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V. I. Lenin, who made a thorough scientific analysis of the causes of Russia's defeat in the Russo-Japanese War of 1904-1905. [[He wrote: "Up to now, the Japanese have more swiftly and more abundantly reinforced their own military forces after each major battle than the Russians have. And now, having achieved complete control of the sea and the complete destruction of one of the Russian armies, they are able to send twice as many reinforcements as the Russians."[6]]

[[Later,]] The category of control of the sea was studied and developed in the Soviet Navy. For example, in the 1930 Military Regulations of the Navy, it is stressed that those conditions must be established which will assure egress of the forces to the sea from bases and the accomplishment of their combat mission. These conditions included countering the enemy's blockade by correctly selecting operating bases, making it difficult [[for him]] to carry on the blockade, as well as [[own]] *strictly* military operations preventing the blockade or reducing its effectiveness, and countering the enemy's reconnaissance and picket forces.

It should be noted that from the very outset of its existence Soviet naval [[science]] *art* has completely rejected attempts to identify the concept of "control of the sea" with the concept "control of the world." It has always viewed the gaining of sea control not as a goal in itself, but only as a path to establishing certain conditions which would permit naval forces and resources to successfully accomplish one mission or another in certain regions of a theater within a specific period of time. Therefore, in the Soviet Navy, the term "favorable operational regime" was more widely used in the prewar years. In our regulations it is stressed that this term refers to conditions favoring the successful accomplishment of missions assigned to the Navy. By these conditions we mean those elements of a situation which would permit the formation of necessary groupings of naval forces, the delivery of attacks, and the accomplishment of assigned combat missions without essentially deviating from the intended plan. To create these conditions it may be necessary to conduct a persistent and sometimes also a rather prolonged effort, employing various forces and equipment at sea, in the air, and, in certain cases, also in coastal areas.

In the course of the Great Patriotic War, the basic documents regulating the combat activities of the Navy and the actions of its forces to create the necessary situation for the conduct of own operations were classified as operations creating a more favorable and stable operational regime in basing areas and on the most important communications routes. An analysis of

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the combat experience of our fleets has made it possible to refine a series of definitions relating to this category of the art of naval warfare. In the late 1940's, sea control was regarded as the establishment of conditions promoting the successful conduct by fleets of operations at sea and by the land fronts near the coast. Strategic control of the sea (in a theater) was acknowledged to be the best of these conditions. It was characterized by such a favorable situation (relative strength of forces, their bases, facilities in the theater, and so forth) that throughout the theater the enemy was in no position to stop the operations being conducted by us. We would note, in passing, that at that time the concept of a maritime theater of military operations referred only to seas directly contiguous to the territory of the Soviet Union.

If strategic control of a maritime theater was lacking, and this was quite typical of that period of time, then the gaining of operational control was considered an essential condition for the successful conduct of naval operations. Operational control was defined as superiority in forces and equipment in the sector of the main attack, which was achieved by the widespread and daring maneuvering of forces both in the preparatory stage of the operation and during its course and through the skillful use of geographical features of the maritime theater and of its facilities.

The difference between strategic and operational control, based on the views of the day, lay only in the dimensions of the area being controlled and in the length of time this control could be maintained. Whereas strategic control serves the goals of waging a war or campaign, operational control serves the goals of conducting an operation, a series of battles, or an individual engagement.

The intrinsic content of these two concepts remains exactly the same -- a favorable operational situation gained to conduct an operation or battle in a certain area of a sea theater for the period of time necessary to reliably ensure success and to guarantee that the enemy will not interrupt the preparation and conduct of the operation or battle.

With the appearance of nuclear, and later also missile, weaponry, many theoreticians assert that the question of gaining control of the sea had supposedly been thrust to the background owing to the fact that the new combat and technical means of sea warfare had fundamentally altered the conditions for conducting operations and combat actions and, consequently, also the methods of supporting them.

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One of the arguments denying the need to gain control of the sea was that, since combat operations had become so rapidly-developing and so effective, the forces conducting the battle at sea did not need to establish favorable conditions. The question is often even raised in this manner: What will a fleet do in a nuclear war -- destroy the enemy or gain control, subjecting itself to the risk of being destroyed by the enemy before it is able to achieve its own goals?

History shows that, as the material base of navies is developed and as their combat capabilities are improved, new characteristics of the contest for sea control have appeared, although the contest itself remains an expression of the objective practicability brought about by the specific characteristics of combat operations at sea.

The time frame within which one can maintain control of the sea has been considerably reduced as the speed of ships and other naval forces has increased and as communications and intelligence have improved. For example, after the Battle of Abukir in 1798, the English sailing fleet established control in the Mediterranean Sea for several years, which resulted in the failure of Napoleon's expedition to Egypt, despite the fact that the French troops had already landed and had won a series of major victories in battles ashore. However, the control gained by the Japanese Navy, achieved in late 1941 as a result of the defeat of the battleship forces of the American Navy at Pearl Harbor and by the sinking of the British battleships in the Gulf of Siam, lasted no more than 4 months.

From these examples it is clear that there is a tendency toward a reduction in the time period of maintaining the sea control which has been gained, and the effort to gain it is becoming more and more intense. This tendency remains even today, since naval forces and equipment are being intensively developed, nuclear-missile weaponry is being upgraded, and naval aircraft are being employed more and more widely. It is particularly important that submarines have become the main arm of the forces of modern navies. The new strategic orientation of the navies toward warfare against the shore has also played a great role. All of this has to a great degree increased the need for the all-around support of the operations of forces prosecuting strategic missions. Therefore, the effort to establish favorable conditions in a certain area of a theater and for a certain time for the successful accomplishment by a major grouping of naval forces of the primary missions assigned to it and at the same time also to establish those conditions which would make it difficult for the enemy to carry out his own missions and would prevent him from disrupting the operations of the opposing side will apparently become widespread.

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Establishing the conditions for gaining sea control has always required lengthy periods of time and the execution of a series of measures while still at peace. These measures include development and preparation of the necessary forces and material and maintaining them in readiness to accomplish combat missions, concentration of groupings of forces and disposing them in a theater in such a manner that they will have superiority of position over the enemy, [[and also]] providing of facilities in the sea and oceanic theaters of military operations, the proper organization of forces and a base system, a system for controlling them, and so forth, appropriate to their mission.

The correlation and interdependence of naval combat operations in prosecuting the primary missions and gaining sea control consists, and will apparently continue to consist, in the fact that the areas and sectors in which control of the sea is achieved, and how long it is maintained, depend fully on the conditions for accomplishing the primary missions. In this connection, combat operations whose goal is to strengthen control of the sea in selected areas or in certain sectors can either precede the accomplishment by a fleet of its main missions or can be conducted simultaneously with it. Consequently, the achievement of sea control is the factor ensuring the success of the operations of forces prosecuting the primary missions. Moreover, the successful prosecution by the Navy of these primary missions ensures the further strengthening of its control of the sea and an expansion of the sphere in which it exercises this control.

The experience of the Great Patriotic War showed that the success of ground operations, and the seizure by them of new coastal regions, also favored gaining control of the sea. An example of this was the achievement and strengthening of control by our fleets in the Black, Baltic, and Barents seas as a result of operations conducted by ground troops jointly with the fleets. The German command strove for control in the Black and Baltic seas by seizing the bases of the Soviet Navy by land. However, the Hitlerites did not succeed in achieving this goal. Their plans were foiled by the joint operations of the Soviet Army and Navy. From this we may draw the conclusion that the gaining of sea control depends both on the prosecution of the primary missions assigned to the Navy and on the course of the armed conflict as a whole.

We must not fail to note that, when carrying out military preparations, the imperialists strive to establish the conditions for gaining control of the sea at the very outset of a war. In this connection, it is assumed that the sphere of sea control will be extended to the depths of the ocean and to the airspace above it.

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From the foregoing, it follows that a category of the art of naval warfare such as the gaining of sea control continues to retain its validity and, therefore, the development of it in every aspect applicable to the present day is one of the most important tasks [[of naval science]].

Consequently, the general prospects for the development of the art of naval warfare are tied in with the uninterrupted growth in the requirements for the more effective employment of combat resources, with the toughening of the standards for readying and employing weapons, with increasing the intensity of combat operations, with reducing decisionmaking time, and with increasing the responsibility of the flag officer. The appearance of long-range and homing weapons and highly effective cybernetic [[and]] automated systems are increasing the role of man in naval warfare still further.

The progressive expansion of the subject of naval art research and of the field of optimization, and the increase in the role of engineering-technical and physical-mathematical sciences as the accepted basis required for resolving theoretical questions of the art of naval warfare are important trends in the development of this art.

The prospects for the development of such elements of the art of naval warfare as intelligence, security, operational and tactical deployment, combat dispositions, defense, rear support, and others await their own treatment.

NAVIES IN LOCAL WARS OF IMPERIALISM

The end of the Second World War did not bring the long-awaited peace to the nation. This was prevented by the aggressive expansionist policy of the imperialist powers which are trying to achieve their own political goals with the aid of an unrestrained nuclear-missile arms race, and through their preparations to unleash a worldwide nuclear war at the "suitable moment." However, taking into consideration the relative strength of forces in the world arena which is steadily changing to their disadvantage, the imperialists are trying to achieve their own goals in individual areas of the world by using a vast arsenal of various operational methods and forms among which local wars, i.e., wars with limited participation by two or several states, occupy an important place. Consequently, they are limited with respect to their missions, the territories where they are conducted, and by the scale and the equipment employed in the armed combat. The goal of all of these wars remains invariable. It lies in suppressing national-liberation

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movements, keeping former colonies in social and economic dependence, weakening the world Socialist system, and seizing and holding strategically important areas of the world. Vast monetary, human, and material resources are expended by the imperialists to conduct local wars. Thus, for example, the war against the Korean People's Democratic Republic cost the United States $20 billion. More than one million men, more than 200 warships, up to 1,000 tanks, and 1,600 aircraft participated in it on the side of the aggressors. France threw more than 500,000 officers and men, about 1,500 aircraft and 1,000 tanks against the National Freedom Forces of Algeria.[11]

In the war against the people of Vietnam from 1961 to the beginning of 1973, according to official, clearly understated figures from the Pentagon, the United States spent $140 billion (according to Senator Mansfield's figures, almost $400 billion). During this period 2.5 million American servicemen went to Vietnam, and in the most intensive period of the war their numbers reached 549,000. US carrier-based, strategic, and tactical aircraft dropped about 7.5 million tons of bombs on the cities and towns of Vietnam, more than three times as many bombs as were dropped in the entire Second World War. Despite this, the aggressors were not able to taste the fruits of victory: After losing (according to Pentagon figures) about a million officers and men killed and wounded, and 8,612 aircraft and helicopters, the American-Saigon side was forced to recognize the impossibility of achieving their established goals by military means and recognized their own actual defeat in the war.

Experience shows that the imperialist powers assign an important role to naval forces in local wars. Thus, for example, the US and British navies have always been indispensable participants in every local war and conflict provoked by imperialism in the postwar period. However, experience in the combat employment of navies in these wars has been highly specific, because the aggressors have had practically no naval adversaries and their fleets operating virtually under target practice conditions. Nevertheless, this experience permits us to draw some conclusions as to the development of navies and as to methods of employing them in combat.

First of all, it should be stressed that the navies of the major imperialist powers, whose main purpose is the accomplishment of strategic missions in a nuclear-missile war, are continually being trained concurrently for local wars, where they are assigned the leading role in suppressing national-freedom and other progressive popular movements. Accordingly, the present-day imperialist powers, the United States, Great Britain, and France, are building their own navies, which consist

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of both strategic strike forces equipped with nuclear missiles and general-purpose forces, i.e., forces intended to participate in nuclear-missile warfare and in local wars.

The role of the navy in local wars is conditioned by the fact that of all the branches of the armed forces it is the most suited to carry out broad-scale military actions against countries situated at great distances from the territories of the aggressors. In the last two decades, where geographic conditions have permitted, major naval forces of one and sometimes several imperialist powers have actively participated in every military conflict. It is far from true, however, that they have always managed to achieve their assigned goals.

In a majority of cases, naval forces were dispatched in advance to the areas where it was planned to aggravate the situation. Information on the movement of groupings of naval forces of the imperialist states on the World Ocean have often served as a reliable indicator that a military conflict would break out in one region of the world or another.

Naval forces are regarded by the imperialists as the most suitable weapon for local wars because they possess high mobility and the capability to remain for a long time in constant combat readiness in areas of probable military operations, without violating the sovereignty of other states until a certain time, and without provoking premature international complications.

The West considers it an important factor that in local wars the attacking navy has a low vulnerability to retaliatory actions by the side being attacked because usually that side does not have sufficient naval and air forces.

The high operational and combat capabilities of the forces of a modern navy give the imperialists the potential capability to expand the area of their employment in local wars. Thus, the capability of attack carriers to deliver attacks on targets located at a distance of up to 2,000 kilometers has made them one of the most important forces in local wars. This circumstance is promoted to a great degree by the fact that carriers are frequently the sole means permitting the bases of attack aircraft to be moved closer to the area of combat operations.

In local wars, as experience has shown, other surface warships -- guided-missile, gunfire support, mine-countermeasure, and landing ships -- can also play an important role. They are capable of transporting and landing troops, providing fire support to the littoral flanks of the groupings of their own ground forces, delivering guided-missile and gunfire attacks against

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coastal targets [[in the country subjected to the aggression,]] and accomplishing other missions.

The Marines have been widely used in local wars and conflicts as one of the main attacking forces, because Marine forces and units are the more mobile organizations and are kept at a high level of combat readiness to be sea- or air-lifted to the area of aggression.

The idea of widely employing naval forces in local wars and conflicts is finding expression in the establishment by the imperialists of a system of naval bases, and also in selecting areas where they maintain a constant presence on the ocean. In addition to deploying major nuclear-missile naval strategic groupings aimed primarily at the Soviet Union and the countries of the Socialist Community, the aggressive circles of the leading imperialist powers are at the same time striving to maintain powerful naval groupings to conduct local wars and provoke conflicts in strategically important areas of the world. These naval forces are constantly ready to perform police functions in suppressing the national-liberation movement in maritime colonial countries or in developing countries recently freed from colonial dependence.

The situation existing in the Mediterranean Sea, where a major grouping of US nuclear-powered missile-armed submarines with their missiles aimed at the Socialist countries is concentrated, the American Sixth Fleet and naval forces of other NATO countries with a nucleus of attack carriers can serve as a vivid illustration of what has been said. Under the flag of the Commander of the Sixth Fleet alone, there are normally two attack carriers (150-180 carrier aircraft), several cruisers, up to 15 screening ships, and also a landing group with its support.

To support the interests of British imperialism, Great Britain also constantly maintains naval forces in the eastern part of the Mediterranean Sea. The real reason for these forces was seen in the 1956 aggression, when the British and French fleets with a total of 185 ships (six carriers, one battleship, three cruisers, and [[ten]] *tens of* destroyers and escorts) and also Marines and strategic aircraft, delivered attacks against Port Said. The British Navy earlier also frequently played the role of instigator of military conflicts in the Persian Gulf and other regions of the Middile East.

The American Pacific Fleet, which numbers hundreds of combatants including a squadron of nuclear-powered missile-armed submarines and a considerable grouping of attack carriers, has similar missions. These forces are constantly situated in

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various areas of the Pacific Ocean, particularly in seas washing the countries of Southeast Asia. In recent years, the Indian Ocean has been included in the sphere of operations of this fleet, where a squadron of US ships is constantly on station and construction of new naval bases is underway.

The conducting of military-political demonstrations with naval forces to exert pressure on democratic governments objectionable to them or on national-liberation forces coming out against the antipopular regimes enjoying the protection of the imperialists is also a favorite device of the imperialists. Such demonstrations, as experience has shown, are usually conducted for a short time and often grow either into direct, independent combat employment of naval forces or into operations in support of ground troops.

Considerable naval forces whose actual composition is conditioned by the emerging situation, the course of events, and the nature of the conflict, are employed by the imperialists in local wars. For example, against the small countries of Latin America (Panama, the Dominican Republic, Guatemala, and others), the U.S. Navy has employed only those forces which were needed to land units of Marines and to support their operations ahore.

In the period of the Caribbean crisis directed against /Cuba/, the Americans operated differently. The United States used attack carriers, major forces of surface ships, and considerable contingents of Marines. At the same time, vigorous preparations were made for the employment of nuclear weapons and the landing of a large amphibious force on the island of Cuba. Military-political actions were conducted on a global scale in order to exert pressure on other countries to force them to refrain from supporting revolutionary Cuba.

In every military conflict, regardless of scale, the imperialists strive to establish and maintain overwhelming superiority in forces over their enemy. This occurred in the war in Korea in 1950-1953, also during the events in Lebanon in 1958, and especially in the war in Vietnam from 1961 to 1973. The main forces of the US Seventh Fleet were constantly on station off the shores of Vietnam. In the concluding stage of the war, beginning in the spring of 1972, combat operations were conducted there by [[426]] 4-6 attack carriers, 60 to 65 major combatants of other types, and up to 180 patrol ships and craft. Moreover, more than 30 combatants and up to 390 patrol and landing craft belonging to US allies participated in the combat operations.

In the course of the war in Vietnam 15 of the 17 attack carriers in the US naval inventory, six of the nine amphibious assault ships, and also three-quarters of the guided-missile

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ships -- cruisers, frigates and destroyers (48 of 58) -- and an overwhelming majority of the destroyers (163 out of 179) participated in the combat operations.

Aircraft carriers [[and their aircraft]] and other surface ships have played the main role among the naval forces participating in local wars. These forces have carried out the mission of neutralizing enemy troops and objectives ashore in supporting the operations of their own units, by operating against distant targets with aircraft and against coastal targets with guns and partly with unguided rockets. The shore blockade has also been widely used. Limited use has been made of submarines in these wars. Their missions have amounted to supporting operations of surface ships, protecting them from possible retaliatory attacks, and conducting reconnaissance.

As new naval material appears, the sphere of employment of naval forces in local wars will obviously be exanded, as attested to, for example, by the use of air-cushion vehicles to carry US Navy units deep into South Vietnam along small rivers previously considered to be unnavigable. There they conducted combat operations at a considerable distance from the sea coast, in heavily marsh-ridden areas and in jungles.

The art of naval warfare in local wars has been characterized, first, by the desire to widely employ operations forms and methods which have proved themselves in previous wars, and, secondly, by the testing of new methods of armed combat appropriate to modern weaponry. This has transformed the field of battle into a unique proving ground to test newly developed models of armament and combat equipment.

In the local wars waged by the imperialist states since the Second World War, various forms of employing a navy have been utilized: the landing of forces (mainly Marines) from ships onto the shore, the employment of carrier aircraft to support own troops, delivery of naval gunfire on shore targets, and the naval blockade with the employment of mines. The practice of providing sea- and air-lifts has also become widespread.

The landing of naval amphibious forces is one of the devices most frequently employed by the aggressors for direct support of reactionary regimes and for the suppression of national-liberation movements. Landing operations in Korea were carried out on a broad scale, and they were conducted in Vietnam on a lesser scale.

The composition and missions of landing forces and their support forces and the organization and intensity of the landing

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of forces in local wars have varied depending on the relative strength of the forces of the sides and the course of the armed combat on land. When the troops of the aggressors suffered defeat, for example in Korea, then the landing operations assumed a larger scale. Troops were landed in the rear or on the flank of the attacking patriotic forces, and they tried to stop or contain their offensive in order to make it possible for the /interventionists/ to gain the necessary time to regroup and reinforce their own troops. The well-known Inchon Amphibious Operation in Korea, which was one of the most important events in this war, was of exactly this nature. In other cases, [[major operational landing]] parties were landed in order to support the fast offensive pace of the ground forces.

Tactical landing forces consisting, as a rule, of units and subunits of Marines landed ashore with the support of aircraft and naval gunfire have been widely used in local wars. Methods of landing an amphibious force have been considerably developed in recent years. Whereas in Korea the landing of an amphibious force was conducted directly from landing ships, in Vietnam a combined method was employed: Personnel and light combat equipment were landed ashore by helicopters, and heavy combat equipment, by landing ships.

The US Marines have begun to practice new tactical landing methods, so-called vertical envelopment and eagle flight [sic], which consist of the following. After the defenses in the area to be captured are neutralized by [[attack]] *strikes by* aircraft and naval gunfire, helicopters are directed to the landing zone to isolate it with direct fire support, to support the landing of the troops from assault helicopters, and to provide fire support for the troops. After accomplishing the combat mission, the assault units are taken aboard helicopters and sent to take follow-up positions or objectives.

Let us examine in some detail [[from a purely military point of view]] the aforementioned Inchon Amphibious Operation. The concept of this operation was to land deep in the rear of the Korean People's Army from the sea, capture Seoul, make a forced drive to the east, sever the ground communications lines, disorganize the control of the Korean forces and their supply, while attacking simultaneously from the north and from the south, and to surround and destroy the main forces of the Korean People's Army with joint attacks by ground forces, the Navy, and aircraft. Later it planned to move up to the borders of China and thereby complete the military operations in Korea.

The following major forces were dispatched for direct participation in the landing: 1) the US Seventh Fleet, reinforced

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with American, British, Canadian, New Zealand, Australian, French, and Dutch ships, which numbered up to 300 units, including six carriers, one battleship, seven cruisers, more than 40 destroyers and escorts, 18 minesweepers, 76 landing ships, and 66 transports; 2) air forces, including more than 500 aircraft of various types; and 3) the Tenth Army Corps (the reinforced First Marine Division and the Seventh [[Marine]] *Infantry* Division) with a total strength of more than 40,000 men.

In preparing for the operation, the interventionists created a more than twentyfold superiority in troops and, in addition, ensured for themselves absolute control of the air and the sea.

Units of the *Korean* People's Army defending Inchon and the dispatched reinforcements continuously engaged the attacking enemy, dealing him serious losses in men and equipment. Therefore, by the evening of 16 September, in stubborn battles for each objective, the leading units of the interventionists had managed to penetrate only 10 kilometers and to occupy positions 15 kilometers from Kimpo Airport and 20 kilometers from Seoul. The planned rapid advance from Inchon to Seoul had been disrupted.

In order to support the development of the drive in the Seoul sector, on the evening of 16 September an airborne unit consisting of one airborne regiment was landed in the area of Kimpo Airport. After capturing the airport and moving aircraft there, the Americans were able to employ it to support the lead units attacking Seoul.

Carrier aircraft operated actively, making 500 aircraft sorties or more per day.

Despite the concentration of large forces, the interventionists were not able to occupy Seoul until 14 days after the initiation of the operation. In the course of the operation they achieved operational success; however, the strategic mission, the liquidation of the main forces of the People's Army and the achievement of a rapid ending of the war in Korea, were not accomplished. The tactical methods which had been used in the Second World War were repeated in the Inchon Amphibious Operation.

The landing and the operations ashore were successful only owing to the repeated superiority established in ground forces with complete control of the sea.

The distinguishing feature of this operation was the landing of a force directly in a port situated deep among the defenders.

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Without the extensive active employment of the Navy, the interventionists would hardly have been able to avoid a military defeat in Korea. The Navy was the force which considerably influenced the course of the war as a whole. Through the use of their Navy, the Americans were able to create a powerful strike force grouping in a narrow sector of the front which permitted them to avoid complete defeat in Korea.

Aircraft Operations in local wars have from the very outbreak of the conflict pursued the goal of concentrated mass attacks on airports, air defense forces, and control systems in order to deprive the defenders of the possibility of putting up organized resistance against the aggressor. At the time, air attacks have been carried out against the heavily populated areas of the country in order to sow panic among the population, to demoralize and break the people's will to resist, and to disorganize the administration of the country. Major forces of carrier aircraft operating in small groups over a broad front have ordinarily been used to deliver the first strikes. Mass attacks of carrier aircraft operating from different directions at different altitudes have been used to destroy the most heavily defended targets. In characterizing aircraft operations in the war against Egypt in 1956, one French journalist wrote that the main mission of aviation prior to the landing of the landing force lay in destroying or neutralizing the Egyptian aircraft for a period of two to three days, and then in shifting to airborne psychological warfare with the dropping of pamphlets and night bombing of popu lated areas. In this connection, it was believed that the lowered morale resulting from the bombings "possibly could lead to the unconditional surrender of the enemy even before a single soldier had touched his soil."[12]

The very same mission was assigned to carrier aircraft in the war against heroic Vietnam. After provoking the "Tonkin Incident" as the pretext for so-called retaliatory measures, on 2 August 1964 the American Seventh Fleet, through attacks by its carrier aircraft on populated centers, tried to demoralize the population of the Republic and to demonstrate its resolution to hold their occupied positions in Southeast Asia at any price in order to force the Vietnam patriots to give up their liberation struggle. Not having achieved her goals through these barbaric attacks, beginning in February 1965 the United States shifted to delivering systematic all-out air attacks on populated centers, including the capital of the country, Hanoi, and on the most important sea and ground communications lines. The United States, forced to cease her air bombardment of the DRV on 1 December 1968 under pressure from world public opinion, nevertheless continued individual military actions by her aircraft against the DRV, and in April 1972 made a last desperate attempt

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to crush the heroic resistance of Socialist Vietnam. This time, having marshalled off the shores of Vietnam the largest naval grouping of the entire war, consisting of six attack carriers and a large number of other warships, they renewed the bombing of the DRV with particular savagery, using carrier-based, strategic, and tactical aircraft. However, in this case, too, they failed to achieve their goals.

Carrier-based aircraft were employed with great intensity in this largest of the local wars. With an average *of 1.4 crews* per aircraft, each pilot made 20 to 28 combat sorties per month, while for the entire period from 1965 to 1972, carrier aircraft made up to 8,000 aircraft sorties per month.

The carrier aircraft attacks on the DRV were made under conditions of considerable opposition from the air defense system, as a result of which every carrier lost 10 to 15 aircraft per month. Aircraft operations against the South Vietnam patriots encountered considerably less resistance from antiaircraft guns, yet the aircraft operated with a 1.2-1.5 greater intensity than they had against DRV targets. Here carrier aircraft mainly prosecuted missions of air support for American and Saigon ground forces and Marines. A general idea of the intensity of carrier aircraft operations is provided by some of the results of the battle for the city of Khesanh, besieged by the patriots in 1968, where in 77 days of battle the aircraft of the American aggressors made more than 25,000 aircraft sorties (up to 1,600 sorties on individual days), dropped 100,000 bombs, and fired 700,000 rockets.

The following figures eloquently attest to the intensity of the employment of carrier aircraft by the United States in the Vietnam War. Carrier aircraft accounted for more than 50% of the total number of aircraft sorties of all types of US aircraft taking part in the bombing of targets in South Vietnam. Eight attack carriers and one antisubmarine carrier were [[noted]] in the composition of Carrier Task Force 77 of the US Seventh Fleet operating in Vietnam. The daily rate of carrier aircraft operations were: 178 aircraft sorties for a single carrier, up to 311 sorties for two carriers, and up to 350 sorties for three carriers. In the course of the year, carrier aircraft made 74,965 sorties of which 53,481 (71%) were attack sorties and 21,484 (29%) were support sorties.

From the beginning of the systematic attacks on the DRV, from February 1965 until a temporary cessation on 1 December 1968, carrier aircraft made 200,000 aircraft sorties on attack missions alone.

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In spite of the fact that the combat maneuvering of the US carriers was carried out under simple conditions, in the absence of a real threat to them, the US naval command nevertheless took a full set of measures to defend and protect the attack carrier groups: The ships maneuvered in dispersed combat formations, were constantly covered in the air by patrolling fighters, and took defensive measures against submarines, mines, and small combatants.

As we have already said, carrier aircraft were also employed in direct support of attacking or defending forces of the aggressors. The defense of the American Pusan Perimeter in 1950 and also their operations in the area of Khesanh in South Vietnam serve as examples of this.

Carrier aircraft supported the offensive of US troops toward Seoul after the amphibious landing at Inchon. The fact that the American troops which were driven to the sea in the area of Hungnam avoided complete defeat and annihilation in 1950 is largely due to the support of their own carrier aircraft.

In the course of the combat employment of American aircraft against the DRV, electronic countermeasures against the air defense systems underwent considerable development. The widespread employment of passive jamming of radars was combined with attacks on them using SHRIKE and STANDARD ART-type antiradar missiles. Electronic television-controlled or laser-beam-guided SMART bombs were also used. Aircraft operations were supported by tactical reconnaissance and by additional reconnaissance of the targets and air defense systems, as well as by thorough operations and tactical security.

It is useful to examine joint actions by ships' guns and ground forces in local wars in the examples of the intervention in Korea and in Vietnam.

In the war in Korea, ships' guns were [[very]] widely employed by the interventionists against the shore. They also had the mission of supporting troops, destroying military targets and inflicting casualties on the personnel supporting the coastal flanks of the front, and disrupting ground coastal communications of the Korean People's Democratic Republic. Individual ships and entire forces were employed to carry out these missions. The employment of ships' guns, according to American experts, sometimes was of decisive importance in individual sectors of the front.

The Americans employed ships' guns most intensively and most massively in 1950 in preparation for the landing at Inchon, when

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in the course of almost three months ships bombarded military and other objectives of the *Korean* People's Army on the east coast 89 times.

In 1952 the battleship WISCONSIN, the heavy cruisers ST. PAUL and ROCHESTER, and the light cruiser MANCHESTER over a period of 2½ months fired on the forward positions of the *Korean* People's Army, rendering support to Marine units. During this period they expended 977 406-mm projectiles (with an average firing range of 16 miles), 1661 203-mm projectiles (with an average range of about 11 miles), and 470 152-mm projectiles (with an average range of 11 miles). As a result of these attacks, the troops of the *Korean* People's Army lost about 470 men killed and 450 men wounded; six gun emplacements were destroyed and 18 damaged, and 225 reinforced concrete pillboxes and shelters were destroyed and 252 damaged. The American command believed that the gunfire support to the troops ashore in this period was effective and justified itself.[13]

When examining the experience in employing American ships' guns against shore targets in Korea, we must not fail to note that the intensive employment of guns was possible only because the American ships were not subjected to proper counteraction by North Korean aircraft and naval forces, which had no long-range weapons at their disposal at that time.

In those cases when events extended to those areas defended even by a few guns of the *Korean* People's Army, the guns often became a serious impediment to the ships of the interventionists.

Only due to the specific, almost firing-range conditions were the interventionists able to employ ships' guns against the shore on such a scale.

Ships' guns were also widely used by the interventionists in Vietnam. [[Here]] Shore bombardment was carried out by a group of warships usually consisting of one to three cruisers and one to five destroyers. Target reconnaissance and gunfire spotting were carried out by aircraft, helicopters, and also by ground fire-direction posts dispatched by the ground forces and the Marines.

When analyzing the experience of combat operations in Vietnam, the US naval command came to the conclusion that although the employment of 203-mm and 152-mm cruiser guns and 127-mm destroyer guns for constant operations against shore targets was not sufficiently effective, it was more effective and more economical than deploying aircraft, because they were less dependent on weather conditions. Therefore, in order to increase

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the strength of the gunfire attacks on coastal targets, the Americans sent the battleship NEW JERSEY, armed with 406-mm guns with a range of up to 38 kilometers, to the shores of Vietnam. This was intended to ease the situation of the other ships of the US Navy which suffered considerable losses from counteraction by shore-based guns of the DRV.

Thus, the American intervention in Vietnam also showed that ships' guns continue to have an important place in the armament system of a modern navy.

The naval blockade has been employed by the imperialist powers in one form or another in practically every conflict and local war. Its goals were to isolate the victims of aggression, to deprive them of support by friendly states, and in the final analysis to reduce their ability to put up resistance to the interventionists. In order to conduct the blockade, the navy of the aggressive side usually established several blockade zones on the approaches to the seacoast, which were constantly monitored by ships and aircraft. For example, two blockade zones were established on the approaches to the Vietnamese coast: the near and the far zone. In the far zone, major surface combatants and aircraft monitored the approach to the shores of Vietnam of transports from countries friendly to it. In the near zone, patrolling American ships, patrol boats, and aircraft hunted Vietnamese transport ships and junks engaged in coastal navigation. However, the hunt for the Vietnamese junks did not yield the desired results. The Vietnamese patriots delivered a considerable amount of cargo by sea and by inland waterway. A majority of the cargo reached the ports of Vietnam from friendly countries in the same manner. Therefore, grossly violating every norm of international law by expanding the criminal undeclared war in Vietnam, the United States shifted to the widespread employment of mines on 9 May 1972 in order to increase the effectiveness of the naval blockade.

In accordance with a previously developed, thorough plan, in one night carrier aircraft laid mines in the approaches to all of the ports of the DRV. The internal waters of the Republic were also mined simultaneously. The mining operations of the American Navy continued right up to the end of the war in Vietnam. As a result, vast water areas became dangerous for international shipping, and the legal rights of other states to enjoy freedom of the high seas was infringed upon. A blockade organized to suppress the people's liberation movement and to interfere in the internal affairs of other countries under all circumstances is an act contravening the norms of international law as proclaimed in the United Nations Charter and in a number of international treaties.

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From a purely military point of view, the US blockade operations in the war in Vietnam, as in other local wars, teach us little, because [[they were conducted where]] the defending side had no real naval forces capable of putting up proper resistance against the aggressor.

Military Sea Transport in local wars has played [[a highly]] *an* important and at times decisive role, and the intensity of shipping has grown especially during the period of the most intense battles on land. Thus, for example, the defeat of the American and Korean troops who had been driven to the sea in the Pusan beachhead in 1950 was prevented to a considerable degree because the Americans managed to hastily transport five divisions of reinforcements by sea from Japan to Pusan. During the years of the war in Korea, some five million men were transported by ship from the United States and Japan and between Korean ports. Four tons of various cargoes were needed for each soldier landed in Korea. In the 37 months of the war, the American Navy delivered 44 million tons of dry cargo and 22 million tons of petroleum products to Korea. We would note for the sake of comparison that in the period of the Second World War the minimal necessary annual import of strategic raw materials for Great Britian [[-- a country for whom the problem of sea shipping is a vital question --]] was 16 million tons. This required keeping 2,000 ships constantly at sea and processing 350 transports through the ports daily.

Ocean and sea shipments were also of [[very]] great importance in the Vietnam War. The Americans imported monthly into South Vietnam 85,000 tons of ammunition, 320,000 cubic meters of fuel, and 15 million daily food rations, i.e., an average of 35 kilograms of stores per man per day.

According to foreign reports, the total monthly volume of ocean shipping to South Vietnam was 1.5 to 2 million tons. More than 300 ships were constantly engaged in shipping, with ocean transport accounting for up to 98% of the volume of cargo shipments and up to 35% of the volume of personnel shipments.

Ocean shipping experience confirmed the great advantages of containerships, of which we spoke in the /first/ chapter. The unloading of such a ship in port took a total of 18 hours instead of 5 to 7 days. Container shipping permitted widespread employment of helicopters in unloading work and in delivering cargo over considerable distances from the unloading points.

Transoceanic military air shipments were also of great importance. In the period of the Vietnam War the total volume of these shipments was: 110,000 tons in 1965; 255,000 tons in 1966; 540,000 tons in 1967; and 910,000 tons in 1968.

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Thus, a study of the experience in employing US naval forces in local wars makes it possible to conclude that sizable groupings were employed to carry out the broad range of missions examined above. In several cases, more ships and aircraft participated in combat operations than in individual major operations of the Second World War. Carrier-based aircraft, surface ships, and Marines were usually included in the composition of the [[forces of these]] groupings. Carrier aircraft, as a rule, were the main strike force.

Operations by the naval forces of the aggressor were distinguished by their diversity and high intensity. Close mutual support was also reflected in the timely establishment and movement of operational groupings of naval forces into certain areas to aid the operations of the ground forces. Military shipments across the ocean were of great importance. Despite the growing role of transoceanic air communications, a large part of the personnel and the bulk of the combat equipment and other cargo were shipped as before on oceangoing and seagoing transports.

Moreover, experience in local wars confirmed that the aggressive operations of the imperialists led to success only when the appropriate opposition was lacking. When there has been well organized resistance by the freedomloving peoples supported by the powerful Socialist Community and other progressive forces of today, the imperialists have not succeeded in achieving their military-political goals in local [[warfare]] *wars*.

NAVIES IN TIME OF PEACE

Throughout the history of their existence the armed forces have always been the most active instrument of state policy not only in wartime but also in time of peace. Today, in a period of the very sharp ideological contradictions between the two social systems -- the capitalist and Socialist systems -- in a period of growth in the national-liberation struggle [[on all continents]], of unprecedented scientific-technical progress through which scientific-technical discoveries which have drastically [[changed]] *increased* the power of weaponry have been placed at the service of the states, this statement is even more true[[, and proof of it is evident at every turn]]. It is well known that immediately after the end of the Second World War, placing her hopes on a monopoly on nuclear weapons, the United States assumed for herself the mission of "representing" the interests of all mankind. In connection with their temporary monopoly on nuclear weapons, the American state leaders tied all policy and diplomacy to nuclear policy and diplomacy, and military strategy to a nuclear strategy. In this connection, the achievement of

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rule over the entire world became the main goal of American monopolistic capital. As a result of the intensive efforts of Soviet scientists, the American nuclear monopoly was soon broken, and the imperialists were deprived of their material base for conducting a policy of nuclear blackmail in relations with the Socialist countries. However, the pretensions of the aggressive circles in the United States to world supremacy were not curtailed even after the loss of their monopoly on nuclear weapons.

In the 1940's as well as in the 1950's the desire for world supremacy was rather openly proclaimed by the ideologists of American imperialism with the main stress being placed on nuclear weaponry and the Navy. As the American journal MILITARY REVIEW wrote: "Nuclear power plus seapower yields a freedom of action for our country which can easily allow it to implement its God-given right to lead the entire world."[14] Colonel Reinhardt, an active proponent of a policy for establishing US world supremacy, in hoping that nuclear weaponry would be the key to establishing world supremacy, wrote: "Technology, which is making the world smaller, for the first time in history is creating conditions which will permit effective rule over the world by a single power."[15] But the USSR and [[the entire Socialist camp]] *countries of the Socialist Community* stood with insuperable strength in the way of the aspirations of American imperialism for world supremacy. And the fact that, despite the threat to destroy Communism, imperialism has not decided to unleash a new world war is explained primarily by the enormous growth in the military might of the USSR, which has altered the relative strength of the military forces. This serves as dramatic confirmation of the evident truths that only the real military might of the Armed Forces of the Soviet state has a sobering effect on the aggressive forces of the imperialist camp, which have not rid themselves of their wild ideas of crushing the countries of the Socialist Community and above all the Soviet Union. Even the ideologists of the numerous military and other doctrines of "rolling back" and "destroying" Communism recognize this themselves. As early as 1959 the Senate Foreign Affairs Committee in its report noted that "The end of the American nuclear monopoly and the growth in the strategic capabilities of the Soviet Union have increased the difficulties connected with maintaining a military posture necessary to achieve established American goals."[16] This committee was forced to conclude that "The military posture of the United States has deteriorated: The country, which was previously in unquestionable safety, now is open and vulnerable to direct and destructive attack."[17]

We must not fail to consider such statements by bourgeois figures in analyzing the relative strength of forces. They attest to a great deal, especially if one takes into account the

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fact that the imperialists are forced to recognize one achievement or another by the Socialist countries only when life itself forces them to do so.

The irresistible military might of the Soviet Union comprises an indispensable part of the military potential of the entire Socialist Community; it safeguards the security of fraternal countries, and is making a radical change in the relative strength of forces in the world arena to the advantage of the world revolutionary process and world peace. At the International Conference of Communist and Workers' Parties in 1969, representatives of fraternal countries and parties stressed the enormous international significance of the defensive might of the USSR. Walter Ulbricht, First Secretary of the Central Committee of the Socialist Unity Party of Germany, said: "Today, under the conditions of the revolution in combat equipment and military science, the defensive might of the Soviet Union more than ever is the decisive guarantee of the protection of all Socialist states who have achieved national freedom, and the guarantee of the protection of peace throughout the world."[18]

In addition to nuclear weaponry, among the many components comprising the might of the Soviet Armed Forces is the rich arsenal of nuclear delivery systems which our country has at its disposal, and above all those systems through which the American Continent has become just as vulnerable to punishing retaliatory strikes as the other areas of the world which American strategists regard as springboards for attack on the USSR. These are having the most sobering effect on the advocates of preparations for a new world war and the new pretenders to world supremacy. It is a matter primarily of nuclear weapons delivery systems with an intercontinental range which the Stategic Missile Forces and the Navy have at their disposal. The Air Force, the Ground Forces, and other branches of our [[glorious]] Armed Forces are to a great degree a means of deterring and, when necessary, also a means for suppressing the aggressive acts of the imperialists.

Policy, as V. I. Lenin taught, is a concentrated expression of the economy, whose condition primarily determines the strength of such an important instrument of policy as the armed forces of the state. The economic might of a [[given]] country is expressed precisely in the condition of its armed forces.

The Navy can be a graphic affirmation of this and an arbitrary indication of the level of development of the country's economy.

F. Engels wrote: "A modern naval ship is not only the product of major industry, but is at the same time an example of

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it. . . . A country with the most highly developed major industry enjoys almost a monopoly on the construction of such ships. . . .

". . . A political force at sea backed by modern naval ships is not a 'direct' force at all, but on the contrary it is manifested *by* economic power. . . ."[19] These words were written at the dawning of the development of the steam-powered navy. [[And]] Today their significance has increased many times over.

A high level of development of every area of the industry and science of a country is needed to build a modern naval ship. Construction of an individual ship which meets modern requirements is possible only through the broadest cooperation and only in the event that each of the areas of industry connected with shipbuilding delivers the highest quality production. As a rule, several hundred industrial enterprises participate in the construction of a warship. Only states with a powerful economy can build a navy as a whole with an inventory sufficient to accomplish the missions assigned to it and with all the means of support necessary to its normal functioning.

[[We may assert that]] A state bounded by the sea, which does not have a navy corresponding to its importance in the world, thereby shows its relative economic weakenss. Thus, each ship of a navy is a relative indication of the level of development of science, technology, and industry in a [[given]] country and an indicator of its real military might.

The long time needed to create the material and technical resources for a navy, the relatively short service life of ships and the associated danger of the obsolescence of naval forces places special demands on science, which must indicate the course of naval construction years and even decades in advance.

One more trait is inherent in the Navy as a component part of the armed forces, and that is the ability to clearly demonstrate the real combat might of one's own state in the international arena. This feature is usually employed by the political leadership of the imperialist countries to deter potential enemies. It should be noted that the arsenal of the means for such demonstrations utilized by the diplomats of these countries is constantly expanding.

As we know, in recent years there have been frequent exhibitions of missile weapons, military aircraft, and diverse military equipment conducted on an international scale, which, in addition to their commercial purposes, are aimed at another goal -- to demonstrate to potential enemies the perfection of this equipment, to have an effect on their morale, to intimidate

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with the power of their weaponry while still at peace, and to fill potential enemies beforehand with the thought of the hopelessness of their efforts to combat aggression. This method was often employed by Hitler's Germany, and today it has been included in the Pentagon's inventory. It is far from true that this type of propaganda method always leads to the intended goals, primarily because the weapons being demonstrated appear before the viewers only as a potential threat. The navy is another matter. Warships appearing directly off the shore represent a real threat of operations whose time and execution are determined by those in command. Whereas such a threat was quite great in the past, today it is much more so, since modern warships are platforms for nuclear-missile weaponry and aircraft whose range can cover the entire territory of a state.

In many cases naval demonstrations have made it possible to achieve political goals without resorting to an armed struggle merely by exerting pressure through one's own potential power and by threatening to initiate military hostilities.

Thus, the navy has always been an instrument of state policy, and an important support for diplomacy in peacetime. This is fostered by the very nature of a navy and the properties inherent in it: [[namely]] a constant high degree of combat readiness, mobility, and the ability to concentrate one's own forces in selected areas of the ocean in a short time. Moreover, the neutrality of the waters of the World Ocean makes it possible to carry out the movement and concentration of naval forces without violating the provisions of international law and without presenting the opposing side with formal reasons for protest or other forms of counteraction.

The ability to threaten a potential enemy by the very fact of their existence has transformed the navies of the capitalist countries into a deterrent force and has raised the building of them to the level of one of the most important issues of the political contest in the international arena.

So it was that Great Britain took economic, military, diplomatic and propaganda measures to build the strongest Navy, which actually played an important role in the achievement of goals of British policy not only in wartime but also in peacetime and contributed to the transformation of Great Britain into the major colonial power. Her Navy was widely employed in so-called gunboat diplomacy, suppressing the freedom movements of oppressed peoples and expanding colonial supremacy.

The importance of navies in peacetime is confirmed by many examples from Russian history. The power of the Russian Navy

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under Peter I was the main factor which deterred the militarist intentions of the British who were attempting to come to the aid of a Sweden suffering defeat in the war with Russia.

In 1780, Russia, utilizing the growing might of her Navy, emerged as the initiator of a declaration on freedom of neutral maritime commerce, which contributed to the development of world maritime commerce, and was a blow against the unfounded claims of England to her personal right to conduct maritime commerce only in English ships.

In 1783, the Czarist government, utilizing the superiority of its fleet in the Black Sea, annexed the Crimea without a war, and brought it into the structure of the Russian state, while in 1830 a favorable defensive alliance with Turkey was concluded without conducting military operations. Owing to this alliance, the presence of major forces of the Russian Navy and ground forces in the area of the Bosporus and the Turkish capital was established. It seemed that under peacetime conditions the cherished goal of Russian Czarism had been achieved -- freedom of navigation from the Black Sea into the Mediterranean Sea. However, military-political blackmail by Western states, primarily England, backed by stronger naval forces than the Russian Navy, prevented consolidation of the diplomatic success achieved by the Russians, and Russian Czarism was forced to submit to the dictates of the Western powers without a war.

The special importance of navies [[to]] *in the politics of* states is affirmed by a series of acts regulating international relations. Thus, according to the Paris Peace Treaty of 1856, Russia was forbidden to have a navy in the Black Sea.

The Anglo-Japanese alliance agreement of 1902 particularly stipulated a requirement to maintain an allied fleet superior to the Russian fleet in the Pacific Ocean.

In the discussion of the draft of the Portsmouth Peace Treaty after the end of the Russo-Japanese War, Japan tried to include it in a requirement to limit the composition of the Russian fleet in the Pacific Ocean, but the demand was not met because England, France, the United States, and other interested states were afraid of strengthening Japan excessively.

In the peace treaties concluded after the First and Second World Wars special attention was devoted to limitations pertaining to the navies of the vanquished states. The requirement to completely destroy submarines and the unconditional prohibition against the vanquished countries' building or acquiring them was characteristic of these treaties.

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In addition to the limitations and prohibitions imposed on the navies of the defeated states, the victors divided those navies up with particular thoroughness. Thus, the procedure for dividing up the Navy of Hitler Germany was established at the Berlin conference of the three great powers (July-August 1945). All surface ships, including those under construction or under repair, were divided equally between the USSR, the United States, and Great Britain. The German submarines were destroyed, except for 30 submarines which were also divided between the victorious countries. All stores of the German Navy were turned over with the ships. Japan's warships were also divided on the basis of these same principles after her capitulation. Characteristically, similar measures were not taken with respect to the other branches of the Armed Forces.

The repeated attempts made at international conferences from 1922 through 1935 to limit construction of warships also /attest/ to the special significance of navies in the policy of major states. It is true that the decisions of these conferences restrained naval construction in most major states only until approximately the mid-1930's, after which the naval arms race proceeded without any limitations.

The role of navies in state policy can also be traced by examining the events which led to the weakening of England, who for a long time occupied the leading position in the capitalist world. It is interesting that the United States dethroned England as the "mistress of the seas" not only without fighting her in this period, but [[also]] while being her constant ally. The United States achieved without a war what Germany was unable to achieve in two world wars.

The weakening of England began as early as the First World War, and was clearly displayed immediately after the end of the war, when England was forced to give up her "two-power standard" and agree to an equality of forces between her own and the American Navy. But the weakening process developed at a faster pace in the Second World War, and navies again played an important role in it. Of course, this process had even deeper roots, and was conditioned also by the influence of the revolutionary and national-liberation movements embracing the entire world. However, even taking these basic reasons into account, the role of navies in the weakening of England also cannot be underestimated. The fact is that the United States did not direct the operations of her Navy only against the navies of the Hitler coalition. At the same time she was pursuing the goal of eliminating her oldest imperialist competitor, the British Empire, and of taking her place in the world. The United States conducted this kind of policy for a prolonged period of time, and especially during the Second World War, utilizing naval forces as her main instrument.

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The Americans "ousted" England from the seas contiguous to the American Continent, and liquidated her former power in the Western Hemisphere, in the area of the Mediterranean Sea, in the Indian Ocean, in the Far East, and also in the Pacific Ocean basin. In the most difficult period of the war, the United States raised the question with England of the withdrawal of her Navy to bases on the American Continent in the event of defeat. England's entire gold reserves migrated across the ocean in the course of the war.

In addition, the emerging conditions and a powerful economy permitted the Americans to concentrate sizable efforts on naval construction and to build tens of thousands of various warships and patrol boats during the Second World War. By the end of the war, the number of the main types of warships in the US naval forces equaled the number of warships in the navies of all of the capitalist states taken together, and was twice as large as a number of warships in the British Navy.

The American Navy also surpassed the navies of the other imperialist powers in its qualitative indices. In 1945 it was the most modern Navy; more than 75% of the ships in its inventory were less than five years old, i.e., essentially, it had been fully renovated during the war, and in addition, it had been transformed into a Navy of aircraft carriers and submarines, the most modern of the day.

In the postwar period, the United States moved up among the leaders of imperialism, and its Navy became a widely utilized instrument of imperialist policy. At present, the US Sixth Fleet (and not the British) is constantly on station in the Mediterranean Sea, in the past a traditional area of British supremacy, and is the main means of threatening and exerting political pressure on a number of countries in the Mediterranean Basin. It is being used as the main means of combating the national-liberation movement of the Arab peoples, and also gives comprehensive support to the aggressive aspirations of Israel and to the economic expansion of American monopolies in the Near East, in Africa, and in Southern Europe.

The US Seventh Fleet is being widely utilized in the struggle against the national-liberation movements, democracy, and progress in Southeast Asia. It represents the leading grouping of the imperialist armed forces, which has repeatedly unleashed open wars against the [[progressive forces of the young]] *developing* states of Indochina in this area of the globe.

The growth in *might of* naval forces has permitted the Americans to widely expand into various countries of the world, including countries of the British Empire. The United States of America, and not Great Britain, has become the center of a system of postwar aggressive alliances uniting a large number of states, with the American Navy acting as the connecting link in these alliances.

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It is difficult to find an area in the world where the American politicians have not employed their Navy against progressive forces. With the aid of the Navy, they carried out a blockade of revolutionary Cuba and landed detachments of counterrevolutionaries on its territory, suppressed the democratic movement in the Dominican Republic, and aided in the overthrow of the progressive regime in Chile and of the antidemocratic forces in other countries of Latin America.

Moreover, the United States also employs her Navy to pressure her allies who are participants in the pacts, and who have relatively weak forces at sea and whose purpose is to carry out auxiliary missions. It is interesting to note that whenever tension grows within these alliances due to the effect of imperialist contradictions or in other instances, US politicians bring forth plans for establishing various groupings of so-called combined naval forces, thereby trying to shore up the alliance, and to create the impression of equality among members. This was so in 1962, when US Secretary of State Dean Rusk proposed the establishment of "multinational naval nuclear forces." Subsequently a plan was drawn up for the establishment of a surface nuclear fleet of 25 ships with multinational crews, a plan was drawn up for establishing a combined squadron of several destroyers in the Atlantic Ocean, and so forth. However, the United States went no further than the symbolic establishment of multinational naval forces, reserving the possibility for the full utilization of the Navy for itself.

Times are changing, and methods of employing navies as an important instrument of policy in peacetime by various governments are also changing.

In the postwar years, when modern capitalism was striving to accommodate itself in every way to the new situation in the world, the forms of employment of navies changed. Faced by the competition with Socialism, the ruling circles of the capitalist countries are resorting to more and more refined methods of demonstrations of force and deterrence, and to nuclear blackmail, not stopping short of any crimes against mankind in their attempts to preserve or restore their supremacy over the peoples of former colonies or of other countries which have torn themselves from the clutches of capitalist exploitation.

The demonstration of force by navies of the leading seapowers of the capitalist world [[against our country and its Navy]] has been made a daily practice by the military command of the countries participating in the various aggressive military blocs. This includes patrols by nuclear-powered submarines in various areas of the World Ocean, demonstrations by aircraft carriers in seas adjacent to the territories of our country, numerous overflights of our combatants and auxiliaries, and demonstration calls by warships in the Black, Baltic, and

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Japanese and other seas. All of these clearly provocative acts have been realistically appraised by us and have not achieved the goals pursued by their perpetrators.

The growth in the power of the Soviet state and its prestige in the world arena have forced the leaders of many countries to recognize the hopelessness of such demonstrations, as a result of which, as was noted above, in 1972 for the first time in the practice of mutual relations in maritime law, a Soviet-American treaty was concluded on the prevention of incidents at sea, which has considerably normalized the situation in the areas of navigation of Soviet and American warships.

The Soviet Navy is also being utilized in the foreign policy measures of our state. But the aims of this utilization differ radically from the aims of the imperialist powers. The Soviet Navy is an instrument of a peaceloving policy and of friendship of peoples, a policy of suppressing the aggressive aspirations of imperialism, of deterring military adventures, and of decisively countering threats to the security of peoples on the part of the imperialist powers.

With the emergence of the Navy onto the ocean expanses, the Soviet Union acquired new and more widespread opportunities to utilize it in peacetime in support of her own state interests. And these opportunities are being successfully exercised. While in foreign ports, Soviet navymen -- representatives of the various Soviet peoples [[and specialties]] -- feel themselves to be plenipotentiaries of our country.

Friendly visits by Soviet navymen present the opportunity for the peoples of the countries being visited to see with their own eyes the triumph of Socialist principles in our country, the true equality of the peoples of the Soviet Union, and their high cultural level. [[In our warships they see the achievements of Soviet science, technology, and industry.]] Soviet navymen[[, from seaman to admiral,]] carry the truth about our Socialist country, about our Soviet ideology and culture, and about our Soviet way of life to the peoples of other countries. They demonstrate a high degree of awareness, organization, and culture, a deep respect for the peoples and national traits and customs of those countries which they come to visit. Soviet diplomatic representatives and other officials of these states confirm that our navymen are worthy representatives of their people abroad and are contributing greatly to an increase in sympathy and friendly feelings for the Soviet Union and her highly humanistic ideals. Thus, on 10 January 1969, the newspaper AFRO-AMERICAN wrote: "The Kenyans were surprised that Soviet navymen, in contrast to the navymen of the American and

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British navies, did not leave the slightest trace of chaos behind them in port. . . . The Soviet navymen conducted themselves so responsibly and so well that it seemed as though they were men from another planet."

Moreover, Soviet navymen see the achievements of peoples of friendly countries [[to us]], who have gained the right to control their own fate, and see the aftereffects of many centuries of rule by the colonialists and the social contrasts of the capitalist countries, which are so thoroughly concealed by bourgeois propaganda.

The official visits and calls of our warships at foreign ports are making a considerable contribution to the improvement in mutual understanding between states and peoples and to strengthening the international prestige of the Soviet Union. This is convincingly confirmed by the numerous examples of the display of warm feelings toward our country on the part of the population in every foreign port, by the enormous interest in the life of the Soviet people, and in our navymen and warships. Statements by many official representatives attest to this. It is enough to cite only the statement by the Minister of Foreign Affairs of [[South]] *People's Democratic Republic of* Yemen regarding the first visit to the port of Aden by Soviet warships[[, in which he said]]: "For the first time in history, warships of a friendly nation have visited our country. In the past, many warships have come to Aden, but they have borne the banner not of friendship, but of threats, force, and enslavement."

The major OKEAN maneuvers conducted by the Soviet Navy in April and May 1970 also were concluded with the visit of warships to more than ten foreign ports situated on four continents of the globe. Usually after major exercises inspections are held of the forces participating in them. However, due to the global scope of the naval maneuvers, it was impossible to conduct such an inspection. Therefore the calls of the Soviet naval ships at foreign ports were a unique inspection of the naval forces of the great Soviet power guarding the peace and security of peoples. They contributed to the strengthening of friendship with these peoples, and to the development of international relations between the Soviet Union and a number of developing sovereign states.

PROBLEMS OF BALANCING NAVIES

In the course of building our Navy, a great deal of attention was devoted and continues to be devoted to constantly maintaining all the elements comprising its combat strength in the

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most favorable combination, i.e., as we have come to say today, to keep them balanced.

A correct definition of the nature of balancing naval forces is possible only on the basis of a profound scientific analysis of all the previously examined preconditions which objectively influence the direction of their development. The problem of balancing a navy is [[a subject of modern naval science, embracing such of the more important areas of it as]] *closely connected with* the art of naval warfare, technology, and history. This problem undoubtedly is also of considerable interest of a purely cognitive nature. All of this provides us with the basis for a more detailed examination of [[the above question]] *it* from a [[theoretical]] *contemporary* and historical viewpoint.

The military doctrine which determines a navy's role and position in the system of armed forces of a state, [[its]] missions in armed combat, and also the purpose of the [[types of forces]] *arms* comprising it, must form the basis for the balanced development of a navy.

The balanced development of a navy presupposes in a certain historical period the priority development of those types of forces which are capable of most effectively accomplishing the main missions confronting a navy.

At the present time, the leading position in navies is being assigned to those forces which are capable of prosecuting important strategic missions, which pursue the goal of undermining the military-economic potential of the enemy and crushing his nuclear seapower. A scientific analysis of experience in past wars, the assumed nature of a future war, and the trend in the development of the navies of the imperialist states make it possible to conclude that nuclear-powered submarines armed with ballistic and cruise missiles and naval missile-armed and ASW aircraft are these kinds of forces. It is precisely they who embody the enormous striking power and possess the high mobility, the low detection probability, and the capability to deliver attacks on important military-industrial *targets* and administrative centers of the enemy, situated on the coast and deep in his territory, as well as to attack nuclear-missile groupings of his navy on the ocean.

The priority given to the development of submarines and naval aircraft not only does not preclude, but on the contrary presupposes, a matching development of other arms of naval forces, without which the successful employment of the main forces and the accomplishment of all missions confronting a navy in modern warfare, as well as the implementation of all forms of

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combat and logistical support, in which surface ships will play the most important role, are unthinkable.

Hence one can draw the conclusion that the balanced nature of a navy lies in the fact that all elements comprising its fighting power and the means for their support are constantly kept in the most favorable combination in which a navy can fully realize its own particular quality of versatility, i.e., the ability to carry out various missions under conditions of nuclear, as well as *under conditions of* any other possible type of warfare.

Another aspect of the problem is defining the quantitative composition of a navy based on the main requirement imposed on it -- to be capable of carrying out the assigned missions with the inventory of forces existing in peacetime in consideration of the geographical situation and the possiblity of movement between theaters.

In this connection, one must not forget that in contrast to past wars, under nuclear warfare conditions the replacement of naval forces will be very difficult or practically impossible. Consequently, the problem of building a modern balanced navy can be resolved mainly in the process of building it in peacetime.

The manner of balancing a navy is not fixed; under certain historical conditions it can change. The main factors governing such changes are the world political situation (new alignment of forces, presence of military blocs, change in regimes in individual countries, and so forth), economic capabilites and the growth of the military-economic potential of a country, the development of domestic and foreign science and technology, and a change in missions assigned to the navy.

Of all of these factors the main ones are the missions assigned to the navy by the political leadership, and the level of the country's economy, above all the capabilities of shipbuilding, instrumentmaking, aircraft and other sectors of industry engaged in construction of ships *and* aircraft, *and the production of* weaponry and combat equipment.

It is wrong to try to build a navy in the image and likeness of even the strongest seapower, and it is wrong to define the requirements for building warships for one's own navy guided only by quantitative criteria and the relative strength of ship inventories. Every country has a specific requirement of naval forces, and only this requirement, determined by the missions of the Navy, can serve as the basis for the development of types of forces, ship types, and weaponry.

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Central to the management of the building of our Navy and the determination of the nature of the balancing of its forces are the decisions of the CPSU Central Committee and scientific management methods based on a careful consideration of the aforementioned factors, and on a mathematical and logical analysis of the possible prospects for changes in them. The essence of these methods consists in a systematic approach to scientific research and investigations conducted with the aid of modern computer technology to determine the optimal quantity of types of ships, aircraft, weapons systems, and other material, and also the mix which will make possible the successful accomplishment of the missions assigned to the Navy in various situations of modern warfare.

The broad scale of scientific research and the concrete scientifically based conclusions obtained as a result of them aid to the maximum degree in avoiding incorrect subjective decisions concerning the development of the Navy, and make it possible to concentrate efforts on design and engineering thought, and also on material-technical expenditures on creating optimal forces and material capable of achieving the greatest effect with the least losses in accomplishing their own specific missions.

History provides many instructive examples of when underestimating the problem of balancing a navy or ignoring it (particularly when economic capabilities were limited) owing to a faulty military doctrine or a short-sighted national foreign policy have led either to the defeat of navies in war or to the extreme overtaxing of the economies of these countries which were forced to overcome previously committed mistakes in the course of the war.

On the eve of the Russo-Japanese War of 1904-1905, the Czarist government and the higher military command of Russia were not able to define the main political and military goals and the missions stemming from them for which the Navy had been built. In the process of building the Navy, they strove to achieve numerical superiority in ships of the main types over the navy of the probable enemy, although even at that time it was clear that one should not have been guided by that criterion alone. Japan's acquisition of several armorclad ships and cruisers of foreign construction brought Russia's efforts to achieve superiority at sea to naught. Russia's economy did not permit a rapid change in the relative strength of forces which emerged at the outbreak of war, therefore her Navy was unable to meet those goals for which it was built, either with respect to number or quality of its ships.

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At that moment when the Navy should have had a decided influence on the outcome of war through its operations, it turned out to be clearly unprepared to carry out this mission, and was essentially blockaded in its own bases.

The shortsightedness of the foreign policy of the Czarist autocracy and the helplessness of the Russian naval command only hastened the loss of the [[Pacific]] fleet *in the Pacific*. The attempt to correct the situation in the course of the war by dispatching a squadron to the Far East, as is well known, ended in its tragic defeat [[in Tsushima Strait]].

On the eve of the First World War, the British Navy retained its numerical superiority in powerful battleships over the fleets of the other European powers. The Kaiser's Germany strove to /equalize/ the striking power of her Navy with the power of the British Navy primarily in number of battleships.

The development of the British and German navies was determined by a single goal -- to gain the victory in a general naval battle, which would lead to the achievement of control of the sea. Therefore, only those lessons were extracted from the experience of the Russo-Japanese War which were partially confirmed by the postulates of Colomb and Mahan, which had been based on the combat employment of sailing fleets. An improvement in the tactical characteristics of battleships, cruisers, destroyers and above all in their weapons and armament was envisioned. Not a single Western naval theoretician made any essential conclusions concerning the direction of the development of navies, their purpose, composition of forces, and employment, although the need for it had been revealed in the Russo-Japanese War.

Even at that time, on the basis of an analysis of the changes in naval warfare produced by the development of the material-technical base of the navy, one could have arrived at a conclusion as to the necessity of structuring naval forces on the basis of their main missions in warfare. Despite the fact that this need was the result of objective laws, it was not taken into consideration in a single navy of the seapowers, who continued to be guided by outmoded concepts. On the basis of these concepts the necessary ratio between the forces and equipment was maintained only to the degree required for the employment of the main naval line forces in battle. The ratio of the various types of combatants was determined according to the principle: support the entry into battle of the battleships and conduct of the battle by them under the most favorable conditions in a situation.

On the eve of the First World War, each of the potential enemies proceeded from the fact that its navy would be able to

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achieve its established goals only with the aid of decisive offensive operations against the forces of the enemy navy represented by squadrons of battleships and heavy cruisers. Therefore, central to the construction of a navy was the task of creating strike forces -- battleships and cruisers -- capable of conducting offensive operations against the enemy navy. The accomplishment of defensive missions was considered an emergency measure, and building of new warships to that end was not envisioned. Such missions, if they arose in the course of the war, were supposed to have been carried out mainly by obsolete ships which were unable to participate in general battle.

Thus, practically speaking, the naval forces of the Western powers were not apportioned according to mission, and the question of balancing them had not been resolved on the eve of the war.

The acknowledgement that gaining control of the sea was the main goal of the employment of a navy in war narrowed the sphere of its employment in advance, artificially limited the essence of combat operations at sea, and did not permit defining [[of its]] main missions and, in light of them, structuring existing and prospective naval forces and material for armed combat.

The need for the balanced development of a navy was also not fully recognized in Russia, although the Russo-Japanese War clearly [[confirmed]] *demonstrated* the need to build a more versatile navy than the shipbuilding programs of the Western powers envisioned.

The separateness of the maritime theaters washing the shores of Russia, and the differences in their military-geographical conditions, in the characteristics of the navies and in the intentions of the possible enemies in these theaters and, consequently, also in the main missions assigned to the Baltic and Black sea fleets required a different solution to the question of what forces had to be developed and in what quantity.

Moreover, the need to restore Russia's seapower after the Russo-Japanese War should have contributed to the building of a balanced Navy. But this required time, men, and money. There was little time left, there were few knowledgeable, capable, and vigorous men in the leadership of the country and of the Navy, and there was even less money. Therefore, on the eve of the First World War the Russian Navy was being developed under very difficult conditions.

After the Russo-Japanese War, Russia built warships designed mainly to carry out defensive missions. Although they were

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first-class ships for that time, the SEVASTOPOL-Class battleships built in Russian yards by 1915 and [[two]] *four* IZMAIL-Class heavy cruisers, laid down but not completed, could not form the combat nucleus of a fleet due to their small number, and they did not participate in combat operations.

The light forces of the Navy were the most highly developed forces, i.e., the NOVIK-Class destroyers possessing versatile combat qualities owing to their high speed and rather powerful gun and torpedo armament, as well as minelayers and [[mine countermeasures ships, the]] minesweepers.

It should be stressed that individual surface ships, especially destroyers built according to the designs of Russian engineers in domestic shipyards, were distinguished by their good tactical characteristics and surpassed the best foreign ships in a number of respects. However, on the whole, due to technical and economic backwardness, Russia was unable to build a Navy capable of competing with the navies of the [[traditional]] *other* seapowers by the outbreak of the First World War.

Having small, albeit also fully modern forces and equipment, the Russian Navy was prepared to carry out a wide range of defensive missions in the coastal areas of maritime theaters, and continued to remain an in-shore Navy which was able to exert only a local influence on the course of the armed struggle in the littoral sectors of the ground fronts.

The absence of a unity of views of the higher military and naval commands of many states as to the nature of a future war and the role of [[each of]] the branches of the armed forces in it considerably affected the choice of the direction of the development of navies, the defining of their missions and, consequently, also the numerical and qualitative composition of the forces.

Prior to the outbreak of the First World War, military theoreticians assumed that although the strategic employment of the navy and the army had the same final goal -- the defeat of the enemy -- these branches of the armed forces were supposed to exist and develop independently from each other. The army and navy were regarded as two independent forces. It was acknowledged that combat operations of the navy and army could be conducted jointly, although constant coordination of their efforts on a major scale was considered unthinkable.

This point of view, which was characteristic of the traditional seapowers, was also held by the entire German leadership, although its Army and Navy were under the joint command of the

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Kaiser. There were serious disagreements on questions of strategy between the higher officers of the German Navy and Army. The Army officers, like the civilians in the government, assumed that the First World War would proceed in two stages: First the ground forces of France and Russia would be destroyed, then would come England's turn. The need to employ naval forces did not arise until the second stage. At the outbreak of war, the German Army command did not demand that [[through its operaations]] the Navy hinder the movement to the continent of the [["pitiful and]] small English Army.

But the war did not proceed as many military experts, including naval experts, had imagined. Since Italy had remained neutral at the outbreak of war, and later joined the side of the Entente, the major engagement in the Mediterranean Sea on which so many hopes had been placed did not take place. The weak Austrian Navy stayed in the ports of the Adriatic Sea, and its role was limited to pinning down certain enemy forces, not allowing *an opportunity for* them to be used in other areas.

Within only 22 months after the outbreak of war, a major (with respect to the composition of the participating forces) engagement had taken place between the German and British fleets in the North Sea, which is well known in history as the Battle of Jutland. In this battle, which had no strategic or operational relationship to the combat operations on the ground fronts, both sides avoided a decisive clash, and the results of the battle did not alter the situation existing at sea.

The lack of balance in the navies of the opposing coalitions was felt increasingly more strongly in combat operations at sea. After a prolonged search for a way out of the strategic impasse and for ways to overcome the crisis in employing the mighty but inactive British Grand Fleet and the German High-Seas Fleet, both belligerents came to the conclusion that it was necessary to expand the range of missions of their navies in naval warfare. Each of them solved this problem in his own way.

[[In August 1915, the British Admiralty,]] *During the Dardanelles Operations (19 February 1915 through 9 January 1916), the Anglo-French command,* without considering the fact that the [[British Navy]] *Allied navy* did not have special landing ships in its inventory (that is, it was not balanced with respect to the given mission), decided to make a combined attack with the naval forces of its allies on the southern flank of the Austro-German Front, to land a major amphibious force on Gallipoli Peninsula and, under cover of it, to make a breakthrough with the fleet through the Dardanelles to occupy Constantinople. The [[12]] *18* battleships, [[four]] *12* cruisers, [[16]] *40* destroyers,

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[[seven submarines, aircraft transport ships, and the large number of transports dispatched]] *and a large number of other ships and vessels concentrated* for this [[operation]] *purpose* were unable to ensure the successful landing of the force, which numbered [[157,000]] *over 150,000* men. [[The British did not have landing ships or special ships to provide fire support for the troops.]]

The main naval forces, which were the battleships and cruisers, had not been trained in operations against a defended shore. Thus, the organizational abilities of the officials of the Admiralty and the British Mediterranean Fleet command left much to be desired.

The attempts to employ ships not equipped to land an amphibious force and thereby to overcome prewar mistakes in determining the essential composition of naval forces, as well as in naval warfare planning, could not be successfully completed, and led to the failure of the operation. This had such a serious effect on the military ideologists of England and a number of other countries that right up to the outbreak of the Second World War they considered the employment of naval forces in combat against a shore defended by a strong enemy to be impractical, and they did not prepare the Navy for it.

Let us note in passing that the Russian Navy on the whole successfully carried out the mission associated with cooperating with ground forces in the Baltic and Black Sea theaters[[. It stopped the German attempt to land an amphibious force on the Moon Sund Islands in 1916]], landed its own forces on the coast of Lazistan, supported Army units with naval gunfire from the sea, protected military shipping, and supported the movements of ground troops in littoral sectors of the theaters. The somewhat better (than the British) balance of the Russian Navy with respect to the missions arising in the course of the war contributed to this to a great degree.

The miscalculations of the British Admiralty in balancing its Navy were even more clearly revealed in the course of carrying out missions in protecting ocean and sea communications, which were of vital importance to Great Britain. The protection of communications was not a fresh problem at the very outbreak of the war, but it became especially acute after the Germans turned their gaze toward the sea in quest for a way out of the strategic impasse on the ground front.

Having become convinced after the Battle of Jutland of the futility of their attempts to gain control of the sea, the German command came to the conclusion that the German Navy,

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which trailed the Allied fleet in number of battleships, could achieve great success against the sea and ocean communications lines of the enemy with submarines. The redirecting of German U-boat operations against the merchant ships of the Allies occurred relatively quickly in the course of the war. The British Navy was unable to actively counter it. Large in number of ships and total displacement, but unbalanced with respect to missions, the British Navy proved powerless in the face of the rising danger, and was forced to react with limited defensive measures against the changing combat methods of the enemy, who shifted to an all-out offensive. Right in the middle of the war England was forced to create the necessary forces and equipment to combat the submarines, mobilize her own and Allied resources, and develop methods of employing ships not trained for this purpose in order to reduce losses in transports and cargoes. In the United States it was calculated that the cost of the military equipment necessary to successfully combat the submarines was 19 times greater than that of building the submarines.

Objectively speaking, Germany, which had devoted her attention not only to the construction of a surface fleet, but also to the development of submarines, proved to be in an especially favorable position. First, she confronted the enemy with the need to hurriedly open a new front in the warfare at sea. Secondly, owing to this, she was able to considerably increase the strain on the British economy, which was already under heavy pressure, thereby forcing England to spend vast sums for the accelerated construction of ASW forces.

Miscalculations *made* in defining the direction of the development of the British Navy and their severe consequences were overcome only with the help of the American Navy, which supported its partner in the dangerous situation. A series of measures of an operational-strategic nature and enormous material expenditures permitted the Allies to sharply reduce the success of the German submarine operations at the cost of great losses.

Without exaggeration we can say that the brunt of the naval warfare was borne by the naval forces and equipment built in the course of the war, i.e., those forces with the aid of which the navies of the belligerents were balanced during the course of the armed struggle, and not as a result of scientific foresight in naval construction.

The experience of the First World War showed with complete clarity that the range of missions performed by navies had considerably expanded and that their combat operations had become

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much more diverse in form and content. The scale of military operations at sea and the scope of those operations increased immeasurably. Combat operations embraced the oceanic expanses. The naval inventories needed to have forces designed to interdict sea and ocean communications of the enemy, to protect own communications, to support ground forces operating in littoral sectors from the sea, to battle enemy fleets at sea, and so forth. Moreover, the need arose to distribute naval forces capable of carrying out these missions in near (coastal) and distant (oceanic) areas.

Despite the clear need to employ the experience gained in the First World War in the subsequent balancing of navies, the traditional maritime states continued to adhere to conservative, prewar concepts of gaining control of the sea by crushing the power of the line forces of the enemy navy. The question of the balanced development of navies and the effective distribution of their forces with respect to primary missions in operational areas was not raised even on the theoretical plane, and was not taken into account in the analysis of the combat experience of the First World War. The navies of these states conducted the training of their battleship forces for battles on the high seas as they had previously done. New battleships armed with large-caliber guns continued to be built in the shipyards of the United States, Great Britain, Germa. Japan and Italy.

After the failure of the Dardanelles Operation, the British and French naval commands, as was previously pointed out, considered naval operations against the shore, if not impossible, then at any rate extremely difficult. Therefore, prior to the outbreak of the Second World War the Allied staffs did not plan any type of naval operations against the shore, and did not establish special forces for this purpose.

Many other miscalculations and mistakes were made in solving the problem of balancing the forces of the British Navy on the eve of the Second World War. The true state of affairs was *hidden* not so much in the conservatism and limited military thinking of the naval theoreticians as in the shortsightedness of the foreign policy of Great Britain and in the erroneous prediction of events on the eve of the war. In aiding Germany to restore her military potential after the First World War, British ruling circles were convinced that they would succeed in channeling the aggression against the Soviet Union and, in the course of the war, in strengthening their position as the leading seapower.

However, subsequent events completely frustrated these calculations. England had to survive many severe defeats in the

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war at sea, i.e., precisely in the sphere where she was considered the strongest among the major seapowers. Moreover, England was forced to irrevocably give up her leadership to her ally, the United States, who hastened to take advantage of the situation and who without special effort became the leader of the imperialist camp.

During the Second World War, the British Navy was again faced with the need to eliminate the lack of proportion in its own forces. At the outbreak of war, naval operations were sharply limited by German minelaying, which the British Navy did not have the necessary forces and equipment to counter. The inability of the British Navy to protect its own sea communications was strikingly manifested even in that period when the number of German submarines fit for operation in the Atlantic did not exceed 20, and when the conditions under which they were deployed were extremely limited. The British Navy was not only unable to prevent the egress of the submarines into the Atlantic, but even to organize a reliable opposition to them on the approaches to the British shores. As a result, the Merchant Marines of Great Britain and her allies began to /suffer systematic/ losses, which in 1940 and in the first six months of 1941 exceeded 300,000 tons a month.

Only the redeployment of armed forces (including naval forces) of Fascist Germany to the East for the war against the Soviet Union and the associated limitations of the intensity of German naval operations against the West gave Great Britain and her Allies a marked respite. Their Merchant Marine losses from [[German U-boat]] *enemy* attacks dropped sharply: Whereas in the first half of 1941 [[787]] *760* ships totaling [[2,822,000]] *2,884,000* GRT were sunk, in the second half of the same year only [[276]] *539* ships totaling [[1,375,000]] *1,444,000* GRT were lost.[[ ]]*20*

The need became acute in the British Navy for inshore antisubmarine and mine-warfare ships capable of countering submarines and the mine threat on the approaches to the ports and the bases of the homeland. No less important was the question of antisubmarine forces and material designed to protect convoys on the high seas at great distances from sea and ocean communications /terminals/.

From the very first days of the war the British shipbuilding industry was forced to switch over and devote even greater attention to the building of ASW and mine-warfare ships. It had to master the construction of escort carriers, patrol-escort ships, frigates, and corvettes. By the end of the war the British Navy had 138 frigates and 131 corvettes, and more

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than 1,000 submarine chasers with a displacement of from 65 to 70 tons were built for coastal defense. Moreover, 32 American escort carriers, 88 frigates, and 15 corvettes transferred under lend-lease entered the naval inventory.

Since the 42 minesweepers existing at the outbreak of war were unable to provide even minimal protection from the mine threat, the British had to take extreme measures to strengthen the mine warfare defense. They were forced to turn for aid to the Americans and employ a considerable number of their minesweepers. A multitude of fishing trawlers and drifters were mobilized, and new minesweepers were built at an accelerated rate. By the end of the war the British Navy already had 126 fleet minesweepers and 453 specially-built motor harbor minesweepers.

Before the war the British Navy did not have the necessary numbers of transport vessels. Even in May 1943 higher British officials continued to complain of the fact that the main obstacle to implementing their plans for an offensive was the lack of merchant ship tonnage. At that time, Churchill pointed out that this was limiting the scope of all of the British operations. As the Chief of the Imperial General Staff stated, the lack of merchant ship tonnage "stifles [[our]] . . . operations," while the Minister of the Merchant Marine stressed that it "will hinder and is essentially already hindering the implementation of [[our]] . . . *entire* offensive strategy."

It is true that these statements must be approached critically, especially in those instances when they serve as a justification for England's failure to fulfill her own obligations to the Soviet Union.

British naval aviation also proved to be unprepared to carry out missions at sea and, as in the First World War, it was assigned an auxiliary role. The British Air Force was trained primarily to defend the British Isles from attack from the air and to deliver attacks against enemy military-economic targets. The direction of the development of fighter and heavy bomber aircraft was also determined by these missions. The underestimation of the role of naval aviation led to the fact that only a short while before the outbreak of the Second World War debates were concluded on its role and position within the system of naval armament, as a result of which not until [[1939]] *the war was on* were naval air forces included in the naval inventory. British naval aviation proved to be insufficiently prepared to carry out missions at sea, and it had a small number of aircraft.

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More than once the British government tried to justify its own unseemly actions with regard to the general delay in opening a second front by the lack of balance in the Navy and diffculties in eliminating prewar miscalculations[[. This was done]] precisely at the time when the Soviet Armed Forces were experiencing the greatest pressure in combat with the enemy.

Only at the end of the war, owing to US aid and the full utilization of her own resources, was Great Britain able to more or less balance her Navy with respect to the missions assigned it. The ratio of the displacement of aircraft carriers, destroyers, antisubmarine and mine-warfare ships, and submarines to the displacement of the Navy as a whole increased noticeably. The accelerated construction of landing ships (their number increased hundreds of times over by the end of the war) brought about great changes in the balancing of the forces. At the same time, the relative weight of the total displacement of battleships and cruisers decreased considerably although at the end of the war they accounted for about half the tonnage of the British Navy. An analysis of the changes in the relationship of forces of the British Navy makes it possible to conclude that the Admiralty was only able to balance the Navy with respect to goals, missions, and areas of operation by the end of the war with the aid of its ally, the United States, and only owing to the fact that the main missions of the Second World War were carried out on the Soviet-German Front.

The Navy of Fascist Germany differed considerably from the British Navy with respect to the balancing of its forces according to these same characteristics. In preparing for the attack on the Soviet Union, Hitler's command devoted priority attention to developing the Army and Air Force. The extent of the effort which Germany expended on preparations for conducting naval warfare against the Western powers was extremely small. Preparations for war with England and, consequently, expanded naval construction, were scheduled for a later time after the completion of the war in the East. The general plan for naval construction (Plan Z), developed with this consideration in mind and adopted in February 1939, called for the building of six battleships (including three "pocket battleships"), five heavy cruisers, two aircraft carriers, and 190 submarines by the time of the possible outbreak of war against England. After the completion of Plan Z it was intended to have 13 battleships, 33 cruisers, four aircraft carriers, and 267 submarines in service.

According to Plan Z, the main goal of naval operations was to interdict the British sea and ocean communications. All naval forces were intended to be used for this purpose, with

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the main stress being placed on surface ships. To carry out this mission long-range forces were established, consisting primarily of high-speed battleships and cruisers with a long cruising range and high endurance, capable of attacking enemy combatants and merchantmen in distant areas of the high seas. Submarines were also included in the long-range forces. On the eve of the Second World War, the German Navy had a total of 57 submarines. The total submarine displacement was only 9% of the total tonnage of the Navy, while at that time battleships made up 46% of the tonnage; cruisers, 31.5%; and destroyers, 13.5%.[21]

The German command underestimated the role of aircraft in operations at sea. Goering's resistance to the establishment of naval aviation greatly contributed to it. He believed that all aircraft of the armed forces should be concentrated in the Luftwaffe which, depending on the situation, should be employed either to aid the Navy or to [[carry out independent missions, i.e., for strategic bombing]] *deliver strikes against ground targets*.

The German command [[also]] devoted a great deal of attention to the development of coastal forces intended to defend its basing areas, to combat the mine threat, to support the deployment of the main forces of the Navy at sea, and to maintain a favorable operational regime in its own coastal waters. Thus, on the eve of the war the Navy of Fascist Germany was already oriented toward interdicting the ocean communications of the enemy. Its construction and training was proceeding in accordance with that end.

The lack of foresight and the adventurism of Hitler's naval command, which affected the selection of the direction of naval construction, and also the views on its employment, were the main reason that the German raiders were destroyed by Allied naval forces in the very first year of the war. The subsequent redirection of attack aircraft operations to the Soviet-German Front in the summer of 1941 left only the German submarines to conduct the battle against Allied communications. The Hitler command regarded the reassuring results of their combat operations at the outset of the war to be a stimulus for the expansion of intensive construction of submarines and for accelerated training of their crews. The successes of the submarines were to a great degree due to the passiveness of the British and American armed forces on land and in the air and also to the indecisiveness of British naval operations at sea.

On 30 December 1939 a new shipbuilding program was approved in Germany under which the construction of 392 submarines was

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envisioned by the end of 1941. In the summer of 1943 one more program was adopted for the accelerated construction and introduction into service of 288 XXI-series submarines by February 1945 and of 140 XXIII-series submarines by October 1944.

The employment of large contingents of labor forces (hired foreign workers, workers from the German-occupied countries, prisoners of war, and women) and other [[emergency]] measures permitted German industry to considerably [[increase]] *accelerate* submarine construction. Whereas in 1939 six of them were built, in 1940 this figure rose to 40, in 1941 to 219, and in 1942 it reached 222. The largest number of submarines was built in 1943 and 1944 (292 and 283 respectively). The Germans succeeded in putting 1,131 submarines into service in the course of the war.[22] However, the increased construction of submarines did not improve the situation of Fascist Germany at sea, since no forces were built capable of supporting the operations of those submarines, of opposing the fleets of England and her allies, and of cooperating from the sea with her own ground forces.

The development of primarily one arm, the submarine force, should have led and, in the final analysis, did lead to a drastic limitation on the range of missions of the German Navy in combating the enemy fleets, and predetermined its passiveness in every other sphere of warfare at sea. Thus, the Fascist German command put itself in an unfavorable position at sea, making the operations of the enemy fleets to a certain degree easier, and contributing to the purposeful development of their antisubmarine forces.

Germany was still unable to exploit the fruits of such a rapid, yet to a certain degree warped, development of her Navy, because she had lost a great deal of time, having allowed the enemy to undertake appropriate countermeasures. Moreover, having built an armada of submarines, the Hitler command did not concern itself with the battle against the antisubmarine defenses of the Allies. Finally, what was most important was that the tremendous intensity of the struggle on the Eastern Front deprived Germany of her ability to allocate greater material resources to the Navy. The scope of the struggle and a series of major defeats on the decisive Eastern Front prevented the German Fascist command from assigning aircraft for use against British, and later also against American, shipping, for reconnaissance support of submarine operations, for the laying of mines, and for combating the antisubmarine forces at sea. Moreover, the [[very]] powerful shipbuilding industry of Great Britain and the United States remained unaffected, as a result of which, beginning in 1944, the replacement and building

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of the transport fleet exceeded its losses in the war, and the increase in the construction rate of antisubmarine forces in the final analysis led to the failure of the German plans for unrestricted submarine warfare.

[[All of]] The above factors aggravated the prewar miscalculations of the Hitler command still further, which had an immediate effect on the combat operations of the German Navy as a whole.

[[The balancing of the Navy of Fascist Germany in the course of the war was also constantly influenced by]] The operations of the *Soviet* Northern, Baltic, and Black sea fleets, which the Hitler command was forced to combat by dispatching a considerable part of the forces from the sea and ocean communications, in addition to inshore forces[[. This]] increased the disproportion in the Fascist German Navy and limited its capabilities to combat the navies of our allies.

One of the contributions of the Soviet Armed Forces was that, by displaying steadfastness on the defensive and by delivering attacks on the offensive, they prevented the Hitler command from eliminating this lack of proportion in the development of the Navy or creating balanced forces to carry out their main missions at sea in the course of the war.

Taking advantage of the fact that the Soviet Union was waging a bloody war single-handedly against Fascist Germany by engaging almost all of the German forces, the Anglo-American command, while avoiding the direct conduct of active combat operations in the decisive ground theater for almost three years, built up without hindrance and finally employed vast naval forces and aircraft to combat the German U-boats.

According to very rough figures, more than 1,500 land-based aircraft, more than 30 aircraft carriers, and about 3,500 escort ships of various classes carried out this mission. British and Canadian aircraft alone flew 44,000 sorties from airfields to escort convoys and [[755,000]] *75,500* sorties to patrol maritime areas in the hunt for hostile submarines. We should add to this that the German shipbuilding enterprises, especially the factories and yards building submarines and turning out equipment for them, were subjected to frequent mass attacks by Anglo-American aircraft beginning in 1943.

Even by this time, as a result of the sharply declining level of crew training and the drop in their morale, German diesel submarines, which had remained essentially at the 1939 technical level, proved incapable of successfully overcoming

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Table 23 Merchant Marine Losses of England and Her Allies to German Submarines in WW II.[2,3]

Year	Merchant ship losses		No. of German Subs sunk	No. of ships sunk per submarine lost	Gross Register tons of ship losses per submarine lost
	No. of ships	GRT			
1939	114	421156	9	12.6	46795
1940	471	2186158	22	21.4	99375
1941	432	2171754	35	12.3	62050
1942	1160	6266215	85	13.6	73720
1943	463	2586905	237	1.5	10915
1944	132	773327	248	0.5	3118
1945	56	281716	145	0.4	1949
Total	2828	14687231	781	3.6	18806

counteractions by the thoroughly trained forces of the enemy's antisubmarine defense, which were more advanced technically. German submarine losses during the forcing of antisubmarine barriers and in the course of the attacks on British and American convoys began to increase substantially, while Merchant Marine losses of Great Britain and her allies dropped noticeably. This is clearly seen in Table 23.

Foreign historians have often employed these statistical data to prove the far-fetched idea that submarines, like battleships, were defeated in the last war. But the reduction in the effectiveness of submarine combat operations against sea communications in the course of the war was nothing other than [[an expression]] *the result* of the process of the contest between offensive weapons and defensive weapons, whose development proceeded under unequal conditions: The former were improved slowly, without altering their technical level, while the latter were developed on a new technical base. While the British and Americans achieved certain successes in combating submarines, owing to the massive employment of ASW forces and equipment, there is no doubt that the appearance of fundamentally new classes of submarines with improved armament would have inevitably altered the situation in the U-boats' favor. In other words, if the Hitler command proved to be unable to widely

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employ new submarines and new combat equipment before Germany was defeated on land by the Soviet forces, then this certainly does not mean that submarines were at all discredited as a means of waging war against sea communications.

The success of the Allies in armed combat at sea is largely explained by the lack of balance of a German Navy which was employed only to carry out one mission. The adventuristic nature of the German naval strategy, which transformed the Navy from a versatile branch of the Armed Forces into a narrowly specialized instrument and limited its sphere of employment only to operations against enemy communications, was one of the main reasons for the defeat of the German Navy "in the battle for the Atlantic." The lack of balance of the Navy prevented the Hitler command from effectively employing it against strike forces, against the shore, or to combat Allied landings, which encountered practically no firm resistance at sea.

At the same time, the employment of various forces and equipment by the German Navy in the sea theaters adjacent to the territory of the Soviet Union and the periodic reinforcement of them with submarines, with antisubmarine forces drawn from the ocean sectors, and also by aircraft from the front, greatly complicated the struggle for our Navy. [[However, the operations of the Soviet Navy were to a certain degree favored by the absence in the German naval inventory of major amphibious ships and equipment to provide support from the sea for the ground troops in the littoral sectors.]]

Active combat operations by our Navy prevented the Hitlerites from compensating for the lack of balance in their forces at sea through various [[types of improvisation]] *redeployments*. Therefore, throughout the course of the war, the German Navy was unable to render decisive support to their troops in the littoral sectors even when they had suffered serious defeats.

It cannot be said that the US Navy entered the war balanced with respect to its goals and missions. On the eve of the Second World War, this oceanic Navy, the largest numerically, was also oriented toward waging war with battleship forces on the high seas. All major ships, including aircraft carriers and cruisers included in the composition of the squadrons, were supposed to support the entry into battle of the battleship forces.

A rather large number of US submarines were earmarked mainly for combat with the enemy's surface combatants, although this did not exclude the possiblity of employing them to destroy transports on the sea and ocean communications routes.

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The apportionment of naval forces with respect to mission did not go any further than this, if we exclude the fact that it was proposed to employ part of the surface ships comprising the squadrons in the battle for communications. Therefore, the American command was forced to resolve the problem of balancing right in the middle of the armed struggle.

After the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor "Like Adam and Eve, the Americans saw they were naked, . . ."[24] [[A large]] *The greater* part of the "foundation" of its Navy lay on the bottom in the form of a useless mass of scrap. The loss of eight battleships, three cruisers, three destroyers, and other warships shocked the [[hierarchy of the]] American Navy. Six months were needed to orient the Navy toward the accomplishment of their main missions in the war on the sea with carrier forces. The Battle of the Coral Sea *and the Battle of Midway* were needed to convince them that battleships had finally lost their leading role and had irrevocably given it up to aircraft carriers, the platform for naval attack aircraft.

The vital need for aircraft carriers forced the US naval command to push construction of them in every possible way. At the same time, construction of battleships, cruisers, and destroyers was accelerated. During the war nine battleships, 45 cruisers, and 379 destroyers were built.

The Second World War introduced considerable changes in the relative strength of the American naval forces. Whereas at the outbreak of war the ratio of the displacement of the battleships to the displacement of the entire fleet was 45.6%, and this ratio was 22% for cruisers, 19.1% for destroyers, 9.3% for aircraft carriers, and 4% for submarines, at the end of the war it was 24% for battleships, 23% for carriers, 23% for cruisers, 19% for destroyers, and 9% for submarines.

These figures [[confirm]] *reaffirm* the conclusion that in the course of the Second World War, battleships had already lost their former significance and had yielded their main role in armed combat at sea to the carriers and submarines, which even today are the main combat strength of the US Navy.

The American Navy entered the war completely unprepared to protect merchant ships from submarine attack. The enormous losses of the Merchant Marine and the continuing acceleration of German submarine operations in the Atlantic Ocean confronted the US Navy with the primary problem of building patrol-escort ships. Through extreme measures and at great financial expense, the Americans succeeded relatively rapidly in expanding major series construction of ships. [[Whereas]] At the end of

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July 1941, 280 patrol and escort ships were engaged in antisubmarine warfare; within a year 527 were participating, and two years later there were 1,260.

Thus, in the years of the Second World War the United States created powerful antisubmarine surface forces practically from scratch. Taking into account the insignificant losses suffered in the course of combat operations, by the end of the war they numbered 73 escort carriers, 358 escort ships, 77 frigates, eight corvettes, and 659 submarine chasers.

At the outbreak of the war with Japan, the United States was faced with the need to make up the deficiency in landing ships. At that time there were only several experimental ships of this type in the US naval inventory. The United States began accelerated series construction of landing craft of various classes and of large ships to transport troops across the ocean and to deliver a landing force to landing areas in the course of the war. By the end of the war the US Navy had 17 amphibious command ships, 1,090 large LST's, 554 LST's, 454 amphibious transports and 23 dock landing ships. In addition, thousands of various small landing ships and craft were constructed.

Mass construction of mine warfare ships was undertaken. Whereas at the outbreak of war there were almost no mine warfare ships in the American Navy, by the end of the war there were already 223 fleet minesweepers, 74 inshore minesweepers, and 450 minesweeping craft.

Thus, only in the course of the war was the American Navy balanced with respect to missions, qualitative and numerical composition, and areas of operation. The operational-strategic goals of employing its forces in warfare were redefined, requiring the building of new types of ships, including antisubmarine and landing ships.

The US Navy, which previously had been oriented toward waging war with the enemy's surface fleet, was transformed into a general-purpose branch of the Armed Forces, which was charged with such major missions as conducting large-scale amphibious operations, the defense of Allied ocean communications, and the interdiction of enemy communications.

The successful resolution of the problem of balancing the forces of the American Navy was aided in the course of the war by the fact (which favored the United States) that the strategic missions of the war were accomplished by the Soviet Armed Forces on the main, Soviet-German ground front, and therefore the Navy of Fascist Germany, particularly beginning in 1943, was not able

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to wage warfare against communications lines and the US Navy in the Atlantic. As a result of this, US industry was not subjected to enemy action and operated under the most favorable conditions during the war.

However, even under these conditions American industry required years to build naval forces from the keel up which were capable of battling the German submarines in the Atlantic, as well as to build major amphibious forces for the Allied invasion of Europe.

The lack of balance of the Japanese naval forces with respect to goals and missions was detected from the very outset of military hostilities in the Pacific Ocean, and served as one of the reasons for their defeat in the Second World War. The trend in the development of the Japanese Navy in the prewar period was determined proceeding from those same original theses which underlay the military doctrines of the Western powers. The differences consisted only in the fact that the Japanese provided for the construction of combatants and auxiliaries to land amphibious forces. However, no modern forces for the antisubmarine defense of ocean communications lines were built, although the insular position of Japan and her dependence on the importation by sea of strategic raw materials has always been her weak point.

The rapid advance of the Japanese in a southerly direction and the seizure of vast island areas in the southwestern part of the Pacific Ocean at the outbreak of war led to the dispersion of naval forces employed to protect merchant shipping and to extreme pressure on the inshore antisubmarine forces, whose position and combat qualities did not permit them to conduct combat operations over the vast expanses of the Pacific Ocean.

In preparing for the war against the USSR, the Japanese military leadership proceeded from the premise that if even limited ASW forces prevented the Soviet submarines from egress from the Sea of Japan, every mission respecting the protection of Japanese communications in the Pacific Ocean would be accomplished. The mass employment of mines and networks of antisubmarine barriers covered by ships and coastal artillery in the straits were considered sufficient for this purpose.

The losses inflicted on the Japanese Merchant Marine in the very first year of the war considerably exceeded every prediction of the Japanese command. However, the limited capabilities of the production and of the raw material base of the country, which was not prepared to build the necessary number of antisubmarine ships in a short period of time, prevented the taking of

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decisive measures to support and protect sea shipping. The overall inventory of escort forces of the Navy continued to remain insufficient. In 1943, the Japanese naval inventory included only 50 antisubmarine screening ships (of these 14 were specially-built antisubmarine ships) including several destroyers constructed in the period 1920-1925, but they were also employed mainly to screen major surface combatants.

The escorting of transport ships at sea was carried out mainly by inshore escort ships with weak antisubmarine armament. The four escort carriers in the inventory of the ASW forces were able to participate in the convoys only in 1944.

In the quest *of methods* to eliminate the effects of mistakes in balancing its naval forces, the Japanese naval command employed a large number of motorized and sailing fishing ships unsuited for antisubmarine work to combat the American submarines. Such ships were not equipped with sonar and radar and were unable to have any sort of effect on combating the submarines.

Seeing the gap in their strategic plans, the Japanese military leadership intended to build 233 escort ships in the period 1942 to 1945 to add to the 14 special antisubmarine ships in service. However, this intention, which was not backed by industrial capabilities, was not realized.

The weakness in the material-technical base and lack of preparedness of the Japanese Navy for antisubmarine defense created very favorable conditions for American submarine operations against the sea and ocean communications of Japan. Without meeting any serious counteraction, they sank 1,150 Japanese ships totaling about 4,860,000 register tons, about 62% of the total losses of the Japanese Merchant Marine.[25]

The Japanese lost more than 80 combatants, including one battleship, eight aircraft carriers, 12 cruisers, 37 destroyers, and 24 submarines to submarine weapons.[26]

The Japanese Navy turned out to be insufficiently prepared to repel attacks from the air. During the war, 750 merchant ships totaling 2,467,000 register tons (which was 31.5% of the losses in merchant tonnage) as well as 112 major combatants, including six battleships, 13 aircraft carriers, 20 cruisers, 51 destroyers, and 22 submarines, were sunk by American aircraft."[27]

Thus, an analysis of the condition of the navies of the Socialist states in the period of the Second World War, the

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dynamics of their development, and changes in the structure and relative strength of forces in the course of military operations produced by unforeseen circumstances, makes it possible to conclude that on the eve of the Second World War the problem of balancing naval forces had not been solved by a single one of the imperialist belligerent seapowers.

What were the basic reasons for underestimating this important problem in the prewar period?

It seems that it was not at all that the economies of such imperialist states as Great Britain, Germany and Japan were unable under peacetime conditions to build naval forces with the needed combat qualities and numerical compositions. One can hardly agree that the military thought of these countries proved incapable of defining the goals and missions of naval forces in a future war stemming from the foreign policy of the states or of developing a scientifically-based program for naval construction.

The true reasons for this situation are: 1) major irreparable miscalculations in foreign policy by the ruling circles and military leadership of the United States and Great Britain, which were unable to recognize Hitler Germany as a potential enemy in time and to determine the nature of the Second World War and the role and position of their navies in it; 2) the adventurism of the policy and strategy of Fascist Germany and militarist Japan, [[which doomed to failure the aspirations of the military]] *and the aspirations (doomed to failure) of, having begun the war,* to achieve world supremacy in a short time; and 3) the ignoring of the wealth of experience in the First World War by the military leaders of the countries in both coalitions; the overestimation of the combat capabiliities of major gunnery ships; and the underestimation of the striking power and prospects for the development of submarines and aircraft, which actually became the main naval forces in warfare at sea.

The lack of balance of naval forces with respect to their missions was revealed in the course of the expanding warfare at sea, which confronted all of the belligerents with the need to rapidly correct the mistakes which had been made at the cost of enormous effort and maximum stress on their economies. Yet only by the time the war ended did the navies of the United States and Great Britain become balanced to a considerable degree with respect to the missions which had arisen.

The limited economic capabilities of Fascist Germany and militarist Japan in comparison with those of the United States

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and Great Britain were utilized only to develop those naval forces on which the main burden of warfare at sea fell in the various periods of the war. This considerably narrowed the range of missions of the Navy, and deprived it of that important quality of versatility. Favorable conditions were naturally created for the enemy, permitting him to concentrate his own naval forces only in limited sectors, to support their operations precisely in this narrow sphere, and to achieve success at the cost of relatively small effort and material expenditure.

By utilizing mainly submarines in the war at sea, the Germans forced the enemy to survive many bitter disappointments in their desire to protect their own ocean communications. However, due to its one-sided development, the German Navy turned out to be powerless in battle with the Anglo-American fleet.

The navy is among the branches of the armed forces most difficult to rebuild; the replacement of its losses and the restoration of its ships and weapons entail great expenditures in time and material resources. States which were strong economically coped with this task in the course of the war in a short time only when there were extremely favorable military-political conditions. In the absence of these conditions the replacement of naval forces, much less the balancing of them in the course of the war, was a practically unsolvable problem. A good example of this was Japan, which did not have the necessary raw material base and whose industrial targets were constantly subjected to American *air* attack.

The industrial enterprises of Fascist Germany also found themselves under attack by Allied aircraft; however, as a rule these attacks were not sufficient to fully deprive Germany of her capability to replace the naval losses which she suffered.

At the outbreak of the Second World War British industry was replacing ship losses with great difficulty, because its enterprises were subjected to savage attacks by German aircraft. Only after Hitler's Air Force ceased its massive attacks on England, concentrating all of its efforts on the Soviet-German Front, and only after enormous US aid, was the construction of antisubmarine ships, landing ships and minesweepers as well as ships for the transport fleet increased.

The Second World War showed that not a single belligerent capitalist country whose industry suffered enemy attack was able without Allied aid to eliminate the disproportion in the balancing of its navy and to organize and implement the replacement of naval forces and equipment in the course of the war. Only

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US industry was in a position to independently resolve this problem. The invulnerability of the American Continent to the weapons existing at that time, and also the great strength and high level of the economy and of the US military industry aided in this.

The absence of unity of operational-strategic thinking hindered the correct determination of the direction in developing various types of weapons and branches of the armed forces, which was particularly expressed in the underestimation of naval operations against the shore. Only experience in the war somewhat altered the situation and forced the Anglo-American command in a number of cases to form a joint Army-Navy leadership group to conduct operations against the shore, mainly in the Pacific theater.

Nuclear-missile warfare, if unleashed by the imperialists, will create new conditions for the economies of all countries ruling out the possibility of eliminating mistakes in prewar naval construction.

Today the fact that not a single ocean protects the aggressor country from attacks from strategic nuclear missiles launched from any area of the ocean or from another continent has become an immutable truth for all of the apologists of imperialism.

Questions of Balancing the Soviet Navy in the Prewar and Wartime Periods (1921-1945). The initial stage in the development of the Soviet Navy as a branch of the Armed Forces coincided with the period of devastation [[of the national economy]], when the country was able to allocate very limited resources to the development of Armed Forces. These resources were clearly insufficient for the construction of new warships. Therefore, the Tenth Congress of the Russian Communist Party (of Bolsheviks) made the decision to put into service those warships which remained from the old Russian Navy. In this connection, the primary attention was given to those ships which could be restored and utilized to protect the coast from enemy attacks from the sea. At that time there was no thought of balancing the Navy.

At the same time development of the theoretical bases of the Soviet art of naval warfare was begun. There were difficulties in that it was impossible to utilize the theoretical legacies of the old Russian Navy and of the bourgeois naval theories, because they were based on completely different ideological and political positions, not to mention completely different economic capabilities.

Soviet naval [[theory]] *art* followed an independent path. Theoretical theses on the so-called small war oriented toward

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defensive naval operations in own coastal waters were adopted as the basis.

Various points of view were expressed in numerous public debates and discussions. However, naturally only those proposals whose realization did not extend beyond the limits of the economic capabilities of the country made practical sense. The development of the Navy was directed toward establishing forces capable of fully repelling an enemy attack on our coast from the sea with the least material expenditure. For many years this concept determined the main purpose of the Navy -- to cooperate with our own forces in the accomplishment of missions in the ground theaters of military operations which, as the Armed Forces developed, assumed various forms, from direct naval support of the Army from the sea to conducting independent naval operations, but with the same operational goal.

The foundation of the fleet at that time was the coastal forces, torpedo boats, land-based aircraft, coastal artillery, and mine weapons. Their combined employment, particularly in previously prepared positions with the support of submarines, major gunnery ships, and coastal artillery batteries, of which the Navy had a very small number, permitted a more or less effective opposition to the enemy fleet if his intentions were to deliver an attack on our shore or to land amphibious forces.

Thus, in developing the Navy at that time, we proceeded from the need to accomplish the main mission with its aid -- to support the defense of our shore primarily by supporting the flanks of the Army with fire support. However, in accomplishing this mission, we were unable to avoid mistakes. Like the navies of the capitalist countries, our Navy did not have and did not build special landing ships. In rare instances, so-called improvised means and unsuitable transports were utilized in combat training. These erroneous views in the development of our Navy were held right up to the Great Patriotic War and in the course of the war. When the problem arose of landing amphibious forces, which was a very widespread form of combat operations carried out on the coastal flanks of the Soviet-German ground front jointly with the Army, unfortunately we had to pay for ignoring this kind of combat training for the Navy and the Army.

As industry was rebuilt and the economic capabilities of the country grew, new prospects opened up for the development of the Navy. In 1926, the Council for Labor and Defense approved the first six-year program of naval construction, which called for the building of surface ships and submarines intended basically for operations in our own coastal waters.

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As noted above, in 1928 the Revolutionary Military Council of the Republic confirmed that the main purpose of the Navy was to cooperate with ground forces, which thus continued to be the main starting point for determining the requirements for naval construction in the new stage. In the years of the first two five-year plans, the Navy began to receive new cruisers, destroyers, submarines, escort ships, and torpedo boats.

The program for building a large oceangoing Navy, adopted in 1938, called for the building of major gunnery ships capable of engaging in single combat with a strong enemy on the high seas. The questions of balancing the naval forces as applied to the new conditions were not properly resolved either in theory or in naval construction practice.

In the last prewar years Soviet military thinking was oriented toward the establishment and employment of squadrons of major surface ships headed by powerful battleships and cruisers. In this connection, the high combat capabilities of aircraft as attack forces in naval warfare were not given sufficient consideration. At the same time, Soviet military theory, being oriented toward surface ships, was unable to justify the need to have in its oceangoing naval inventory aircraft carriers capable of providing cover for ships with their weak antiaircraft armament beyond the range of the shore-based fighter aircraft. As a result, one could not count on success in ship operations in the relatively distant areas of the sea, much less in zones controlled by enemy aircraft.

Thus, the oceangoing Navy which was being built actually could operate only in its own coastal areas, and cooperation with troops in the ground theaters and support of the Army, as before, remained its main missions. It was considered that the Navy could also carry out such a mission as interdicting the sea communications of the enemy, but the establishment of special forces for this purpose was not envisioned.

Even the performance requirements for the new submarines under construction were not scientifically based. In this connection, they proceeded from retrospective needs which had arisen in the years of World War I, and did not take account of possible changes in conditions of armed warfare in the very near future. The bulk of the submarines being built had a short cruising range and short endurance. It was intended to build small numbers of submarines capable of operating on the ocean.

As is well known, we did not succeed in realizing the naval construction program adopted in 1938, owing to the outbreak of the Great Patriotic War. Therefore, although our Navy had been considerably strengthened with surface ships, submarines, and aircraft, it actually did not prove to be balanced with respect

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to the missions which it had to accomplish. Yet in the course of the war the Navy actually had to accomplish completely new missions which were not foreseen when the decisions were being made for its development. Instead of cooperating with deep offensive operations by the ground forces, the Navy was forced to provide defense from the sea and land for naval bases besieged by the enemy, to evacuate those bases and coastal cities, and to quickly form numerous flotillas in order to conduct defensive operations on the Sea of Azov, and on rivers and lakes deep in our territory. The Baltic and Black sea fleets had to rapidly establish a new base system in areas under enemy attack.

In this situation, the absence of special landing ships, of the necessary number of minesweepers, antisubmarine ships and patrol boats, as well as of transport means, had a particularly acute effect. Moreover, there was an insufficient number of sweeps to combat influence mines and mines with influence exploders.

The absence in the naval inventory of the necessary number of mine-warfare ships led to the fact that, in the period of the Great Patriotic War, 24% of the total losses of our warships in the Black Sea, 49% in the Baltic, and 22% in the North Sea were due to mines. Fifty-two percent of all the destroyers lost by us during the war were sunk by mines. In this connection, one cannot fail to note that losses of combatants of the capitalist states due to mines in World War II were 7.7% of their total losses, *and of destroyers, 10.7%,* i.e., five times less than the losses of our Navy.

The extremely insufficient number of auxiliary and military transport ships produced serious difficulties in providing military shipments; we had to employ combatants and patrol boats for this, diverting them from accomplishing other missions. In the Red Banner Baltic Fleet, for example, in the first months of the war more than 70% of the torpedo boat sorties were made to transport various military cargoes.

Prior to the Great Patriotic War, the air forces of our Navy included a large number of aircraft. However, special naval aircraft were represented only by inshore, reconnaissance seaplanes. We had no antisubmarine aircraft. Initially the MBR-2 seaplane was equipped for antisubmarine defense, and later also the D-3, Pe-2, Il-4, and DOUGLAS wheeled aircraft were also employed. These aircraft had no special submarine search equipment, but were actually armed reconnaissance aircraft. In order to cover combatants and auxiliaries from attack at sea, we had to [[limit ourselves to]] *use* conventional front-line aircraft with a short operating radius, which made the employment of

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surface ships difficult and in a number of cases led to great losses.

In the course of the Great Patriotic War our combatants and auxiliaries operated with a severe and constant lack of air cover. For this reason, their losses from enemy aircraft action amounted to 47% of the total number of combatants and auxiliaries lost in the Black Sea Fleet, 26% in the Red Banner Baltic Fleet, and 48% in the Northern Fleet.

The change in the nature of balancing our Navy in the course of the Great Patriotic War was frequently a result of the entry of ships into the naval inventory through mobilization from the People's Commissariats of Internal Affairs, from the Merchant Marine and the river fleet, from the construction of new combatants and aircraft in domestic yards, and also from the receipt of a certain number of ships from the Allies.

More than 1,600 different ships and boats were mobilized from civilian organizations. Weapons were installed on many of these and a number of them were converted. However, all of them had poor performance characteristics and could carry out only secondary combat missions or perform the functions of auxiliary ships. Therefore, the receipt of such combatants, boats and ships did not make any essential changes in the nature of the balancing of naval forces.

Prior to the outbreak of the Great Patriotic War the shipbuilding industry of the USSR built warships of all types. The basic trend in its work was the construction of large and medium surface ships and also submarines. The organization of production, technology, and the nature of the industrial collaboration were subordinated to that end.

With the outbreak of war, the trend in naval construction was sharply altered. By the decisions of the State Committee for Defense, adopted in July 1941, construction of major ships requiring large expenditures of labor, long periods of time and materials, equipment, and weapons which were in short supply, was suspended. Emphasis was placed on the delivery of light surface combatants and the building of various combat patrol boats.

As a result of the evacuation of the southern shipyards (about 30% of the gross output) and the expansion of construction of tanks in several of the major shipbuilding yards, naval construction was substantially curtailed. The productive capacity of the shipbuilding industry and the number of workers engaged in it was reduced by 50%. Therefore, the domestic

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shipbuilding industry was unable to fulfill the needs of the Navy for ships under the unusually difficult conditions which it faced. To a certain degree this need was satisfied by ships received through lend-lease (22 minesweepers, 108 submarine chasers, 86 torpedo boats, and several frigates). However, these measures had no practical effect on the balancing of our Navy, and by the end of the war it was only partially balanced.

Questions of Balancing the Soviet Navy in the Postwar Period. In the first postwar decade the main missions determining the construction and development of the Navy remained as before, cooperation with ground forces when they are conducting operations in the coastal sectors, and interdicting nearby sea communications routes of the enemy. In order to accomplish these missions, the Navy was supposed to have a considerable number of surface ships of various types, submarines, a strong naval arm, naval infantry, and coastal artillery. However, the severe wounds inflicted on our country by the war did not permit the immediate building of such a Navy after Fascist Germany's capitulation. For a long time it continued to be unbalanced with respect to its missions.

The naval inventory did not have the necessary number of oceangoing submarines, of antisubmarine and mine-warfare ships. The Navy had no landing ships. The naval aircraft had a short operating radius, and there were no antisubmarine aircraft. Fighters were able to cover ships at sea only in a narrow area adjacent to the shore, and shipboard antiaircraft armament remained weak. The auxiliary fleet consisted primarily of slow harbor craft.

Therefore, the Navy continued to be a coastal Navy, and, consequently, on the operational-strategic plane it was a defensive factor in a war against a strong naval adversary.

Only in the second postwar decade was it possible to clearly define the basic requirements for balancing the Navy, i.e., after industry had recovered and with the onset of the technical revolution in military affairs.

The technical revolution in military affairs, the growing economic capabilities and outstanding achievements of domestic science and technology, the introduction into the Navy of nuclear-missile weapons, nuclear propulsion, and electronic systems, permitted the Central Committee of the CPSU and the Soviet government to define the course for the construction of a nuclear-missile oceangoing Navy fully meeting the requirements of Soviet military doctrine. A qualitatively new Navy, capable of carrying out missions of a strategic nature and of

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waging a successful struggle against a strong naval adversary, was built in the shortest possible time.

On the basis of profound scientific studies of the combat capabilities of the new naval forces and hardware, an analysis of the postwar development of the naval forces of the leading imperialist states, and of the experience in operational training of our own and foreign navies, [[all the trends in naval science were determined,]] operational-tactical requirements for the new naval forces were developed, and a harmonious theory of the art of naval warfare which revealed paths for planning the development of these forces and their employment in warfare was created. These operational-tactical requirements were based on the thesis that a modern navy, in view of the broad range of missions confronting it, must have diverse special-purpose forces in its inventory. In this connection, the optimal numerical relationship between the submarines, surface ships, aviation units, naval infantry, coastal missile-artillery troops, as well as auxiliary ships and other support units must permit forces and tactical groups which are established to defeat enemy opposition and successfully carry out the missions with which the Navy is charged independently or in concert with forces of other branches of the Armed Forces.

Scientific research has confirmed that only a balanced navy can meet such requirements, and we already have the foundation for one.

As note above, a modern navy is a very complex and multifaceted organization. The inventory of a modern navy has diverse combat forces, which include various types of surface combatants, naval aircraft, coastal missile-artillery troops with naval infantry, and various support units in addition to the submarines which are the main striking force. The quantitative composition of these forces and their combat capabilities are determined by the need to establish groupings to accomplish any mission which arises even in the case of the most unfavorable combination of these missions, i.e., in those instances when these missions have to be accomplished not in sequence, but simultaneously.

In the current stage, the operating conditions of the Navy have changed, and the service forces for the supply and repair of ships have begun to operate in a new capacity. In order to accomplish these missions, a balanced Navy must have floating service forces based on oceangoing supply ships, repair ships, and tenders. The quantitative composition of these forces and their equipment must ensure the employment of the oceangoing forces at a high operating intensity which will meet the situation emerging in the ocean and sea theaters.

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Having briefly examined the basic problems of employing the seapower of the state, and above all, of employing navies in war and in peace, we can draw the following conclusions.

1. One of the basic qualities of modern naval forces is their versatility, [[this is]] expressed in the ability of these forces to accomplish multifaceted missions.

The development of naval material has not simply increased the effectiveness of naval operations and has not only expanded their sphere of possible employment, but has also had a direct effect on those missions assigned to the navy.

For example, at a certain stage in the development of navies, the prevalent type of operation related to battling the enemy's fleet, in the course of which missions were accomplished which involved gaining control of the sea, which was particularly necessary in the era of the sailing fleets.

Today, naval operations against the shore have assumed a dominant role. Whereas naval operations against the shore were previously brought to bear through the accomplishment of missions in warfare against the enemy's fleet, under present-day conditions operations directly against the shore are a factor determining the development of navies and of their art of naval warfare.

In examining the change in missions being prosecuted by navies from an historical point of view, we cannot fail to note that the "oldest" of them, which retains its importance even under present-day conditions, is the battle on the sea lines of communication and amphibious landings.

2. Local wars, which have been waged by the imperialist states practically without interruption since the end of the Second World War, are a specific variety of military operation under present-day conditions. Experience in these wars shows that the Navy plays a major role in them and can be utilized (within the framework of the employment of conventional weapons) in the prosecution of any possible mission known to the modern art of naval warfare and military doctrine.

Naval operations in local wars gravitate toward the accomplishment of missions in the "fleet-against-shore" area. Existing experience in employing navies in local wars is [[characterized]] *distinguished* by a well-known unilateralism resulting from the nature of these wars, which are as a rule conducted by major imperialist powers against small countries which are free or have just been freed from the yoke of colonialism. Nevertheless, a study of this experience makes it

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possible to see changes in the means and methods of employing large navies in the evolutionary development of individual functional areas of the art of naval warfare. [[In general, experience in employing naval forces in local wars is having a definite influence on the development of navies and the art of naval warfare with the employment of nuclear weapons or in a contest between equal naval forces.]]

3. The navy, as a branch of the armed forces and the most important component of seapower, possessing specific characteristics, has often emerged as one of the [[most important]] instruments of state policy under various historical conditions. The imperialist states actively utilize this special property of a navy in relations with weak states. Attempts have been made to employ this form of seapower even against the Soviet Union, although they have been fruitless.

In the policy of our Party and our state, the Soviet Navy is emerging as a factor for stabilizing the situation in various areas of the world, contributing to the strengthening of peace and friendship between peoples and acting as a deterrent to the aggressive aspirations of the imperialist states.

4. The multifaceted activity of the Navy in war and in peace and the broad range of missions accomplished by it, each of which demands the participation of various forces and equipment, have generated the need to balance naval forces with respect to various criteria and characteristics. An analysis of the combat experience of navies in past wars shows that lack of balance in their forces is manifested not only in the limitations on their capability to carry out that mission for which the given forces were established, but also to accomplish a series of related, attendant missions. [[For example, the absence of minesweepers had an effect not only on the containment of enemy mining operations, but also on the conduct of the battle against surface ships and submarines on the high seas and on the execution of all missions by the Navy in coastal areas.]] In this connection, balanced naval forces can be regarded as a certain specific form of actual material capabilities.

In light of this thesis, in general, a stronger (in total displacement and number), but less balanced, fleet can be inferior in overall operational capabilities to a numerically smaller, but correctly balanced, fleet[[, because in employing this fleet a favorable effect will result from the cooperation of its mixed forces which is brought about not simply by the aggregate of the capabilities of groupings of forces, but by the generation of a new quality, representing a higher degree of unity of offensive and defensive capabilities]]. The problem of

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the complete balancing of a navy depends to a decisive degree on that complex process known as the scientific management of building it. [[The solution of the problem of balancing a navy requires great material expenditures, because actually this amounts to building a navy which meets the needs of a given state.]]

[[On the whole, we can consider it indisputable that the victories of a navy and the art of employing its forces in the war for which it is established depend to a considerable degree on the correct resolution of the problem of balancing it.]]

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1. *Mahan, A. T. Vliyaniye morskoy sily na istoriyu (The Influence of Seapower on History). Moscow-Leningrad, Voyenmorizdat, 1940, p. 25.*

2. *As a result of this so-called Spanish-American War, the USA acquired Cuba and the islands of Puerto Rico, Guam, and the Philippines. The populations of Cuba and the Philippines, which fought to free themselves from the Spanish yoke, not only did not receive the promised freedom, but turned out to be in an even more serious position, having fallen under the power of the new colonialists.*

3. *Lenin. V. I. Polnoye sobraniye sochineniy (Complete Collected Works), Vol. 9, p. 155.*

4. *Klado, N. Morskaya sila (Sea Power). St. Petersburg, 1907, p. 21.*

5. *Ibid., p. 22.*

6. The Americans lost 18 major combatants, including four battleships which were destroyed, and four battleships which were put out of action for a long time.

7. Citation from the book: Zherve, B. B. Morskaya Strategiya Napoleona (Napoleon's Naval Strategy). Petrograd, 1922, p. 34.

8. Among the strategic landings of the Second World War we may cite: the landing of the Fascist German troops in Norway in 1940; by Japanese troops in the Philippine Islands in 1941 and 1942; by the Anglo-American troops in North Africa in 1942, in Italy in 1943, and in Normandy in 1944; and by the American troops in the Philippines in 1944.

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9. Engels, F. Izbrannyye Voyennyye Proizvedeniya (Selected Military Works). Voyenizdat, Moscow, 1956, pp. 666-667.

10. Frunze, M. V. Izbrannyye Proizvedeniya (Selected Works), Vol. II, [[Voyenizdat, Moscow, 1957]] p. 12.

[[6. Lenin, V. I. Polnoye sobraniye sochineniy (Complete Collected Works), Vol. 9, p. 154.]]

11. Cf: Matsulenko, V. Lokal'nyye Voyny Imperializma (1946-1968). VOYENNO-ISTORICHESKIY ZHURNAL, No. 9, 1968, p. 39.

12. LA REVUE MARITIME, No. 1, 1959.

13. See: Cagle, M. and Manson, F. Morskaya Voyna v Koree (The Naval War in Korea), Moscow, Voyenizdat, 1962.

14. Citation from the book: Solontsov, Z. M. Diplomaticheskaya Bor'ba SShA Za Gospodstvo Na More (The US Diplomatic Campaign for Control of the Sea). IMO Publishing House, Moscow, 1962, p. 385.

15. Yearbook of World Affairs, Washington, 1958, p. 5.

16. Citation from the book: Voyennaya Strategiya (Military Strategy). Moscow, Voyenizdat, 1963, p. 79.

17. Ibid.

18. PRAVDA, 11 June, 1969.

19. Engels, F. Izbrannyye Voyennyye Proizvedeniya (Selected Military Works). pp. 17-18.

[[* Istoriya Voyenno-Morskogo Iskusstva (The History of the Art of Naval Warfare), p. 333.]]

20. Cf: Yeremeyev, L. M. and A. P. Shergin. Podvodnyye Lodki Inostrannykh Flotov Vo Vtoroy Mirovoy Voyne (Submarines of Foreign Navies in the Second World War), p. 67.

21. *Cf:* Yeremeyev and Shergin, p. 11.

22. *Cf:* Yeremeyev and Shergin, p. 27.

23. *Cf:* Yeremeyev and Shergin.

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24. Fuller, G. Vtoraya Mirovaya Voyna 1939-1945 gg. (The Second World War 1939-1945). Foreign Literature Publishing House, Moscow, 1956, p. 179.

25. *Cf:* Belli, V. A. et al., Blokada i Kontrablokada (Blockade and Counterblockade), p. 706.

26. *Cf:* Morskoy Atlas (Naval Atlas), Vol. III, Part II, sheet 48.

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CONCLUSION

Among the many factors characterizing the economic and military might of [[our]] *a* country, an ever [[greater]] *more increasing* role is being played by [[its]] sea power, which expresses the real capability of the state to effectively utilize the World Ocean in the interest of building Communism. The higher the level of economic development of our country becomes, the greater the importance of the World Ocean is to us as an inexhaustible source of energy, raw materials, and food, and as a sphere for further developing our political, economic, scientific-technical, and military ties with countries and peoples [[of all the continents]] on Earth.

Scientific-technical progress is bringing about the need to develop all components of seapower in an integral relationship, and is revealing new opportunities for employing them in various sectors of the national economy. From the point of view of economics and international relations, the transport and fishing fleets are coming to the forefront, ensuring the exploitation of the resources of the World Ocean and the further expansion of economic, scientific, and cultural ties with peoples of many countries of the world.

At the same time, the study of the World Ocean is assuming ever greater importance as an important factor affecting the status of the sea power of the state and the discovery of new resources of the Earth's hydrosphere [[to satisfy the rapidly growing needs of our country for energy and fuel, minerals, and food]].

But a special role belongs to the military side of the sea power of the country, which characterizes the real capabilities of the Soviet Navy to maintain the inviolability of the sea frontiers of the Motherland and to protect her state interests at sea.

The important position held by the Navy among the other components of the sea power of our state under present-day conditions is determined by the attempts of imperialist powers to turn the course of world development to their own advantage with the aid of armed forces in general, and with navies in particular. Wars of aggression are alien to the Soviet Union.

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Yet the socialist gains of the Soviet people will be decisively protected using all our country's power, including the sea power represented by the Navy component.

The building in our country of an oceangoing nuclear-missile Navy has brought about profound changes in the views of its role within the system of Armed Forces of our country and of the methods of employing it. In this connection, the acute need has arisen to draw general inferences from historical experience in naval warfare in that area relating to present-day problems of building and employing the Navy. The author set this goal for himself, but at the same time believes that the present work is far from an exhaustive attempt to produce this kind of generalization.

In the course of studying the path of development of navies, and of the forms and methods of employing them in wars and in peacetime, consideration was constantly given to the fact that they have always been an integral part of a single whole -- the Armed Forces of the state -- and also to the fact that the interrelationship between all branches of the Armed Forces and their penetration into each other's sphere of operations are constantly being intensified. However, the relative importance of each branch of the Armed Forces has varied, depending on the composition of the enemy coalition, the political goals of the war, and the weaponry and its combat characteristics.

[[In many wars, particularly those in which the principal adversaries were separated by seas, navies have had the decisive role in gaining the victory. This was basically characteristic of the wars of the pre-imperialist stage of development of capitalism and of the initial wars of the epoch of imperialism, including the Russo-Japanese War.]]

[[Despite the increase in the scale of military operations at sea, navies became relatively less significant in the course of the First World War. We might also note the similar situation in the Second World War, despite the further increasing scale of naval warfare. As is well known, the struggle on the Soviet-German land front played the decisive role in the course of that war.]]

Scientific-technical progress in the military domain has introduced new criteria for defining the real combat strength of each branch of the Armed Forces, the main criterion being the capability to more rationally utilize such decisive military material as nuclear-missile weapons. Therefore, forces possessing strategic, nuclear-missile weapons with an intercontinental range have come to the forefront.

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[[Scientific-technical progress has introduced]] Submarines [[as]] *have become* the more advanced platform for modern weaponry: They have practically the entire World Ocean for launching sites. The Navy has amassed numerous mobile strategic weapons platforms. Each of [[which]] *them* can carry a very large number of long-range missiles and is capable of deploying its launch positions over an area many times greater than the area which land-based missile troops could utilize. Seaborne strategic weapons platforms also lend themselves to deployment in depth, seeking shelter in the water and utilizing it not only for cover, but also for concealment, which to a great degree improves the viability of seaborne strategic weapons systems. Thus, the objective conditions of armed combat in a nuclear war are thrusting forward the nuclear-missile fleet, which rationally combines the /latest/ achievements in science and technology, enormous striking power and mobility, viability of the strategic systems, and a high degree of readiness to employ them immediately, as the nuclear-missile strike forces.

In the [[course]] *era* of [[the]] scientific-technical revolution, naval forces have been assuming significance as one of the most important strategic factors capable of having a [[very]] great, and at times decisive, influence on the outcome of the war through direct action against enemy troop concentrations and vitally important targets in his territory.

[[The effect of naval warfare on the course of the war as a whole will be manifested primarily by the degree to which the Navy's capability to destroy land targets and to undermine the strategic nuclear potential of the enemy at sea is realized.]]

The growing importance of navies in armed combat has been reflected in the military doctrines of the imperialist states, with the main ones being oriented toward an oceanic strategy. The strategy reflects not only the military, but also the fundamental economic and political interests of the leading powers of the capitalist world at sea. Thus, an analysis of the current alignment of forces in the international arena and the frenzied development of navies in the postwar period provides the basis for the assertion that the importance of naval warfare has grown and will increase in the future.

There is no doubt that, when the main political poles of the world are separated by oceans, the success of political measures and the accomplishment of strategic missions will in the future also depend to a considerable degree on the power of the Navy and its real contribution to armed warfare.

The postwar period is the most important period in the history of the development of navies and in the art of employing them.

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The most significant and profound qualitative changes in the material base of naval warfare and also in the operational art and tactics of the Navy have occurred precisely in this period.

The characteristic feature of the postwar period is the general recognition of the growing role of naval warfare and also, consequently, of the oceanic sectors and theaters of military operations in modern warfare. This is confirmed by the fact that today, in contrast to the Great Patriotic War, we are opposed by a coalition of seapowers having at their disposal powerful modern fleets capable of prosecuting strategic missions in a war. The imperialists are converting the World Ocean into a vast base of launching sites for ballistic-missile submarines and carrier-borne aircraft aimed at the Soviet Union and the countries of the Socialist Community. In their opinion, these bases are less dangerous for their countries than land bases. And our Navy must be capable of countering this real threat.

Yet the military aspects examined by us [[are]] not [[the]] only [[aspects which]] exert an effect on the role of navies. Navies, while remaining [[a highly]] *an* effective and indispensable means of armed combat, also are constantly being utilized as an instrument of state policy in peacetime. The sea is a no-man's land, and therefore navies do not encounter in their activities many of the limitations which prevent utilization of other branches of the armed forces in peacetime for political purposes.

[[In this regard, navies have assumed particular importance under present-day conditions in connection with the growth of their striking power. The mobility of the fleet and its flexibility in the event limited military conflicts are brewing permit it to have an influence on coastal countries, to employ and extend a military threat to any level, beginning with a show of military strength and ending with the disembarkation of a landing force.]]

[[The activity of the American Sixth Fleet in the Mediterranean Sea can serve as confirmation of this. It has exerted pressure on elections in Italy and Greece, openly acted as the vanguard of a group of the aggressors in 1956, landed Marines in Lebanon, and has repeatedly been used for various military demonstrations.]]

[[However, even this does not exhaust the reasons why a greater role is being assigned to the navies.]] At the present time, a new stage in the contest for the division and exploitation of the oceans themselves for economic and military purposes

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s being observed. The World Ocean is becoming the target of the extraordinary expansion of the imperialist states. It is clear that navies, as an instrument of policy, will occupy an important place in the struggle.

The interest in the exploitation of the World Ocean is explained by its truly inexhaustible resources. All of these resources can be more fully utilized in the interest of mankind only if the seas, oceans, and the seabed remain a sphere of peaceful cooperation[[, if they are not seized and transformed by the imperialists into bases for the deployment of new forms of weaponry. And many facts attest to the far-reaching plans of the extremists of various persuasions with regard to seizing and appropriating whole areas of the World Ocean]].

It is clear that our seapower can withstand the new expansionist aspirations of the imperialists on the oceans, which are directed against the Socialist countries, and that it is capable of having a sobering effect on them.

Our Navy is an integral part of the Armed Forces of the country which are guarding the security of [[our]] *the* Motherland. The Party, government, and the entire Soviet people are devoting a great deal of attention to its development. [[The direction of the development of our Navy was determined by the CPSU Central Committee. As early as the mid-1950's, the establishment first and foremost of powerful submarine forces and naval aviation, the equipping of the Navy with nuclear-missile weaponry, and the employment of nuclear power in submarine construction were envisioned. A definite role also was assigned to construction of surface ships, without which the accomplishment of a series of tasks levied on the Navy is impossible. In this connection, the need for balanced naval forces was considered.]]

The building of a modern Navy became possible thanks to the powerful military-economic potential of our country, the major achievements of Soviet science and technology, and also the introduction of scientific methods in the process of managing the construction of the Navy. The building of [[our]] *the Soviet* oceangoing nuclear-missile Navy, capable of prosecuting strategic missions on the oceans, has been the outstanding event which has shattered the illusions of the imperialist aggressors that they had no strong opponent in the sphere of naval warfare. We may include [[the building of the Soviet blue-water Navy]] *this event* in a series of most important events of the recent past which have had decisive influence on world policy, including such events as the development of nuclear weaponry, which meant the end of the American imperialist monopoly on the most important means for armed combat, and the development of intercontinental

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ballistic missiles, which ended the inaccessibility of the American Continent.

The Soviet Navy is not only a means for defending our Motherland, but is also one of the factors deterring war. It serves as an important instrument of policy in peacetime, protecting the interests of [[our country]] *the Soviet Union* and supporting friendly countries. It must be noted that the methods of solving many technical problems in the building of the ships and naval weaponry of our Navy are of a clearly expressed specific nature. The ships of the Soviet Navy and their weaponry comprise a new, original trend in the development of the navies of the world.

In the quest for ways of developing our Navy, we avoided simply copying the fleet of the most powerful seapower of the world. The composition of the Navy, its weapons, ship designs and organization of forces were determined primarily by the missions which the political leadership of the country assigned to the Armed Forces, and consequently also to the Navy, by the country's economic resources, and also by the conditions under which the Navy had to accomplish these missions.

The revolution in military affairs has led to considerable advances in all areas of military theory and practice. It has also brought about changes in the organization of the Navy, invaded the domain [[of naval theory, and affected the content]] of the art of naval warfare from tactics to the strategic employment of the Navy. This has given rise to the development of a modern art of naval warfare, which is characterized by new functional areas and a unique interpretation of earlier concepts and principles. However, at a certain stage this art coexisted with elements of the "old" art. Examples of this are the operational art and tactics of the Navy which [[held sway]] *existed* at the outset of the process of introducing nuclear weaponry and missiles into the fleet. At that time the traditional tactics of surface strike forces, based on the combat employment of ship guns and conventional torpedoes, had to be modified to utilize the platforms of the fundamentally new weaponry which possessed considerably greater combat capabilites. The operational art had to develop rational methods of planning and conducting operations under conditions where nuclear-missile weaponry is employed alongside conventional weaponry. This determined the special characteristics of the combat disposition and operational organization of forces and ensured maximum effectiveness in the employment of mixed strike groups or echelons of forces.

At the present time, the general trend in naval construction is toward the building of a [[well-rounded, well-developed

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fleet, i.e., a]] balanced fleet. [[Our]] *The Soviet* Navy has a theory on the employment of forces under present-day conditions and a system of [[training cadres]] *organizational development of a material base of naval warfare*. Backed by this firm foundation and the experience already gained, our country will in the future continue to establish the [[conditions and]] prerequisites for further strengthening our sea power.

The development of military material has made ever greater demands on the discipline and morale of personnel. Only armed forces composed of fighting men infinitely devoted to the Party and to the Soviet people, who are disciplined, who possess a high level of general and special training, and who have physical toughness and stamina, can gain the victory in modern warfare. Even stricter demands are being placed on naval personnel, especially the commanding officers of ships. Therefore, together with the growth of the Navy's material base and the development of the art of naval warfare, it is essential to objectively develop new methods and forms of training and education, making it possible to form real masters of their trade, skillful mariners, and specialists in military affairs.

In the course of the struggle to build a Communist society, our Motherland has had to undergo many difficult tests. Since the day of the birth of the Soviet state, the imperialists have never ceased to nurture plans for its military destruction. They have already attempted more than once to destroy it through military force.

During the years of the Civil War, the ground forces of the interventionists and the domestic counterrevolutionaries were the main force on which imperialism relied. The fleets of the imperialist powers played only an auxiliary role in this struggle. They did not succeed in suppressing our Revolution. Forged in the fires of war, the Red Army, with the support of the Navy, routed the enemy forces, drove them beyond the borders of [[our]] *the Soviet* state, and consolidated the gains of the October Revolution. But imperialism did not change its aggressive nature. It fostered Fascism -- its most frightful handiwork -- and in 1941 moved this force against our Motherland. A battle unprecedented in its scale and savagery developed between the strike forces of imperialism and the first Socialist power. And once again the imperialists thrust forward the land armies of Hitler's Germany as the main force in this struggle. The navies once more continued to play a role which, while important, was still a secondary role. The brilliant ground forces of the Soviet Army, with all possible support from the other branches of the Armed Forces, defeated the most powerful reactionary armed force in the history of mankind. The Soviet Army showed itself to be an unbeatable force in this struggle.

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Yet after the victory of the forces of Socialism and progress in the Second World War, imperialism did not lay down its arms. It continued to nurture plans for the military defeat of the countries of the Socialist Community. The imperialists not only did not abandon their hopes of revising the results of the historical battles of the 20th century and of establishing world supremacy, but intensified their aggressiveness even more in all areas, i.e., in the economic, political, ideological, and military spheres. The face of modern imperialism is shown above all in the militarization of the economy, the establishment of the military-industrial complex, and in the frenzied arms race. The main purpose of its armed forces is to prepare for war against the Soviet Union and other Socialist countries and to suppress national freedom movements.

In contrast to the past when the main armed forces of imperialism were the land armies, under present-day conditions naval forces have been assigned one of the main roles in the arms struggle against the Socialist countries. However, taking into account the experience of history, which has proven the complete bankruptcy of military doctrines oriented toward the employment of one branch of armed forces or one type of weapon, the imperialists *also* are providing for the development of land, air, and [[also]] missile troops[[, while at the same time placing the main emphasis on naval forces]].

One of the reasons for the shift in emphasis to naval forces is the fact that today the aggressive forces of imperialism are represented by a bloc of sea powers having at their disposal powerful naval forces [[backed by]] *having* numerous bases and occupying favorable strategic positions. Moreover, the introduction of the achievements of [[the]] scientific-technical [[revolution]] *progress* has fundamentally changed the missions of navies. Attacks from seaward against objectives in enemy territory have become their basic /mission/. They have become capable of directly affecting the course of the armed struggle quickly and decisively in practically all theaters of military operations. Naval forces are gradually becoming the main carrier of nuclear weaponry which is capable of hitting the enemy on all continents and seas. In this connection, the imperialists are giving ever greater preference to an oceanic strategy and warfare from the sea against the shore. The historical experience of unsuccessful campaigns against the USSR by the most powerful land armies of imperialism has also played an important role in the shift in emphasis to naval forces.

As a result of the consistent implementation of the Program of Peace adopted at the 24th CPSU Congress *and continued and developed in a closely related manner in documents of the 25th*

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Party Congress, the process of relaxation of international tensions continues, the most important stages of which were the successful completion of the Helsinki Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe and also the [[series of recent fruitful meetings between the leaders of the Soviet Union and a number of leading capitalist states]] *signing of the second Treaty between the USSR and United States on a Limitation of Strategic Offensive Arms (SALT-II) in June of 1979 by CPSU Central Committee General Secretary, Chairman of the Presidium of the USSR Supreme Soviet, Comrade Leonid Il'ich Brezhnev, and US President J. Carter, which marked a concrete step on the path to normalizing the entire international political climate.*

Fundamental changes in the alignment of economic and military forces to Socialism's advantage preceded the current achievements on the path to peace. This became possible thanks to the wise leadership of the Communist Party, [[decades of]] selfless labor by the Soviet people, mass heroism of the Soviet fighting men during the years of the severe military tests, and the enormous worker and political enthusiasm with which the entire country is continuing to carry out the grand plans outlined by the Party. However, the forces of imperialist reaction and aggression, who have not given up their attempts to undermine the process of strengthening peace and normalizing the international situation, still [[exist and]] are actively operating on our planet. These forces have not been neutralized, and the danger of war has still not been eliminated. The Party teaches that as long as imperialism, whose aggressive nature has not been altered [[remains]] *exists*, the real danger of an outbreak of a new world war continues to exist. In the leading capitalist states, preparation of the material base for warfare has not eased, military budgets are growing, and new armament systems, above all the latest nuclear-missile submarine system, are [[actively]] being developed.

All of this determines the [[need and]] appropriateness of the efforts which are being undertaken in our country to develop a Navy -- the basic component of the sea power of the state -- capable of opposing the oceanic strategy of imperialism. The sea power of [[our country]] *the USSR* is intended to ensure favorable conditions for the building of Communism, the intensive growth of the economic strength of the country, and the tireless strengthening of its defense capability. [[Therefore, unwavering attention is being devoted to the development of the components of sea power which are to an ever greater degree being backed by the achievements of scientific-technical progress.]]

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